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Abstract
Many coastal land titles in New South Wales are already at risk from shoreline recession and
more will become affected, as local impacts of global climate change, specifically higher sea
levels and more extreme weather events, produce more erosion and inundation of coastal lands.
This thesis explores the claimed private property ‘right’ to defend against the sea to protect
private land from coastal erosion, and the risks this poses to the public rights to use the
foreshore and coastal waters for bathing, surfing or navigation, in the foreseeable future, as
coastal lands experience ‘coastal squeeze’, due to rising sea levels and fixed seawalls. This term
from biological and tourism contexts, is applied to these public rights and likely impacts on
future social, economic and ecological uses of coastal lands as they are squeezed, are discussed
and illustrated using original diagrams. The problem is thus defined: claimed private property
rights conflict with existing public rights, competing for priority use of the foreshore. As a step
towards ascertaining whose rights would prevail in future conflicts, the thesis examines these
competing rights and investigates which rights are dominant in current law. Guidance is sought
from the courts and NSW legislature as arbiters of similar prior conflicts. Senior appeal court
decisions and statutory provisions in five fields of law applicable to coastal lands in this
jurisdiction are reviewed, and their relative status under current law is established. However it is
posited that a future government could adopt a policy to reverse the status quo, but to do so
would need to obtain the legislature’s support for enabling legislation. Hence to estimate
possible future events a diverse range of potential responses by a future government to
emerging conflicts over competing rights, are identified. A suite of philosophical views which
may influence future government policy on whose rights should prevail, are canvassed. Criteria,
on ethical land management and successful public policy, drawn from relevant literature, are
used to assess the merits of these potential responses. Using these assessments and three
political criteria, the responses most likely to be pursued are identified. With a credible forecast
of the likely policy environment of the future, the question, ‘will private property rights trump
public rights to use coastal lands under climate change conditions?’ is answered in the negative.
[=379 words]
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Preface
The origins of this thesis lie in the early 1990s when I attended a field trip to Byron Bay, as a
non-government member of the Coastal Committee advising the NSW Minister for Planning.
As part of a tour of sites of concern, council staff invited us to walk along Belongil Beach, to
see rusting wrecked car bodies strewn along the toe of the dune, by adjoining landowners, in a
desperate attempt to control erosion of the beach. As we walked the white water rushed up,
narrowing the area between the wave and the wrecks where we could keep our shoes dry, interrupting our musings on whether the car bodies were a good idea, and should remain in place.
When the committee reconvened we agreed to advise Council that the wrecks were dangerous to
beach-using residents and tourists and should be removed by whomever had placed them there.
However with the first IPCC report recently published,1 and more coastal erosion forecast, the
discussion ranged widely, beyond the local example, and a suite of questions were raised by
members, around which there were no clear or obvious answers.
• What ‘rights’ if any do landowners have to defend their land from coastal erosion?
• Do boundaries ‘fixed’ by original survey persist below tidal waters?
• If land is lost to the sea, is compensation payable to the owner, as in the US? By whom?
• Do State governments or local councils have a ‘duty’ to defend land against the sea?
• Are governments or councils legally liable if they do not defend land against the sea?
• What means of defending land from coastal erosion would be effective and appropriate?
At the next committee meeting it was reported that the car bodies had been removed, but
answers to the questions raised in our discussion were never reported, and events moved on.
However uncertainty about the answers to these questions persisted, despite ‘coastal’ enquiries.2
This led to the federal Minister being advised in 2011 that ‘the effect of rising sea levels on real
property and local government liability’ were climate change impact research priorities.3

I responded to that advice by deciding to prepare this thesis: to answer those decades-old
questions about the legal effects of climate change impacts on coastal land in New South Wales.

1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment.
Report prepared for IPCC by Working Group 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
2 See Resource Assessment Commission (RAC) Coastal Zone Inquiry – Final Report, (AGPS, 1993), the
reviews of beach management in NSW reported in Coastal Council NSW, Annual Report 1998-99, 789; the report of Standing Committee on Climate Change, Water, Environment and the Arts, House of
Representatives, Managing our coastal zone in a changing climate (Commonwealth Parliament, 2009).
3 Commonwealth Coasts and Climate Change Council, Report to Minister Combet (2011), s3.IV
Liability.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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“If by your art, my dearest father, you have
Put the wild waters in this roar, allay them.
The sky, it seems, would pour down stinking pitch
But that the sea, mounting to the welkin’s cheek4,
Dashes out the fire...”
Miranda, daughter of Prospero.
William Shakespeare, The Tempest (1623) Act I, Scene ii,

Chapter I - Conflict over competing rights
Introduction to the thesis
At the core of this thesis is my recognition that the claimed private property right to defend
against the sea, conflicts with – and poses a direct threat to - public rights of access to the
foreshore and coastal waters, due to ‘coastal squeeze’, a phenomenon explained below. My aim
in this dissertation is to apply my understanding of the natural processes at work on coastal
lands and factor in the effects of global climate change, to anticipate local future conditions for
coastal management. Further, I want to explore the merits of the competing private and public
‘rights’, consider the utility of prior approaches to resolving future conflicts, and to develop
possible government policy responses to manage these impacts and these conflicts.
In the first chapter I introduce my primary research question, ground my enquiry into ‘property’
in the jurisdiction of New South Wales, and explain key terms and phrases employed. I illustrate
the problem of competing rights, outline the issues involved, and identify crucial contextual
elements, before describing the approach and methods used in seeking to answer this question.

In Chapter II I canvass the literature on property, real property and private property rights, and
consider other views on the nature and extent of public property and public rights. This allows
me to identify where the ambit of private property rights claimed by coastal landowners intersects, and potentially conflicts, with public rights to access the foreshore and coastal waters.

Seeking guidance on how my central research question might be answered, I turn to earlier
decisions of society’s arbiters of conflicts, and note the relative weight attributed to competing
private and public rights by the courts in Chapter III and the NSW legislature in Chapter IV.

Further, in Chapter V, I consider other current philosophical approaches relevant to the topic
which might influence or determine how this question is answered in the future. Then, from the
literature reviewed, I derive criteria for assessing possible responses.
4

welkin: Archaic: the sky; vault of heaven. Delbridge et al (eds) above n 4, 1982.
______________________________________________________________________
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Recognising that a future NSW government policy would be central to any answer to the
primary research question, in Chapter VI a range of positions as potential government responses
to increasing conflict between competing rights are considered. In Chapter VI a suite of policy
initiatives which might address, resolve or avoid entirely, future conflicts are explored.

Using criteria drawn from the literature I evaluate the merits of these potential responses in
Chapter VII. With the results of this analysis I consider factors influencing their ‘likelihood’ in
Chapter VIII and generate an informed answer to the primary research question.

Part A – The problem of conflicting rights
1. Introduction to Chapter One
In Part A of this chapter I introduce my topic, identify the problem being addressed – conflict
over competing rights - and outline how I came to adopt this as the focus of my research. I
explain the key terms which constitute the primary research question, outline the nature and
scope of claimed private property rights, and public rights of access to the foreshore and coastal
waters. I explain my use of ‘trump’ and how adopting this term informed my research method.
I also clarify what likely changes to future global climate conditions are pertinent to my topic,
and canvass the extent of their possible impacts on coastal environments and settlements in New
South Wales. And, using my original figures I illustrate the process of ‘coastal squeeze’ which,
under certain conditions, constitutes a real threat to the survival of longstanding public rights.

In Part B, I provide a rationale for my research and explain why understanding the effect of
rising sea levels on real property and its boundaries is both important and pressing. I describe
state of the literature as limited, ‘confused’ or silent on key these issues. I report the problem
created by rising sea levels and greater coastal erosion, due to changes in global climate, which
confronts coastal landowners and managers, and the general public. I note that the increasing
rate of sea level rise and caution that adverse impacts of higher, and stormier, seas may be
under-estimated. I then outline why my research is significant and contributes to the ‘storehouse
of knowledge’.

In Part C I outline my objectives for my research and state the research perspectives adopted in
the stages of my enquiry. In Part D, I introduce my methodology and research methods, and
describe the methodology adopted in undertaking my research, in four designated stages.

_____________________________________________________________________________________
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1.1 Introducing the primary research question

The primary research question which forms the topic of my dissertation is: Will private property
rights ‘trump’ public rights to use coastal lands, under climate change conditions?

This question is comprised of a series of phrases which refer to other larger concepts, wherein
these phrases indicate key terms which have specific, and perhaps layered, meanings. Hence, as
preliminary steps in introducing my topic I decode these terms, explain the ambit of their
meaning, and note their relevance to the primary research question, in sections which follow.
However before looking closely at the component parts of the question it is appropriate to make
some general introductory observations on the scope and orientation of the question as a whole.

1.2 Introductory observations

Initially it is apparent that in its formulation, the question recognises that private property rights
and public rights constitute juxtaposed, and hence competing, interests in coastal land, and
suggests that in the future, one party’s rights may be found superior, negating the other’s claims.
Hence its focus is the likely relationship between these conflicting ‘rights’ to use coastal lands
and waters, in the future, under climate conditions affected by anthropogenic global warming.

Vital to understanding my approach to this question are several broad, if obvious, observations.
At face value, this unusual rhetorical question raises uncertainty and invites speculation. In
popular culture such a question might more commonly be found in contemporary sports
commentary: as in ‘Will the Cats defeat the Tigers in the grand final,5 if the rain continues?’
Framed like a sporting contest, the two sets of rights – private property rights and public rights –
are juxtaposed as opposing teams competing for dominance. They might be seen as rivals, or
may be portrayed as evenly matched. But are they? What do we know about their prior form?

Certainly the idea that there is a struggle between opposing camps looming in the near future is
pertinent, and so too is the implication that the weather, or the climate, will create a challenging
context for that struggle. But the parties with competing ‘rights’ to use coastal land are not
contesting annual sporting titles, but the long-term ownership of land titles. So though apt to an
extent, the sports analogy can be taken only so far before it appears contrived. But it raises an
important point: can the future be predicted at the present time with any confidence?

5

The AFL grand final on 24 October 2020 pitted Geelong FC, the Cats, against Richmond FC, the Tigers.
See < https://www.afl.com.au/news/519503/afl-s-grandest-prize-beckons-for-tigers-cats-in-historic-decider >.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Page 3

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Law)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

Chapter I – Conflict over competing rights

© John R Corkill
Student No. 2376398

Hence the question is hypothetical. It seeks an answer now, about the relationship between
private property rights and public rights at some unspecified future time. However, rising sea
levels and conflicts over ‘rights’ to use coastal land, are not hypothetical, but real and imminent.
Nonetheless, this future orientation poses methodological challenges. How can one confidently,
meaningfully, predict the future? I explain my approach to this conundrum below.
Implied in this question is the idea that ‘the public’ have ‘rights’. But who are ‘the public’? And
what ‘rights’ do they have? To answer these and other questions, such as ‘what private property
rights?’ it is necessary to ground the question in a jurisdiction where property and rights exist in
law, as a matter of practice. Based on my location and experience, I have chosen the State of
New South Wales.6 By locating my enquiry in this State, I aim to shift the focus of the primary
research question from ‘theoretical’ rights in a generalized context and refocus on ‘actual’ rights
related to land in this jurisdiction, available under its legal framework. Hence ‘the public’ are
principally New South Wales residents but includes interstate and international visitors to this
State. In this thesis ‘a member of the public’ means, generally speaking, anyone in a public
place in only a personal capacity: not someone performing a commercial or official role.

One further important observation is that the primary research question impliedly accepts the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) conclusion that climate change is real.7
Also accepted are forecasts of the impacts these changes will have on south-eastern Australia.8

This thesis does not aim to contest these scientific conclusions, cited below, but adopts them as
starting points from which to explore their likely future implications, in law and public policy.
2. Understanding key terms and phrases of the question
I next explain the key terms and phrases which constitute the primary research question.
2.1 Nature and scope of claimed private property rights

In this section I provide an overview of private property rights relevant to coastal landowners,
and identify the ‘rights’ claimed by some landowners, which are contested.

Rather than include the geographic limitation of ‘in New South Wales’ in the thesis title as a starting
point, I have preferred to make it clear that a focus on a jurisdiction is methodologically necessary in
order to undertake an informed discussion of current applicable law, and rights available under that law.
7
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science
Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report (Cambridge UP, 2013) ‘AR5
Summary for Policymakers’, 2.
8
See A Barrie Pittock, Climate Change: The Science, Impacts and Solutions (CSIRO, 2nd ed, 2009), 112.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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Private property ‘rights’ are, generally speaking, the social conventions by which owners
control and use for their benefit, objects, ideas and other things.9 In this thesis the ‘private
property’ interest10 under consideration is ‘real property’: land and buildings in coastal New
South Wales. Hence ‘private property rights’ refers to the ‘rights’11 exercisable by the registered
proprietor of the land title, ie by the landowner, over the ‘real property’ they own. Well known
and uncontested private property ‘rights’, and their limits, are discussed in the next chapter.12

However there are also private property rights claimed by some landowners, which if exercised,
would threaten the public’s rights to access the foreshore and coastal waters, in the future.

In particular, these claims are that landowners have private property rights that:
a) allows them to build seawalls or other structures to defend against the sea;
b) obliges the government to ‘protect’ them from the sea, with a duty to build defences;
c) entitles them to be paid compensation for land lost to the sea;
d) are dominant, and paramount considerations “which legislatures cannot ignore”.13

The basis for these claimed rights is scrutinized in Chapter II, since their existence is contested.
Further, whether and how other, uncontested private property rights, operate in the area focused
on by this thesis – the foreshore – is also examined.
2.2 What ‘trump’ means in this thesis

In this dissertation, ‘trump’ means to win by exercising a superior value, or to be dominant. The
notion of ‘trumps’ in card games14 has been translated into a legal context by Dworkin, as a

The term ‘things’ is enormously broad and includes tangible objects, intangible phenomena and abstract
ideas. The scope of the ‘thing’ owned, and the subject of a private property interest, is conceptually
unbounded. See the discussion of this in Chapter II.
10
The term ‘private property’ applies more broadly than to land.
11
Some writers have described the private property interests in a thing as more than simply ‘rights’, and
noted other social relationships arising from ‘ownership’. See section 4 Chapter II.
12
While these rights apply to the private ownership of most things, some additional rights are only
available to land-owners in particular geographic situations. See section 5 Chapter II.
13
The phrase was used in Karen Coleman, ‘Conveyancing and property: Coastal Protection and Climate
Change’ (2010) 84 Australian Law Journal 421. This view is further discussed in section 5 Chapter II.
14
In the card games of Bridge, Euchre and Five Hundred, when one suits is nominated as ‘trumps’ the
Jack of that suit becomes the Right Bower, the second-highest card after the Joker, and the Jack of the
suit of the same colour becomes the Left Bower, the next highest card and nominally a ‘trump’, for that
hand. The lowest card in the suit nominated as trumps overplays any higher cards in another suit, during
the tricks played from that hand. By using a card of the suit nominated as trumps to overplay a higher
card of another suit, a player is said to ‘trump’ the other card and so wins the trick. Hence originally a
noun, it is often used as a verb. See Delbridge, et al (eds), above n 4, 1874.
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metaphor for the superiority of rights or principles over social goals or policies,15 and has been
employed by other writers, to connote a clear and ‘uncontestable’ win over other claims.16

Because this term aptly describes the posture of some private property rights advocates, who
seek to exercise claimed private property rights as paramount considerations in government
decision-making, I considered its use to frame the question was relevant to the claims being
examined. The idea of trumps also suggested a key step in my research, which I describe below.

2.3 Nature and extent of public rights of access

The phrase ‘public rights to use coastal land’ refers to three explicit public rights. The first two,
the rights to navigate and to fish, are rights under English common law from before time
immemorial,17 recognized by New South Wales courts18 and the third is a public right of
pedestrian access to and along the foreshore recognized by modern statute.19

Public rights
The right to access and navigate on tidal waters is an ancient public right available to any
member of the public under English common law,20 recognised by NSW courts.21 Because it is a
public right on tidal waters,22 also known as ‘coastal waters’23 it also applies to the foreshore.24
See Figure 1 below. The public right of navigation includes subsidiary rights to anchor, and to
land a boat on the foreshore.25 Though now regulated, it is posited that it has not been
extinguished,26 and continues today, subject to compliance with the applicable regulations.27
See Ronald Dworkin: Taking Rights Seriously (1978) and Dworkin ‘A Trump over Utility’ (1981) in
MDA Freeman, (ed) Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (Sweet & Maxwell, 8th ed, 2008), 659.
16
Marett Leiboff and Mark Thomas Legal Theories in principle (Thomson Lawbook, 2004), 130-132.
17
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268, 305; 106 ER 1190, 1203 (Bayley J).
18
That English law, including common law rights, came to the colony of New South Wales during
colonisation was recognised by the courts. See Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cases 286, 291 (Lord
Watson). See also Catriona Cook et al, Laying Down the Law, (Lexis, 7th ed, 2009), 35.
19
Section 3 (d) Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW). One object of the Act is ‘to promote pedestrian
access to the coastal region and to recognise the public’s right to access.’
20
See Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268, 294; 106 ER 1190, 1199 (Holroyd J).
21
York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads [1983] 1 NSW LR 391, 393 (Powell J).
22
Tidal waters includes the sea, rivers and creeks influenced by the tide, and all ‘arms of the sea’.
23
‘Coastal waters’ refers to tidal waters within three nautical miles (3 nm) seaward of the base-line of the
low water mark, and is defined under Commonwealth Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1979 (Cth).
24
The foreshore is defined as the land between high water and low water marks, intermittently covered by
water during a natural tidal cycle. See Re Hull and Selby Railway Co (1839) 5 M&W 327, 332; 151 ER
139. See also Mellor v Walmesley [1905] 2 Ch 164, 177 (Romer J) where it is made explicit that in law
‘seashore’ has the same meaning as ‘foreshore’. This area is sometimes referred to as the ‘wet beach’.
25
York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads [1983] 1 NSW LR 391, 393 (Powell J)
26
See Bernard Walrut, ‘The public rights to use the sea and rivers’ (2003) 20(6) Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 423-444. I discuss Walrut’s article and the survival of the public right of
navigation in Section 8 of Chapter II below.
27
Marine Safety (General) Regulation 2009 (NSW) made under the Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW).
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Figure 1 – The foreshore of New South Wales in context

The public right to take fish from tidal waters is also a longstanding public right, which includes
the right to enter the foreshore for the purpose of fishing.28 In New South Wales this ancient
public right has also been affected by modern legislation29 and regulation.30 In some places the
right to fish has been suspended permanently,31 but it continues to apply broadly elsewhere.32
The third public right - of access to the foreshore - is a product of legislation33 which codified
the prior common law right access to, and along, the foreshore into statute law.34 Since
European settlement, diverse public uses of the foreshore,35 and a suite of wider public interests
in the beach, and other inter-tidal areas36 have developed. These will be discussed in Chapter II.

28

Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268; 106 ER 1190, 279, 284-5; 1194-6 (Best J).
See Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW).
30
See Marine Safety Regulation 2016 (NSW).
31
Due to ‘closures’ of certain defined areas or the creation of ‘no-take’ zones under the Fisheries
Management Act 1994 (NSW).
32
The survival of the public right to fish in NSW was discussed Warwick Gullett, ‘Up the creek and out
at sea: the resurfacing of the public right to fish’ (2006) 146 Maritime Studies 1-11. I consider Gullett’s
article and the impact of legislation on the public right to fish in Section 8 of Chapter II below.
33
See the statement of Objects inserted into the Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW) in 2002.
34
On a steep coastline the foreshore may be short and rocky, but on a gently inclined sandy beach, the
foreshore may be many metres wide.
35
Beyond traditional uses of launching a boat, or fishing, public use of the foreshore now includes a suite
of recreational activities, some, like beach volleyball, are more active than others, beachcombing.
36
Public interests in beaches and other inter-tidal areas includes their scenic value, passive recreational
value, and ecological functions as habitat for species of conservation or economic significance.
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Coastal lands

Under English common law public rights applied narrowly, to the foreshore and coastal waters,
even if they were privately owned.37 However in many places in New South Wales, where
coastal lands were reserved from sale,38 they remain publicly owned and public rights to enter
and use them also apply generally to them.39 Thus, when I refer to ‘coastal lands’, I include the
foreshore, seabed and sub-soil of the coastal waters, and adjacent land above the high-water
mark (HWM), in public ownership. Where I include privately-owned land adjoining the
foreshore in a broader reference to coastal lands, this is made clear.
In this thesis I explore the public’s capacity to enjoy these rights to use coastal land, if landowners seek to exercise private property rights over the beach and build seawalls to protect their
land, in response to climate change impacts. Seawalls’ adverse environmental impacts, which
threaten sandy beaches, where many public rights and interests are focused, 40 are explained in
Section 3.3 below.
2.4 Likely ‘climate change conditions’ in the future?

The phrase ‘climate change conditions’ refers to changes in global climate due to anthropogenic
global warming, described by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),41 of
which increased storminess and higher relative sea levels42 are most relevant to this thesis.
Researchers posit that additions to volume and thermal expansion of oceanic waters are key
drivers of higher sea levels,43 and note that sea levels are already rising.44 Recent data indicate
that in south-east Australia, the rate of sea-level rise has almost doubled (see Figure 2).45
37

SA Moore, A History of the Foreshore and the Law relating thereto (Stevens & Haynes, 1888), 653-5.
under legislation which preceded the Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW).
39
Albeit subject to any governing Plan of Management made under the Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW),
the Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW) or the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW).
40
See BG Thom, ‘Beach protection in NSW: new measures to secure the environment and amenity of
NSW beaches (2003) 20(5) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 325, 331.
41
IPCC, Climate Change 2013, above n 7.
42
Relative sea-level can be affected by a range of factors include changes in land elevation due to
isostatic responses of geographic uplift post-deglaciation, or deformation of basins following
inundation, volcanic and seismic activity, tectonic movements and increases in ocean volume due to
deglaciation inputs and thermal expansion of warmer oceanic waters. See Kurt Lambeck et al,
‘Paleoenvironmental Records, Geophysical Modeling, and Reconstruction of Sea-Level Trends and
Variability on Centennial and Longer Timescales’ in John Church et al (eds) Understanding Sea-Level
rise and Variability (Blackwell, 2010) 62, 66-7, 84-88.
43
See Gary T Mitchum, et al, ‘Modern Sea-Level-Change Estimates’ in Church et al (eds) above n 42,
122.
44
Global sea level has risen about 20 cms since 1870 and about 17 cms in Australia between 1842 and
2002 according to John A Church et al ‘Sea-level rise’ in Peter W Newton (ed) Transitions - Pathways
Towards Sustainable Urban Development in Australia (CSIRO Springer, 2008) at 192. See also
National Tidal Centre / Bureau of Meteorology The Australian Baseline Sea-level Monitoring Project,
Annual Sea-level Data Summary Report, July 2007 – June 2008 (Australian Government, 2008) cited in
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Figure 2 – Changes in global mean sea level (from BOM CSIRO, 2020)

There are a range of predictions for the height of future sea level.46 It is clear that mean sea level
will rise substantially over the next hundred years,47 and will continue to rise for centuries.48

Australian Government, Climate Change Risks to Australia’s Coast – A first pass national assessment
(Department of Climate Change, 2009), 25, n 20.
45
The rate of sea level rise has risen from 1.7 mm per year in the previous century, to 3.2 mm per year,
over the last twenty years. See Bureau of Meteorology / CSIRO State of the Climate Report (2020)
Oceans, Sea level, 13. See also the findings in H-O Pörtner et al (eds), IPCC Special Report on the
Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (IPCC, 2019) 10, par A.3.1., that the rate of global mean
sea level rise in the period 2006–2015 has been two and a half times the rate for 1901–1990, a rate of
rise stated with high confidence and thought to be ‘unprecedented over the last century’.
46
IPCC Climate Change 2013: above n 7, 21, predicted a rise in sea level of 26 - 82 cms by 2100. It
noted that under higher emissions scenario RCP8.5 (CO 2 700 – 1500 ppm), projected rise in sea level
would increase up to 3m over pre-industrial levels, 26. Will Steffen Climate Change 2009: faster
change and more serious risks (Australian Government, 2009) reported that a rise of up to 1.4m by
2100 had been projected by Stefan Rahmstorf, et al 2007. Other authors postulate greater increases
depending on the rate and extent of ice melt in major ice sheets: eg E Rignot argued that increases could
be up to 3m and J Hansen estimated that increases could be up to 5m by 2100, in Pittock, above n 8, 88.
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A recent projection of future sea level along the NSW coast49 using the range of IPCC future
emissions scenarios is shown in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3 – Sea Level Rise Projections (Figure 11 from Glamore et al (2016)
IPCC’s forecasts of greater storminess indicate more storm activity, longer, more intense storms
and an increase in the frequency of ‘extreme events’50, with research suggesting 1 in 100 year
storm events, may reoccur at intervals of 40 years, or sooner.51 These forecasts indicate many
areas of land along the NSW coast will likely undergo significant erosion and increasingly
frequent inundation by tidal waters.52 Other scientists posit that, due to higher sea levels and
J Church and N White ‘A 20th Century acceleration in global sea-level rise’ Geophysical Research
Letters (2006) 33:L01602 cited in Australian Government, above n 44, 25, fn 19.
48
See IPCC Climate Change 2013, above n 7, 26. See also Lambeck et al, above 42 x, 62.
49
: WC Glamore, PF Rahman, RJ Cox, JA Church and DP Monselesan, Sea Level Rise Science and
Synthesis for NSW, NSW Office of Environment and Heritage’s Coastal Processes and Responses Node
- Technical Report (NSW Government, 2016) p 20.
50
See IPCC Climate Change 2013, above n 7, at 21.
51
John A Church, et al, ‘Sea-level rise around the Australian coastline and the changing frequency of
extreme sea-level events’ (2006) 55 Australian Meteorological Magazine 253, 258. More recently the
IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere, above n 45, 20 par B.3, reported that extreme sealevels of 1 in 100 year events ‘are projected to occur frequently (at least once per year) … by 2050.
52
Church, et al, above n 44, 191.
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greater coastal erosion, in some places a trend of shoreline recession will become apparent.53

These then are the climate change conditions of the future being contemplated in this thesis.
This concludes my introduction of key terms. I next explain the problem being addressed.

3. Identifying the problem
In this next section I identify the problem of conflicting rights by describing the factors which,
in combination, threaten the survival of the public right of access to and along the foreshore.

3.1 Rising seas mean a receding shoreline

The higher sea levels and increased storminess forecast by the IPCC, are likely to create more
frequent severe erosion events,54 and increase the incidence and rate of shoreline recession,55 the
long term trend of landward movement of the shoreline, defined by the line of Mean High
Water (ie MHWM), due to rising sea levels and repeated inundation and erosion.56 It primarily
affects low elevation land constituted of ‘unconsolidated sediments’, where the real property
most at risk from its impacts are residential buildings constructed on erodible sand dunes.57

The impact of shoreline recession to date has been masked in many places by the cushioning
effect of the strip of coastal lands reserved from sale and dedicated for public purposes. The
dunes and beach system within these coastal Reserves have borne the brunt of the landward
recession of the shoreline, such that in many places, the extent of the dunes have been seriously
diminished and many Reserves are now a fraction of their original width of 100 feet (30.4m).58

This masking of the trend of shoreline recession will end however, when the land in a coastal
Reserve is wholly eroded away by the sea. Elsewhere, in places where there were no coastal
lands reserved from sale, these impacts are already being experienced.59
Roshanka Ranasinghe, David Callaghan and Marcel Stive, ‘Estimating coastal recession due to sea
level rise: beyond the Bruun rule’ (2012) 110 Climatic Change 561-574.
54
See Pittock above n 8, 108-114. See also Roshanka Ranasinghe and Marcel Stive ‘Rising seas and
retreating coastlines’ (2009) 97 Climate Change 465-468.
55
ECF Bird ‘Present and Future Sea Level: The Effects of Predicted Global Changes’ in Doeke Eisma
Climate Change Impact on Coastal Habitation (Lewis Publishers, 1995), 36; Andrew D Short and
Colin D Woodroffe The Coast of Australia (Cambridge UP, 2009), 273; Australian Government, above
n 44, 35, 69.
56
Shoreline recession is cited as a coastal hazard in NSW Government, Coastline Management Manual
(1990) Appendix C3.
57
See Australian Government, above n 44, 75 – 79, 34.
58
At Woolli on the Clarence coast, the width of the coastal reserve has been reduced from 100 feet
(~30m) at time of original survey, to less than 2 metres in 2018.
59
For example at Wamberal, and Collaroy, on Sydney’s northern beaches, where episodes of beach
erosion have undermined beach-side houses. See Carrie Fellner, ‘These homes should never have been
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a) A zone of instability will move landward

One likely result of increased shoreline recession is that more coastal residences, especially
those situated on remnant sand dunes, will be affected by the advance of a zone of instability,
which could compromise or destroy building foundations.60 Located immediately landward of
the coastal erosion escarpment, land in this zone is prone to slumping. (See Figure 4 below.)

Figure 4 – the zone of instability Figure C7.1 from NSW Government, CMM

Residences affected by this hazard are likely to become unsafe for continued occupation. Hence
in some places, development consent requires a 20m set back from the erosion escarpment.61
b) The ambulatory boundary of MHWM will move with the shoreline

As shoreline recession progresses landowners will observe the land seaward of their property
boundary erode, and eventually be lost to the sea. Then the tidal waters will begin to encroach
on and erode their land as their original surveyed boundary, becomes more frequently inundated
on the high tide. When this occurs the ambulatory boundary62 formed by the line of mean high
water will move with the shoreline and the MHWM will replace the original boundary.63

As sea-level rises and shorelines recede, it is likely that, during storms, erosion and inundation
will damage or destroy infrastructure, utility services, and both public and private land.64
These foreseeable progressive impacts on coastal land are shown in the Figures 5.1 – 5.4 below.

built’, Sydney Morning Herald, (Sydney), 18 July 2020, at < https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/thosehomes-should-never-have-been-built-the-40-year-saga-behind-wamberal-beach-erosion-20200718-p55dao.html >.

NSW Government, CMM, above n 56, C-5 refers to a ‘zone of slope readjustment’ in which buildings
are at hazard of collapse (see Figure C7.1).
61
See for example Byron Shire Council’s Development Control Plan – Part J Coastal Erosion Lands –
(adopted August 2018) section J2.1, prescriptive measure 1, page J4.
62
The term ‘ambulatory’ means ‘capable of walking’: see Delbridge, et al, above n 4, 53.
63
See the discussion of the primacy of the tidal boundary in John R Corkill, ‘Ambulatory boundaries in
New South Wales – real lines in the sand’ (2013) 3 (2) Property Law Review, 67-84.
64
Australian Government, above n 44, 35; A Barrie Pittock, above n 8, 108-114; John Sheehan,
‘Destroying Coastal Land Values’ (2009) Australia and New Zealand Property Journal 257-262; See
also Roshanka Ranasinghe and Marcel Stive ‘Rising seas and retreating coastlines’ (2009) 97 Climate
Change 465-468.
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Figure 5.1 Coastline at time of first survey
• position of MHWM at time of 1st survey
• Crown foreshore = MHWM to low water
mark
• Crown reserve = MHWM + 100 feet
(~30.48m)
• property boundary defined at time of survey
• Lot ‘X’ = land title registered under
o Real Property Act 1900 (NSW)
• The ‘beach’ included land above MHWM

Figure 5.2 Changes by gradual erosion
• two processes of change are in operation:
increased coastal erosion and higher sea
levels.
• Crown reserve narrows < 100 feet (30.48m)
• minor erosion restored over weeks /months,
HWM fluctuates around mean position.
• episodes of major erosion and minor accretion
create a net trend of shoreline recession.
• where coastal compartments have negative
sediment budget, MHWM moves landward.

Figure 5.3 - Changes by perceptible jumps?
• noticeable changes or ‘perceptible jumps’ in
the position of MHWM become evident.
• more frequent severe events leave little time
for accretion before next erosion event.
• foreshore shortens, steepens, trends landward.
• Crown reserve < 50 % of 100’ (30.48m)
• clusters of storms may produce defined
landward trend of MHWM.

Figure 5.4 MHWM crosses line of 1st survey
• position of MHWM following a stormy
period: a series of severe events over weeks /
months
• MWHM crosses boundary defined by survey.
• foreshore made very narrow and steep.
• Crown reserve wholly eroded: lost to the sea.
• trend of shoreline recession is evident.
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These adverse impacts will affect all States, however in NSW between 40,800 and 62,400
residences have been identified as at risk from a sea level rise of 1.1m and the storm surge of a
1: 100 year storm.65 The extent of coastal erosion risk in NSW was further assessed in 201766,
identifying large areas at risk on the north, metropolitan and south coasts. See Figure 6 below.

Figure 6 – NSW Erosion Risk (Figure 8 from EOH, 2017)
65

Australian Government, above n 44, 77. This assessment estimated the value of the residential
buildings at risk in New South Wales as between $12.4 billion and $18.7 billion, in 2009. Sea-level rise
vulnerability assessments have been prepared for many council areas. Eg John Hudson, et al, High
resolution terrain mapping of the NSW Central and Hunter coasts for assessments of potential climate
change impacts – Final Project Report (NSW Planning, 2008). Councils have also identified lands at
risk from coastal hazards in maps of ‘vulnerable lands’, prepared under cl 12 SEPPCM 2018 (NSW).
66
NSW Office Environment and Heritage, Coastal Erosion in New South Wales – Statewide Exposure
Assessment (NSW Government 2017) p 16.
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3.2 Coastal landowners want to protect their land

Once they understand this situation most coastal landowners would be justifiably alarmed.
a) Landowners’ private property concerns

Some may wonder what impact the moving MHWM will have on the land title of their real
property. Relying on original survey measurements, landowners may assert ownership of the
same area of land as always and declare that their property boundaries remain ‘fixed’ where
they have always been.67 Based on these assumptions they may believe that they have, or will,
come to own part of the foreshore, and thus have a private property right to exclude the public.68

If they confront the reality of their situation, many landowners adversely affected by shoreline
recession would consider what they could do to forestall the inundation or prevent the eventual
loss of their land. If they conflated assumptions about their ‘fixed’ boundaries with a claim of a
private property right to ‘defend’ their private land, some landowners may seek to build a seawall on their original boundary,69 and try to ‘reclaim’ their land by depositing fill behind it.70
Were they to consult the literature on managing coastal hazards, concerned landowners would
realise that their predicament has been anticipated and their options are circumscribed.

b) Four macro policy options

Four major options or broad approaches have been identified, and while the names vary, the
substance of the responses are equivalent. As shown in Figure 7,71 below, they are:
i) do nothing (ignore);
ii) retreat (relocate, managed realignment)
iii) defend (protect, hold the line) and,
iv) adapt (accommodate, limited intervention).
Figure 7 – Four broad approaches

67

See BG Thom, above n 40, 342.
This was one of the concerns expressed by Byron Shire Council in its submission no.43, to the House
of Representatives’ Standing Committee on Climate Change, Water, Environment and the Arts
Managing Our Coastal Zone in a Changing Climate – the time to act is now (2009), 147.
69
The core issue of whether a land title boundary created by line of survey can survive permanent
inundation by tidal waters is addressed in Chapter II, below.
70
Land reclamation, through the deposition of fill requires development consent. Land ‘reclaimed’ by fill
is usually held to be owned by the Crown, not the adjoining landowner under common law rules.
71
From Wade Hadwen, et al, Information Sheet - Managed adaptation options (NCCARF 2012).
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Page 15
68

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Law)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

Chapter I – Conflict over competing rights

© John R Corkill
Student No. 2376398

Faced with these options, some landowners may dismiss the ‘do nothing’ and ‘retreat’ options.
Many would consider their capacity to adapt and perhaps modify their home and investigate the
feasibility of obtaining any approvals needed for the necessary works. Other landowners may
not be able or may not wish to explore the ‘adapt’ option, and so, hoping it would protect them
from the sea, may choose ‘defend’, and seek to build a seawall.

However, building a privately owned seawall is no small undertaking. In New South Wales,
seawall proposals require detailed documentation for review in the development control
process,72 and consent authorities for such works usually consider development applications for
seawalls73 in the context of the local coastal management planning instrument,74 prepared under
relevant Guidelines.75 Similarly, proposals by a public authority to build a seawall to implement
a coastal management plan, or program, require extensive studies, modelling and consultation,
before approval can be granted.

c) Legal liability for coastal works

Where the council, in its capacity as a consent authority, decides to construct a seawall, or grant
consent to a private landowner to do so, subject to whatever conditions are considered
necessary, the council would be exempt from any legal liability,76 if it acted in good faith.77
In contrast, private landowners acting as of ‘right’ would not be exempt from legal liability.
Landowners who seek to ‘reclaim’ land or build a seawall without approval, risk prosecution for
a breaches of relevant Acts, and invite liability for damages in proceedings brought by other
landowners who allege their land has been adversely effected by the nuisance of increased
erosion or flooding, caused, or made worse, by the fill, or the structure.78

Hence, the options available to landowners to respond to shoreline recession are not extensive,
and since they rely the relevant authority’s approval, they are not at the landowner’s discretion.

72

See the example of the information required for a development application for three seawalls at
Belongil Beach, in Byron Shire, at < https://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/topics/water/coasts/coastalmanagement/framework/transitional-arrangements/coastal-development-applications >.
73
Where a coastal management plan has not yet been prepared seawall proposals are considered under
transitional arrangements, made under cl 7 Schedule 3 of the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW).
74
Such as a coastal management plan are made under the Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW) or a
coastal management program made under the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW).
75
Guidelines for preparing CMPs are set out in NSW Government, Coastal Management Manual Part A,
available at < https://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/topics/water/coasts/coastal-management/manual >.
76
Council’s exemption from legal liability is available under s 733 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW).
77
The leading case on ‘acting in good faith’ is Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal
Council [1993] FCA 408; (1993) 116 ALR 460, at [34].
78
Such a case was Egger v Gosford Shire Council (1989) 67 LGRA 304
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d) Landowner claims and rhetoric

Realizing that approval for their preferred option - public funding to construct a seawall to
protect their private property - may not be possible, even in the long term, and privately funded
seawalls face significant hurdles, some landowners have sought to convince, or coerce, councils
to accede to their demands, and approve public funds to build a defensive structure, through
rhetoric and legal threats.79 Hence a slew of assertions have been made, including claims of a
landowner’s private property rights to: defend against the sea, be protected from the sea by the
government, claims of council liability for damages ‘caused’ by not protecting private land, and
claims for compensation for land lost to the sea. These claimed private property rights and their
asserted paramountcy are examined in Chapter II.

What some landowners may not realize, because of their exclusively private focus, is that
constructing a seawall on a receding shoreline, as sea levels rise, poses a real threat to the public
right of access to and along the foreshore, due to the phenomenon known as ‘coastal squeeze’.
3.3 The threat of ‘coastal squeeze’

The term ‘coastal squeeze’ was coined by Doody,80 for a phenomenon also recognised by
others.81 It is said to occur when a substantial structure, such as a road or seawall, designed to
withstand storm surges and the action of large waves, is built behind a natural coastal
environment, such as a muddy tidal bank, or a sandy beach, to ‘protect’ the adjoining land.
However, such structures obstruct retreating natural eco-systems. Over time, as seas rise and
erosion increases, the beach or bank in front of the seawall steepens as it is gradually eroded
away, until no beach or bank is visible, even at the lowest tide.82

As a result, the ecological and social communities dependent on the inter-tidal area are
‘squeezed’ between the immobile sea-wall and rising seas. The term has been used by biologists
to describe the impacts of rising seas and receding shorelines on the bio-diversity of rocky intertidal zones,83 on mangrove flats,84 tidal marshes and wetlands,85 and by economists who refer to

79

See for example Mallesons Solicitors 32 page letter to Byron Shire Council < insert date >.
JP Doody, “Coastal Squeeze’: an historical perspective’ (2004) 10(1/2) Journal of Coastal
Conservation 129-138.
81
See ECF Bird, ‘Present And Future Sea Level: The Effects of Predicted Global Changes’ in Doeke
Eisma (ed), Climate Change Impact on Coastal Habitation (Lewis Publishing, 1995). See also AD
Short and Colin D Woodroffe, The Coast of Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 273.
82
R Silvester Developments in Geotechnical Engineering: Coastal Engineering (Elsevier, 1974) 143,
quoted in OH Pilkey and HL Wright III, ‘Seawalls versus beaches’ (1988) SI 4 Journal of Coastal
Research 41, 44.
83
AC Jackson and J McIlvenny, ‘Coastal squeeze on rocky shores in northern Scotland and some possible
ecological impacts’ (2011) 400 Journal of Experimental Marine Biology and Ecology 314; Nigel I
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a squeeze for coastal tourism.86 Bird’s sketches87 (see Figure 8. below) showing likely impacts
on mangrove-fringed coasts, are the best illustration of ‘coastal squeeze’ in the literature.

Figure 8. Changes to mangrove fringed coasts as sea level rises. ECF Bird (1995)
Significantly, Bird forecast that ‘Where sea walls have been built, however, tidal mudflats, like
salt marshes and mangroves, will be reduced and eventually obliterated by the rising sea.’88
Bird’s focus on farmland and mangroves, illustrated only one situation where coastal squeeze
could operate in New South Wales. Another involves a migrating marsh or beach approaching a
major road. (See Figure 9)89 below.

Figure 9. ‘Coastal squeeze’ under sea level rise (from Aust Govt, 2009)

Pontee, ‘Reappraising coastal squeeze: a case study from north-west England’ (2011) 164 (3)
Proceedings of the ICE-Maritime Engineering 127.
84
Bird, above n 80, 49. In New South Wales, mangroves and other inter-tidal areas provide key habitats
for a suite of molluscs, crustaceans, birds, and many fish species of economic value.
85
James G Titus, ‘Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to save wetlands and
beaches without hurting property owners’ (1998) 57 Maryland Law Review 1279-1399, at 1316.
86
Christine Schleupner, ‘Evaluation of coastal squeeze and its consequences for the Caribbean island
Martinique’ (2008) 51(5) Ocean & Coastal Management 383-390.
87
Bird, above n 80, Figure 3-6, 48.
88
Bird, above n 80, 49.
89
Figure 4.1 ‘Coastal squeeze’ under sea level rise, Australian Government, above n 44, 52.
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A more typical example in NSW, however, would be a seawall built to protect residential or
commercial buildings, with native dune vegetation and sandy beaches being squeezed.
a) ‘Coastal squeeze’ in New South Wales

In this section I extend the concept of ‘coastal squeeze’ to recognise that, as well as species and
eco-systems, the public right of access along the foreshore, could also be ‘squeezed’, and
extinguished. To show this, I explain ‘coastal squeeze’ by depicting in my diagrams the key
eco-system at risk in New South Wales: sandy beaches.90 See Figures 9.1 – 9.10 below.
To illustrate major changes to coastal lands over some years, an appropriate reference profile of
the coastal landforms under discussion was needed. For this, I have adopted the shape of the
dune and beach systems shown in Coastal Dune Management.91 (See Figure 10.0 below).

Figure 10.0 reference profile: Typical features of a dynamic beach system
By extending the dune landward, I created a suitable base-line profile. See Figure 10.1 below.

AC Brown and A McLachlan, ‘Sandy shore ecosystems and the threats facing them: some predictions
for the year 2025’ (2002) 29 (1) Environmental Conservation 62-78, See also Omar Defeo, et al,
‘Threats to sandy beach ecosystems: a review’ (2009) 81 (1) Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science 1-12.
Regarding the threat to beaches in New South Wales, see Thom (2003) above n 40, Australian
Government, above n 44, 35.
91
NSW Government, Coastal Dune Management – A Manual of Coastal Dune Management and
Rehabilitation Techniques (DLWC 2001), hereafter (CDM). See original Figures 7 & 9.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Page 19
90

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Law)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

Chapter I – Conflict over competing rights

© John R Corkill
Student No. 2376398

Figure 10.1

With a single high fore-dune remaining behind the incipient dune and beach berm, the profile of
Figure 10.1 reflects coastal dune systems, circa 1990. The baseline position of mean high water
(MHW) is shown by

and the landward boundary of the Crown reserve92 is denoted as

.93

Over some decades, due to the combined effect of higher sea level (MHW2) and increased
erosion under storm conditions, the shape of beach berm in the beach profile, has changed.
Sediment has been transported off shore to form nearshore bars, and the MHWM has moved
landward.94 (See Figure 10.2)

Figure 10.2

However, in many locations in New South Wales coastal processes gradually re-deposit most of
the eroded sediments back on shore when favourable winds, and lower wave energy allow
dunes and beaches to gradually accrete, or ‘recover’.95 When this occurs the beach berm profile

92

The strip of land measured 100 feet wide, (~30.4m) from the HWM at the time of original survey was
reserved from sale and retained for public purposes due to Crown instructions and colonial regulations.
See the discussion of this in section 3 of Chapter IV below. A large portion of the coastal reserve has
been eroded away in the time between original survey and this baseline, circa 1990. In many locations,
the natural dunes and beaches were extensively disturbed or destroyed in the 1960s and 1970s, by
coastal sandmining, when floating dredges and bulldozers scoured the coast for heavy minerals.
93
One coastal vegetation type at risk from coastal squeeze in New South Wales is littoral rainforest,
which includes species such as hoop pine, coastal brushbox, tuckeroo, palms, and figs into a complex
suite of plants, often surrounded by drier coastal woodlands or heaths.
94
NSW Government, CMM, above n 56, B-28, C-4.
95
NSW Government, CMM, above n 56, B-28.
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changes again, and the location of the MHWM gradually moves seaward. (See Figure 10.3)

Figure 10.3

This borrow and pay back of sediment is known as the ‘sediment budget’96 of a beach or coastal
compartment.97 It was believed that these natural cyclical processes of erosion and deposition
were roughly in equilibrium, in most locations.98 However, subsequently, closer study of local
coastal processes has shown that in some locations the volume of sediment redeposited on shore
is less than the volume of eroded sediment.99 Some sediments are lost on-shore into dunes, and
under storm conditions some sediments are lost off-shore in deeper waters. Other sediments in
the surf zone are carried alongshore by in-shore currents, often into the up-current sediment
compartment.100 Unless this lost sediment is replaced with an equivalent volume from downcurrent, the sediment budget will be in deficit, and the beach will likely undergo recession.101

In a typical storm, when coastal waters are elevated above natural predicted height due to
barometric and climatic conditions a storm tide or storm surge may be generated.102 Under these
conditions, erosion typically occurs above, and landward, of MHWM, creating a ‘storm bite’ or
erosion scarp at the back of the beach, in the adjoining dune.103 (See Figure 10.4)

96

See Chapman, et al Coastal Evolution and Coastal Erosion in New South Wales (Coastal Council of
NSW, 1982) 169 – 171. The term is defined as ‘an accounting of the rate of sediment supply from all
sources (credits) and the rate of sediment loss to all sinks (debits) from an area of coastline to obtain the
net sediment supply loss’, in NSW Government, CMM (1990), above n 56, 45.
97
A ‘coastal compartment’ is typically an embayment, with defined boundaries, being “the rear of the
beach, the seaward limit of the active zone and usually at either end by headlands and rock reef”. See
Chapman et al, above n 96 169. See Schedule 1 of the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW).
98
See the discussion of this in Egger v Gosford Shire Council (1989) 67 LGRA 304,
99
Short and Woodroffe, above n 80, 18.
100
Ibid.
101
NSW Government, CMM (1990) above n 56, see Appendix C3 – Shoreline recession hazard, C7 – C9.
102
Ibid. See Appendix B4 – Elevated Water Levels, B12.
103
Ibid. Appendix C3 – Shoreline recession hazard, C8 – C9.
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Figure 10.4

If there are a series of storms producing a sequence of erosive events without intervening
periods of beach recovery,104 these impacts will be pronounced, and major changes to the beach
and dune profile and the position of MHWM will become evident.105 (See Figure 10.5)

Figure 10.5

Where landowners become concerned about the receding shoreline affecting their real property,
they may try to arrest the erosion and protect their land, by building a seawall and ‘nourishing’
the beach. In the following illustration a temporary seawall has been constructed from sandfilled geo-textile bags, and the beach ‘nourished’ by artificially depositing sand in front of the
seawall.106 See Figure 10.6 below.

However, these works would be likely to adversely affect remnant native vegetation and restrict
or deny public access to and along the foreshore while works were under way.107 Further, beach

104

Four tropical cyclones Dinah, Barbara, Elaine and Glenda, and a series of five east-coast lows affected
the south-east Queensland from January until July 1967, creating flooding, and major erosion impacts
on beaches and dunes. See Gold Coast City Council, Griffith University Centre for Coastal
Management leaflet, History of coastal storms on the Gold Coast (GCCC 2011). See also J Callaghan,
and P Helman, Severe Storms on the East Coast of Australia 1770 - 2008 (GU CCM, 2008)
105
See Gold Coast City Council, Griffith University Centre for Coastal Management leaflet, Beach
erosion: Coastal processes on the Gold Coast (GCCC 2011).
106
This would have been permissible under the Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW). While the position
of MHWM would move, the position of the boundary would not.
107
Temporary closure of the beach would be necessary to allow excavators to position rock fill safely.
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nourishment is itself potentially problematic108 and provides only a temporary buffer to
erosion.109

Figure 10.6

The impacts of seawalls have been closely scrutinized in the United States literature and
recognised in relevant Australian engineering Guidelines.110 When a seawall is built, erosion at
its toe and ends typically increases, under storm conditions, because the wall reflects the wave
energy, rather than absorb it.111 As erosion and sea level rise progress, it is probable that the
buffer of the nourished beach would be severely eroded, any remaining beach would be steeper,
and the nearshore waters would be deeper.112

The squeeze of the intertidal area would be evident at high tide, because little or no beach would
remain uncovered. (See Figure 10.7)

108

Finding a source of sand, impacts on benthic organisms, odour and cost all present problems.
In the US, experience indicates that nourished beaches last about five years before they too are wholly
lost, and further nourishment is required. See Orrin H Pilkey and Rob Young, The Rising Sea (Island
Press, 2009), 166. More frequent erosive events, due to global climate change, would be likely to
further reduce the ‘life’ of nourished beaches.
110
See National Committee on Coastal and Ocean Engineering (NCCOE) of the Institute of Engineers
Australia, Climate Change Adaptation Guidelines in Coastal Management and Planning (Engineers
Australia, 2012), 39. See also NCCOE of the Institute of Engineers Australia, Coastal Engineering
Guidelines for working with the Australian coast in an ecologically sustainable way (Engineers
Australia, 2nd ed, 2012) 29 -47.
111
There is a high level of agreement in the literature that after a seawall is built, further erosion will
result, in the short to medium term. See Silvester, above n 81, 143, quoted in Pilkey & Wright, above n
81, 44: ‘Walls of vertical or sloping character (revetments) have been used for many decades as a
purported protection in an erosive situation. It is unfortunate that they have, in the main, promoted
further erosion” …’The sea-bed profile in front of the wall will steepen and deepen until subsidence of
one section will occur during a particularly bad storm’ and ‘Tests have indicated that beaches in front of
walls will recede to the point of being non-existent due to the action of standing waves resulting from
reflection’.
112
See Pilkey and Young, above n 108, 165: ‘The beach will continue to erode after a seawall is placed
behind it to protect a building. Over time, the beach will inevitably become narrower and narrower until
it disappears altogether’. See also Sorell E Negro, ‘Built Seawalls: A Protected Investment or
Subordinate to the Public Trust?’ (2012) 18 Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 89 – 126.
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Figure 10.7

If a second or third major storm occurs soon after the first erosive event, before any redeposition of sand and subsequent beach ‘recovery’, it is probable that the beach will undergo
further erosion and will be squeezed out of existence.113 See Figure 10.8.

Figure 10.8

Thus it is clear that together, rising sea levels, private property rights and ad hoc seawall
construction, constitute a physical threat to the future existence of sandy beaches and dune
systems, and pose a plausible threat to the public right of access to and along the foreshore.

b) Post-squeeze impacts

However, the loss of the sandy beach would not be the final impacts of rising seas, receding
shorelines and the rampant exercise of private property ‘rights’, on coastal settlements. Due to
the loss of the beach in front of the seawall, its buffer effect would also be lost and with the
deepening of nearshore waters, in storms the seawall would be exposed to direct wave action.114
High velocity currents from big seas would create additional scouring along its toe and flanks,115
which could undermine the wall’s foundation, and allow materials to slump.

Diana Mitsova and Ann-Margaret Esnard ‘Holding Back the Sea: An Overview of Shore Zone
Planning and Management’ (2012) 12 Journal of Planning Literature 446, 450. Bird, above n 80, uses
the term ‘obliterates’.
114
Pilkey and Young, above n 108, 166.
115
This is known as the ‘flanking effect’ in the United States. See Pilkey and Wright, above n 81, 57
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Wave attack could also displace any movable materials, lower wall crest height and weaken its
structural integrity.116 Under extreme conditions, which exceed its design parameters, the
seawall could ‘fail’ if a section of wall slumped, allowing large waves to overtop it, flooding the
landward side of the wall, generating major damage and destruction.117 (See Figure 10.9)

Figure 10.9

If coastal landowners refuse to accept restrictions on their land use, due to coastal hazards, they
may apply political pressure to demand the government fund and build even larger, ‘permanent’
structures in an attempt to protect residential and commercial premises.118 See Figure 10.10.

Figure 10.10

Even if larger structures were built, however, it is likely that the effects of coastal squeeze
would soon re-emerge. See Figure 10.11 below.

116

Silvester, above n 81.
Pilkey and Young, above n 108, 166-7.
118
Either the complete rebuild of the structure or a substantial upgrade to extend the toe of the wall and
increase the wall crest height. As noted above, reclamation works would move the location of the
MHWM but under common law rules would not move the location of the property boundary.
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Figure 10.11

c) Seawalls create a false sense of security

Investment in seawalls may, however, lead to landowners developing a “false sense of security”
regarding their premises’ exposure to coastal hazards.119 Believing that they are ‘protected’ from
storms and rising seas, landowners may commit additional funds to develop adversely affected
land at risk from inundation, erosion, or shoreline recession.120 Thus there is a serious danger
that when, not if, a storm tide higher than the design parameters is experienced, and the seawall
fails, and flooding results, the extent and cost of the damage to new development will exceed
the cost of damage likely had the seawall never been built.121

Under these circumstances any public funds invested may prove to have been wasted. The
public cost of seawall construction, to protect public infrastructure and perhaps private property,
could only delay, but ultimately would not prevent, damage or loss from extreme storms. The
value of recent private investment in at-risk properties would be reduced by damage, or
potentially, totally lost. However, all this damage and loss would be avoidable, if areas at risk
from coastal hazards were not further developed, and some of the available public funding was
directed to assisting existing development to relocate to new sites in areas not at risk.

More public investment to increase wall crest height to prevent overtopping might be called for,
but the costs of upgrading seawalls for centuries,122 may be prohibitive, and ultimately futile.123
Being locked into a cycle of escalating costs for building and maintaining defensive structures,
and catastrophic losses due to extreme storms, would be a serious post-squeeze impact.
This “false sense of security” is well recognised in the literature on coastal management. See for eg
Australian Government, above n 44, 152.
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid.
122
Sea level rise is forecast to “continue for centuries” see IPCC Climate Change 2013, above n 7, 26;
Pittock, above n 8, 125, discussed the potential for ice sheet disintegration and concluded that if the
Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets ‘more or less completely melted’ the world could experience
‘sea level rise of up to 10 to 12 metres lasting for millennia’.
123
This was the conclusion of coastal management authorities in the UK considered by JAG Cooper and J
McKenna, ‘Social justice in coastal erosion management: The temporal and spatial dimensions’ (2008)
39 Geoforum 294-306. I discuss Cooper and McKenna’s article in section 7 of Chapter V below.
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d) Avoiding ‘the squeeze’

A more feasible option for managing the impacts of coastal erosion and shoreline recession,
would be to ‘retreat’ ie relocate threatened buildings and land uses away from areas exposed to
these hazards.124 Without impeding structures, sandy beaches would be able to migrate landwards as the shoreline retreats, without being ‘squeezed’ out of existence. (See Figure 10.12)

Figure 10.12

Though this would be ideal where this is feasible, it would not be feasible everywhere. In some,
perhaps many, locations no new structure would be needed: the abutments of existing roads and
building foundations will ensure that, as seas rise, coastal squeeze will continue to tighten.125
Hence in such locations retreat may not be feasible. However, it may be different for houses
built on sand dunes: retreat may prove to be the only feasible option in the medium term.

As illustrated above, rising seas, receding shorelines, assertions of dominant private property
rights and ad hoc seawall construction constitute real threats to sandy beaches, continued public
access and the safe use of coastal lands and waters. But they are not inevitable. These threats
and their likely impacts could be minimized or avoided through appropriate public policy
initiatives developed for that purpose. A range of such measures are considered in Chapter VI.

3.4 When competing rights conflict, whose rights would prevail?

In the previous sections the threats to public access rights were identified, their causes
recognised and some, at least, future circumstances anticipated. In this concluding section of

This option of ‘retreat’, and other options of ‘adapt’ and ‘defend’, were considered in the NSW
Government, CMM, above n 56, 25, Appendix D3 Planned retreat; and the Australia Government,
above n 44, 152. Areas prone to coastal hazards, at present and in the future, have been identified and
the risks assessed by many local councils when preparing Coastal Management Plans, under the Coastal
Protection Act 1979 (NSW) and or the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW), for the sections of
‘coastal zone’ within their local government area.
125
See Short and Woodroffe, above n 80, 273-4.
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Part A I make explicit other elements of the competition and conflict between private property
rights and public rights which constitute parts of ‘the problem’.

As indicated above, the overlap of private property rights and public rights to coastal land is
focused on the foreshore, and there are conflicting claims over ownership of land below mean
high water mark (MHWM), based on assumptions about the nature and location of real property
boundaries. Hence, a crucial factor in minimizing the conflict between private property rights
and public access rights is establishing the location of the boundary between privately owned
land and publicly owned land. This can be achieved by applying existing rules of property law
regarding the movement of natural boundaries of land: the doctrine of accretion.126

Leaving ownership aside, there is also an explicit competition for priority use of the foreshore.
The divergent interests of the competing rights would prescribe entirely different priority land
uses, for this area and there appears to be little scope for co-location, and multiple use. It is not
possible to build a seawall on a public beach, to protect adjacent privately owned land and retain
public access to and use of the foreshore, or beach in front of the wall.127 Large rocks and waves
breaking onto a short beach are also not conducive to safe public swimming or surfing. Building
seawalls on eroding sandy beaches would likely obliterate beaches, extinguish beach access and
reduce or destroy the amenity of the adjacent coastal waters.128 So it is apparent that the priority
uses of the foreshore preferred by private and public interests would be physically incompatible.

Logically, allowing the public ownership of the foreshore to be lost, or public access rights to
and along the foreshore be extinguished would not be in the public interest. Hence it can be seen
that private property rights, and assertions of their dominance, conflict with the public interest.

Private property rights and public access rights also compete for theoretical dominance. Some
private landowners assert that their property rights are superior to public rights and sometimes
claim them to be effectively paramount and immutable, a binding obligation which ‘cannot be
ignored’.129 As the next chapter explains, such beliefs conflict with modern theory of property
and property rights in liberal democratic societies such as New South Wales.

Further, demands for focus and priority by private landowners insisting on claimed private
property ‘rights’ compete for the time, focus and priority of coastal managers responsible for
126

The operation of the doctrine of accretion is discussion in Chapter II.
See Ralph Lauren PL v NSW TCP [2018] NSWLEC 207, [116] – [133] (hereafter Ralph Lauren PL v
NSW TCP [2018]).
128
Pilkey and Young, above n 108, 165-6.
129
See Coleman, above n 13, 422.
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preparing plans and programs for managing coastal lands and resources. Should these plans and
programs be designed to satisfy private land owners, or to serve the wider public interest?

Finally, private and public rights compete for finite State and local government resources:
agency staff time and money. Demands for public resources to be made available to address
private property concerns, directly conflict with priorities for expenditure for public purposes.
Were private property rights to be trumps, would there be increased calls for public funding?
Should public funds be allocated to achieve public interest, or private property objectives?

All these dimensions of the competing interests of private property rights and public rights are
thus implied in my discussion of the conflict between them. Having made them explicit, the
primary research question might be concisely restated: whose rights would prevail?

Part B – Rationale for my research
I next outline the rationale for my thesis and flag the significance of my research. Further, I
describe my personal research perspectives and explain my decision to pursue this research.

4. Its focus is a matter of public interest concern
A core part of my research rationale is that its focus is a matter of public interest concern. It
addresses a national coastal research goal identified by the Commonwealth Coasts and Climate
Change Council: the effect of rising sea levels on real property and local government liability.130
However my thesis does not canvass these matters in every State, but focuses on New South
Wales.

A larger matter of public interest concern is the survival of the public rights of access to and
along the foreshore, to fish or other purposes, and to safely swim, surf or navigate in the state’s
coastal waters. The tidal waters, sandy beaches, rock platforms and headlands of the NSW coast
constitute important places in contemporary society, for a range of social purposes and cultural
uses, of intangible value. These public rights of free access, the amenity of coastal lands, the
suite of public interests in, and the diverse public uses of, the foreshore and coastal waters,
which have developed around them, provide a range of ecosystem services,131 and support a

130

Commonwealth Coasts and Climate Change Council, above n 3, See s 3. IV Liability for local
government, < http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/adaptation/australias-coasts/coasts-climatechange-council-advice#2 >
131
Will Steffen, et al, Australia’s Biodiversity and Climate Change (CSIRO Publishing, 2009), 17-19.
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range of economic activities of very considerable economic value.132 If many of our beaches
were to disappear, not only would it affect how and where people socialise, and change
contemporary culture, this could impact on local economies dependent on visitors seeking to
surf, enjoy the beach, or go boating, with knock-on impacts on state and national economies.

5. The literature is limited, uncertain, silent, or erroneous
Another part of my rationale emerged as I began my research and realised that there was a gap
in the literature. Published commentary on the effects of moving real property boundaries on
land title, and on landowners’ private property rights, in the United States of America is
extensive and complex, but since these commentaries cite the constitutions and legal codes of
States in the US and decisions of US courts they have limited relevance to New South Wales.

Regrettably, commentary on these matters in New South Wales is limited and relevant literature
on the extent of private property rights in Australia is sparse. One early work left open the
possibility of the foreshore becoming privately owned due to ‘fixed’ property boundaries,133 a
subsequent National Coastal Inquiry heard concerns about impacts of private property rights on
public access to the beach,134 but its Report135 did not address or resolve these concerns,
allowing uncertainty to persist. A later article136 claimed landowners had extensive common law
private property rights, but did consider the effect of legislation or recent cases.137
Several publications have pointed to the impacts of rising seas on real property,138 but their
focus has been on other matters,139 not a close scrutiny of landowners’ claims of dominant
private property rights. Hence research providing some clarity on these particular matters, and
the application of relevant elements of law in New South Wales, is needed to fill this gap.

132

Economic sectors reliant on coastal resources include tourism, fishing, boating, dive and surf
industries. A detailed consideration of economic impacts is beyond the scope of this thesis. But see the
AIMS Index of Marine Industry 2018 (AIMS 2018) at < https://www.aims.gov.au/aims-index-ofmarine-industry >.
133
Thom, above n 40.
134
These concerns were raised in a submission made by Byron Shire Council, (Submission no. 43, 10).
135
House of Representatives Standing Committee, above n 2.
136
Coleman, above n 13, 421-2.
137
Environment Protection Authority (NSW) v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655 and Environment
Protection Authority (NSW) v Leaghur Holdings PL [1995] 87 LGERA 282. These cases are discussed
in section 8 of Chapter III.
138
Tim Bonyhady, ‘Swimming in the Streets: The Beginnings of Planning for Sea Level Rise’ (2010) in
Tim Bonyhady, Andrew Macintosh and Jan McDonald (eds), Adaptation to Climate Change: Law and
Policy (Federation Press, 2010); Richard Kenchington, Laura Stocker and David Woods (eds),
Sustainable Coastal Management and Climate Adaptation – Global Lessons from Regional Approaches
in Australia (CSIRO 2012); Justine Bell, Climate Change & Coastal Development Law in Australia
(Federation Press, 2014).
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The state of the literature commenting on the NSW situation and my contribution to it are
further considered in Chapter II.
6. The problem’s footprint is large, and growing…
Another part of the rationale for this topic is that its geographic scope, ie its ‘footprint’, is
already large, and the both the number of land titles, and the area of ‘real property’, adversely
affected as climate conditions change is likely to substantially increase in the future. A
preliminary national study of potential impacts of sea level rise and storm surge on coastal land
was published in 2009, Climate Change Risks to Australia’s Coast.140 Using criteria of a 1.1m
sea level rise and storm surge from a 1 in 100 year event, it identified between 157,000 and
247,600 residential properties likely to be adversely affected nationally,141 with New South
Wales the state most seriously adversely affected. 142 While these estimates of the extent of
economic vulnerability are alarming enough, this is not a final assessment of such impacts.
Since rising seas are predicted to continue for centuries,143 with effects which may last
millennia,144 it is highly unlikely that sea level will peak at 1.1m above 1990 levels.
Thus the number of land titles to which the results of my research apply, will continue to grow.

7. Time may be shorter than expected
Also part of my rationale is a suspicion that less time may be available than expected to
understand and appropriately respond to forecast climate change impacts, such as higher sea
levels. That is, the inundation of coastal lands due to a sea level rise, and the recession of the
shoreline in vulnerable locations, may occur before residents and government are prepared.
There is therefore, a danger of coastal communities under-estimating the level of risk they face.
I conclude that the need to practically apply my research may become acute before too long.

Predicting when sea levels will reach the reference line of 1.1m above 1990 base-line used by
the Commonwealth,145 is not the focus of the thesis, nor is it necessary to make such a
prediction in order to establish a valid basis for this thesis. The IPCC has determined that sealevels are rising, the rate of rise is increasing, and predicts sea level exceeding 1 metre above
Eg Public authorities’ liability was the focus in Zada Lipman and Robert Stokes, ‘Shifting Sands – The
implications of climate change and a changing coastline for the private interests and public authorities
in relation to waterfront land’ (2003) 20(6) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 406-422.
140
Australian Government, above n 44.
141
Australian Government, above n 44, 71, with a replacement value in $2008 of between $41 billion and
$63 billion. For an outline of methodology see 79.
142
Australian Government, above n 44, 75. Other states were also found to be significantly exposed to
risk from 1.1m sea-level rise and a 1: 100 year storm.
143
See IPCC, Climate Change 2013: above n 7, 26.
144
Ibid 27.
145
Australian Government, above n 44, 46.
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base-line in the decade after 2100.146 Nonetheless, it is possible that sea level exceeds 1.1m
above 1990 base-line sooner than predicted.147 This concern of ‘running out of time’, when
developing public policy, has been recognised in the literature,148 and its specific contribution to
my research rationale is a personal imperative to not (further) delay.

8. My contribution to current knowledge
In this section I outline how my research may usefully contribute to current knowledge.
I aim to extend the concept of ‘coastal squeeze’ beyond its prior use in understanding changes in
coastal bio-diversity149 and tourism viability,150 to show how ‘coastal squeeze’ poses a real and
growing threat to continued public access to and along the foreshore of New South Wales. I also
aim to resolve the uncertainty about whose rights are dominant at present, by clarifying the
nature and extent of those rights, and assessing their likely future status.

I contribute new knowledge regarding the operation of the law of property, as it applies to
coastal land titles, at present, by explaining the effect of the interaction of surviving common
law rules, with relevant recent case law and current statute law, in New South Wales.151

Further, by applying this knowledge to plausible future scenarios, under foreseeable conditions,
I hope to contribute to the planning of the future management of coastal lands in NSW. My
summary of the common law doctrine of accretion, which makes explicit its modes of
operation, and relevance to rising sea levels will, I hope, contribute new insight into, and
supplement current knowledge of, existing principles of law.

Another useful contribution to current knowledge may be made by my marshalling of feasible
public policy initiatives, some borrowed, some original, which a future State government might
adopt, to respond to the impacts of a receding shoreline or conflicts between competing rights.

IPCC, Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report AR5 – Summary for Policy Makers, (IPCC, 2014) 11.
Indeed the IPCC’s AR5 Report acknowledged that higher values for its predictions of sea level “could
not be excluded”, due to uncertainty about the rates and models of melting ice.
148
Kelly Levin, Benjamin Cashore, Steven Bernstein and Graeme Auld, ‘Playing it Forward: Path
Dependency, Progressive Incrementalism and the “Super Wicked” Problem of Climate Change’ (Yale,
2010), 6 <http://environment.research.yale.edu/documents/downloads/0/2010_super_wicked_levin_cashore_
146
147

bernstein_auld.pdf >
149

See Jackson and McIlvenny, above n 82.
See Schleupner, above n 85.
151
See Corkill, ‘Ambulatory’, above n 63.
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Part C – Research objectives and perspectives
In this part I outline my research objectives and describe the research perspectives adopted in
my staged approach to answering my primary research question.

9. Objectives of the research
Through my research and the completion of this thesis, I have sought to achieve a number of
inter-related objectives, described in the following sections.

One primary objective is to identify and highlight the real threats to public rights of access to
the foreshore and coastal waters posed by rising seas and ad hoc construction of seawalls, by
private landowners trying to protect their land. These threats are to the survival of sandy
beaches, to the public rights of access and, due to the physical hazards created by such
structures, to the public safety of people enjoying their public rights of access,152 and indirectly,
to coastal economies. By highlighting these threats I hope to alert the public, public-interest
non-government organisations, and coastal managers in local and State government, and inform
their discussions about public policies and management actions that might minimize or avoid
conflicts over competing rights in the future.
A second key objective of my thesis is to clarify ‘uncertainty’ about the effect of rising sea
levels on the land title of real property, under current NSW property law, and thus provide a
sound basis for developing public policy responses to global climate change’s local impacts.

A necessary contributing objective is to investigate public rights of access, and private property
rights, and assess their strengths and weaknesses, and their relative weight, at the present time.
A subsequent objective is to apply my knowledge of the competing rights to answer the primary
research question: whose rights will prevail, in the future.

Moreover, by critically examining the basis for claims of a Crown duty to protect, and of
superior private property rights, I hope to inform coastal managers and assist them in
responding appropriately to the demands and threats of private landowners and empower them
to prepare plans and implement management programs for coastal lands which are principally
152

Though it is not the focus of the thesis, I recognize that ad hoc construction of seawalls and a
consequent diminution or loss of safe public access to the beach and the change in the amenity of that
locality that this would produce, may also create adverse social impacts and economic shocks. See
section 8.2 in Chapter VI below.
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directed towards serving the public, not private, interests. My research thus aims to help clear
the log-jam in decision-making created by uncertainty over claims of superior private property
rights, so that the coastal management planning, and the development of appropriate public
policy responses to climate change impacts, can proceed without further delay. Removing this
uncertainty and overcoming the delays caused requires a robust appraisal of the merits of the
arguments and a final analysis of whose rights would prevail. Hence a secondary objective of
my research is to test the practical reality of theoretical claims that have been made.

10. Research perspectives
I approach this research as a person who has sought to advocate for and defend ‘the public
interest’ in its various forms. I recognize that important natural features and a key element of the
public interest – public access to the foreshore and coastal waters - are at risk of being lost, and
my natural response is to investigate how best to protect these invaluable public interests.
However, though the thesis is focused on human use, it is clear that other species which rely on
intertidal areas during their lifecycles, are also at risk of being squeezed, unless they can migrate
inland. Hence, I approach this anthropocentric topic, appreciating that climate impacts on
humans are but the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of impacts on species, habitats and biodiversity.

Since I seek solutions to issues of real world consequence, which have practical application and
utility for wider society, the key perspective informing my research methods is pragmatism.153
Kennedy quoted Dean Roscoe Pound’s definition of pragmatism as “the adjustment of
principles and doctrines to the human condition they are to govern rather than to assumed first
principles,” and noted that its methods involve “the marshalling of facts, the balancing of
interests and the weighing of values” to reach a conclusion which can “accomplish justice”.154
Moreover, since the thesis discusses impacts on natural ecosystems and operation of current
environmental law, but does so from ‘within the established legal framework, using existing
legal vocabulary’,155 it would be apt to characterize my perspective as ‘eco-pragmatism’.156

Walter B Kennedy, ‘Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law’ (1925) 9(2) Marquette Law Review 63-77.
Kennedy saw pragmatism as a legitimate philosophical perspective with which to approach legal
research, since it involves seeking “a practical solution”.
154
Ibid 64, 66.
155
Keith Hirokawa, ‘Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique in Environmental Law’
(2002) 21 Stanford Environmental Law Journal 225, 265.
156
Ibid 267. Hirokawa discussed the view of pragmatism in Daniel Farber’s Eco-pragmatism: Making
Sensible Environmental Decisions in an Uncertain World, (Uni Chicago Press, 1999). See also Nicole
Rogers, ‘Where the Wild Things Are: Finding the Wild in Law’ 183- 191, in Peter Burdon, (ed),
Exploring Wild Law – The Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence (Wakefield Press, 2011).
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Hence these methods - assembling facts, considering diverse interests and carefully assessing
their value - have been adopted in undertaking the research needed to answer the primary
research question. Though it underpins this chapter, pragmatism also imbues other chapters.

Consistent with this pragmatic approach, my methods of enquiry are not limited to those of a
single philosophical framework. Where a suitable methodology existed with which to pursue
my enquiry it made sense pragmatically to adopt or adapt it. However where no formal
methodology was available I have devised one. Hence, diverse sources of law and legal
commentary have been drawn on to develop plausible responses, identify relevant criteria with
which to assess their merits, and frame methods of analysis appropriate for the tasks defined.
I state these pragmatic decisions about methodology explicitly next in Part D.

First however it is appropriate to briefly identify the research perspectives adopted when
undertaking my research in defined stages. I describe the methodology of these stages in the
next part, but to illuminate the research perspectives being employed it is useful to state here the
goals of the analysis being undertaken in these stages of analysis:

Stage 1/ ascertain the current relationship between competing private and public rights;
Stage 2/ anticipate future circumstances and potential responses by a future government;
Stage 3/ evaluate the merits of these potential responses using appropriate criteria;
Stage 4/ forecast the future by assessing which response would be most likely to be adopted.
In Chapter II I pursue a doctrinal research perspective,157 since I enquire into the roots of
property law, its development in New South Wales and examine key concepts in contemporary
law and society, regarding private property rights and public rights. Further, I examine where
the boundary lies, both physically, and conceptually, in current NSW property law. Questions of
what is within and what is outside accepted legal doctrine,158 and how the boundary is defined,
are core doctrinal methods, and applying them to coastal land is the focus of the thesis. The
doctrinal method is thus apt for the tasks of Chapter II, and underpins Chapters III and IV.
I pursue my research from a positivist perspective159 in the next chapters, focusing on recent and
current case law (Chapter III) and statutes (Chapter IV) to make an assessment of the law in
New South Wales as it currently stands. By examining relevant primary sources I am able to
See Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal
Research’ (2012) 17 (1) Deakin Law Review 83-119, 101. They cited the 1987 Pearce Committee’s
report which characterized ‘doctrinal research’ as encompassing “a systematic exposition of the rules
governing a particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of
difficulty, and perhaps, predicts future developments.”
158
The core legal doctrine being examined is the doctrine of accretion. I discuss this in Chapter II below.
159
That is describing the relevant law ‘as it is’. See Leiboff and Thomas, above n 16, 139.
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understand the current relationship between competing rights and answer secondary research
questions as a positivist, as an interim step towards answering the primary research question.

I adopt a largely pragmatic perspective in Stage Two to devise methodologies for answering a
policy question about the future.160 I report in Chapter V the selections from the literature which
I believe are most relevant, and of most practical assistance to the research task being pursued.
From these sources I pragmatically select criteria with which to assess the merits of the potential
public policy responses of a future State government, to conflicts over use of coastal lands.

My research perspective shifts in Chapter VI when describing these potential responses. First I
adopt the common law tradition to estimate future court rulings, by applying relevant common
law rules.161 I then adopt a reform-oriented approach162 to other responses, since I apply ideas
from various sources to explore how the law of property might operate in the future.
I return to a pragmatic policy analysis mode in Stage Three in Chapter VII, to evaluate these
responses’ merits by assessing each potential response across two sets of criteria. In this way I
identify the potential response which would have greatest merit.

In Chapter VIII I complete the Stage Four of my policy analysis by making overtly political
assessments of which response a future NSW government would ‘most likely’ adopt. This shift
into a reform oriented perspective is necessary because in practice public policy decisions are
essentially political decisions.163 I then return to doctrinal research mode,164 to provide a
reasoned answer to the primary research question.

This is consistent with the ‘policy analysis’ type of legal research, which Minow described as ‘present
a problem, canvass alternatives, propose an evaluative scheme or method, recommend preferred
solution.’ See Martha Minow ‘Archetypal Legal Scholarship – A Field Guide’ AALS Workshop for New
Law Teachers (AAL 2006) 34-5, quoted in Hutchinson and Duncan, above note 156, 103.
161
Cook, et al (eds), above n 18, 73-82.
162
According to the Pearce Committee report cited in Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 156, 101, reformoriented research… ‘intensively evaluates the adequacy of existing rules and … recommends changes to
any rules found wanting’.
163
See Catherine Althaus, Peter Bridgman and Glyn Davis, The Australian Policy Handbook (Allen &
Unwin, 4th ed, 2007), 6.
164
Predicting ‘future developments’ is an element of doctrinal research according to the Pearce
Committee’s report, cited in Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 156, 101.
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Part D – Methodology
11. Overview of the methodology
On the face of it, answering a question about any circumstances in the future faces considerable
methodological obstacles. How can one conduct research to foretell the future? A simple idea
suggested a process that might lead to a credible hypothetical answer about future ‘rights’. I
reasoned that I needed to know how private property rights and public rights related to each
recently, and currently, in order to be able to frame an appropriate answer about the future.
Thus the idea of a staged trajectory for my research crystallized. I provide a short overview of
these stages next and a more detailed description of them in subsequent sections of this Part.

In the first phase of my research I examine the recent and current relationship between competing private property rights and public rights, as a stepping stone to exploring their likely
relationship in the future. I reasoned that whatever the results of this first stage of my research
were, it was not certain that any current dominance would continue into the future unchanged.
Though a future State government could continue the current relationship, it could theoretically,
seek to reverse the status quo, as a matter of public policy. Thus I theorized that notwithstanding
their current status, either private property rights or public rights could be ‘trumps’ in the future,
depending on the social and political goals, and mandate, of a future NSW government. Further
stages of analysis are thus required to scope the range of the potential responses by a future
government to conflicts between competing rights and to assess their merits, and likelihoods.

Hence in a second stage of analysis a range of potential responses are framed, and relevant
philosophical approaches which could influence a future government’s policy on whose rights
should prevail are identified, and suitable criteria for assessing their merits are adopted, in
preparation for later stages of analysis. As the final step in this stage, the actions proposed under
each potential response by a future government are elaborated.

In the third stage, these potential responses by a future government and the public policy actions
involved are evaluated to ascertain which response would best satisfy the criteria selected.

A fourth stage, preparing to answer the primary research question, is then possible. The results
of and insights from the merits assessment are applied to identify the response a future State
government is ‘most likely’ to adopt. With the benefit of these analyses, the likely policy
environment of the future may be forecast, framing a credible, coherent answer.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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12. Research methods employed
The research methods used are suitable for my enquiry of the current relationship between
competing rights, but they are also useful for enquiring into their likely future relationship, in an
attempt to solve the specific legal problem: whose rights will prevail when they come into
conflict over access to coastal lands in the future? Hence my research is in the form
characterized by Hutchinson and Duncan165 as ‘problem-based doctrine research’,166 and the
‘internal method’ of doctrinal legal research described by Lucy,167 is the principal method
employed. I identify and obtain the law relevant to conflicts between competing rights and
interpret and analyze these legal sources.168 Standard approaches to judicial interpretation169 and
settled rules of statutory interpretation170 are used to ascertain the meaning of key words and
phrases,171 to understand the scope and operation of legislative provisions. I apply logical
deductions, and inductive reasoning from my position ‘in the legal system’, in order to answer
my research questions about the relationship between competing rights under current law172
I then explore potential responses to future conflicts between competing ‘rights’, by applying
this doctrinal knowledge to hypothetical future circumstances, and referring to relevant
analogies, to forecast likely future results or effects, in more reform-oriented writing.173 Thus in
Chapter V the ‘external method’ described by Lucy, is used to look outside the law for concepts
from ‘philosophy, political theory and economy’174 with which to explore how the legal
framework might develop in the future to address conflicts between competing rights. Hence the
thesis aims to be more than a positivist report on current law in this jurisdiction.

Having provided an overview of my staged methodology and research methods, I next describe
in detail the methodological elements of the four stages of my research.

165

Hutchinson and Duncan above n 156, 83 - 119.
Ibid 106.
167
William Lucy, ‘Abstraction and the Rule of Law’ (2009) 29(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 481,
cited in Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 156, 114.
168
Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 156, 110. See my identification and discussion of relevant case law
in Chapter III and applicable NSW statutes in Chapter IV.
169
Principally, discerning the ratio of the decision from other obiter comments, in the majority of the
judgements of appellate courts. Cook et al, above, n 18, 79.
170
See Elizabeth Ellis, Principles and Practice of Australian Law (Lawbook, 3rd ed, 2013) 219-256;
Michelle Sanson, Statutory Interpretation (OUP, 2012); Cook et al, above n 18, 167-310.
171
If needed, further guidance on the meanings of the rulings of the court, or the operation of statute law,
will be provided by legal dictionaries, legal services and learned discussions in published law journals.
172
These methods are the hallmarks of the internal method according to Christopher McCrudden, ‘Legal
Research and the Social Science’ [2006] Law Quarterly Review 632, 633, cited in Hutchinson and
Duncan, above n 156, at 115.
173
Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 156, 108.
174
Lucy, in Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 156, 114-5.
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13. Stage One – Ascertaining current relationship
In this section I explain the methodology I employ in the first stage of my investigation of the
current relationship between competing rights.

13.1 Framing pertinent secondary research questions

As a result of analyzing the interests of private landowners adversely affected by shoreline
recession, I identified a suite of issues. These were concerns about:
a) the nature, and the location, of their real property boundary,
b) what might be done to stop the erosion and forestall or halt shoreline recession;
c) what the ultimate result might be, if their land is subject to more erosion and inundation
d) whether the government has a duty to protect private land, by managing coastal hazards;
e) their continued long term ownership of land as it becomes eroded and or flooded
f) eligibility for payment of compensation if their ‘real property’ were wholly lost to the sea.

From these concerns I developed a suite of secondary research questions whose answers could
ground an understanding of their current relationship, and possible future relationship.175

Accepting that seas are rising and shorelines receding, these questions are:
• where will the boundary of private land, affected by these coastal hazards, be located?
• who owns land when it becomes covered by tidal waters ie < MHWM??
• do landowners have a private property ‘right’ to build seawalls to defend against the sea?
• are governments duty bound to construct defences against the sea?
• will governments be liable to pay compensation for private land ‘lost’ to the sea?
Answers to these questions are provided in section 9 of Chapter IV below.
13.2 The search for evidence of ‘trumps’

A simple methodology for exploring these secondary research questions was adopted. I formed
two hypotheses: based on the two possible answers: ‘Yes, Private property rights would trump
public rights’ and ‘No, Public rights trump private property rights’.176 I reasoned that if either
proposition were correct, it would be apparent from the records of our society’s two arbiters of
conflicts over competing rights, the courts and the state Legislature. I posited that since ‘trump’
cards are instantly recognizable, and achieve uncontestable wins, evidence of rights acting as
‘trumps’ would also be obvious in the records of the resolution of prior conflicts between
175

Guiding research questions are considered useful, see Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 156, 109.
Ibid 108. Doctrinal researchers may use ‘test hypotheses’.
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competing rights. Consequently, I undertook to search the primary sources of law for evidence
of rights acting as trumps, which could assist in answering the primary research question.

13.3 Reporting the results of research on current relationship

The results of my search for ‘trumps’ and research into the relationship between competing
rights, under current NSW law, are reported at the end of Chapter IV. With the benefit of a
review of relevant cases and statutes, an assessment of the relative weight of competing rights,
as at 2020, is then possible. That assessment of their current relationship concludes Stage One.
14. Stage Two – Anticipating the future
In this section I outline the method for considering other factors which may affect the nature of
the relationship between private property rights and public rights, in the future.

14.1 Moving from existing law to possible future scenarios

Having understood the nature of the current relationship between these competing rights at the
end of Stage One, I reasoned that it was not inevitable that current institutional arrangements
would continue indefinitely. However ascertaining their current relationship allows me to
explore their likely future relationship, by framing potential responses by a future State
government as either maintaining or overthrowing the status quo.
To develop a credible answer about their future relationship other factors – apart from climate
change – that may be in play, and influential, in the future would need to be considered. Three
crucial factors with the potential to affect or determine their future relationship were identified:
i] the rulings of future courts on specific cases which have wider application;
ii] the policy of a future State government; and
iii] the attitude and co-operation of the legislature in the Parliament of New South Wales.
An existing methodology for estimating future courts’ rulings is available. It is possible to
estimate the decisions of future courts by using the common law tradition and applying existing
legal rules. While this approach could achieve a high degree of certainty where existing law is
applied to well-known situations, it could also assist in estimating future rulings of the court
where existing elements of law would be applied to novel circumstances.
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Though methodologies such as the Delphi method,177exist in the social sciences, for research
institutions to assess the effect of past government policy,178 estimate the likely content of future
government policy and build a consensus on what future government policy should be, based on
expert opinion, which could be adapted to forecast the electoral appeal of future government
policy based on the views of beach users and coastal residents, or to estimate the level of a
future legislature’s co-operation in enacting government policy,179 use of these expert or
consultative approaches for these tasks in a doctoral thesis poses practical difficulties.180
Moreover their use is unnecessary given I can make estimations of these matters myself which
are adequate for the purposes of the thesis, by using a diverse set of scenarios.181

I outline the methodology adopted for framing a suite of potential future government policy
responses to conflicts between competing rights in the next section, and I explain how I estimate
these potential responses’ appeal to electors and legislators in section 15.3 below.

14.2 The central roles of a future State government and the legislature

The policy of a future State government of New South Wales, if enacted by the legislature, is
perhaps the most crucial factor, because it has the capacity to determine the nature of the
relationship between private property rights and public rights, in the future, through legislation.

It is clear that it is the NSW government which has the central role in affecting the exercise of
private property rights or public rights in the future. The State’s jurisdiction and powers relate
directly to real property,182 coastal management and coastal navigation.183 Moreover, the State’s

HA Linstone and M Turoff ‘Introduction’, in HA Linstone and M Turoff (eds) The Delphi method:
Techniques and applications (2002): 4-12
178
R Adam Manely, ‘The Policy Delphi: a method for identifying intended and unintended consequences
of educational policy’, 11(6) Policy Futures in Education (2013) 755-768, 755.
179
Ibid 4. Linstone and Turoff advise that Delphi technique requires a researcher to ‘sculpt’ its
application to the desired subject area, as an important preliminary step in its use. Hence they admit that
the technique is not a ‘neatly wrapped package sitting on the shelf, ready to use’.
180
There financial and time costs in the many sub-processes involved in such consultative processes,
which include: recruiting and briefing suitable participants or experts, formulating and issuing an initial
questionnaire, seeking and collating the results of initial feedback from participants, distributing feedback to participants, issuing a refined questionnaire for a second, third (or fourth) round of consultation,
collating and reporting further feedback, and analysing feedback, in order to produce an answer. See
Manely, above n 178, 755.
181
The IPCC has created projections of future GHG emission levels by adopting a suite of scenarios
describing national government policy responses. See IPCC, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios by
Working Group III IPCC (Cambridge University Press, 2000) (IPCC SRES, 2000).
182
British colonies in Australia were unwilling to cede control of property law to the new
Commonwealth, and the relevant statute in New South Wales, the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) was
enacted shortly before federation. See the discussion of this in Simon Evans, ‘Property and the Drafting
of the Australian Constitution’ (2001) Federal Law Review 6.
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legislative powers have been held to be extensive and effectively unlimited.184 Hence, a policy
adopted by executive government, about whose rights should prevail in the future, would be
potentially determinative, but would not be enough by itself. The legislature’s co-operation in
enacting relevant legislation, would be essential if the policy were to become law. For these
reasons, whatever the status quo, if the legislature enacted legislation which repealed existing
statutes and created new statutory processes, a future State government could, in theory,
determine a new relationship between private property rights and public rights of access.185
Without such an intentional reversal however the status quo would likely continue.

However, without a majority of support in the Legislative Council, announcements of policy to
reverse the status quo by a government controlling only the Legislative Assembly, would have
no effect at law. Hence the attitudes of the Members of the Legislative Council (MLCs), and the
level of their co-operation in enacting the legislation necessary to implement the government ’s
policy, would be vital factors in the success of any government policy response.

14.3 Framing potential responses by a future government

I reasoned that the scope and nature of potential responses to conflicting rights would be finite.
A future government could pursue either of two propositions as their public policy goal:
privilege private property rights or protect public rights of access. However, I realized that this
is not the full scope of the responses available. A potential response by government could be
inaction, due to unwillingness to address these matters, or its inability to convince the
legislature enact their policy and change existing statute law. Hence a failure to act, and the
courts adjudicating conflicts between competing rights, is possible and worth considering.

Another response that a pragmatic future government might pursue, is also plausible: attempt to
do both – protect both private property rights and public rights. Thus four future pathways were
initially identified: do nothing, privilege private, protect public, or attempt to do both.

I observed however that these responses could be pursued to varying degrees and decided to
include a modest and more robust version of each, as potential variations. However, I concluded

The management of coastal lands and waters were formally delegated to the States, under the ‘offshore
constitutional settlement’ by Commonwealth legislation, Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth)
and Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980 (Cth).
184
See Durham Holdings PL v State of New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399, Kirby J at [56].
185
It would be unlikely that Regulations by themselves, could achieve an effective reversal of the status
quo. Legislation would be required to amend or repeal the common law, and existing statutes.
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Chapter I – Conflict over competing rights

that postulating different intensities in the courts’ responses would be inappropriate since they
would follow existing precedents186 and their rulings would likely be within a narrow band.
Thus using the IPCC’s approach of defining plausible future scenarios for emissions reductions
based on stated government policies187 seven theoretically possible, potential responses by a
future State government to conflicts between competing rights were identified, as shown in
Figure 11 below.
FUTURE PATHWAYS

POTENTIAL
RESPONSES

Nil response

do nothing

status quo

privilege private
property rights

Weak
Robust

protect / enhance
public rights

Strong
Stronger

attempt to
do both

Balanced
Accept + accommodate

Figure 11. Decision pathways and potential responses
The characters of these seven potential responses reflect differing policies on the core concerns
of adversely affected private landowners, identified in Part A above:
a] the nature and location of the real property boundary,
b] the ownership of land below tidal waters,
c] the ‘right to defend’,
d] the government ‘duty to protect’,
e] any right to compensation, and
f] level of public funding available.

By framing them in this way, and by constraining their scope to six key concerns, I generate a
limited but diverse set of potential government responses likely to cover most eventualities.
These responses are described in Chapter VI and are summarized in Table 4 of Chapter VI.

14.4 Selection of relevant literature which may be persuasive

The next step in this stage is to consider philosophical views in the literature which could

Exercising the principle of stare decisi. See Cook et al, above n 18, 73 – 75.
IPCC, above n 176, 3-4.
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influence key government Ministers and cross-bench Members of the Legislative Council, on
whose rights should prevail, and which of these responses should be adopted.
My research into secondary sources which could shape legislators’ attitudes, and future public
policy directions identified a polarized literature on property theory. I reasoned that I should
canvas views which discuss the management of coastal hazards’ impacts on coastal lands,
across this spectrum, from pro-private property rights to pro-public rights.188

The works selected for close review were thus chosen to reflect these diverse perspectives. The
public interest views considered highlight the existence and antiquity of ‘public property’ in
coastal land,189 designate an ethical framework for private ownership of land,190 suggest how
exercising private property rights over land might best be done,191 and identify potential
directions for the future development of local laws on ‘real property’.192 Eric T Freyfogle views
are especially useful due to his focus on the future ethical management of land, which
recognizes its innate character and condition,193 and contributes to social goals.
In contrast Coleman’s article presents one landowner’s perspective on the primacy of private
property rights in New South Wales,194 when governments develop policies to address the
impacts of climate change on coastal lands. Cooper and McKenna’s review was also identified
as relevant since it explores a novel private landowner perspective and assesses the validity of
landowners’ calls for ‘social justice’ in decisions about coastal management in the UK.195 These
works are considered more closely in Chapter V.
15. Stage Three – Evaluating the merits
Having generated a suite of potential responses by a future NSW government to conflicts
between competing private and public rights, and stated an intention to evaluate their merits in

The consideration of a range of views including ‘opposing and incompatible perspectives’ is consistent
with pragmatism’s practical approach to problem solving. See Hirokawa, above n, 155, 252.
189
See Joseph L Sax, ‘The Public Trust doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention’ (1969-1970) 68 Michigan Law Review 471-566; JL Sax, ‘The Public Trust doctrine in
Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine (1970) 79 Yale Law Journal 762 763-4; JL
Sax, ‘Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles’ (1980) 14 University of
California Davis, Law Review 185-194. See also Rose, above n 237, 713.
190
See Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 183, 639 - 640.
191
Gregory Alexander, et al, ‘A Statement of Progressive Property’ (2008) 94 Cornell Law Review 743-4.
192
See eg Thom, above n 316, 38-40.
193
Eric T Freyfogle, ‘Ownership and Ecology’ (1993) 43 Case Western Reserve Law Review 1269-1297.
I focus on Freyfogle’s work in s 6 Chapter V below.
194
Coleman, above n 13, 422.
195
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123.
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order to estimate which response would be most likely to be adopted by a future government, a
necessary next procedural step is to nominate criteria against which they are to be assessed.

In this section I explain the derivation of evaluation criteria from the literature, introduce the
criteria adopted for evaluating the merits of the seven potential responses, and outline how they
will be applied in assessing the merits of each potential response, in stage three of my analysis.

15.1 Derivation of evaluation criteria

In my review of the literature, I found no ready-made set of criteria with which to evaluate the
merits of theoretical models of future government policy affecting the ownership and use of
coastal land, or their likelihood of success. However, the literature suggested methods of
assessing diverse options and developing feasible analysis about likely future events by
consulting participants, or panels of experts, using the Delphi method.196 This approach was
explored but the time and cost of the extensive sub-processes involved,197 made it impractical.
However, a key step in its method, ‘sculpting’ the technique to develop ‘a relevant application
to the desired subject area’,198 suggested that identifying useful criteria myself to meet my
specific purposes, was an approach which was plausible, practical and feasible. Hence it became
clear that seeking others’ views on suitable criteria for my purposes was also unnecessary.
I concluded that I could draw on the relevant literature and pragmatically identify appropriate
criteria myself with which assessments might be made of the merits of these potential responses.

Several ideas offered a useful framework. First, practical criteria suitable to the assessment task
being contemplated would be needed. Second, the subject’s complexity warranted using
multiple criteria: one set to assess the merits of the responses in their decisions about the future
use of coastal lands; and another to evaluate their substance as public policy as an analogue of
their likely success as government policy. Third, assessing the merits of these potential
responses may not be enough to frame a credible answer to my research question. Criteria
would be required for the final stage of analysis, to assess which response would be ‘most
likely’ to be adopted by a future government.

See HA Linstone and M Turoff ‘Introduction’, in HA Linstone and M Turoff (eds) The Delphi
method: Techniques and applications (2002): 4-12. The Delphi method was originally developed to
make estimates of future events.
197
See the outline of the many sub-processes involved in consultations, in Manely, above n 178, 755.
198
Linstone and Turoff, above n 196, 4.
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Identifying the assessment criteria myself is justified by my pragmatic approach, because it
works:199 the criteria selected suit the task at hand200 and are plausible because they relate to key
issues discussed in the literature.

15.2 Criteria adopted

From my review of the literature on private property rights and the ethical management of land
the works of Eric T Freyfogle appeared highly relevant. Several of his articles, 201 nominate
specific criteria which he asserts ought to be considered by an ethical landowner when making
decisions about the future use of land. Though Freyfogle’s focus is on the individual
landowner’s ethical conduct in their land management, they are certainly relevant and
applicable at a larger scale, to governments making decisions about the future use of land.
Hence from Freyfogle’s work I adopted five criteria, as hallmarks of ethical land management.
Before using land, ethical landowners would consider the:
a] land’s physical condition,
b] social community of people potentially affected by their decision,
c] ecological community which inhabited that land,
d] effects of the land use over some lengthy period time, and
e] ways this land use might contribute to a wider social good.202

To estimate the likely success of these potential responses by a future government, I reasoned
that they would also need to be assessed against criteria for ‘successful public policy’. Again
since no ready-made set of criteria were available to evaluate their merits as public policy, I
resolved to pragmatically develop a relevant set of criteria myself, by drawing on published
discussions of the impact of government decisions. 203 From this literature, a short list of key
attributes for successful public policy was identified: a clear public interest rationale, was

A pragmatic approach seeks to ‘solve real problems’ and develop ‘answers to practical questions’
rather than identify theoretical principles. They are “free to consider a variety of ideas, approaches and
solutions without committing to particular theoretical foundations, such that “all relevant ideas become
useful to the resolution of a dilemma”. See Hirokawa, ‘Some Pragmatic Observations on Radical
Critique in Environmental Law’, (2002) 21 Stanford Environmental Law Journal 225-281, 251-2.
200
The adaptation of existing theories and principles to account for ‘the contextual needs that make the
inquiry important’, in solving practical problems, is a hallmark of a pragmatic jurisprudence. Hirokawa,
above n 15, 250.
201
Frefogle’s writing is extensive. See Eric T Freyfogle, ‘Ethics, community, and private land’ (1996) 23
Ecology Law Quarterly 631 – 66; see also Eric T Freyfogle, 'Property and Liberty' (2010) 34 Harvard
Environmental Law Review 75 – 118.
202
Eric T Freyfogle, ‘Eight Principles for Property Owners in the Anti-Sprawl Age’ (1999) 23 (3)
William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 777-799.
203
For eg see JAG Cooper and J McKenna, ‘Social justice in coastal erosion management: The temporal
and spatial dimensions’ (2008) 39 Geoforum 294-306.
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timely, cost-effective, minimized disruption, and credible because it relied on expert opinion
and applied best practice.
Consequently, five criteria for assessing responses’ merits as ‘public policy’ were adopted:
a) its justifying rationale: how well does the response support a ‘greater public good’,
b) its timeliness: was it timely? How well did the response consider the effects of time?
c) its cost-effectiveness: the utility, level and value of any public spending required;
d) its potential disruption: whether incidental costs, unintended impacts or outcomes, delays,
difficulties or uncertainty might be generated in its implementation, and
e) the credibility of the response with the public, and other stakeholders,204 given relevant expert
opinion in published research, and best practice in coastal management.205

Hence the merits of each potential response will be assessed using two sets of five criteria: the
hallmarks of ethic land use decision making; and indicators of sound public policy. Additional
criteria for ascertaining which response would be ‘most likely’ are stated in section 6.1 below.
The derivation of these criteria from the selected literature, and their use to evaluate potential
responses, are further explained in Chapter V.

15.3 Estimating how each potential response might play out

Assessing the merits of the potential responses of a future government by evaluating their likely
satisfaction of the criteria selected, lies at the core of Stage Three of my research project.
However this assessment requires an estimation of how the potential responses outlined above
may play out in the future. Hence estimating the future events is a key step in this stage of my
analysis. However, in my research I encountered no ready-made methodology for such a task.
Though the IPCC’s predictions of likely future climate conditions are available, no guidance is
available for estimating other key elements under consideration: the policy direction of a future
government, the difficulty of implementing their coastal management policies, their effectiveness in managing climate change impacts or resolving conflicts between competing uses, or the

204

As well as beach-using non-resident members of the public, and beachfront landowners, other stakeholders would include coastal science researchers, experts in coastal processes, natural resource or risk
management, local council staff and other managers of coastal Crown lands. See Rachel Baird and
Donald R Rothwell (eds), Australian Coastal and Marine Law (Federation Press, 2011) 56 -58.
205
Such as the IPCC’s publications, and the findings of scientific researchers. Best practice in coastal
zone management would require an integrated co-ordinated approach applying the principles of ESD.
Best practice in coastal management planning is presently described in the NSW Government, Coastal
Management Manual Parts A & B (2018) and reference documents it cites, such as the Coastal Council
of NSW, Coastal Design Guidelines (NSW Government, 2003).
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level of public support they may engender. So pragmatically, I have adopted my own approach
for estimating future events. I describe the methods employed in this complex task next.
When making mental estimates of future events I actively speculate on the diverse ways a
specific scenario might play out in the future, and the ideas - which shape the future possibilities
at the foundation of these estimates - arise in me. These ideas are reflected upon and relevant
factors further considered in subsequent iterations of internal analysis, to generate plausible
estimates of likely future outcomes. Thus they are the creative output of my intellect when
imagining future circumstances which cannot be proven at this time.206 Reflecting on the
making of these estimates, I recognized that several elements form the core of my approach. I
draw on my familiarity with public policy on NSW coastal management,207 understanding of
legislative procedures208 and political processes,209 and apply the knowledge and insights
developed through my academic research.210 I consider relevant analogies and use legal
reasoning to draw conclusions about logical consequences.211 My aim is to generate credible
estimates, based on appropriate assumptions, about likely future scenarios, that are realistic, and
nuanced, not exaggerated. Hence these estimates are the syntheses of my skills, experience and
knowledge, applied imaginatively but plausibly, to the policy or scenario being considered.212
I have sought to make these estimations in general rather than specific terms. I prefer to indicate
outcomes that may occur, or are likely, or very likely to occur, rather than certain occurrences.
Where there are reasons to be less confident in making estimates I am explicit about this.

15.4 Assessment of potential responses against criteria

Evaluating the merits of potential responses by a future government. involves making qualitative assessments of their likely satisfaction of the ten selected criteria, by making informed,

This is consistent with the description of doctrinal research as involving ‘rigorous analysis and creative
synthesis’ by the Council of Australian Law Deans, CALD Statement on the Nature of Research (2005)
quoted in Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 156, 105.
207
As a non-government member of the ministerial advisory body, the NSW Coastal Committee (199098), and as a member of the statutory body, the Coastal Council of New South Wales (1999 – 2003).
208
In 1990 I worked as liaison officer to NSW Parliament for the state’s conservation groups. In 1991 I
sought the disallowance of a Regulation, drafted special legislation and successfully lobbied for its
enactment as the Endangered Fauna (Interim Protection) Act 1991 (NSW). See Tim Bonyhady, Places
Worth Keeping: Conservationists, Politics and Law (Allen & Unwin, 1993) 90 -103. I later successfully
sought a new Bill (No.2) to amend the Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW) in 1998, and drafted amendments to the Act in 2002. In 2015 I critiqued the Bill for the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW).
209
I was Secretary of The Greens NSW 1994-5, and media co-ordinator in the 1995 NSW Legislative
Council election campaign, in which the first Greens MLC was elected. Later I was The Greens
candidate in the NSW seat of Lismore in 1999 and 2003, and in the federal division of Page in 2001.
210
Elements of my research have been published in peer reviewed law journals. See Corkill, above n 63.
211
These are some of the tools of doctrinal legal research. See Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 156, 111.
212
This has been described as ‘a unique blend of deduction and induction’. See CALD, in Hutchinson and
Duncan, above n 156, 105.
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albeit subjective judgements, like those used in estimating future events, described above.
To do this I employ a blend of deductive and inductive reasoning to assess each response
against each criterion, using my personal reflections on likely answers to the focus questions
designated for each criterion, described in sections 8 and 9 of Chapter V and my observations of
the advantages and disadvantages of these responses made in Chapter VI.
When making these assessments I will aim to apply these criteria consistently across all seven
potential responses, based on four considerations:
i] whether it is foreseeably possible that the criterion could be satisfied by that response;
ii] if so, in what ways, to what extent and how well;
iii] whether the satisfaction of a criterion might be logically indicated, or contra-indicated, in the
substance of a potential response, and
iv] whether there are foreseeable obstacles to satisfying the criterion under that response.
Where I am uncertain about the application, impact or satisfaction of a criterion by a potential
response, I am explicit about that uncertainty.
Based on my assessments, I award a raw score for each of these responses’ satisfaction of each
criterion, in the range of 0.0 to 1.0. This process of scoring potential responses against the
nominated criteria is described next.

15.5 Scoring merits assessments

As noted in s 15.2 Chapter I, ten criteria will be used to assess the merits of seven potential
responses. These assessments involve posing the focus question for each criterion and drawing
on the existing elements of property theory and law213 to develop, by using internal processes of
deductive and inductive reasoning which integrate the four considerations above, hypothetical
but realistic answers to them, upon which judgements are then made about the response’s likely
performance against that criterion. Based on those appraisals, which note relevant correspondences with these existing elements of property theory and law, I assign a score for the
response’s likely satisfaction of each criterion. In this task I use the standard multi-criteria
scoring model often used in personnel recruitment to compare competing applicants,214 or in

213

Relevant elements of property theory are discussed in Chapters II and V, instructive decisions of the
courts on the operation of property laws, are considered in Chapter III, and current applicable statutes
are examined in Chapter IV, below.
214
See ‘Rating Scales for Government Selection Panels’ at < https://www.selectioncriteria.com.au/ratingscales.shtml >.
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other project selection tasks,215 where raw scores are awarded against criteria, which are then
‘weighted’ for overall importance,216 and subsequently aggregated to produce a final score.
Using this method, and my deliberated assessment of each response, raw scores of a maximum
of 1.0 will be awarded for full satisfaction of each criterion, and raw scores of 0.9 – 0.1 will be
awarded for lesser degrees of satisfaction.217 See Table 1. below.
Raw Score

Level of satisfaction of criteria

0.5 Basic satisfaction

1.0 Full satisfaction

0.4 Partial satisfaction

0.9 Very good satisfaction

0.3 Minor satisfaction

0.8 Good satisfaction

0.2 Low satisfaction

0.7 Moderate satisfaction

0.1 Very low satisfaction

0.6 Fair satisfaction

0.0 Nil satisfaction

Table 1. - Assessment raw scores for satisfaction of criteria
The raw scores of each potential response, cited in brackets in each sub-heading, are collated in
Table 6, section 11 Chapter VII. These raw scores against all criteria are then ‘weighted’, that is
adjusted, by assigning greater ‘weight’ or numeric value to two of the ten criteria - ‘physical
characteristics’ and ‘public interest rationale’ – based on my view of their relative importance.
I determined that how well the land’s ‘physical characteristics’ would be taken into account by
the response was the criterion of highest importance, due to the profound physical impacts
possible on coastal land due to coastal hazards, likely to exacerbated by climate change, and the
very high physical risks to people and real property if they are ignored.
I adopted the articulation by government of a coherent ‘public interest rationale’ as a second
highly important criterion because it would explain subsequent actions, be crucial for obtaining
public support and justify committing the expenditure of very large sums of public funds.
To simplify the weighting process each response’s scores against these two criteria will be
weighted x 1.0, and all other raw scores against the other eight criteria will be weighted x 0.8.
These weighted scores are then aggregated to produce a weighted final score (see Table 6).

See Anne DePianter Henriksen and Ann Jensen Traynor, ‘A Practical R&D Project-Selection Tool’,
(1999) (46(2) IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 158-170, 168.
216
Ibid 163. Weighting of criteria typically considers overall importance but may factor in other
considerations, such as risk. See Steve Walton, ‘The Importance of Weighting Selection Criteria’ at <
https://www.fenchurch.com.au/resources/How-to-weight-selection-criteria.pdf >.
217
Indications of likely high and low scores are stated for most criteria, in Chapter V.
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These scores will allow comparisons of the response’s merits across the criteria, and their final
weighted scores will indicate a ranking of their capacity to satisfy these criteria (see Table 7 –
Ranking of potential responses by merit, in s. 15 of Chapter VII).
However identifying the response with greatest theoretical merit does not mean that it would be
‘most likely’ to be adopted by a future government.
16. Stage Four – Preparing to answer
To foresee the likely policy environment of the future, to frame a credible context in which the
primary research question can be practically answered, a final stage of assessment is needed to
identify the potential response ‘most likely’ to be adopted by a future NSW government.
16.1 Moving from ‘greatest merit’ to ‘most likely’.

This assessment of likeliness is needed because a future government’s decision on the response
it would adopt would be a political, not an academic, decision. Hence it is necessary to move
beyond a technical assessment of merits. While key ministers would likely consider the results
of a departmental merits assessment of potential responses, and their advantages and
disadvantages, the ministers would probably employ overtly political considerations to canvas
their political feasibility, when deciding which response the government would adopt.

These political calculations would seek to gauge:
i) its difficulty; in justifying it, enacting the necessary legislation and implementing it, and
ii) the overall cost of implementing the response; and
iii) the level of political ‘kudos’218 or electoral advantage likely to gained by the government.

In Chapter V I explain how these considerations were adopted as key criteria for conducting a
final political assessment of each response’s ‘likeliness’ and note their correspondence with
elements of the property theory, and property law, examined in Chapters II, III and IV. I note
that in government, assessing responses against these factors would require detailed reports, and
multiple agencies’ work, but for the purposes of this thesis I use insights about the difficulty,
cost and electoral appeal of responses, drawn from the assessments made in Chapter VII.

16.2 Applying insights from these results

These political considerations by key ministers would likely integrate insights on each potential
response made in the merits assessment, particularly the successful public policy criteria.
‘kudos’: n. glory, renown: Delbridge et al, (eds) above n 4, 984.
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Considerations of difficulty would include: difficulty in articulating a public interest rationale,
in obtaining public and legislative support to enact the response, and in its timely implementation given the disruption likely to be caused by the response. Politically, ‘timely’ would mean
within the four year electoral cycle of New South Wales. Appraisals of cost-effectiveness of
public spending would be simplified to focus on overall cost. Responses with low or moderate
overall cost, or staged costs, would be preferred politically, since they would not overcommit
public funds or compete for funding with other policy areas. Estimates of the kudos the
government might gain with voters would likely consider the strengths of the public interest
rationale justifying the response, potential for creating disruption and make overt political calls
about its likely public credibility, its electoral appeal in key electorates. Political estimates of
these kinds would likely use a simple ratings scale: very low, low, moderate, high, very high.

Hence political calculations of difficulty, overall cost and electoral appeal would make the
adoption of some potential responses by a future government, more likely than others.

By identifying the response most likely to be adopted, a credible forecast can then be made of
the likely policy environment of the future, in which an answer to the primary research question
might be stated, about the relationship between competing rights in the future.

16.3 Answering the primary research question

Having identified the likely policy environment of the future, as a plausible context, I will be
able to state a coherent answer to the primary research question. The method for arriving at this
answer will be principally deductive logic. Based on my conclusions about their current
relationship, and the likely policy environment of the future, I will be able to frame a plausible
answer about their likely relationship in the future. In order to be coherent, the answer ought to
agree or disagree with the proposition in the primary research question, and state the reasons for
the conclusions reached, with any necessary qualifications.

This completes the description of my proposed methodology and concludes Chapter I.
In this chapter I introduced the topic, defined key terms, illustrated the problem, and set out my
research perspectives, objectives and methodology. In Chapter II the meanings of ‘property’ and
the nature of private and public rights in New South Wales are examined.
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"All forms that perish other forms supply,
(By turns we catch the vital breath and die)
Like bubbles on the sea of matter borne,
They rise, they break, and to that sea return."
Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man (1732 -34)

Chapter II – Property and rights: private and public
Introduction to Chapter II
In this Chapter I develop the ideas outlined in my introduction and examine the key concepts
that comprise my primary research question.
In Part A I describe the concept of ‘property’, its various meanings and usages, and report the
difficulties encountered by theorists in developing a sound definition of ‘property’. I canvas
meaning of ‘property’, define key terms employed, and clarify my focus as ‘real property’. Two
little known but applicable vestiges of English common law and an obscure but relevant metaprinciple of property law are described since their application to real property is highly relevant.
An overview of the literature is presented to demonstrate its enormous diversity and to situate
the works I have selected for closer review within the literature on property.
In Part B I provide an overview of modern thinking on ‘property’ and ownership. I describe the
nature and extent of private property ‘rights’ available to landowners in New South Wales and
distinguish rights which can be identified as settled law, from claimed private property rights.
This material is presented to establish the nature of property and property rights as socially
constructed, not god given, to situate my own review of claimed rights within the norms of the
property theory literature, and to make explicit the theoretical positions from which I proceed.

In Part C I trace the key ideas about public property in land from early civil law texts, describe
their evolution into common law ‘public rights’ and outline the scope of current public rights to
access coastal lands and waters, in this jurisdiction. In Part D I report my conclusions.

Part A – Conceptualizing ‘property’
In this Part I outline the difficulties of defining ‘property’, provide an overview of relevant
literature, and describe key concepts in current property theory which are largely agreed. I
explain my use of key terms and focus my discussion on ‘real property’ before noticing two
relevant surviving elements of earlier land law.
______________________________________________________________________
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1. Defining ‘property’
The term ‘property’ has a range of meanings in its contemporary usage.219 Some meanings have
continued from early use,220while others have become lapsed in common usage but survive in
legal parlance. 221 Subsequently new applications of the term have developed.222

1.1 The evolution of the term

As will be shown below, the term ‘property’ is understood to have a legal meaning as the ‘legal
or equitable interests’ in a thing, not the thing itself. Other uses of the term abound however.
Using ‘property’ to refer explicitly to the object of property, while technically incorrect, is not
new. Writing in 1913, an eminent American jurist noted the ‘looseness’ in the use of the term
and distinguished its confusing non-legal usage by laymen, ‘to indicate the physical objects to
which various legal rights, privileges, etc relate’, and its proper usage to ‘denote the legal
interest (or aggregate of legal relations) appertaining to such physical object’.223 I discuss
Hohfeld’s contribution to property theory in s 4 Chapter II below.
Historically, a distinction has been made between ‘personal property’224 and ‘real property’
being land and buildings, including interests in land such as easements or a profit a prendre.225
The origin of this distinction is remote,226 and in contemporary usage the distinction has been
blurred or lost. The ambit of things which can be the subject of ‘property’, or legal interests, has
however developed substantially during the 19th and 20th centuries.227
219

See Delbridge et al (eds) above n 4, 1413.
referring to ‘an essential or distinctive attribute or quality’ of an object or thing, is not the meaning
considered in this thesis.
221
Delbridge et al (eds), above note 4, 1413, see definition 8.
222
Stuart Banner, American Property A History of How, Why, and What We Own (Harvard UP, 2011).
223
Wesley N Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913)
23 Yale Law Journal 16, 21-22. To emphasize how confusion had persisted on this point Hohfeld
quoted a statement on this distinction in a case from 1856: “In a strict legal sense, land is not ‘property’,
but the subject of property. The term ‘property’, although in common parlance frequently applied to a
tract of land or a chattel, in its legal signification ‘means only the rights of the owner in relation to it’.
‘It denotes a right over a determinate thing’. ‘Property is the right of any person to possess use, enjoy,
and dispose of a thing’. Selden J in Wynehamer v People 13 NY 378, 433…”
224
Peter Butt and David Hamer (eds), LexisNexis Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 4th ed, 2011), 438. Personal property includes chattels, being movable possessions: see
Butt and Hamer, above n 207, 86-7. ‘Chattels real’ include leasehold interests in land and annuities
deriving from such interests. ‘Chattels personal’ include all other forms of personal property.
225
Butt and Hamer, above n 207, 466. Fr ‘a right to take’ something off another person’s land.
226
It is said to lie in the ‘causes of action’ available to the lawful owner to recover possession of them.
Originally, in English common law, proceedings to recover ‘property in land’ were known as a “real
action” (actio realis), while proceedings to recover personal property were known as “personal action”
(action personalis). ‘And so property recoverable by the real actions came to be called “real” property.’
Peter Butt, Land Law (Lawbook, 6th ed, 2010) 94 [5 17].
227
It includes tangible things of monetary value such as cash, stocks and bonds, and intangible things
such as outstanding loans and debts, appointed positions in statutory offices and streams of revenue or
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1.2 The search for an essential definition

As these various uses show, reporting an essential definition of ‘property’ is not straightforward,228 and may remain elusive.229 Various attempts at stating a key definition compete, but
there is no consensus on a definition which reflects all property’s nuances.230
A principal emphasis in ‘property’ theory is the idea that property is the relations between
people regarding a thing, not the thing itself.231 The nature of these relations are the subject of
dispute among theorists, since some writers posit a moral, and legal ‘right’ to own a thing,232
while others contend that what constitutes property varies, and includes interests in a thing less
than a ‘right’ to ‘own’.233 Thus it appears ‘property’ is a flexible, abstract social concept.234
In mainstream property theory, ‘property’ as a concept, is also said to be ‘de-physicalized’
because the physical characteristics of the owned thing are not determinative: it is the abstract
relations between people regarding the thing, which constitute property.235 Some writers posit
that to qualify as property, the relations regarding a thing need to be of an exclusive nature,
where only one person has that relation.236 Others theorise that it is possible that several, even
many, people can simultaneously have similar or varying relations, or interests, regarding a
thing, such as an area of land, and each relation qualifies as ‘property’.237
income, and less tangible materials capable of ownership, such as ‘intellectual property’ the exclusive
title to which has been secured through the registration of patents or the assertion of copyright. More
recently the scope of ‘property’ has developed to include news, sounds and music, and wavelengths.
See Banner, above n 205, (news) 73-93, (sounds and music) 109-129, (wavelengths) 202-219.
228
One attempt by Walter Hamilton, cited in Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman and Alvin Saunders
Johnson (eds) Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Macmillan, 1937) posited that property is nothing
more than ‘a euphonious collection of letters which serves as a general term for the miscellany of
equities that persons hold in the commonwealth’, quoted in Thomas W Merrill, ‘Property and the Right
to Exclude’ (1998) 77 Nebraska Law Review 730, 738.
229
In The Right to Private Property (Clarenden, 1988) Jeremey Waldron noted that some have argued
that ‘the concept of property defies definition’, cited in Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo M Peñalver,
An Introduction to Property Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
230
See discussion of the difficulties in defining ‘property’ in Alexander and Peñalver, above n 229, 1.
231
Numerous articles have made this as a preliminary point. See for eg Hohfeld, above n 223, 22.
232
See discussion of Locke’s view on private property in Alexander and Peñalver, above n 229, 39.
233
Anthony M Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in AG Guest (ed) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford
University Press, 1961) 124 – 126.
234
Hohfeld, above n 223, 30.
235
See the discussion of this in Brendan Edgeworth, ‘Post-Property? : A Postmodern Conception of
Private Property’ (1988) 11 University of New South Wales Law Journal 87, 97. See also the analysis in
Nicole Graham, Lawscape: Property, Environment, Law (Routledge-Cavendish, 2010) 134-159.
236
Thomas W Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to Exclude’ (1998) 77 Nebraska Law Review 730, 734-5.
Merrill cited Felix Cohen, ‘Dialogue on Private Property’ (1954) 9 Rutgers Law Review 357, 374.
237
See Carol M Rose, ‘The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property’ (1986) 53(3) University of Chicago Law Review 711-781. Other sources are cited by John
Page, ‘Towards an Understanding of Public Property’, in Nick Hopkins (ed) Modern Studies in
Property Law (Hart Publishing, 7th ed, 2013) 195, 195.
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Another key idea is that ‘property’, as an essentially social construct, requires social consent.238
Without agreement in a social context, by either explicit acknowledgement or acquiescence, an
individual’s claim to own a thing as their (private) property may be met with a similar claim by
other persons, rendering the initial claim, and all claims of property, as continually contested.
Thus, property conceptualized without social context and consent from others renders claims of
property pointless.239 The innately socially nature of property rights is further explored below.

In the absence of a definition, a metaphor often employed by theorists to describe the various
interests, or property, in a thing is the ‘bundle of rights’.240 This idea has been further developed
as a ‘bundle of sticks’, where each interest is represented by a metaphorical ‘stick’.241 This
metaphor has not been accepted as adequate however by many scholars.242
A closely related concept in the literature is ‘ownership’, since it is said that to own a thing
encapsulates fully, the ‘property’ in that thing. 243 Honoré found multiple social relations, such
as uses or values, often described generically as ‘rights’, applied to a thing which is owned.244
These are social relations because they are between people, about the thing. The identification
of the existence of these interests, uses, values or rights does not create a stable definition of
‘property’ however, but does contribute to understanding the concept of ‘ownership’.245 While a
person possessing a combination of these interests is said to be sufficient for ownership,246 such
is the flexibility of ‘property’ that it is not necessary to possess all these interests, and the lack
of one or more of them would not inevitably deny ownership of a thing.247
238

Claims of ownership do not derive validity from a person merely claiming a thing. To constitute it as
their property, requires that their claim be agreed to by others. Hohfeld, above n 223, 30, described the
relations as being four pairs of reciprocal relations: right, privilege, power, immunity.
239
Crawford Brough Macpherson, ‘The Meaning of Property’ in CB Macpherson, (ed), Property:
Mainstream and Critical Positions (University of Toronto Press, 1978) 1-13
240
See JE Penner, ‘The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property’ (1995-6) 43 University of California, Los
Angeles Law Review 711;
241
See Alexander and M Peñalver, above n 229, 2-3.
242
See Henry E Smith, ‘Property is Not Just a Bundle of Rights’ (2011) 8(3) Economic Journal Watch
279-291.
243
See the definition offered by the American Law Institute in its 1936 Restatement of property as ‘the
totality of rights, powers, privileges and immunities which one could have with respect to a “thing”
are complete property in [the] thing’, quoted in Denise R Johnson, ‘Reflections on the Bundle of
Rights’ (2007) 32 Vermont Law Review 247, 252. See also Anthony M, Honoré, above n 216.
244
Honoré, above n 216, refers to some relations as ‘rights’ but describes others as ‘incidents’ of
ownership.
245
Ibid 108, nonetheless he posits that ‘ownership is provisionally defined as the greatest possible interest
in a thing which a mature system of law recognizes…’ (emphasis in the original).
246
Holding an interest, or property, in land, such as a right to harvest would not designate ownership. Nor
does the exclusive possession and use of land, since these are usually available to a leaseholder.
247
Honoré, above n 226, 124-128. For eg the holder of a lease over ‘real property’ enjoys many incidents
of ownership such as the rights to possess, use, manage, income but would not normally be described as
the owner, but rather the lessee has a form of contract with the lessor, who is in fact the owner.
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What is achieved by re-combining various disaggregated interests, is property and ownership in
various forms,248 but not a definition of ‘property’.249 This inexactness has led to other attempts
to define property, including seeing it as a concept which is ‘descriptive’ or ‘prescriptive’.250
However this approach’s utility is doubted, because its wide scope would encompass ‘virtually
every civil, political and economic right’, and make property ‘practically meaningless’.251
A further innovation was the idea that property has ‘denotative’ and ‘connotative’ meanings.252
Denotative meanings are characteristics which when combined denote or indicate the meaning
of property. 253 ‘Connotative’ meanings represent the ‘evaluative, ideological and political’
messages implied by or associated with property. These messages are sensitive to the period in
which they occur, and are socially constructed since they ‘like all meanings, are negotiated,
influenced and modified by debate, struggle and power’ in contemporary society, despite the
view that property has ‘a timeless, Platonic form, above and beyond the grubby terrains of
politics and economics’.254 Thus for Edgeworth, through the use of terms which ‘indicate’
meaning as appropriate, a single definition of ‘property’ is side-stepped as inappropriate, and
‘property’ is seen as having multiple layered meanings related to its use. That property has
varying meanings in legal and cultural domains is a distinctive quality noted in the literature.255

Hence, despite its existence for millennia, the diverse social relations possible regarding a thing
have frustrated attempts to define ‘property’. Though some theoretical elements are agreed,
other elements are contested,256 and what constitutes owning a thing remains ‘a conundrum.’257
2. ‘Property’ and ‘property rights’ in this thesis
It is clear therefore that ‘property’ has diverse applications and multiple meanings, and
confusion may result from its inexact use. I next explain my use of the term in this thesis.

See Henry E Smith, ‘Property’, above n 225, 279-291.
Penner, above n 223, 714, described the ‘bundle of rights’ as ‘no explanatory model at all’ which is
‘little more than a slogan.’
250
Macpherson, ‘The Meaning of Property’, above n 222.
251
Edgeworth, above n 218, 90.
252
Ibid 89. Edgeworth asserted that the ‘modern concept of property … embraces the values of an
exclusivist, productivist, individualist and capitalist culture’.
253
Ibid. According to Edgeworth there is ‘an irreducible consensus: that property is (a) exclusive; (b)
commodifiable; (c) objective … and (d) individual’.
254
Ibid.
255
See Margaret Davies, Property: Meanings, History, Theories (Routledge, 2007), 23 – 49.
256
See Davies, above n 238, 7-8.
257
See Page, ‘Towards’, above n 235, 195, 204.
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2.1 The meanings of ‘property’ in this thesis

The term ‘property’ is used in a range of ways, some of which are consistent with formal legal
usage, while others reflect modern usage. For the most part, I use ‘property’ to mean a stake, an
equitable interest or legal right in, or claim to, a thing of value capable of being owned; and
‘property in…’ to refer to a legal interest in a thing, which is less than ownership, but still
capable of legal recognition.258 I avoid using ‘property’ to mean only legal interests in a thing
held by a private individual, as if all ‘property’ were ‘private’. Where I refer specifically to
privately-held legal interests in a thing, I use the term ‘private property’.
2.2 The focus on ‘real property’

The principal focus of the thesis however, is not ‘property’ in things generally, at a high level of
abstraction, but rather property in coastal lands affected by tidal waters, and the effect in
property law, of the physical impacts of natural forces of wind, wave energy and higher sea
levels on ‘real property’ and ‘private property rights’. Fortunately, ‘real property’ is clearly
defined as ‘land and buildings as a physical entity’.259 I use this term to refer to land titles
registered under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) and any associated buildings. Similarly, I
use ‘coastal land’ to mean both privately- and publicly-owned land in the coastal zone.260 And I
refer to land and buildings owned by persons or corporations, not the State or public authorities,
as ‘privately-owned’ or ‘private land’.261

Where I refer to land held by the Crown, as the State government, public agencies or authorities,
I use the terms ‘publicly owned’ or ‘public land’. This includes coastal land dedicated for public
purposes under Crown Lands Acts, the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW), the Local
Government Act 1993 (NSW) and land below MHWM,262 submerged by tidal waters.263

258

See Butt and Hamer, above n 207, 468-9.
‘…as distinct from personal property. Technically, ‘real property’ includes intangible interests in land,
such as easements and profits a prendre. Though ‘real estate’ is often used as a synonym, it is a
narrower term since it does not include intangible interests in land. Butt and Hamer, above n 207, 491.
260
The ‘coastal zone’ is defined under s 5 of the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW). Relevant
/management areas’ are defined by maps attached to the SEPP (Coastal Management) 2018 (NSW).
261
Importantly ‘land’, though broadly defined under s 3 Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) does not include
‘the bed of the sea or tidal waters below high water mark, and … land below high water mark in tidal
estuaries (unless otherwise stated on the certificate of title)’. See Environment Protection Authority v
Leaghur Holding Pty Ltd (1994) 6 BPR 13,655, 13,660, (Bannon J).
262
New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 486 (Jacobs J). Land below MHWM is
‘vested in the Crown unless it can be deduced that some grant of land was intended to apply to land
below high water mark’.
263
Submerged land can be registered as ‘real property’, however title to these lands is usually held by an
agency of government. See for eg the bed of Sydney Harbour, defined under the Sydney Harbour Trust
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Though submerged lands are publicly owned, they may also be the subject of lesser private
interests.264 I reserve the term ‘public property in land’ for the range of legal and equitable
interests held by the public or the State on behalf of the public, in lands of all tenures.
2.3 A plurality of ‘property’ in land

The narrow use of ‘property’ to refer exclusively to only ‘real property’ in private ownership
has been criticized as obscuring other ‘property’ in land, not privately owned.265 In New South
Wales, there are various forms of property in land and a ‘plurality’ of types of ‘real property’.266
Though ‘common property’ may evoke memories of ‘commons’,267 game or fisheries,268 it still
has current applications as: reserves of Crown land;269 jointly-owned facilities in strata
development;270 and land co-owned by several persons, as a ‘tenancy in common’.271
With a broad view it is possible to identify a range of ‘public property’ in New South Wales,
which includes all publicly-owned lands and natural resources, and lesser legal interests held by
the public, or a public authority on their behalf, in private land.272 This includes lands which are
the geographic focus of this thesis: the foreshore, tidal waters, seabed, submerged lands,
adjoining beaches and reserved coastal lands, which remain publicly owned.
Other forms of ‘public property’ in land, are further considered in Part C below.

Land Title Act 1909 (NSW) considered in Verrall v Nott (1939) 39 SR (NSW) 89. The registered
proprietor was then the Maritime Services Board, as agent of the NSW government.
264
It has been the policy of the NSW government to issue leases over land below MHWM, being parts of
the bed of navigable waters, for the construction of oyster beds, privately owned marinas, wharves or
piers, rather than alienate the submerged land and convey the land title into private hands.
265
Carol M Rose, ‘The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and
Ecosystems’ (1998-1999) 83 Minnesota Law Review, 129, 132. Page, ‘Towards’, above n 235, 195.
266
John Page, ‘Reconceptualising property: Towards a sustainable paradigm’ (2011) 1 Property Law
Review 86-96.
267
In England, ‘common property’ was jointly-owned by a limited number of commoners: See David J
Seipp, 'The Concept of Property in the Early Common Law (1994) 12 Law and History Review 29-91.
268
The term ‘common property’ when used to refer to other natural resources, such as non-exclusive
fisheries, or wild game, often meant the fish or game not yet caught.
269
‘Commons’ are held and managed by trusts constituted under the Commons Management Act 1989
(NSW). Land and fixtures, being ‘real property’, and other physical assets or legal interests attached to
the ‘common’ are formally designated as ‘trust property’. See Division 4, s 24.
270
‘Common property’ under the Strata Schemes (Freehold Development) Act 1973 (NSW) includes the
building’s external walls and windows, driveways, yards, entrances, stairwells, hallways, laundry,
utility connections, not part of individual strata lots. It is held by the owners’ corporation. See <
http://rgdirections.lpi.nsw.gov.au/faqs/strata_scheme/common_property >. Other NSW statutes also
apply: see: Strata Schemes (Leasehold Development) Act 1986; Strata Schemes Management Act 1996;
Strata Schemes Management Regulation 2010; Strata Schemes (Freehold Development) Regulation
2012; Strata Schemes (Leasehold Development) Regulation 2012.
271
See Butt and Hamer, (eds), above n 207, 575.
272
See John Page, Property Diversity and its Implications (Routledge, 2017) 37 -69.
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2.4 Current regulatory framework

The ‘real property’ and ‘private property rights’ the focus of this thesis, exist and operate in the
legal framework overarched by the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) for the State of New South
Wales. Laws governing registration of land titles and legal interests in real property273 and the
registration of easements and covenants over real property274 are State based.275 As will be
shown in section 6, the exercise of private property rights to use and develop privately-owned
land are regulated under modern State-based statutes276 and management of coastal land occurs
within a complex statutory framework where other laws277 also apply, may limit or prohibit
land-uses,278 or impose a duty on landowners.279

The public property and the public rights available to members of the public in New South
Wales are also governed by State-based legislation280 and the exercise of public rights of access
to and use of publicly owned coastal resources are managed through State-based Regulations.281
This complex statutory framework and the operation of current NSW statutes in five fields of
law are described in detail in Chapter IV.
That concludes the definitions of ‘property’ and ‘property rights’ used in this thesis. I next
outline the scope of the literature on property and identify relevant discourses within it.
3. The literature on ‘property’
The literature on ‘property’ and private property rights has developed over centuries,282 and
many later works refer to earlier authoritative texts.283 In the twentieth century the literature has
grown massively and spans the range of meanings and contexts of ‘property’ within the
paradigm of contemporary liberal democratic capitalist society.284 This literature encompasses
273

The Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).
Under s 88 the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).
275
The States retained principal power over ‘property’, except on Commonwealth land. See Evans, above
n 177, 125-7.
276
The principal statute of which is the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW).
277
especially the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW).
278
Eg pollution control regulations made per Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW).
279
Eg to eradicate a ‘biosecurity risk’ under the Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW).
280
Crown Land Management Act 2016, National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974, Marine Estate
Management Act 2014 (NSW)
281
Eg Crown Land Management Regulation 2018, Marine Estate Management Regulation 2017 (NSW).
282
Perhaps the earliest civil law authority cited is the Institutes of Gaius (c 160 AD) which was updated
by the Institutes of Justinian (533 AD). Civil law concepts in modern property law are discussed below.
283
See John Locke, The Second Treatise on Civil Government (first pub 1690, Blackwell, 1948) and
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (first pub 1765, 12th ed, 1978).
284
See Macpherson, above n 222, 1-13; see also Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Nigel Bankes, ‘Different
Views of the Cathedral: The Literature on Property Law Theory’, in Aileen McHarg et al (eds) Property
and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (OUP, 2010) 19-59.
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many diverse approaches, and themes,285 some of which do not relate to my research question.

Pragmatically, outlining all the fields of debate in modern property theory is not necessary here,
but I note property’s diverse applications next, and outline four relevant discourses within this
literature, as a prelude to identifying works most relevant to my primary research question.
3.1 Overview of literature on ‘property’

Much legal writing explores ‘property’ at a highly theoretical level, which attempt to identify
the essential qualities at its core conceptually,286 discuss its meaning(s),287 or define its rules.288
Other writers critique its assumptions and justifications,289 or extend its limits.290 Other writing
on property, focused on the application of modern property concepts in practice, is also diverse.

The historical development of property law in the US has been described by Banner, who
outlined the scope of modern private property interests including, ‘intellectual property’
protected by patents and copyrights;291 musical sounds, fame, wavelengths and body parts.292
3.2 Discourses in contemporary ‘property theory’

The relevant literature on ‘private property’ in land and resources is extensive. Its themes
include historical sources of property concepts,293 the personal,294 and social purposes that
private ownership of land serve,295 and arguments for reform of ‘property’ and property law.296

285

These themes were considered under three broad groupings by Davies, above n 238.
See Hohfeld above n 221. Hohfeld scheme of ‘jural relations’ is discussed in section 4 of this Chapter.
287
See Thomas Grey ‘The Disintegration of Property’ in JR Pennock and JW Chapman eds Nomos XXII
Property (1980) cited in Alexander and Peñalver, above n 229, 2.
288
See Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 (6) Harvard Law Review 1089-1128.
289
See for eg John A Lovett, ‘Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003’
(2010)89(4) Nebraska Law Review 739-818; Jeanne L Schroeder, ‘Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist
Critique of the Disaggregation of Property (1994) 93 Michigan Law Review 239-41,
290
Robert J Goldstein, ‘Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology
into Real Property Law’ (1998) 25 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 347-430.
291
Banner, above n 205, 23 – 24.
292
Banner, above n 205, sound (109 - 129), fame (130-161), wavelengths (202- 219), body parts (247).
293
See Davies, above n 238, 49 – 84. See also Robert P Burns, ‘Blackstone’s Theory of the “Absolute”
Rights of Property’ (1986) 54 University of Cincinnati Law Review 67-86, discussed below.
294
See discussion of Hegelian property theory in Alexander and Peñalver, above n 229, 57 – 69. See also
Margaret Jane Radin, ‘Property and Personhood’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957;
295
See Utilitarian property theory in Alexander and Peñalver, above n 229, 11 – 34. See also Freyfogle
‘Ethics’, above n 201, 638, ‘property ownership… could help a people achieve all manner of economic,
social and political ends’.
296
See Graham, above n 235.
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The literature on the theory of private property rights over land is also diverse, with many
theories,297 diverse meanings’,298 and purposes of private property in land,299 in use. Though
they are not mutually exclusive, and are sometimes interwoven, in this section I outline some
contemporary discourses on property relevant to my topic and identify the authors selected for
closer review within them. I consider these authors more closely in Chapter V.

3.2.1 Meanings discourses

One key discourse in the literature examines the meanings of ‘property’ and private property
rights.300 Among a diversity of views, some authors note the nebulous, flexible definition of
‘property’,301 and characterize it as ‘empty’.302 Others assert that ‘private property’ in land has
personal,303 ideological,304 or political meanings,305 while some or propose its re-thinking,306 to
reflect valid interests in land unrecognized in mainstream views of ‘real property’.307
In this discourse Carol Rose critiques the assumption that ‘property’ means ‘private property’,
advocates remembering and recognizing ‘public property’, and challenges the dominant but
erroneous view of property in the USA, as quintessentially ‘private’. 308 Rose cites past and
current examples of public property, and publicly-owned real property,309 critiques the
assumption that natural resources are always better managed by private owners,310 and frames a
pluralistic view of real property, where sole private ownership of land is only one of many
forms:311 a view shared by others.312
See the exposition of theories of property Alexander and Peñalver, above n 229, 11 – 80.
See the diverse meanings of ‘property’ discussed in Davies, above n 238, 23-48. See also the
discussion of connotative and denotative meanings of property in Edgeworth, above n 218, 89.
299
See the discussion of utilitarian theories of the purposes of private property in Alexander and Peñalver,
above n 229, 11-34, the review of Hegelian theories which see the purpose of property as developing
‘personhood’, at 57-69, and recount of Aristotelian theory that the purpose of property is human
flourishing, at 80 -101.
300
See Davies, above n 238, 23-48.
301
Kevin Gray, ‘Property in thin air’ (1991) 50 (2) Cambridge Law Journal 252- 307.
302
See views on the ‘meaninglessness’ of property by Alain Pottage, ‘Instituting Property’ (1998) 18
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 331-334, discussed in Graham, above n 235, 155-7.
303
See Hegel’s formulation of property, as manifesting the owner’s personality: G Hegel Philosophy of
Right (1896), discussed in Alexander and Peñalver, above n 229, 57 – 69; see also Margaret Jane Radin,
‘Property and Personhood’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957.
304
Edgeworth, above n 218, 89.
305
Macpherson, above n 222, 1-13.
306
Craig Anthony Arnold, ‘The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests’ (2002) 26
Harvard Law Review 281.
307
See discussion of this in Crawford Brough Macpherson, ‘Liberal-Democracy and Property’ in CB
Macpherson (ed), Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (Uni of Toronto Press, 1978) 199-207.
308
Rose, above n 237.
309
Carol M Rose, ‘Crystals and mud in property law’ (1988) 40(3) Stanford Law Review 577-610.
310
Carol M Rose, ‘Property as storytelling: Perspectives from game theory, narrative theory, feminist
theory’ (1990) 2 Yale Journal of Law and Humanities 37.
311
See also Carol M Rose, ‘A Dozen Propositions, above n 1448, 265.
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Rose’s review of the history of the custom and law regarding ownership of the seashore and
seabed in the USA, and her characterization of submerged lands as ‘inherently public property’
which should not be alienated into private hands 313 are valuable contributions to this discourse.
Rose’s wider view which places private property in land and associated property rights claims
in context, as part, rather than the totality, of property theory and property law is most useful.
Page has pursued this approach314 describing ‘public property’ in Australia in various guises.315
Rose’s emphasis on ‘inherently public property’ is directly relevant because potential responses
by government to climate impacts and conflicts between competing rights will affect whether
many beaches, important publicly-owned social, ecological and economic assets, can survive.
3.2.2 ‘Rights’ discourses

The origin and nature of private property rights over land is the subject of much scholarly
writing. Some authors in this discourse assert that the ‘right to exclude’ is the ‘core’ private
property right,316 but others contest this, cite contra examples of property without the right to
exclude.317 Some writers rebut libertarian and natural rights theorists’ claims about private
property’s origins,318 challenge the idea of pre-social private property rights over land,319 assert
the social origin of property and the dynamic nature of property rights,320 and emphasize that
‘property is a creature of the law’.321 This is most relevant because it justifies abandoning
‘natural rights’ claims and adopting ‘social utility’322 as the basis for exploring one potential
policy response: privileging private property rights.
Babie’s323 definition of ‘property’ in modern liberalism,324 his summary of the idea of private
property being socially created,325 involving a variety of social relations,326 by which society

Eg Page, ‘Reconceptualising’ above n 249.
Rose, ‘Comedy’, above n 235, 713-723.
314
Page, ‘Reconceptualising’, above n 269, 86-96; Page, ‘Towards’ above n 235.
315
Page, Property, above n 270, 40.
316
Thomas W Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to Exclude’ (1998) 77 Nebraska Law Review 730.
317
John A Lovett, ‘Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003’ (2010) 89(4)
Nebraska Law Review 739, under Scots common law 753-9, and the 2003 Act, 778-85.
318
See the rebuttal of Miller’s portrayal of ‘absolute’ property rights in Robert J Burns, ‘Blackstone’s
Theory of the “Absolute” Rights of Property’ (1986) 54 University of Cincinnati Law Review 67-86.
319
Epstein’s libertarian view of ‘pre-social’ property is reviewed in, ‘Owning’, above n 310, 286-292.
320
Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 638.
321
Freyfogle, ‘Property’, above n 201, 84.
322
Ibid 108.
323
Paul Babie, ‘Climate Change and the Concept of Private Property’, (2010) University of Adelaide Law
School Research Paper No. 2010-003 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1539294 >. Later included in
Rosemary Lyster, ed, In the Wilds of Climate Change Law, (Australian Academic Press, 2010).
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confers specific property rights on the owner,327 are a useful part of this ‘rights discourse. His
overviews of the choices involved in private property,328 and its moral context,329 given its use
often impacts on others,330 are also apposite and form part of the ethical discourses outlined
below. Further, the critical analysis underpinning his claim that, due to the acts of choice and
their external impacts, private property is a primary driver of climate change,331 is persuasive.

In this rights-led discourse some theorists and landowners believe that private property rights
are dominant, and immutable.332 Thus Coleman’s perspective, asserting landowners have an
ancient ‘right to protect’ their land from the sea, despite modern laws, fits within this discourse.
I discuss the veracity of these claims and posit a basis for refuting them in Chapter V below.
Landowners’ calls for ‘social justice’ and public intervention in protect their private land, also
fall within this discourse, but Cooper and McKenna’s review of the merits of these calls333 is
part of the critical discourses outlined below.
Private rights aside, ‘rights’ discourses also recognise public rights.334 Hence the work of Joseph
Sax, 335 David Slade,336 James Titus337, and others.338 on protecting public rights to use coastal
lands and waters under the ‘public trust doctrine’, are located within these ‘rights’ discourses.
Much of this literature is focused on the United States of America, where a key issue is a

Ibid 5. Babie notes that private property ‘involves the creation, conferral and protection over choice
and control over goods and resources’ and traces the history of this idea to Jeremy Bentham, citing The
Theory of Legislation (1802) vol 1, 113.
325
Babie, above n 323, 5 -7, 13-18. Babie specific rejects the ideas that property rights are ‘absolute’ in
the sense that they cannot be remoulded by the legislature, and ‘a gift of the creator’.
326
Ibid 5. Babie cites the four types of jural relations – rights, privileges, powers and immunities –
identified by Hohfeld. See Hohfeld, above n 223. Hohfeld’s analysis is discussed below.
327
Babie, above n 323, 5-6. Babie cites the work of Honoré, above n 216, and discusses the ‘bundle of
rights’ metaphor for the de-aggregation of ‘property rights’. Honoré’s incidents’ are also discussed
below, in section 4, and their operation in practice in this jurisdiction is examined in section 5 below.
328
Babie, above n 323, 7-8, adopts the term ‘choice architecture’ and cites the work of RH Thaler and CR
Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness (2008).
329
Babie, above n 323, 15-18, 24 discusses the work of Singer, Underkuffler, Radin and others.
330
Babie, above n 323, 14, 18-21.
331
Ibid 1, 9, 30.
332
Karen Coleman, ‘Coastal Protection and Climate Change’ (2010) 84 Australian Law Journal 421.
333
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123.
334
See for eg Sax, above n 189; Carol M Rose, ‘A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights,
and the New Takings Legislation’ (1996) 53 Washington and Lee Law Review 265;
335
See Sax, above n 189.
336
David C Slade, ‘Lands, Waters and Living Resources Subject to the Public Trust Doctrine’ in DC
Slade, (ed) Putting the Public Trust to Work: The application of the public trust doctrine to the
management of lands, waters, and living resources of the coastal states. (CSO, 2nd ed, 1997).
337
James G Titus, et al, ‘Greenhouse Effect and Sea Level Rise: The Cost of Holding Back the Sea’
(1991) 19 Coastal Management 171-204; See also Titus, above n 84.
338
Madeline Reed, ‘Seawalls and the Public Trust: Navigating the Tension between private property and
Public Beach Use in the face of Shoreline Recession’ (2009) 20 Fordham Environmental Law Review
305-339; Negro, above n 111; Michael C Blumm, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The
Accommodation Principle’ (2010) 27(3) Pace Environmental Law Review 649-667.
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citizen’s ‘right’ to compensation, under the ‘takings’ clause of US Constitution.339 However this
literature, though extensive, is of limited relevance to New South Wales. 340 Thus, while many
US writers’ contributions on property theory applied to land are highly relevant at an ‘in
principle’ level, other writing on the practice and effect of property law, based on US federal or
state jurisdictions, are not. Ascertaining what is relevant to our jurisdiction has been
challenging, but the works of Margaret Davies,341 and John Page342 have greatly assisted.
Several writers have suggested this doctrine could apply in New South Wales,343 and although it
has not been overtly recognised in this jurisdiction,344 I explore this possibility in Chapter V.

3.3.3 Critical discourses

There are many critical views on ‘property’ in discourses on property theory applied to land.345
One thread in these discourses critiques the commodification of land,346 and cites the
dephysicalization of the ‘property’ concept,347 seen in many owners’ failure to consider their
land’s natural attributes and wider values when deciding its future use, as a cause of land
degradation.348 ‘Property’, ‘property law’ and the operation of ‘market forces’ in modern
western societies are also critiqued for failing to take into account the special qualities and
ecological features of land, and their non-economic values, when its ‘valued’, its ownership
changes or decisions are made about its use.349 Further, this critique observes that the

Eg Richard A Epstein, ‘Littoral Rights under the Takings Doctrine: The Clash Between the Ius
Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment’ (2011) 6 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public
Policy 37.
340
This is due to fundamental differences in the legal frameworks created by the Constitutions of the
United States of America and Commonwealth of Australia. See the discussion of this in Chapter V.
341
Davies, above n 238.
342
John Page, ‘Towards’, above n 235, 195-215; Page, above n 255.
343
Tim Bonyhady, ‘A Usable Past: The Public Trust in Australia’ (1995) 13 Environmental and Planning
Law Journal 329-338; Tim Bonyhady, ‘An Australian Public Trust’ in S Dover (ed), Environmental
History and Policy: Still Settling Australia (Oxford University Press, 2000); Bruce Thom, ‘Climate
Change, Coastal Hazards and the Public Trust Doctrine’ (2012) 8 (2) Macquarie Journal of
International Comparative Environmental Law 21-41; See also Paul Stein, ‘Ethical Issues in Land-Use
Planning and the Public Trust’ (1996) 13 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 493-501.
344
See the discussion of this in section Chapter V.
345
Davies, above n 238, 5 -18. See also Graham, above n 235, 15-16.
346
Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 645; Graham, above n 235, 112, 134-159.
347
See Graham, above n 235, 134. If ‘the ‘thing’ is removed from the property concept, so that property is
understood as solely relations between persons, this dephysicalises the concept of property.
348
Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 648-9; Graham, above n 235, 191-2.
349
Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 649.
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‘dephysicalisation’ of land as ‘property’ increases its ‘commodification’350 in the market
economy, as though all land was (always) ‘fungible’.351

Some critical theorists notice in modern property thinking about land use, a weakening, or
severing, of links with earlier notions associated with ‘real property’, views of what is ‘proper’?
or ‘appropriate’? and ideas of ‘propriety’, ‘proprietor’ and ‘properties’ of land,352 that alienates
owners from the land and community, and strip ‘real property’ of its special attributes.353 This
narrow highly abstract view of land as commodity, has led to the observation that the concept of
‘property’ in land, ie ‘real property’ now exhibits an essential ‘placelessness’.354

The effects of the dephysicalisation of property on the uses of land and natural resources are
much discussed in this discourse.355 Too often landowners see their land as one homogenous
unit, pursue unrealistically intensive uses,356 exceed the land’s carrying capacity,357 and create
impacts which adversely affect nearby lands.358 Thus the concept of ‘dephysicalising’ real
property describes some landowners’ thinking, and explains observable phenomena: the
division, commodifying and degrading of land.

Though it is focused on rural lands, this critique and its warnings about the dangers of
landowners ignoring land’s physical attributes are highly relevant and have direct application to
decision making about the future use of coastal lands affected by physical hazards.

The critical review of claimed property rights is also part of these diverse critical discourses.
Hence the review of calls by UK landowners for social justice in coastal management decision
making, prepared by Cooper and McKenna is a significant contribution to these discourses. I
explore their analysis, its relevance in this jurisdiction and derive relevant assessment criteria
from their conclusions in Chapter V.

Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 645; Graham, above n 235, 113.
Ie able to be readily exchanged or substituted. See Margaret Jane Radin, ‘Property and Personhood’
(1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957, discussed in Alexander and Peñalver, above n 229, 66-7; See also
Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 643; Graham, above n 235, 27, 66.
352
See Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 638; Freyfogle, ‘Ownership’, above n 193, 1270; Carol M Rose,
Property and Persuasion, (Westview Press, 1994) 58; Margaret Davies ‘The Proper: Discourses of
Property’ (1998) 9 Law and Critique 147-73, discussed in Davies, above n 238, 25-39.
353
Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 649; Graham, above n 235, 44.
354
Graham, above n 235, 5, 160-1.
355
See Graham, above n 235, 7-8, 181-2. Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 643.
356
Eric T Freyfogle, ‘Private Rights in Nature’, in Peter Burdon (ed) Exploring Wild Law: The
Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence (Wakefield, 2011) 272.
357
Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 646-7.
358
Freyfogle referred repeatedly to processes which degrade land as ‘land ills’. See Eric T Freyfogle,
‘Owning Nature Responsibly’ in Kelly Barth (ed) Imagination and Place: Ownership, (Lawrence, KS:
Imagination and Place Press, 2010) 158, 168; Graham, above n 235, 191-2.
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3.2.4 Ethical discourses

Rejecting the trend of ‘dephysicalisation’ as inevitable, some writers in ethical discourses seek
to re-conceptualize ‘property’ in what they see as its ‘proper’ context359 and propose rethinking
the idea of ‘real property’ as a special case, from an ethical viewpoint, which recognizes the
special attributes and properties inherent in that land,360 respects the other species present,361 and
accepts the responsibilities and obligations which arise from ‘ownership’.362

Importantly ethical theorists offer practical suggestions for landowners, property theorists, and
lawmakers to take, to remedy social and ecological ills created by commodification of land.363
These ethical discourses have cohered around an ‘Earth jurisprudence’ which moves beyond the
anthropocentric view of land as commodity, to an eco-centric view of land as ‘community’.364
Freyfogle’s ideas of natural limits to land use and an ethical approach to decision-making, and
their use as criteria to assess the merits of potential responses, are considered in Chapter V.
Further, the application of these ideas to landowners’ and legislators’ decisions about the future
use of coastal lands is postulated in several potential responses, in Chapter VI.

3.3 Other literature relevant to the primary research question

In addition to published works in the discourses in the property literature outlined above, a
diverse range of other publications are relevant to my primary research question.
Highly relevant to my topic are works on the history of property law in New South Wales,365
which record the struggle for public access to the coast,366 and describe the retention of power
For eg see Rose, ‘Crystals’, above n 309.
Eric T Freyfogle, ‘The Particulars of Owning’ (1999) 25 Ecology Law Quarterly 574, 580-1; see also
Freyfogle, ‘Owning the land: Four contemporary narratives’ (1998) 13 Journal of Land Use and
Environmental Law 279-307.
361
See Alexander, et al, above n 191, 744.
362
See discussion of owners’ moral responsibility for property choices in Babie, above n 323, 18-24.
363
The use of a re-thought ‘do no harm’ rule, and tailoring of property rights to reflect the land’s natural
features, are two important suggestions, see Freyfogle, ‘Eight’, above n 202, 791-2. See also Graham,
above n 233, 193-202.
364
See Cormac Cullinan, ‘A History of Wild Law’, in Peter Burdon (ed) Exploring Wild Law: The
Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence (Wakefield, 2011) 13. See also Nicole Graham, ‘Owning the Earth’,
in Burdon (ed) 259- 269; Freyfogle, ‘Private Rights’, above 356, 270-278.
365
See Andrew R Buck, The Making of Australian Property Law (Federation Press, 2006); Butt, above n
209, Louise Tiffany Daley, Men and a River (A & R, 1981).
366
See Caroline Ford, ‘The Battle for Public Rights to Private Spaces on Sydney’s Ocean Beaches, 18541920s’ (2010) 41 Australian Historical Studies 253- 268; C Ford, Sydney Beaches – A History
(NewSouth, 2014); Douglas Booth, Australian Beach Cultures – The History of Sun, Sand and Surf
(Frank Cass, 2001); Leone Huntsman, Sand in our souls: the beach in Australian history (MUP, 2001).
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over property law by Australian States at Federation.367 Useful, contextually, are works which
discuss the implications of the development international law on the sea,368 and the institutional
transformation of coastal law brought about by the ‘Off-Shore Constitutional Settlement’.369
Particularly relevant are scientific reports on changes in global climate,370 which discuss likely
climate change impacts globally,371 and on eastern Australian coasts,372 and promote active
management of the coast under these conditions.373 Also relevant are assessments of legal issues
arising from climate change which acknowledge shoreline recession’s effect on the private
property rights of coastal landowners, as real and significant.374
The literature on how rising seas would affect private property rights in New South Wales is
limited and contested. Early commentary by Gordon identifying a trend of shoreline recession
in NSW, suggesting sea-level rise as a likely contributing factor,375 is highly relevant. His later
paper on the history of the mean high water mark (MHWM), questioning its suitability as the
boundary between private and public lands,376 and recommending rolling easements to protect
public access is also relevant. However, his limited review of common law decisions
contributed to the uncertainty on questions of law rather than resolving them.377
Lipman and Stokes’ article, which raised concerns about the impacts of a receding shoreline on
privately-owned coastal land and on public authorities, is also relevant but is sadly erroneous.378

367

See Evans, above n 177, 6.
See Donald R Rothwell, ‘The International Legal Framework’, 21-44, in Baird and Rothwell (eds),
above n 189.
369
Marcus Haward, ‘The Australian offshore constitutional settlement’ (1989) 13 (4) Marine Policy 334348; Pat Brazil, Offshore Constitutional Settlement 1980 - A Case Study in Federalism (2001)
Occasional Paper Australian National University 5 April 2001. See also Rachel Baird, ‘The National
Legal Framework’, 48-54, in Baird and Rothwell (eds), above n 189.
370
See IPCC Climate Change 2013, above n 7.
371
Pittock, above n 8.
372
John A Church, et al, ‘Sea-level rise around the Australian coastline and the changing frequency of
extreme sea-level events’ (2006) 55 Australian Meteorological Magazine 253-260; Roshanka Ranasinghe, and Marcel Stive, ‘Rising seas and retreating coastlines’ (2009) 97 Climatic Change 465-468.
See Australian Government, Climate, above n 44; see also NSW Office Environment and Heritage,
Coastal Erosion in New South Wales – Statewide Exposure Assessment (NSW Government 2017)
373
State of New South Wales, Coastal Management Manual Part A (OEH, 2018) ISBN 978-1-76039968-9, and Part B (OEH, 2018) ISBN 978-1-76039-967-2. See also Kenchington et al, above n 137.
374
See Bell, above n 137; Bonyhady, above n 137.
375
Angus D Gordon, ‘A tentative but tantalizing link between sea-level rise and coastal recession in NSW
Australia,’ in GI Pearman (ed) Greenhouse Planning for climate change (CSIRO 1988): 121-134.
376
Angus D Gordon, ‘Highwater Mark - The Boundary of Ignorance’ (2001) (Paper presented at 11th
NSW Coastal Conference, Newcastle, 13-16 November 2001).
377
Gordon’s noting of the fluctuating shoreline and his critique of a lack of a ‘repeatable’ boundary did
not recognise the MHWM boundary’s ambulatory nature, or the common law rule that its position is
where it is located from ‘time to time’. See Scratton v Brown (1825) 4 B & Cr 485, 498-9; (Bayley J).
378
Zada Lipman and Robert Stokes, ‘Shifting Sands – The implications of climate change and a changing
coastline for the private interests and public authorities in relation to waterfront land’ (2003) 20(6)
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 406-422.
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The doctrine of accretion’s ability to move a coastal boundary is discussed,379 but the authors
did not describe the doctrine in depth, cited cases which lacked authority,380 and did not
consider appeal decisions which ruled emphatically on the ownership of land below MHWM.381
Whether a right to compensation existed was not examined, and the authors focused on the issue
of whether public authorities’ had a ‘duty of care’ to protect private land from coastal erosion,
and their potential liability for damages.382 They found that ‘no clear guidance’ was available,
suggested matters would continue to be decided on an ad hoc basis, but nominated criteria the
court would likely use when deciding if a duty of care existed.383 Significantly they concluded
that the exemption from liability provided in the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) was not
total, requiring councils to act in ‘good faith’, but observed the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)
would make bringing actions against a local council ‘considerably more difficult’.384 They
identified ‘no hard and fast rule’ when a council will incur liability, and urged the legislature to
further narrow the liability of public authorities.385 Their case study of Collaroy/ Narrabeen
beach, exploration of council’s potential liability in three scenarios and concern that erosionprone sites would be further developed, repeating past errors, are also relevant.
Commentary by Thom,386 and by Coleman,387 on a right to protect against the sea are relevant,
but regrettably also failed to consider these key decisions. I disagreed with Coleman’s claims,388
since her claims were contradicted by English common law, then current NSW statutes and
misunderstood the ambit of State legislatures’ power.389 Subsequently I discussed errors in
recent reports, sources of uncertainty regarding the ownership of land below tidal waters, and
drew on the EPA cases to explain the law governing ambulatory boundaries in NSW.390 On the
issue of compensation for lands lost to the sea, raised by others,391 I concluded that, based on
Ibid 411. See also the authors’ brief discussion of erosion in their second paper, Zada Lipman and
Robert Stokes, ‘That sinking feeling: A legal assessment of the coastal planning system in New South
Wales’ (2011) 28 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 182-200, 187-8.
380
The quote from Zelling J preferring ‘public policy’ over rules of property law was from the SCOTI
judgement set aside as wrongly decided, and the conflicting decisions cited were not by senior courts.
Warringah Council v Franks [1999] NSW LEC 65, was decided by a sole judge of the LEC and Scott v
Byron Council (1996) NSW LEC 10513 of 1996 was decided by Commissioner Hussey.
381
The case of EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655 and NSW Court of Criminal Appeal’s
decision in EPA (NSW) v Leaghur Holdings Pty Ltd [1995] 87 LGERA 282, discussed in Chapter III,
were also not considered in their second article, Lipman and Stokes, above n 338.
382
Lipman and Stokes, above n 337, 411-4.
383
Ibid 414-5. They were: statutory powers, proximity, control, knowledge, vulnerability, reasonableness.
384
Ibid 417.
385
Ibid 422.
386
Thom, above n 40.
387
Coleman, above n 13, 421.
388
John R Corkill, ‘Claimed property right does not hold water’ (2013) 87 Australian Law Journal 49-58.
389
Our positions were described as opposed in Thom, above n 316, 37.
390
Corkill, ‘Ambulatory’, above n 63, 67-84.
391
Lipman and Stokes, above n 337, 411; Thom, above n 40, 358.
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my analysis of statutes and a key case,392 no liability for such compensation exists in NSW. 393
O’Donnell discussed the potential for conflict between public interests and coastal landowners
as sea level rises,394 described one landowner’s resistance to council’s coastal management,395
and outlined the challenges of climate change adaptation.396 However her focus on legal
geography is not relevant to the questions of property law examined in this thesis.
More relevantly, a recent court decision397 refusing consent for a seawall in Byron Bay, due to
its adverse impact on public access to the beach, was discussed by Sack et al398 and me.399
The literature on the development and evaluation of public policy is also highly relevant and
extensive,400 though much of it is focused on the United States401. Most useful to my elaboration
of a future government’s potential ‘public policy’ responses, and evaluation of their merits, is a
key source which addresses the development of ‘public policy’ in Australian contexts.402
This concludes my brief overview of the relevant literature. I consider selected authors more
closely in Chapter V below. I next consider modern concepts of property theory.

Part B – Private property and private property rights
In this Part I, I outline major contributions to modern thinking about property and ownership,
and then employ them to ascertain the private property ‘rights’ current available to NSW
landowners in practice. I then briefly notice that two elements of prior English land law, not
encapsulated by modern property theory, persist nonetheless and relevantly apply to privately
392

Durham Holdings PL v State of New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399, is considered in Chapter III.
Corkill, ‘Claimed’, above n 347, 79-81.
394
Tayanah O’Donnell and Louise Gates, ‘Getting the balance right: A renewed need for the public
interest test in addressing coastal climate change and sea level rise’ (2013) 30 Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 220.
395
Tayanah O’Donnell, ‘Legal Geography and Coastal Climate Change Adaptation: The Vaughan
Litigation’ (2016) 54(3) Geographic Research, 301 – 312.
396
Tayanah O’Donnell, ‘Coastal management and political-legal geographies of climate change
adaptation in Australia’ (2019) 175 Ocean and Coastal Management, 127 – 135.
397
Ralph Lauren PL v NSW TCP [2018] NSWLEC 207.
398
Ballanda Sack, Timothy Allen and Bruce Thom, ‘Coastal Management and Protecting the Public
Interest: Recent Land and Environment Court Decisions’ (2020) 37(1) Environmental and Planning
Law Journal 128 – 135.
399
John R Corkill, ‘Landowners’ Appeal of Seawalls Refusal Unsuccessful’, (2020) 37 (3) Environmental
and Planning Law Journal 322 – 337.
400
Eg Justine Bell and Mark Baker-Jones, ‘Retreat from retreat: the backward evolution of sea-level rise
policy in Australia, and implications for local government’ (2014) 19 Local Government Law Journal
23-35; Marcus Haward, ‘Institutional design and policymaking down under: developments in Australian
& New Zealand coastal management,’ (1995) 26(2) Ocean & Coastal Management 87-117. APSC,
Tackling Wicked Problems: A Public Policy Perspective (Australian Government, 2007).
401
See for eg Megan Higgins, ‘Legal and Policy Impacts of Sea Level Rise to Beaches and Coastal
Property’ (2008) 1 (1) Sea Grant Law and Policy Journal 43-64.
402
Althaus et al, above n 163.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Page 70
393

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Laws)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

Chapter II – Property and ‘rights’: private and public

© John R Corkill
Student No. 2376398

owned real property in New South Wales.
4. Modern conceptualizations of ‘private property rights’
In the next sections I outline two views in modern property theory, which have shaped the
conceptual framework in which property and especially ‘real property’ exist and operate.
These articles are included because they expose key concepts regarding the origin and nature of
private property rights underpinning modern property theory in western liberal societies, as
socially constructed, not God-given, and able to be modified, not absolute or immutable.
4.1 Hohfeld’s ‘jural relations’
The work of American jurist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,403 provided an important foundation
for modern understandings of how property and property rights operate in then contemporary
western liberal-democratic capitalist societies. Hohfeld explained the character of these legal
interests as essentially incorporeal, due to their necessarily abstract nature,404 and he carefully
described these ‘fundamental legal relations’ as more than either rights or duties, positing a
schema of ‘jural relations’ which operated as opposites, or as correlatives.405 His schema is
reproduced below in Table 2.
(Jural
(Opposites

rights
no-rights

privilege
duty

power
disability

immunity
liability

(Jural
(Correlatives

right
duty

privilege
no-right

power
liability

immunity
disability

Table 2. – Hohfeld’s pairs of jural relations (1913)
Hohfeld’s schema was predicated on the notion, not examined in detail, that these jural relations
were, as abstract legal interests between people, socially constructed. He made plain however
the essentially social context of these jural relations through a comprehensive examination of
their operation in a second article, 406 in which he characterized some rights or claims as being
held by a person against a single other person (paucital relations),407 while other rights or duties
applied to ‘a very large and indefinite class of people’ (multital relations).408

403

Hohfeld, above n 223, 30.
Hohfeld, above n 223, 24; ‘incorporeal’, 3. Law without material existence, but existing in
contemplation of law, as a franchise. Delbridge, et al (eds), above n 4, 892.
405
Hohfeld, above n 223, 30.
406
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’
(1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710.
407
Hohfeld, above n 406, 718, Hohfeld made it plain that a paucital right or duty could be held by ‘a
person (or group of persons)’ and could avail ‘against a single person (or single group of persons)’.
408
Ibid, 718. Hohfeld noted however, at 719 fn 22, that while multital relations operate against people ‘in
general’ they do not necessarily apply to ‘all persons’, since there may be some persons to whom ‘leave
and licence’ has been given, and disparaged use of the phrase “against all the world” as inappropriate.
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This conceptualisation of ‘property rights’, as essentially a series of mutual relationships
between people and hence socially constructed, has formed the bedrock of many later
discussions of property within modern liberalist philosophical frameworks.409 At its core is the
idea that persons other than the claimant owner, have essential roles to play in the social
construction of ‘private property’, in acknowledging a claim, acquiescing or contesting it.
Hence claims of god-given immutable property rights which existed before society are rejected.
4.2 Honoré’s ‘incidents of ownership’
Understandings of ‘property’ as a diverse range of social relations was further developed by
Anthony Honoré,410 who described available criteria for identifying the interest called
‘ownership’ and the ‘actual owner’ recognized by the liberal concept of ‘property’411 and
defined a scheme of legal interests, termed ‘incidents of ownership’, in which some, but not all,
interests were said to be ‘rights’.412 See the summary in Table 3 below.
Incident of Ownership
(i) The right to possess413
(ii) The right to use414
(iii) The right to manage415
(iv) The right to income416
(v) The right to capital417
(vi) The right to security418
(vii) The incident of
transmissibility419
(viii) The incident of absence of
term420
(ix) The prohibition of harmful use421
(x) Liability to execution422
(xi) Residuary character423

Description
A right to exclusive control and a claim that others ought not to
interfere with the thing without permission.
A right to personal enjoyment of the thing owned.
The right to decide “how and by whom the thing owned shall be used”.
A right to derive income earned by the thing owned.
A right that “consists in the power to alienate the thing and the liberty
to consume”.
An indefinite right to remain the owner provided the owner is solvent.
The ability to pass on the ownership interests ad infinitum.
Continuity of the property interest independent of any determinant time
period or happening.
Any use which harms others in society is forbidden.
Liability for the ownership interest to be removed if certain actions are
taken, e.g. insolvency or judgment for payment of a debt.
The notion that when lesser interests come to an end, the content of
those interests will revert back to the owner.

Table 3. – Honoré’s ‘Incidents of Ownership’ (1961)

409

See Babie, above n 323, 5. See also Stephen R Munzer, A Theory of Property (1990) critiqued by
Penner, above n 223, 724.
410
Honoré, above n 216.
411
Ibid 112.
412
Ibid 113.
413
Ibid.
414
Ibid 116.
415
Ibid.
416
Ibid 117.
417
Ibid 118.
418
Ibid 119.
419
Ibid 120.
420
Ibid 121.
421
Ibid 123.
422
Ibid.
423
Ibid 126.
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Honoré’s work provided an important basis for further discussion of ‘property rights’ because,
as well as positing a complete scheme of already recognized legal interests, he described their
conditions of operation and outlined their limits.
Significantly, Honoré discussed ‘the Liberal concept of ownership’, asserting that these
“standard incidents of ownership do not vary from system to system …. but … remain constant
from place to place and age to age”.424 He examined the subtleties of the operation of these
incidents in combination, introducing the notions of an ‘absolute owner’, “full ownership”,
various forms of “split ownership”,425 and the concepts of greater and lesser interests.426
Further, Honoré questioned the term ‘absolute’ ownership, contrasting different approaches
under liberalism and socialism and observed how, using limitations on the standard incidents of
ownership, via policy or regulation, the State could achieve varying effects in social control.427
In so doing, Honoré showed that private property is culturally contingent, and can be politically
manipulated. Thus, as essentially social and cultural constructs, ‘private property rights’, vary
across jurisdictions. Further, whatever ‘private property rights’ are in theory, what matters are
the private property rights that exist in practice, in reality. To examine what actual private
property rights exist over private land, it is necessary therefore to apply property theory to land
in a specific jurisdiction and examine the rules of property law applicable to that land.
I apply Honoré’s incidents of ownership in the next section, to identify the private property
rights available in practice in this jurisdiction.

5. Private property rights in contemporary New South Wales:
In this section I outline the private property rights available in practice, to landowners under
current NSW law, describe other rights available and contest some claimed ‘rights’.
5.1. Settled ‘private property rights’

Since Honoré identified legal interests already recognised by liberal concepts of property, the
‘incidents of ownership’ he described428 are settled elements of property theory. I next apply
these incidents to land ownership in New South Wales, to describe the ambit of the ‘standard’
private property rights available to landowners in this State, under current law, in 2021.

424

Honoré, above n 226, 109.
Ibid 110-112.
426
Ibid 124-5.
427
Ibid 144-7.
428
Ibid 108.
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Though not all incidents are directly relevant to coastal lands, I adopt a comprehensive approach
to this analysis to ascertain whether the ambit of these agreed private property rights includes
other ‘rights’ claimed to be “fundamental” rights, and to establish how these theoretical
incidents operate in practice, in New South Wales. This approach is necessary to establish
whether and how any private property rights or incidents of ownership have been modified by
NSW statute law, and to assess their comparative weight against public rights.
Using the incidents described by Honoré as a guide, a suite of uncontested private property
rights over real property in New South Wales may be identified.

(i) the right to possess a thing

The ‘right to possess’, and exclude others, is often cited as the ‘core’ private property right,429
but it is affected by other ‘rights’ and social conventions. As Honoré observed, powers of entry
onto private land without the owner’s consent are available to many officials.430 In New South
Wales this includes police, local council staff,431 EPA officers,432 emergency service workers,433
and utility service providers.434 Other social conventions in this jurisdiction permit someone to
enter private land and knock on the dwelling’s front door if they do so for a lawful reason.435
Hence, landowners have the right to exclude, but others may lawfully enter their land without
their consent. Further the right to possess does not create a ‘right’ to dwell.436

To obtain exclusive possession, a coastal landowner could seek to construct a fence along the
boundary to their land to prevent public access to the beach above MHWM,437 and prosecute
trespassers on ‘their’ privately owned land.438 However for trespass to be proven it would be
essential to show the boundary’s actual location,439 but if its location were asserted using
measurements, or survey lines, the case may fail if that boundary has been overtaken by the

Honoré, above n 226, 114. Honoré described it as ‘one essential element of ownership’.
Ibid.
431
Under s 191 of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW).
432
Under s 196 of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW).
433
Fire brigade officers have a power of entry under s 23 the Rural Fires Act 1997 (NSW) and ambulance
officers who have an explicit, or implied, invitation to enter private land are generally exempt from
personal liability for trespass under s 67I of the Health Services Act 1997 (NSW).
434
There may be an implied or explicit easement over private land, including over strata title buildings,
for access to the services by the utility provider’s employee or contractor, for maintenance or repairs.
435
This legal defence is acknowledged by s 4 (1) of Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 (NSW).
436
See the ‘right to use’ below.
437
Local council approval may be required for a new fence, and may specify the fencing type permitted.
438
Such trespass actions were the cause of the proceedings in Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy
(1911) 2 IR 260. The case is further considered in Chapter III.
439
Liability for trespass involves entry (without lawful excuse) onto private land without the owner’s
consent, or remaining on the private land when asked to leave. See s 4(1) the Inclosed Lands Protection
Act 1901 (NSW). In NSW legal actions for trespass may be brought by the landowner, or by the police.
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MHWM.440 Without an obvious, boundary recognizable by the public, the ‘right to possess’, or
‘right to exclude others’ while theoretically operable, would be inconclusive in practice.

(ii) right to use

The ‘right to use’ identified by Honoré,441 is extensively regulated when it applies to land in
New South Wales. While some land-uses are permissible without consent,442 and decisions
about them remain the landowner’s, certain land-uses are prohibited in some zones.443 For many
other land-uses a public authority’s consent under the relevant legislation, is required444 and a
landowner cannot make lawful decisions to pursue those uses under a ‘property right’.
Similarly, the ‘private property right’ to use land does not entitle the owner to use it for
dwelling.445 Under current law development consent is required for some forms of temporary
accommodation,446 and to construct and occupy a dwelling.447

Further, as well as planning controls over zoned lands under Local Environment Plans, use of
coastal land has been constrained by state planning instruments for decades.448 This requirement
to obtain consent for, or prohibition on, certain uses of land, greatly narrows the ambit of an
owner’s ‘right to use’.

(iii) right to manage

Honoré’s right to manage449 has also been limited in its application to land, by modern statutes,
and landowners’ capacity to manage their land is constrained by many regulations. For example
managing land for water capture and storage,450 is constrained by the need to obtain an approval
440

See EPA v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655. This case is discussed in Chapter III.
Honoré, above n 216, 116.
442
See s 4.1 EPAA 1979 (NSW). See the development activities ‘permissible without consent’ in the
Land Use tables of the Standard Instrument (Local Environmental Plans) Order 2005 (NSW).
443
See s 4.3 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
444
See s 4.2 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
445
Not every allotment of land has a dwelling entitlement. A minimum lot size of 40ha is required in rural
zones. LEPs may stipulate minimum lot sizes in other zones. The construction of a dwelling requires
development consent under s 4.2 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
446
Use of privately owned land as a caravan park and or camping area is regulated by State
Environmental Planning Policy 21 – Caravan Parks 1992 (NSW). Under this SEPP consent is required
for these uses. See < https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/EPI/1992/204 >.
447
Dwellings are not among the land-uses permissible without consent in any land-use zone under the
Standard Instrument (Local Environmental Plans) 2006 (NSW). Dwellings are permissible with
consent in some land use zones eg Rural Zones RU1 – RU6, and in Residential Zones R1 – R5, but
prohibited in other zones eg. Environmental Protection Zone E1, Tourist Zone SP3, Recreation Zones
RE1 and RE2, Business Zones B1 – B8, and Industrial Zones IN1 – IN4.
448
See State Environmental Planning Policy (SEPP) 14 - Coastal Wetlands, was introduced in 1985.
449
Honoré, above n 216, 116.
450
Harvestable ‘rights’ to capture and store ‘overland flow water’ ie rainfall run-off is governed by ss 53
of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW)
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to construct a dam451 and limits on the volume of rain that can be harvested into storages.452
Similarly landowners’ ability to ‘manage’ the fuel loads on their land through the use of fire,453
are limited by the conditions of the Fire Permit, including the giving of Notice.454
The ‘right’ to manage has been particularly affected by current law controlling ‘biosecurity
risks’. Like its predecessor,455 the Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW) creates a duty on a land-owner,
to ‘prevent, eliminate or minimize a biosecurity risk’, such as noxious weeds, on their land.456
The Act allows an authorized person to direct landowners to manage their land in a specified
way, to reduce a bio-security risk, such as by eradicating noxious weeds.457 Failure to discharge
a biosecurity duty, or to comply with mandatory orders or directions, is an offence, for which
penalties apply.458 Further, an authority may enter private land to control noxious weeds, without the owner’s knowledge or consent,459 and recover its costs in controlling weeds on that land,
from the owner.460 Thus the Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW) has converted part of the landowner’s
‘right’ to manage land, into an enforceable ‘biosecurity duty’ to manage land in particular ways.
There is no ‘right to manage’ coastal lands affected by coastal hazards. Landowners are subject
to the coastal hazard management strategies and emergency action sub-plans developed by local
councils as part of their coastal zone management plans or coastal management programs.461
Consent is required for many other uses, and may be refused in some circumstances.462
Where private land includes areas of native vegetation recognized as threatened ecological
communities,463 or as ‘critical habitat’ for fauna such as koalas,464 the ‘right’ to manage those
areas is also tightly constrained in order to achieve the designated conservation purposes.465
Hence in New South Wales, the private property right to manage is limited by statute law.
Building a dam requires a ‘water supply work approval’: s 90 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW).
‘Harvestable rights orders’ regulate the size of the storage and volume of water captured under s 53 of
the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW).
453
The Rural Fires Act 1997 (NSW) applies to privately owned lands, and lighting of fires in the ‘bush
fires danger period’ – usually 1 October to 31 March - requires notice to be given, pursuant to s 86 (1)
and the landowner to hold a permit under s 89.
454
The Act provides that the requirements for Notice may be prescribed by the Regulations. Clause 33 of
the Rural Fires Regulation 2013 (NSW) specifies the notice and to whom it must be given. Fire Permits
usually also specify the timing of, and preparation needed for, hazard reduction burns.
455
The Noxious Weeds Act 1994 (NSW) [repealed].
456
See ss 21, 22 Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW), see also s 26 & Schedule 1 relating to weed control.
457
See s 65 Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW).
458
See ss 23, 25, 58, 138 Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW).
459
See s 98 Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW).
460
See s 76, 104 Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW).
461
See s 12 State Environment Planning Policy (Coastal Management) 2018 (NSW), [hereafter SEPP
(CM) 2018 (NSW)].
462
See s 14 SEPP (CM) 2018 (NSW).
463
under s 4.5 of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (NSW).
464
Under State Environment Planning Policy (SEPP) 44 – Koala Habitat protection.
465
Preparation of a koala management plan is required for core koala habitat, under s 9(1) of SEPP 44.
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(iv) right to income

The right to the income earned by or from the thing owned is a major benefit of ownership,466
and its exercise is a core purpose of owning land. But this is the right of the owner to receive the
income generated from the use of a thing they own, if that use is legally permissible. It does not
create a right to generate income from land. Theoretically this right exists in New South Wales,
but it is closely linked to the ‘right to use’, considered above. In practice, in many places,
commercial or industrial use of coastal land to generate income, are permissible only with
development consent.467 However, in some NSW coastal settlements private homes have been
converted to commercial purposes for holiday lettings, without obtaining development consent
for the changed use. AirBnB and other accommodation websites have created a new, lucrative
source of income for landowners,468 disrupted the accommodation ‘market’ and created social
impacts in residential areas, which have led to calls for commercial letting to be regulated.469
Further, landowners’ private property ‘right to income’ does not include income from minerals
or other resources below the surface of their land.470

Thus NSW landowners have an uncontested right to the income from the lawful use of their
land in theory, but in practice the ambit of this right has been greatly narrowed by statute law.

(v) right to capital

Honoré’s ‘right to capital’471 includes “the right to alienate the thing and the liberty to
consume”, but this incident’s operation over land in New South Wales is not straightforward,
and not well understood by some landowners. Certainly the ability to alienate land by sale, or by
bequest upon the owner’s death are well recognised, as is an owner’s ability to use their land as
collateral, and raise new capital by borrowing against the security of the land’s tenure and value.
These are very valuable private property rights in modern societies and economies.

466

Honoré, above n 216, 117-118.
Land uses or activities which cannot proceed under a landowner’s ‘right to use’ because they are
prohibited or require development consent are described in the land use tables for specified Zones, in
the adopted planning instrument, usually a Local Environment Plan made under EPAA 1979 (NSW).
468
See media release Simon Richardson, Byron Shire Mayor, ‘Byron Shire to start issuing fines for
unauthorised holiday letting’, 5 October 2018 See < https://www.byron.nsw.gov.au/Council/Mediacentre/Media-Releases/Byron-Shire-to-start-issuing-fines-for-unauthorised-holiday-letting >.
469
See Byron Shire Council ‘Short term holiday letting’ < https://www.byron.nsw.gov.au/Council/Media467

centre/Media-releases/Short-term-holiday-letting >
470

Mineral resources were not always reserved by the Crown in many original land grants, but since 1861
they have subsequently been reserved by the Crown in the creation of the land title. See Butt, above n
209, 16-17. Section 282 of the Mining Act 1992 (NSW) requires a mining lease holder to pay royalty to
the Crown for the recovery of ‘publicly owned minerals.’ Income from mining is accrued by the holder
of the mining lease under the Mining Act 1992 (NSW).
471
Honoré, above n 216, 118.
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The “liberty to consume” element of this right has its most relevant application to chattels, and
to edible produce such as crops and domestic animals. The liberty of owners to consume crops
or livestock produced on their land has been undisputed for centuries. Likewise the liberty of an
owner to destroy a chattel if they choose, has been long recognised in practice, and legal theory.
However extending this ‘right’ to destroy land is deeply problematic, as discussed below.

(vi) right to security

The ‘right to security’ – to remain the owner, if solvent472 – has special application to real
property, since security of tenure is a principal reason why people buy land for residential use.
This right has been at the core of property theory and English law since the 17th century,473
when the common people insisted on a ‘right’ to be free of the arbitrary confiscation of their
property by the Crown in the Grand Remonstrance,474 and later, in the Great Rebellion.475
Subsequently, this right was embodied in the Constitution of the United States of America.476

There is no doubt that this right exists and operates currently in this jurisdiction through the
indefeasibility of titles created under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). This right is important
to landowners: without it they could not borrow against their land, because financiers would not
make loans on assets they could not recover on default of the loan. However, Honoré’s
qualification “provided the owner is solvent” limits its ambit, to reflect other incidents of
ownership: the right to capital and liability to execution, discussed below.

The right to security of ownership of coastal land is also affected by the laws of physics and the
operation of natural processes, as are the land titles themselves. Current law recognizes that
‘land’ is not permanent. Bannon J said
The Torrens system is not a guarantee of the permanence of land. In the course of history, land is
created and land disappears owing to the movements of nature. The Torrens system only
guarantees title to existing land. 477
472

Ibid 119.
Moore, above n 37, 310. The people of England protested against the Crown’s repeated attempts to
seize privately owned lands along the sea coasts, and the banks of the tidal reaches of the River Thames,
on the basis of an asserted Royal prerogative in 1641. Moore, 212 – 281, detailed the court actions by
Elizabeth I, from 1571 until the death of Charles I in 1649, in which the Crown attempted to seize
ownership of land.
474
Moore, above n 37, 310. Moore quoted Article 26 of the Grand Remonstrance which objected to the
“taking away of men’s rights under colour of the King’s title to land between high and low water
marks…”
475
Ibid. Charles’ failure to heed the explicit warnings made by the English people in this document led to
the clash between Parliament and the Crown, known as the Great Rebellion, and his execution in 1649.
476
Part of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, made in 1791, was to insert a constitutional
guarantee of compensation if the State compulsorily acquired a citizen’s property. See Alexander and
Peñalver, above n 229, 156 – 182.
477
EPA v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655, 13,660. See s 8 Chapter III.
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Further, he ruled that the land title of several allotments had been effectively extinguished:
… in spite of the Certificates of Title … there was no land in the subdivision extending beyond
High Water Mark as depicted in Mr Gibson’s surveys …as at the date of the two notices. Those
Certificates of Title need to be corrected pursuant to s 42 of the Real Property Act 1900. 478

Moreover, under current NSW law ownership of lands lost to the sea reverts to the Crown.479
Thus the ‘right to security’ recognizes the continuing ownership of a coastal allotment by its
registered proprietor, but does not create a ‘right’ for the land to continue to exist in perpetuity.
The landowner’s right to security is therefore limited by natural processes and physical factors.
Hence an owner’s solvency does not secure the ownership of land indefinitely. It is a qualified
‘right’, limited by other incidents, and though key in theory, in practice it has major weaknesses.

(vii) the incident of transmissibility

There is no doubt that the right to ‘transmit’ the ownership interests in real property by sale, gift
or bequest exists in New South Wales, both in theory and in practice,480 subject to the operation
of other incidents of ownership. Because land is often perceived to be ‘permanent’, this right
has special significance when the thing owned is real property. Under this right, title to some
private lands has been passed on over generations.

However, if ownership of land is lost, through insolvency, execution, or permanent inundation,
this property right would also be lost.

(viii) the incident of absence of term

Closely related to transmissibility is the incident of “absence of term”. According to Honoré,
under this incident the owner of a thing has a private property right to remain the owner
indefinitely and notwithstanding the occurrence of other events (eg a general election).481 This
incident allows a landowner to enter into a lease with another person for the occupation and use
of their land, for a specified period, but retain ownership. It ensures that when the lease expires
the ownership of the land is undisputed and the landowner may peacefully regain possession.
Though leaseholders obtain lawful access, possession and use of the land, the temporary nature
of the incidents acquired does not confer ownership of the land, due to a limiting term in the

Ibid. Reference to s 42 may be a typographic error. The Registrar General’s power to correct errors on
the Register is available under s 12 of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), see esp. s 12(1)(d).
479
as the State of New South Wales: see EPA v Leaghur Holdings PL [1995] 87 LGERA 282, 287.
480
Sale and transfer of ownership of land is governed by ss 52A - 68 of the Conveyancing Act 1919
(NSW). See Peter Young, Anthony Cahill and Gary Newton, Annotated Conveyancing and Real
Property Legislation New South Wales (LexisNexis, 2011), 86 - 126, [31001] – [31246].
481
Honoré, above n 216, 122.
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lease. The leaseholder’s legal interests in the land, limited by the terms of the lease, would
extinguish when it expired. The absence of term is therefore vital to preserving ownership.
In practice however, a ‘term’ of twelve years applies to the ownership of vacant real property in
New South Wales.482 If land has been abandoned by the owner and then occupied by another,
after 12 years, if other conditions are met,483 the occupier may apply for possessory title.484
Hence the theoretical ‘right’ to remain the owner indefinitely “notwithstanding other events”
under this incident, is limited in practice by current statute law and by physical reality. It does
not apply to land which ceases to be ‘real property’ due to its submergence by tidal waters.485

(ix) the prohibition of harmful use

Honoré’s incident of ownership ‘prohibition on harmful use’,486 is not, as he acknowledged, a
property ‘right’ as such. Under Hohfeld’s scheme, it is better characterized as a correlative of a
privilege, a no-right, or its opposite, as a duty which arises from owning things.487
From a position of fairness, a person who does not want others to harm their things, has a moral
duty to not harm the things owned by others, through harmful use of things they own. Without
this prohibition, unrestrained harmful uses of things by their owners would create social
conflict, reduce the value of things, and mean the inevitable loss of property through harm. This
incident applies to all own-able things, but its application to real property limits the ‘right to
use’ land, to non-harmful uses.488 Further it prevents owners exercising their ‘right to consume
or destroy’ over their land, because this would likely harm their neighbours and their land.489
Due to their potential to adversely affect others, a landowner cannot undertake destructive,
degrading or offensive uses of land in New South Wales, eg excavation, mining, use of
chemicals or poisons, waste incineration and discharge into watercourses, as of ‘right.’ Such
uses may be prohibited in specified zones,490 need an approval authority’s consent,491 or be

482

Butt, above n 209, 897, [22 04].
Ibid 901 – 908, [22 13] – [2224].
484
Ibid.
485
See the discussion of this in Section 4.1.b below.
486
Honoré, above n 216, 123.
487
Ibid 130.
488
Ibid 123.
489
by changing its appearance, affecting its attributes, reducing its economic value, creating related costs
or diminishing their neighbours’ enjoyment of it.
490
Land-uses permissible without consent, permissible only with consent, and prohibited in each zone are
described in the Land Use Tables of LEPs made under the Standard Instrument (Local Environmental
Plans) Order 2006 (NSW).
491
Under s 4.2 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
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subject to specified conditions.492 Some potentially harmful landuses are unlawful unless a
licence for that use is obtained, and conditions to reduce harm, or risk of harm are observed.493
Hence in this jurisdiction many uses of land under a claimed property right would be unlawful.
Particularly problematic are landowner’s actions intended to protect their land from destruction,
such as building a seawall, which may potentially harm adjacent lands. While proponents may
claim their seawall is beneficial because it protects their land, they often fail to recognise that
such works are likely to increase erosion on nearby lands.494 It is because this potential to cause
unintended harm to other lands is recognised, that in New South Wales building defences
against rising sea levels cannot proceed lawfully as a ‘private property right’ and requires a
detailed application, development approval, and compliance with consent conditions.495
Hence the prohibition on harmful uses is not limited to those intended to be harmful, but applies
to all land uses which may, or will, have a harmful effect in practice.

(x) liability to execution

Honoré’s incident, ‘liability to execution’, 496 is also not a property ‘right’. It is the reciprocal of
another person’s right to capital, their right to be paid money owed to them. The obligations to
pay underpinning this liability may also be framed as a duty under Hohfeld’s scheme,497 which
is unavoidable morally if the landowner has used their land as collateral, to borrow money. As
Honoré noted, without this liability to execution “the growth of credit would be impeded” and
owners would be able to ‘defraud’ their creditors.498 This incident therefore acts as a practical
limit to the owner’s private property ‘right to capital’ when creating a mortgage over their land.
In New South Wales this incident commonly applies when the mortgagor landowner defaults on
repayment of a loan and the mortgagee forces the sale of the real property. Laws governing the
registration of mortgages over land,499 foreclosure of loans,500 and the forced sale of real
property to recover outstanding debts 501 give effect to this incident in this jurisdiction.

492

Conditions on consent may be imposed by a consent authority under s 4.17 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
See ss 42 - 63 Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW). Under s 63 a licence holder
is required to comply with conditions on an environmental protection licence. It is an offence under s 64
to fail to comply with conditions.
494
The construction of seawalls will have the effect of increasing erosion on both the publicly owned
foreshore in front of the wall, and adjoining unprotected private lands. See the discussion of this in
Chapter I.
495
See State Environmental Planning Policy (Coastal Management) 2018 (NSW).
496
Honoré, above n 216, 123.
497
Ibid.
498
Ibid.
499
See s 41 Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). See also Young et al, above n 437, 480, [41140].
500
See s 101 Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), ss 61 and 62 Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).
501
See ss 57, 58 Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). Young et al, above n 437, 515 – 521 [41690] –
[41710.45].
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As Honoré also observed, liability to execution, when applied to real property is sometimes
considered as extending, in theory, to a liability to taxation, based on the value of the land.502
In this jurisdiction, liability for ‘tax’ applies in practice in several ways. Under current law, the
levying of rates on land by local authorities is authorised,503 and where rates remain unpaid and
debt has accrued, the authority may force the land’s sale to recover the debt.504 Land tax is also
payable annually on lands which are not a principal residence or used for primary production.505
A form of tax is also levied via stamp duty, based on the real property’s value, payable by
purchasers, to the State, when ownership changes.506
However, ‘liability to execution’ has another application where an owner’s rights are irrelevant.
In theory, and in practice, in New South Wales, though solvent, privately-owned land may be
compulsorily acquired by a state or local government authority, for a specific public purpose,507
eg managing the coastal zone.508 When this occurs the acquiring authority must to give notice to
the owner of the intention to acquire509 and pay ‘just terms’ compensation.510
Note that compensation is paid under the Act’s provisions not a private property ‘right’.511

(xi) residuary character

The last of Honoré’s incidents - residuary character - is the owner’s right to recover the lesser
legal interests in a thing, when those interests cease. 512 This right to regain control over a thing
after an agreement with another person to allow their temporary use of the thing ceases, has
special application to land. It entitles the landowner to recover possession, use and income from
land, or the discharge of a mortgage over the land, once these temporary interests legally cease.

This right to recover lesser legal interests when they expire, still operates in New South Wales.
An explicit agreement that the tenant will give ‘vacant possession’ of the premises to the owner,
or their agent, when the agreement ends on a specified date, is a standard condition of most
leases of land and buildings.513 Where a tenant fails to vacate by the due date, it is this ‘right to
502

Honoré, above n 216, 123-4.
See ss 494 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW).
504
See s 569 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW).
505
See s 7 of the Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW).
506
See ss 8, 12 of the Duties Act 1997 (NSW).
507
See s 5 Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW). See also s 186 Local
Government Act 1993 (NSW).
508
See Object (l) of s 3 of the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW).
509
See ss 11, 12 Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW).
510
See ss 10(1), 54, 56(2) Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW).
511
See Durham Holdings PL v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399, [29] - [31] (Kirby J).
512
Honoré, above n 216, 126.
513
See Clause 17 of the Standard form of the Residential Tenancy Agreement (NSW Fair Trading, 2016)
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recover’ which underpins a landowner’s legal action to seek an order from the court for the
tenant to deliver vacant possession, or to instruct a court officer to evict the ex-tenant.514
Highly pertinent were Honoré’s observations that ‘the difficulty is’ that the reacquisition of
lesser interests by the owner is a series that “may be continued”, and that as a future step in the
series, the State “may acquire” the owner’s interest in land when that interest determines.515
Though he raised it as a “mere expectancy”,516 this next step applies now in New South Wales.
In practice in this jurisdiction, the series continues when land falls below MHWM and ceases to
be part of the ‘real property’ due to its erosion or inundation by tidal waters.517 An owner’s
interests in that land, for residential or other uses, are deemed to cease when they become
impossible, due to changed physical conditions, and its ownership reverts to the State.518
Thus, this incident of ownership works both ways for the owners of real property.519
Paradoxically, it preserves landowners’ long term private property rights, but provides another
means by which, despite their solvency, they may involuntarily lose ownership of their land.
5.2 Summary of ‘standard’ private property rights

It is clear that all Honoré’s incidents of ownership are present and apply to coastal land to some
degree, and a suite of ‘private property rights’ are available to landowners, in New South Wales.
However, the ambit of the lawful exercise of some ‘rights’ is, in practice, quite limited.
Moreover, it is plain that ownership consists of more than ‘rights’, and also entails liabilities,
obligations or duties to others. These reciprocal social relations have special application to real
property, where neighbours possess the same private property rights, or where a tenant or
mortgagee may have a lesser, but nonetheless legal, interest in their land. Landowners who
expect others to respect their private property rights thus have a moral duty to comply when
others pursue their claims of private property rights against them. Without mutual reciprocity,
the social benefit of private property rights would be limited. Further, even where their
existence is uncontested, some ‘private property rights’ when related to land, are subject to
socially approved exceptions, whether the owner consents or not.
A landlord would need to obtain an ‘order for possession’ against the tenant under s 102 Residential
Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) which, if not obeyed, would allow the NSW Civil and Administrative
Tribunal to issue a ‘warrant for possession’, per s 121 RT Act 2010 (NSW) for execution by the Office
of the Sheriff within 28 days. See < https://www.tenants.org.au/resource/warrants-possession-tenancy >
515
Honoré, above n 216, 128.
516
Ibid.
517
See EPA v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655, 13,660.
518
EPA v Leaghur Holdings Pty Ltd [1995] 87 LGERA 282, 287.
519
While they have a private property right to regain ownership of lesser legal interests in their land when
these interests expire, landowners have a corresponding duty, like that of a tenant, to surrender any legal
interest in land below MHWM, when their interests in that land are deemed by law to have ceased.
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5.3 Additional private property rights

As well as ‘standard’ rights, other common law property rights are available to landowners. If
their ‘real property’ is bounded by tidal waters520 landowners are said to have littoral rights.521

The right to claim ownership of new land

These rights include a right to claim ownership of new land formed against their existing land
under the doctrine of accretion, described below. This private property right is not available to
all land-owners however since it only arises in relation to some titles to ‘real property’ due to
the land’s geographic attributes, ie a natural boundary formed by tidal waters or ‘the bank’.

The doctrine of accretion
The right to claim ownership of new land is a surviving element of civil law rules of property522
which govern the movement of natural boundaries formed by permanent bodies of water.523
These rules were adopted and refined by English common law courts during the 19th century
and became known, collectively, as the ‘doctrine of accretion’.524 Under this doctrine the legal
boundary to real property formed by the bounding waterbody changes to reflect changes in the
position of the water’s edge, provided two conditions are met: the change is gradual, and is
brought about by ‘natural forces’.525 Under its rules, the ownership of new land formed against
existing land, by the gradual deposition of sediment by the bounding water, or by a fall in the
water level, is awarded to the adjoining landowner.526 Thus landowners have the right to claim
the ‘new’ land, which they could expect would be recognised by law.
However the doctrine is ‘double-sided’ 527 and works “both ways”.528 As well as modes of
addition, land may be subtracted via the same gradual natural processes: erosion and diluvion.529
See LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, 355 Real Property/ VI Other/ (2) Boundaries, Fences
and Encroachments/ (B) Boundaries for Land Abutting Water/ (I) Tidal Water Boundaries [355-1405]
521
See Attorney General of the Straits Settlement v Wemyss (1888) 13 App Cas 192, 196. See also
Richard A Epstein, ‘Littoral Rights under the Takings Doctrine: The Clash Between the Ius Naturale
and Stop the Beach Renourishment’ (2011) 6 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy 37.
522
The doctrine of accretion is similar to the right of livestock owners to claim ownership of any progeny.
See John Burke, (ed) Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed, 1977), 18-19.
523
Butt, above n 209, [2 47] 33-4.
524
The term ‘doctrine of accretion was first used in Foster v Wright (1878) 4 CPG 438, 447, by Lindley J.
See also Hindson v Ashby [1896] 2 Ch 1, 13, 14.
525
Butt, above n 209, [2 47] 34. Gifford [Rex] v Yarborough (1828), 5 Bingham 163; 4 ER 1087. See also
Southern Centre of Theosophy Incorporated v South Australia (1982) AC 706; [1982] 1 All ER 283,
discussed in s 7 of Chapter III.
526
Re Hull and Selby Railway Co (1839) 5 M&W 327, 151 ER 139. See also Urquhart Forbes and Henry
John Coulson, The Law Relating to Waters, (Bradbury Agnew & Co, 2nd ed, 1902) 29.
527
The term ‘double-sided’ was used in Attorney General of Southern Nigeria v John Holt & Co Ltd
(1915) AC 599 by Lord Shaw at 614; and in Southern Centre of Theosophy Incorporated v South
Australia [1978] 19 SRSA 389, 392 (Walters J).
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Hence, while there is a right to claim new land, under Hohfeld’s scheme, a landowner would
have ‘no-right’530 to claim to own land lost to these natural processes, and there would be a
correlative ‘duty’ to accept its loss. The doctrine’s subtractive modes of operation are poorly
understood, but highly relevant to the future use of coastal land as sea levels rise. Hence as a
common law concept, its scope extends beyond the meaning of ‘accretion’ in geography.531
Modern statutes532 have modified the operation of the doctrine’s modes of addition, but have not
addressed its subtractive modes. Their future operation under climate change conditions are
therefore especially relevant to the thesis topic, and will be considered in later chapters.
This link between geographic attributes and the existence of additional private property rights is
a rare surviving example of land’s physical nature affecting the scope of the property in, and
property rights available to the owner. There is no ‘placelessness’ for the real property in littoral
land.533 Without evidence of ‘place’ and possession of the vital geographic attribute, a water
boundary, claims by landowners under this right would not succeed. Thus the additional
property rights available under the doctrine of accretion, are ‘geographically contingent’.
5.4. Contested claims of ‘rights’

Extraneous to the private property rights recognised by Has settled property law,534 coastal
landowners in New South Wales, have claimed private property rights that:
a) allow them to build seawalls or other structures to defend against the sea;535
b) creates a ‘duty’ on the State to ‘protect’ them from the sea with defensive structures;536
c) entitles them to be paid compensation for land lost to the sea;537
d) are dominant, and paramount considerations “which legislatures cannot ignore”.538
However, I seriously doubt that these claimed rights exist in law: hence they are not further
considered here as among the private property rights recognized by current property theory.
Following my review of relevant common law in Chapter III and current statute law in Chapter
IV, in s 9 of Ch IV I state my conclusions on the existence of these claimed rights.
In Williams v Booth (1910) 10 CLR 341, Isaacs J discussed the doctrine’s operation and said at 352,
‘… but the rule must work both ways, if at all.’
529
See Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia (1982) AC 706; [1982] 1 All ER 283, 287.
530
Hohfeld, above n 223, 30.
531
See Corkill, ‘Ambulatory’, above n 63, 78.
532
See s 55N Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW); s 28 Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW).
533
See Graham, above n 235, 5-8.
534
Honoré sought to describe “what ownership is” and the standard incidents of ownership which are
constant in liberal conceptions of ‘property’, and other systems. Honoré, above n 216, 105, 109.
535
Coleman, above n 13, 421.
536
Ibid 422.
537
This claim is based on US courts’ rulings that loss of land to the sea is a ‘taking’ of private property
which warrants the compensation of the owner under the Constitution of the United States of America.
538
Coleman, above n 13, 422.
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6. Vestiges of prior land law still apply
Though the English land laws originally applicable to New South Wales have undergone major
modification since self-government began in 1856, to adapt them to colonial conditions,539 it is
appropriate to notice two vestiges of English land law, which still apply to real property today.
a] the ‘doctrine of tenure’

The first is the doctrine of tenure, which holds as a tenet of property law that all title to land has
its origin in the Crown as the ‘original owner’.540 Under this doctrine, landowners’ title to land
is legitimate where a line of lawful conveyance of title exists, at the origin of which is a valid
grant of land by the Crown.541 This doctrine continues to apply in New South Wales, where,
through the adoption of Torrens title, all land titles are created by the State, and relevant details
of the interests in land are recorded in the register of land titles maintained by the State.542

b] the principle of escheat

The second element, the ‘principle of escheat’,543 is linked to the doctrine of tenures.544
Originally, ‘escheat’ referred to title to land reverting to its original owner, the Crown,545 if a
landowner died without heirs or intestate, or was convicted of an offence punishable by death.546
However, despite the report that it is largely extinguished,547 I posit that it continues to apply in
New South Wales where coastal land is eroded or submerged by tidal waters and part of the
land title falls below MHWM.548 It is under this common law principle, that the ownership of
that part of the real property once above, but now below, MHWM reverts to its original owner,
the Crown, as the State of New South Wales.549 I conclude that it is this principle of escheat

539

See Andrew R Buck, The Making of Australian Property Law (Federation Press, 2006) 47-85.
See LegalOnline The Laws of Australia, Real Property > Principles of Real Property > Doctrine of
Tenure [28.1.410], [28.1.460]. See also LexisNexis Halbury’s Laws of Australia 355 Real Property (I)
Introduction (I) Historical Foundation of Real Property in Australia (E) Doctrine of Tenure [355-70].
541
LegalOnline The Laws of Australia, Real Property > Principles of Real Property > Doctrine of Tenure
[28.1.200].
542
Butt, above n 209, 83-4.
543
See LegalOnline The Laws of Australia, Government > Executive > Executive Authority > Executive
Powers, Immunities and Proprietary Prerogatives > Proprietary Prerogatives [19.3.800] [19.3.810].
544
LexisNexis Halbury’s Laws of Australia 355 Real Property (I) Introduction (I) Historical Foundation
of Real Property in Australia (E) Doctrine of Tenure [355-75]. See also Butt, above n 209, 83-7.
545
Delbridge et al (eds), above n 4, 593.
546
Butt and Hamer, (eds), above n 207, 213. See also ‘attainder’, 40.
547
Butt, above n 209, 84-5, concluded that ‘the only remnant of the doctrine of escheat appears to be
under Commonwealth legislation.’ For reasons I make plain, I disagree.
548
As indicated by the court’s use of the phrase ‘reversion of ownership to the Crown’ in Environment
Protection Authority v Leaghur Holdings PL [1995] 87 LGERA 282, 287. See s 8 of Chapter III below.
549
See the discussion in Chapter III below of Environment Protection Authority v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR
13,655 and Environment Protection Authority v Leaghur Holdings PL [1995] 87 LGERA 282.
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which gives legal effect to Honore’s incident of ownership of ‘residuary character’, under which
the private interest in coastal land may lapse or ‘revert’ without the owner’s consent.

This concludes my exposition of private property, private property rights and their limits, in
New South Wales. I turn next to public property and public rights in coastal lands and waters.

Part C – Public property and public ‘rights’
In this Part I examine the key concepts of public property and public rights to use coastal lands
and waters, as they apply in this jurisdiction.

7. The civil law legacy
Several key concepts from Roman civil law provided a foundation for English property law
through their adoption into the common law of England.550 The Institutes of Justinian (c 533
AD),551 are often cited as the source of these concepts, but they sought to update earlier texts

including the Institutes of Gaius (c 160 AD)552 and Codex Theodosianus (c 438 AD).553
Three elements of civil law that are central to modern notions of public rights have their origin
in an often quoted section of Justinian’s Institutes.
…the following things are by natural law common to all - the air, running water, the sea, and
consequently the seashore. No one therefore is forbidden access to the seashore, provided he abstains
from injury to houses, monuments, and buildings generally: for these are not, like the sea itself,
subject to the law of nations. On the other hand, all rivers and harbours are public, so that all persons
have a right to fish therein. The seashore extends to the limit of the highest tide in time of storm or
winter. … Again, the public use of the sea-shore, as of the sea itself, is part of the law of nations;
consequently everyone is free to build a cottage upon it for the purposes of retreat, as well as to dry
his nets and haul them up from the sea.554

Over the centuries since, these civil law concepts have been adapted by English common law,555
or modified by modern statutes,556 providing the philosophical basis for modern public rights.557
These concepts are considered next.

In Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy [1911] 2 IR 260, Palles CB said, at 276 the case ‘ …
presents a typical instance of a principle of the Roman civil law being introduced into, and becoming
part of, the English common law as to real property.’ Gibson J concurred with this legacy at 295, 298-9.
551
See Attorney General (Southern Nigeria) v John Holt & Coy Ltd [1915] AC 599, 613 (Lord Shaw);
Svendsen v State of Queensland [2002] 1 Qd R 216, 221, (Demack J).
552
See Max Radin, ‘The New Gaius’ (1935) 24 California Law Review 304553
DM Walker Oxford Companion to Law (Clarenden Press, 1980) at 237.
554
This text from Institutes of Justinian, Book 2, title 1.1-5, translated by J.B. Moyle, was quoted at
length by Demack J in Svendsen v State of Queensland [2002] 1 Qd R 216, 221.
555
For eg the upper limits of the ‘seashore’ or ‘foreshore’ has been modified in English common law, and
in other jurisdictions including New South Wales, and is defined as the average high water mark on
ordinary, or medium tides, or mean high water mark. In other jurisdictions, such as Queensland high
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a) public property

The first persistent concept: the idea that some lands, other natural resources and specifically
‘the sea and consequently the seashore’,558 are ‘common to all’, and cannot be permanently
appropriated for exclusive private use.559 It formed the foundation for later legal concepts, such
as the jus privatum and jus publicum,560 the ‘public trust doctrine’ revived by Sax,561 ‘inherently
public property’ explored by Rose,562 and reserving some lands from private acquisition.563

(b) access to the sea and seashore

The second concept the right to access the seashore. The text is explicit: ‘No one therefore is
forbidden access to the seashore…’ Further this right of public access extends more broadly, to
‘…the sea itself’, adjoining coastal waters, and ‘all rivers and harbours’. This is the foundation
of the public right to access the foreshore and to navigate over tidal waters.
(c) a ‘right to fish’

The third surviving concept is an explicit ‘right to fish’. The Institutes text referred to ‘rivers
and harbours’ and was explicit that ‘all persons have a right to fish therein’, but the stated
liberty to dry nets and ‘haul them up from the sea’ shows that the right to fish extended to tidal
waters. This civil law concept did not easily translate into English law, where many ancient
grants included lands below HWM, which created a private right of fishery for the landowner.564
A ‘right to fish’ did emerge in English common law however,565 and applied in British colonies.

water is defined as ‘mean high water at spring tides’. In the United States an average of all high water
marks over 19 years is used to calculate the ‘mean high tide line’.
556
For eg fishing by members of the public in tidal waters is still widely permissible in New South Wales,
but it is prohibited within many ports, and other areas declared ‘closed’ by regulation.
557
specifically the public right of navigation, and the public right to fish. See Blundell v Catterall (1821)
5 B & A 268; 106 ER 1190. The right to dry nets was later considered a local custom rather than part of
the common law: see Gann v Free Fishers of Whitstable (1865) 11 HL Cas 192; 11 ER 1305
558
Usefully the text quoted provided an unambiguous definition of ‘the seashore’ as extending ‘to the
limit of the highest tide in time of storm or winter.’ This landward limit is well above and landward of
the line of MHW, and is analogous to highest storm tide, in modern tidal heights.
559
Though the quote states ‘everyone is free to build a cottage upon it for the purposes of retreat’, this is
likely a reference to a temporary use, particularly during stormy weather, as are the other uses cited: not
to a property ‘right’ to make a ‘free selection’ of the foreshore with a view to permanent residency.
560
See David C Slade, Putting the Public Trust Doctrine to Work (Coastal States Org. 2nd ed, 1997), 6-9.
561
See Sax, above n 189.
562
Rose, ‘Comedy’, above n 235.
563
and permanent dedication for public purposes e.g water supply catchments, National Parks.
564
The ability of the English Crown to grant private fisheries was curtailed by Magna Carta, and a public
right to fish has long been recognised in English Common law. See Stuart A Moore and Hubert Stuart
Moore, The History and Law of Fisheries (Stevens & Haynes, 1903), 32-36.
565
Ibid 35.
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8. Public property in New South Wales
For the purposes of this thesis, ‘public property’ in New South Wales refers to the legal interests
in coastal lands held by the general public, or by the government on their behalf.
8.1 Corporeal public property

It has been said that all manifestations of property are ‘incorporeal’566 since they refer to the
‘abstract legal relations’ applying to own-able things. However the term ‘corporeal public
property’ has persisted to indicate legal interests in a thing, such as land, held by the public,
where those interests are so special or extensive as to justify public ownership of the thing.567
This encompasses ‘publicly owned’ lands and premises specifically dedicated for public use.
Thus ‘public property’ may be land registered as ‘real property’, such as public hospitals, public
schools, roads and highways, sporting grounds, owned by specific public authorities in the
public interest ,or areas of un-alienated Crown land such as national parks, state forests or
Crown reserves and ‘an inchoate miscellany’ of other types of Crown land.568 Carol Rose
described some lands, including beaches and foreshores, as ‘inherently public property’.569

8.2 Incorporeal public property

Similarly, ‘incorporeal public property’ refers to legal interests in a thing held by the public,
where those interests do not justify the thing, or the land containing it, being publicly owned.570
That there could be ‘public property’ in privately owned land571 has not been widely considered,
it has been suggested, because theorists focused on ‘private property’ have not recognized it.572
To remedy this restrictive approach requires an ability to ‘see it’, that involves an awareness that
other species of property in land exist, and a willingness to identify them.573 There are many

566

Hohfeld, above n 223, 23-4.
See Page, ‘Towards’ above n 235, 197. Corporeal ‘public property’ would also include the large
swathes of Crown owned land designated as leasehold land, and land and resources owned by the State
government , see Page, above n 235, 201.
568
such as ‘permissive occupancies, travelling stock routes and ‘paper’ roads’, owned by a government
agency or vested in a Minister of the Crown or a Ministerial corporation. See also Page, ‘Property’,
above n 255, 40, Table 2.1.
569
See Rose, ‘Comedy’, above n 235, 722.
570
See for example the use of these terms in Page, ‘Towards’, above n 235, 197-200.
571
Such as covenants restricting impacts on views or easements for public access
572
Indeed, according to CB Macpherson, there has been a pervasive trend ‘by many property writers’ to
misuse the terms and treat the concepts of ‘property’ and ‘private property’ identically, as if no
distinction were possible or necessary. See Macpherson, above n 222, 2.
573
Carol M Rose, ‘Seeing Property’ in Property and Persuasion Essays on the History, Theory and
Rhetoric of Ownership (Westview Press, 1994) 267.
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examples of public rights or interests as ‘incorporeal public property’ in private land.574 In some
jurisdictions a public right of access over private land exists for recreational purposes or as a
thoroughfare between public spaces.575

In New South Wales a general right of access does not exist, however privately-owned land may
be subject to a public right-of-way or an easement for access which is registered over the land
title.576 Other incorporeal ‘public property’ in privately-owned land include water supply
catchments, mineral resources,577 or areas of significant native vegetation and fauna habitat
which do not depend on public access.578
Features such as gardens, fountains, murals, statutes or monuments on private land, which can
be enjoyed from nearby public areas, 579 are also a kind of ‘public property’.580 Ways to protect
public property in privately-owned land are further considered in later chapters.
That concludes my focus on public property. I next address public rights to use coastal lands.

9. Public rights to use coastal lands and waters
The arrival of English common law in New South Wales is briefly explained next as a preface
to my examination of current public rights to access and use coastal land and waters.
9.1 Public ‘rights’ were transported to British colonies

Eg the State’s ownership of native fauna under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) and
the protection of Threatened Species habitat under the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (NSW).
575
Jurisdictions which provide a public right of access over private land include Sweden, where there is
‘right to roam’, Scotland, where the right of access has long existed under Scots law now codified as a
right of ‘responsible access’, under the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (Scot), and England where the
right of access, though customary in many places, has been given statutory recognition by the
Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (UK). See Alexander and Peñalver, above n 229, 4. See also
Page, ‘Reconceptualising’, above n 249, 93-94.
576
Easements for public access across private land may employ an ‘easement in gross’ under Schedule
4A or an easement under Schedule 8, for a ‘right of carriage way’ a ‘right of foot way’ or a ‘right of
access’ under s 88B Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).
577
The land title of real property usually explicitly reserves to the Crown, as the agent for public, the
underground mineral resources, which can be re-allocated by the Crown as another species of ‘private
property’, as an exploration or mining licence, within or underlying privately-owned land.
578
Positive covenants to protect such natural features may be created per s 88BA Conveyancing Act 1919
(NSW) or required as a condition of a development consent issued under the EPAA 1979 (NSW).
579
See for eg Nicholas Blomley, ‘Flowers in the Bathtub: boundary crossings at the public private divide’
(2005) 36 Geoforum 281-296. Though Blomley explores the extension of private gardens onto public
space outside residences, illustrating a private encroachment on public space, his example works both
ways. Members of the public may view, enjoy and relate to elements of privately owned gardens such
as scent, shade or produce from gardens or trees, or close encounters with birds and other wildlife.
580
Sites or items of Aboriginal cultural heritage significance may occur on privately owned land, but they
warrant a more exclusive term, ‘cultural property’.
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The transplantation of English common law rights and rules regarding property generally and
‘real property’ in particular, to distant lands through English colonization, through the ‘silent
operation of constitutional principles’581 was explained in Blackstone’s much quoted statement.
“It hath been held that, if an uninhabited country be discovered and planted by British subjects, all the
English laws then in being, which are the birthright of every English subject, are immediately there in
force. But this must be understood with very many and very great restrictions. Such colonists carry
with them only so much of the English law as is applicable to the condition of an infant Colony.” 582

Though it is now accepted that Australia was inhabited,583 this transplantation of English law
into British colonies transported common law public rights to New South Wales,584 as was later
confirmed by the British Imperial Parliament.585 Thus English law, including rules of common
law, applied to the extent appropriate in the ‘infant colony’, until new local laws developed.
This rosy view of the smooth reception of English law into the colony as a ‘birthright’, is
however troubling,586 since only the ‘birthrights’ of Englishmen were recognised.587
9.2 Contemporary public ‘rights’

As outlined above, two public rights over ‘public property’ in the foreshore have been recog-nized by the common law courts: the public right of navigation, and public right to fish.588
A third right of public pedestrian access to coastal lands has subsequently developed and been
incorporated into NSW legislation. These rights are explained below.

(a) public right of navigation
581

Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cases 286, 293 (Lord Watson).
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (first pub 1765) vol 1, 107, quoted in
Cooper v Stuart (1885) 14 App Cases 286, 291 (Lord Watson). See the discussion of the arrival of the
common law in Australia by Catriona Cook et al, Laying down the law (LexisNexis, 7th ed, 2009) 34-5.
583
The doctrine of terra nullius was overturned by the Full Court of the High Court of Australian in
Mabo and others v. Queensland (No. 2) [1992] HCA 23; (1992) 175 CLR 1 FC
584
Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cases 286, 293 (Lord Watson). Though the court did not cite
Blackstone’s principle, in an early case in New South Wales, (Mary) Lord v Commissioners for the City
of Sydney [1859] 12 Moo PC 473; 14 ER 991, 1000, the court did employ the phrase ‘an infant colony’,
but relied on English rules of law to interpret the terms of the grant of land, citing ‘Mr Chancellor Kent,
… Commentaries (Ed. 1840), part 6, Lect. 52, p. 438’, (Sir John Coleridge).
585
The Australian Courts Act 1828 (6 Geo 4, c 83) included a provision that all laws and statutes in force
in England on 25 July 1828 applicable to the conditions in New South Wales were deemed to be in
force there. See Margaret Davies, Asking the Law Question (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2008) 35.
586
This view is troubling when seen from a contemporary perspective, because at the time that these laws
were transplanted into the colony, as an Englishman’s ‘birthright’, the rights of indigenous peoples were
overlooked, ignored or traduced by the military administrators of the penal colony, and then by many
free settlers. This occurred despite the specific direction to the contrary, noted above.
587
Insights into the attitudes of colonial administrators and the resistance by local aboriginal people to
colonization may be gained from Eric Willmot, Pemulwuy: The Rainbow Warrior (Matilda, 1987).
588
In Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268; 106 ER 1190, Best J, at 284-5; 1196, acknowledged a
‘right to fish’ when he quoted part 1, cap. 8, p 11 of Hale’s treatise De Jure Maris “The King’s right of
propriety, or ownership, in the sea, and soil thereof, is evidenced principally by these things that follow;
first, the right of fishing in the sea, and the creeks and arms thereof, is originally lodged in the Crown”.
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The public right of navigation,589 has its roots in the customary use of boats for transport,
freighting goods to market, and fishing.590 At common law, this right extends over all tidal
waters,591 and includes the foreshore, being land between high- and low-water mark.592
In the New South Wales colony’s early days, since there were few roads and many settlements
were only accessible by boat, coastal navigation was commonplace, and free settlers navigated
the harbour and coastal waters under the public right recognised by English common law.593

Navigation has since been recognised by the court in New South Wales as an extensive public
‘right’ which allows a ‘subject’ to pass freely over tidal waters in any direction, at any time.594
It ‘carries with it all rights necessary for the full use and enjoyment of the rights of convenient
passage’, but it ‘must be done for a reasonable purpose and in a reasonable way’.595 Further, the
public right of navigation is limited by geography and facilities,596 ‘paramount’ over the public
right to fish,597 and can only be abrogated by statute,598 not by a construction of the terms of a
land grant, or by the exercise of a delegated general authority.599

‘navigate’ is defined as verb (t) 1. To traverse (the sea, a river, etc.) in a vessel, or (the air) in an
aircraft; 2. to direct or manage (a ship, aircraft, etc.) on its course; 3. to pass over (the sea, etc.) as a ship
does; and ‘navigation’ as noun 1. the act of or process of navigating; 2. The art or science of directing
the course of a ship or aircraft; see Delbridge et al (eds) above n 4, 1188.
590
Henry Bracton, the Chief Justice of England during the reign of Henry III, and his seminal work De
Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (c. 1260) were cited in Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268;
106 ER 1190, by counsel for the defendants, at 272; 1192, as the earliest English authority on public
rights to use the sea and sea-shore and Bracton’s dicta were discussed at 281-2; 1195 (Best J), 291;
1198-9 (Holroyd J), 308; 1204-5 (Bayley J), 312; 1206 (Abbott CJ). In Rowland v Environment Agency
[2005] Ch 1, [2004] 3 WLR 249, [2003] EWCA Civ 1885, Gibson LJ at [3] noted that the public right
of navigation over the River Thames had existed from ‘time immemorial’, ie before 1189.
591
In Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268; 106 ER 1190. Holroyd J at 289-290;1198 cited the plea
“that, by the common law of England, all the King’s subjects had a right, not only to traverse the ocean
in every direction, as well for commerce, trade and intercourse, as for every other lawful purpose.”
592
See Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268; 106 ER 1190, 291; 1198 (Holroyd J).
593
See Ian Hoskins, Coast – A History of the New South Wales Edge (NewSouth Press, 2013) 183-236.
594
York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads [1983] 1 NSW LR 391, 393 (Powell J).
See also the ruling that it ‘is a common law right, inherent in all her Majesty’s subjects, to use the
surface of all navigable waters, both by day and night, by every kind of vessel, for private advantage or
pleasure, as well as public convenience,’ in Peltier v Darwent (1870) NSWR 133, 150 (Hargraves J).
595
These include ‘the rights to pass and to ground and to anchor, … loading and unloading and
completing repairs; or ‘waiting till the wind and weather, or probably also the season, permits the vessel
to leave’. York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads [1983] 1 NSW LR 391, 393.
596
The court noted that ‘the rights of all vessels are not coextensive’, observing that while a small boat
could ‘go up to the farthest point she can reach’, a ship had no right ‘to get to a place where large
vessels are not accustomed to go, and where there is no accommodation for mooring and unloading
them’. York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads [1983] 1 NSW LR 391, 393-4.
597
Gann v Free Fishers of Whitstable (1865) 11 HLC 192; 11 ER 1305. See also Anon (1808) 1 Camp
517; 170 ER 517 and McInsley v Gilley (1907) 7 WLR 22 cited by Walrut, above n 26, 427.
598
Mayor of Colchester v Brooke (1845) 7 QB 339; 115 ER 518; Wood v Esson (1883) 9 SCR 239.
599
York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads [1983] 1 NSW LR 391, 398.
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Though public navigation had utilitarian origins, in the 20th century recreation boating became
popular. However, it is not a separate category of the public right. That the purpose of
navigation was irrelevant was clarified by courts in England,600 and New South Wales.601

i] Modification by modern statute law

Public navigation in the colony remained unregulated until early 19th century statutes sought to
protect the travelling public’s safety by regulating commercial navigation602 in the coastal
waters of New South Wales.603 These laws were updated during the life of the colony,604 and
after Federation by the State of New South Wales.605
The regulation of navigation in NSW coastal waters was reviewed and updated in the 1990s.606
The Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW),607 Marine Safety (General) Regulation 2009 (NSW)608 and
the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972,609 (as amended)610 are the principal
current statutes.
600

In Blundell v Catterall (1821) the purpose of accessing the sea was much discussed, and Best J said
‘The universal practice of England shews the right of way over the sea-shore to be a common law right.
All sorts of persons who resort to the sea, either for business or pleasure, have always been accustomed
to pass over the unoccupied parts of the shore….’ Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268, 106 ER
1190, 1194. That the purpose was not a factor qualifying the public right was affirmed by Abbot CJ, at
1206, who said ‘… the waters of the sea are open to the use of all persons for all lawful purposes…’
601
The wide scope in the purpose of public navigation coastal waters in this State, was affirmed in Peltier
v Darwent (1870) where Hargrave J ruled that ‘the public right of navigation is a common law right,
inherent in all her Majesty’s subjects, to use the surface of all navigable waters, both by day and night,
by every kind of vessel, for private advantage or pleasure as well as public convenience’. Peltier v
Darwent (1870) 9 NSWR 133, 150. See the discussion of this by Walrut, above n 26, 428.
602
creating minimum standards for passenger vessels. These included requirements for seaworthiness,
essential lifesaving equipment e.g. life-boats and life-jackets and later, standards of competence for
masters and crew. Vessels were also required to operate with lights illuminated after dusk.
603
such as the Shipping Act 1825 (NSW) and the Steam Navigation Acts of 1847 and 1850 (NSW). The
English statute 3 Wm 4 No.6 (1832) also applied in the colony of New South Wales until 1871.
604
Eg the Navigable Waters Protection Act 1862; Steam Navigation Act 1871 (NSW).
605
Eg Navigation Act 1901 (NSW); Navigation and Other Acts (Validation) Act 1983 (NSW). A
treatment of the history of the regulation of commercial navigation in the coastal waters of New South
Wales is beyond the scope of this article. But see M Richards North Coast Run: Men and Ships of the
New South Wales North Coast (Turton and Armstrong, 3rd ed, 1996) See also publications listed at the
Australian National Maritime Museum < http://www.anmm.gov.au/site/page.cfm?u=1474 >
606
For e.g. the Maritime Services Act 1935 (NSW) was substantially amended by the Ports and Maritime
Administration Act 1995 (NSW).
607
Other statutes also apply eg Marine Pollution Act 1987 (NSW); Marine Parks Act 1997 (NSW);
Marine Pollution Act 2012 (NSW); Ports and Maritime Administration Act 1995 (NSW).
608
Other regulations apply e.g. Management of Waters and Waterside Lands Regulations 1972 (NSW);
Marine Parks (Zoning Plans) Regulation 1999 (NSW) Marine Pollution Regulation 2006 (NSW)
Marine Parks Regulation 2009 (NSW); Ports and Maritime Administration Regulation 2012 (NSW).
609
These Regulations derive from earlier rules of sailing. See Tom Lochhaas, ‘Rules of the Road for
Sailboats’ at < http://sailing.about.com/od/lawsregulations/ss/Rules-Of-The-Road-For-Sailboats.htm >
See also Robby Robinson The International Marine Book of Sailing (McGraw-Hill, 2009). The rules
were refined as international rules for international waters under the Convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972, (COLREGS) adopted 20 October 1972, Entry into
force 15 July 1977. See < http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/COLREG.aspx >
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These regulations are summarised in the Boating Handbook (NSW RMS, 2012)611 and
knowledge of them is required to pass the necessary test612 to obtain a marine safety licence.613
These statutes regulate navigation in various ways, outlined below.
Under the Act operators must be licensed,614 vessels must be registered,615 bear a maker
identification plate, and be equipped with safety equipment,616 However some vessels and
operators are exempt from these registration requirements.617 The Act also provides for limits on
a vessel’s speed in parts of the state’s coastal waters and the Minister has power to designate
areas ‘no wash’ zones, and regulate the mooring or use of vessels by posting a Notice.618

Current regulations also empower the Minister to specify areas of coastal waters as off-limits to
navigation by the public for a ‘special event’, by issuing a Notice which declares an exclusion
zone,619 permanently,620 or for a specified period.621 Disregarding any Notice and entering an
exclusion area is an offence, and penalties apply.622

ii] Has the public right to navigate survived?

Whether the right of navigation has survived regulation is not immediately apparent. As a rule
of statutory interpretation, the courts require Parliament to express a clear intent to amend or
repeal a common law rule. But since the relevant Act does not explicitly repeal the right of
navigation, closer analysis is needed to ascertain whether this statute has impliedly repealed it.
Thus these Regulations have the status of international law. They have been refined as ‘international
racing rules’ by the International Sailing Federation, for all competitions held under their auspices. See
< http://www.sailing.org/documents/racingrules/index.php >
610

These COLREGS, with the addition of special NSW rules, were adopted for use in NSW coastal
waters. See cl 5 and Schedule 2 of the Marine Safety (General) Regulation 2009 (NSW).
611
Boating Handbook (NSW RMS, 2012), 30. See < http://www.maritime.nsw.gov.au/sbh/index.html >.
612
Applicants must complete a General Licence Boating Safety Course and pass a test to qualify for a
‘boat driving licence’. See < http://www.maritime.nsw.gov.au/rec_boating/boatingsafety.html#hl >
613
Marine safety licences issued under s 29 Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW) include as (e) ‘boat driving
licence’. It is an offence under s 63 to operate a power-driven recreational vessel without such a licence.
614
See s 63 Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW) [hereafter MSA 1998 (NSW)].
615
Under s 49 MSA 1998 (NSW) all vessels operated in the State’s waters are required to be registered,
except those vessels of a class exempted under regulations made under s 50(3). Thus any commercial
vessel, power-driven vessels that are powered by an engine with a power rating of 4.0 kilowatts or more
(greater than 5hp), any power-driven or sailing vessel of 5.5 metres or longer, every vessel subject to a
mooring licence (includes marina berths) and personal watercraft (PWC), are required to be registered.
616
See Regs 43 and 84Marine Safety (General) Regulation 2009 (NSW) [hereafter MSGR 2009 (NSW)].
617
Under cl 61 of the MSGR 2009 (NSW) vessels with an engine power rating of < 4.0 kilowatts (5hp),
any power-driven or sailing vessel < 5.5 metres, vessels not subject to a mooring licence or using a
marina berth, ‘passive craft’ being a vessel that does not have an engine and is < 4 metres long or a
canoe, kayak, surf ski or rowing shell of any length, are exempt.
618
See s 11 MSA 1998 (NSW).
619
See s 12 MSA 1998 (NSW).
620
Parts of Sydney Harbour are permanently declared sail-board and wind-surfing exclusion areas.
621
Exclusion areas in parts of Sydney Harbour are routinely declared for major public events.
622
under s 11 (4) MSA 1998 (NSW).
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Before looking at the legislation’s effect, it is useful to notice that the right of navigation has
three discernible elements. The first is a right to cross the foreshore for the purpose of
navigating tidal waters. The second is a right to use any or ‘every kind of vessel’ convenient for
that purpose. The third more extensive element, a right to go anywhere one’s vessel is able to
reach safely, for any purpose, at any time, is the essence of this public right, in my view.

On one view, statute law has greatly limited the common law public right of navigation.
It might be said that the first element of the right has been repealed because members of the
public cannot lawfully navigate the state’s coastal waters without a marine safety licence, and
they commit an offence if they do. Thus, it is ‘licence holders’ who may navigate on coastal
waters, and they do so with a licence issued under statute law, not as a common law public
right. Further, it may be argued the second element has been repealed since not any vessel will
do. Only vessels which are registered and comply with the regulations may be used, since it is
also an offence to operate an unregistered vessel in the coastal waters of the State. It could also
be argued that the third element, the freedom to choose one’s course, has been overridden by
regulations which proscribe courses to be taken under stated circumstances, prohibit entry into
‘closed waters’ or mooring in prescribed locations. It may be said that together these statutes so
limit the public right of navigation, that the ability to navigate anywhere, at any time has been
effectively curtailed. Hence in highly regulated waterways such as Sydney Harbour, it might be
argued, the public right of navigation in common law, has been extinguished by regulation.

Alternatively, a strong two limbed case could be argued that, despite the restrictions imposed by
regulations, the essence of the public right of navigation survives. The first limb lies in
analyzing the statutes to ascertain whether their effect is comprehensive. The second limb
requires assessing whether, if relevant regulations are complied with, vessel operators are still
free to choose any course they deem safe, at any time, in accord with the third element of the
public right.

A review of the historical legislation in New South Wales shows that no provision which
expressly repealed the public right of navigation has been enacted. However, the law regulating
personal water craft (PWC), demonstrates Parliament’s ability to regulate public navigation to
such a degree that it may occur only within statutory limits.623 The regulation provided by the
623

Operators of personal water craft (PWC) must undergo special training, hold a PWC marine safety
licence, and a ‘behaviour label’ must be applied and visible at all times. PWCs may not enter ‘exclusion
zones’ and must comply with restrictions which apply in the PWC ‘restriction zone’. PWCs may not be
operated in an ‘irregular manner,’ ie circles and jumps within 200 metres of the shore and may not be
used between sunset and sunrise, see cl 36 - 39 MSGR 2009 (NSW).
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current legislation is not comprehensive however, since some vessels are exempt from the
requirement for registration, their operators do not require a licence,624 and operating powered
vessels below 10 knots does not require vessel or operator to be licensed.625 It follows that if the
public right of navigation has been impliedly repealed for larger more powerful vessels, by
weight of regulations, it survives for smaller craft, which are exempt from regulation. Further,
when the public right of navigation is reduced in highly regulated waterways such as Sydney
Harbour, this loss is usually temporary and ceases when the statutory Notice lapses. Permanent
loss of the public right of navigation in ports, regulated waterways and prohibited areas is
limited, and does not affect other areas of coastal waters where restrictions do not apply.

A second limb may also be argued. Given the Act and regulations do not indicate a legislative
intention to repeal the public right of navigation but merely regulate it, it may be said that if a
vessel is registered, the operator licensed and regulations are observed, the third element of the
public right is still available. A licensed vessel operator may choose whatever course is safe and
appropriate and go anywhere, anytime - subject to prevailing conditions.
I concur with Walrut626 that the public right of navigation has persisted. Small craft remain
unregulated and operable under the public right, and if the operators of larger registered vessels
are licensed and avoid waters controlled by regulations or Notices, they can still choose their
own course, within the limits of safety, in accordance with this ancient public right.

(b) public right to fish

The public right to fish has its roots in English customs627 which began before time
immemorial.628 Since ancient times, the means of fishing in England, commercially and for
sustenance, varied widely, and included fixed engines, stake weirs, stake nets set during high
water and recovered at low water, curtain nets set by boat and recovered by beach hauling, and

624

Hence non-motor i.e. sailing vessels <5.5m long, boats powered by engines of 4KW or less, paddle
powered boats and ‘passive craft’ do not need to be registered. See Cl 61 MSGR 2009 (NSW). These
are craft most likely used by the public under the common law right.
625
See cl. 76 MSGR 2009 (NSW).
626
The survival of the public right of navigation was considered in Walrut, above n 26, 433.
627
In Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268; 106 ER 1190, Best J, at 284-5; 1196, acknowledged a
‘right to fish’ when he quoted part 1, cap. 8, p 11 of Hale’s treatise De Jure Maris “The King’s right of
propriety, or ownership, in the sea, and soil thereof, is evidenced principally by these things that follow;
first, the right of fishing in the sea, and the creeks and arms thereof, is originally lodged in the Crown”.
628
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268, 305; 106 ER 1190, 1203 (Bayley J). ‘Before time
immemorial’ was given as being before the commencement of the reign of Richard I, on 6 July 1189,
according to Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law (1739 ) quoted in Margaret Davies
Asking the Law Question (Thomson Lawbook, 3rd ed, 2008) 46, 48.
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crab or lobster traps.629 Sustenance fishers gathered shellfish630 or used thrown nets, hand lines
or fixed line poles. 631 Hence it is likely that convicts used traditional English fishing measures.
Fisheries resources were considered a commons632 which the public could access,633 and landing
a fish conferred ownership, converting what was ‘common property’ into ‘private property’.634
Common law rules regarding exclusive private fisheries over tidal waters were not applied in
the colony because, since land titles below MHWM had not been granted by the Crown, they
were not appropriate to the condition of the colony.635
Thus fishing in the colony’s coastal waters,636 proceeded under common law637 until the first
Fisheries Act of 1865, 638 to regulate professional fishermen, and protect immature fish.639

i] Modern law on fishing

The public right to fish was affected by further legislation in the 19th and 20th centuries,640 and
laws regulating fishing were last updated by the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW). Under
this Act commercial fishers were required to obtain and operate under a licence,641 use approved
fishing methods and report catches.642 This Act also introduced share management fisheries,643
and fisheries management plans.644

629

See Moore and Moore, above n 529, 96, 168, 202.
In Bagott v Orr (1801) 2 Bos & P 479; 126 ER 391, the defendant argued successfully that the public
right to take fish included the taking of sea-fish and shell-fish from the foreshore.
631
See Moore and Moore, above n 529, 96.
632
The public right to fish was described as ‘a common of fishery’ and as ‘a public common of pischary’
in Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268, 294, 298; 106 ER 1190, 1199-1200, 1201 (Holroyd J)
633
Hale’s statement in De Jure Maris (c 1667) that ‘…the common people of England have regularly a
liberty of fishing in the sea or creeks and arms thereof, as a public common of piscary …’ was quoted in
Moore and Moore, above n 529, xxxix.
634
See Walrut, above n 26, 430-431. Walrut cites several cases on the conversion of fish as common
property into private property on their capture, see eg Young v Hichens (1844) 6 QB 606, 115 ER 228.
635
Walrut, above n 26, 439 observed that ‘private fisheries … definitely did not make the journey to
Australia’.
636
Historical accounts of ‘plentiful’ fish being caught on Norfolk Island in 1790 were cited by Tim
Bonyhady The Colonial Earth (MUP, 2000) 17, fn 9. See also Hoskins, above n 558, 93.
637
Although the colonists discovered fish traps in the estuaries and observed Aboriginal people fishing.
See Hoskins, above n 558, 57-61.
638
Act to Protect the Fisheries of New South Wales 1865 (NSW)
639
Hoskins, above n 558, 156.
640
the Fisheries Acts of 1867; 1881; 1883; 1894; 1902; 1910, Fisheries and Oyster Farms Act 1935
(NSW). The last Act was amended in 1938, 1942, 1957, 1960, 1963, 1968, 1970, 1978, 1979, 1982,
1984, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989. See Acts As Made at < http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/num_act/ >
641
See s 103 Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) [hereafter FMA 1994 (NSW)].
642
See s 121 FMA 1994 (NSW).
643
See Part 3, ss 41 – 101 FMA 1994 1994 (NSW)
644
See ss 56 – 65 FMA 1994 (NSW)
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More recently members of the public have come within the legislation’s purview.645
Recreational fishers must pay a fee646 and hold a receipt647 to fish in the state’s waters.648
Fishing is however subject to size restrictions and bag limits. 649 Significantly, the Act exempts
people younger than 18 years old, adults supervising young people, Aboriginal people or
holders of certain pensioner concession cards from the need to hold a licence.650

Though traditional private fisheries in tidal waters do not exist in New South Wales, some areas
below MHWM are subject to a private interest such as an oyster lease.651 In other areas of the
State’s coastal waters no public right to fish survives due to regulations which prohibit all
fishing. By declaring an area of waters a ‘fishing closure’,652 an ‘aquatic reserve’,653 or part of a
‘no-take’ zone in a marine park654 the regulation overrules the common law, and the public right
to fish is suspended in that area, for the duration of the closure. A permanent ‘closure’ would
extinguish the public right to fish in that area.
ii] Has the ‘right to fish’ survived regulation?

Whether the public right to fish has survived the storm of legislation enacted in New South
Wales is an important question, which I consider next.

It might be argued that the need to hold a fishing licence, size restrictions, bag limits and the
closure of certain waters by fishing regulations, have impliedly repealed the public right to fish,
and fishing now occurs within the statutory framework of the Act and regulations.

Conversely, it could be said that the relevant statutes do not state an intention to repeal the
public right to fish, and much of the law is concerned with regulating commercial fishing, not
the public right. While current legislation now requires a person to pay a fee and hold a fishing

645

The requirement for fishing fees was introduced by the Fisheries Management Amendment Act 1997
(NSW) The principal legislation was further modified by Fisheries Management Amendment Acts in
2000, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009. See NSW Acts as Made, “F”.
646
See s 34C FMA 1994 (NSW). It is an offence under s. 34J (1) FMA 1994 (NSW) to take fish without
having paid a fishing fee.
647
A person is guilty of an offence under s 34J (2) FMA 1994 (NSW) if they cannot produce the receipt
for their fishing fee when asked to do so by an authorised officer.
648
However, s 38 FMA 1994 (NSW) recognises a ‘right to take fish’ from certain inland waters.
649
Taking undersize fish is prohibited by cl 11 and ‘bag limits’ are set under cl 13 FMGR 2010 (NSW).
650
See s 4C (2) FMA 1994 (NSW).
651
Both an ‘aquaculture permit’ under s 144, and an ‘aquaculture lease’ under s 163 FMA 1994 (NSW),
are required to operate an oyster lease.
652
under s 8 FMA 1994 (NSW).
653
Pursuant to s 194 FMA 1994 (NSW).
654
Fishing in a ‘sanctuary zone’ of a marine park is prohibited under Cl 1.11 of the Marine Estate
Management (Management Rules) Regulation 1999 (NSW).
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licence, a deeper analysis reveals that the public right to fish is expressly recognised.655 Further,
there are significant exemptions from the requirement to hold a licence.656 It might also be
argued that where coastal waters are not ‘closed’, the public right to fish continues.

Whether the public right to fish has survived fisheries legislation has been considered by
Walrut,657 and others, notably Gullet,658 and Kailis,659 whose views I briefly consider next.

Gullet reviewed the origin, nature and extent of the public right to fish and described several
ancillary rights.660 He considered the impact of fisheries legislation, Aboriginal land grants and
recognition of native title, on the public right to fish and discussed decisions of the High Court
of Australia661 and Federal Court,662 which found that the public right to fish continued to exist
in northern Australia.663 He concluded that the public right to fish had thus ‘resurfaced’.664
Since Gullet’s article, the public right to fish was further considered by the Federal Court665 and
the High Court of Australia.666 The impact of these cases was reviewed by Kailis, who explored
the survival of the public right to fish following the enactment of fisheries legislation, between
1989 and 2007, and discussed possible unintended consequences of these recent decisions.667
He considered the implications of the fisheries legislation in every jurisdiction in the light of
these High Court decisions, and observed that the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) did

Section 38 FMA 1994 (NSW) recognizes a ‘right to fish’ in inland waters.
People under 18, adults helping someone under 18, Aboriginal people and certain concession holders.
657
Walrut, above n 26, 423-444.
658
Gullett, above n 32, 1-11. Gullet also considered Walrut’s views at 3.
659
George Kailis, ‘Unintended Consequences? Right to Fish and the Ownership of Wild Fish’ (2013) 11
Macquarie Law Journal 99-123.
660
Gullett, above n 32, 4-5. Gullett outlined the statutory interpretation needed to determine ‘the degree to
which the public right to fish, or ancillary rights’ had been affected by legislation, observing that this
required a case by case approach, in each jurisdiction, to ascertain ‘what is left of the public right’.
661
Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries (1989) 168 CLR 314; Commonwealth of Australia v Yarmirr
(2001) 208 CLR 1; Risk v Northern Territory (2002) 210 CLR 392;
662
Yarmirr v Northern Territory [No.2] [1998] 82 FCR 533; Yarmirr v Commonwealth [1999] FCA
1668; Arnhemland Aboriginal Land Trust v Director of Fisheries (Northern Territory) (2000) 170 ALR
1; Director of Fisheries (Northern Territory) v Arnhemland Aboriginal land Trust [2001] FCA 98;
Lardill Peoples v Queensland [2004] FCA 298; Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457;
Gawirrin Gumana v Northern Territory (No. 2) [2005] FCA 1425
663
See eg Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries (1989) 168 CLR 314, 330 (Brennan J).
664
Gullet, above n 32, 1. See title, Abstract.
665
See Gumana v Northern Territory of Australia (2007) FCA FC 23; Commonwealth of Australia v
Akiba obh Torres Strait Islanders of the Regional Seas Claim Group [2012] FCA FC 25,
666
See Northern Territory v Arnhemland Aboriginal land Trust [2008] HCA 29; (2008) 236 CLR 24; 41
[107] (Heydon J), 60 [154] (Kiefel J); Akiba on behalf of the Torres Strait Regional Seas Claim Group v
Commonwealth of Australia [2013] HCA 33 concerning the ability of native title holders and grantee
owners, under NT Land Rights legislation, to control certain areas of coastal waters and fisheries
resources, and exclude commercial and recreational fishers from some northern Australian waters.
667
Kailis, above n 624, 119.
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not contain an express declaration of ownership of wild fish; has, as one of the Act’s objectives,
to ‘share the fisheries resources of the State’; and omits any general prohibition of access.668
Kailis noted the introduction of fees and licences for some recreational fishers,669 but concluded
that the public right to fish had not been wholly abrogated in New South Wales.670 I concur.
Though regulation is extensive, 671 it is not comprehensive, and there is no clear legislative
intent to extinguish it.672 Hence the public right to fish survives in many places, for now.

(c) Public right of access

Under English common law the public right of access to the foreshore was founded on the water
based rights of public navigation, and fishing.673 Following transport of these public rights to the
colony of New South Wales, public use of the foreshore and especially beaches, developed a
local character since, the beach itself and much of the adjacent land were not privately owned.674
With the arrival of free settlers, the colony’s beaches were often used by pedestrians, horses or
horse-drawn vehicles under the public right of way over the foreshore, as a ‘public highway’.675
Further, due to high summer temperatures, day picnicking and camping on coastal lands and
bathing or swimming in the coastal waters of the colony became popular.676 Though attempts
were made to prohibit public bathing during daylight hours,677 these laws were openly defied.678
The use of coastal waters by members of the public for bathing became a celebrated element of
local culture in New South Wales.679 Thus public access to and use of the foreshore for a suite
of recreational uses became common practice on many of the colony’s beaches.680
Following the institution of responsible government in New South Wales in 1856,681 many areas
of coastal lands were reserved from sale and dedicated for public purposes, and some private
668

Ibid 116.
Ibid 117.
670
Ibid 117-118.
671
Fishing in NSW in both tidal ad non-tidal waters is governed by the FMA 1994 (NSW) and the
Fisheries Management (General) Regulation 2010. (NSW).
672
Kailis, above n 624, 117.
673
In Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & Ald 268, 289-290; the court held that public rights of navigation
and fishing were ‘rights upon the water, not upon the land’.
674
The reservation and dedication of coastal lands for public purposes are discussed in Chapter IV.
675
Until the construction of railways and public roads and the advent of motor vehicles in early 20th
century. See eg Maurie Ryan and Robert Smith Time and Tide Again (Northern River Press, 2001), 7.
676
Ford, above n 325, 13, 22-3.
677
Ibid 49-51.
678
Huntsman, above n 325, 57 – 59, 68 - 70.
679
Ibid 70 – 74.
680
Ford, above n 325, 110 – 118. Huntsman, above n 325, 82 – 92.
681
A bi-cameral parliament for New South Wales sat for the first time in 1856, to provide ‘responsible
self-government’. See < https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/about/Pages/1856-to-1889-Responsible-government
-and-Colonial-.aspx >. See also Paul Finn, Law and Government in Colonial Australia (OUP, 1987) 39.
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lands were acquired by the government to allow public access to the beach. Subsequently
public uses extended to these Crown lands, inland of the common law boundary of MHWM.682
The creation of these reserves and history of public uses are discussed in Chapter IV.

i] Statutory recognition

After over a century of public campaigning, public rights to access and use coastal lands became
more widely recognised.683 The Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW) continued the dedication of land
for public purposes684 and encouraged ‘public use and enjoyment of appropriate Crown land’.685
In 2002 a right of public pedestrian access to coastal land, was incorporated into the Coastal
Protection Act 1979 (NSW), via the insertion of the phrase, ‘to promote pedestrian access to the
coastal region and to recognise the public’s right to access’, as one of the objects of the Act.686

This statutory right is for pedestrian, not vehicular, access to coastal lands. Public access to the
foreshore is often provided through other lands owned by the State government, managed by a
local authority, dedicated for public purposes.687 In some places public access to the beach is via
an easement created over private land for that purpose.688 In many places, safe public access
along the foreshore is naturally limited by local geographic features such as cliffs.
The use of vehicles on NSW beaches, as if on a public highway, is not permissible as a public
right, and is either regulated or prohibited.

689

In some locations motor vehicular access,690

horses and horse-drawn vehicles, are permitted,691 but elsewhere this is restricted.692
682

Crown policy from 1828 until 1840 was to reserve a strip of land 100 feet from the line of MHW.
See Bonyhady, ‘An Australian’, above n 316, 258-271, Ford, ‘The Battle’, above n 325. See also
Booth, above n 325.
684
See s 10 (e) Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW) [hereafter CLA 1989 (NSW)].
685
See the Guiding Principle (c) s 11 CLA 1989 (NSW).
686
See section 3(d) Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW).
687
This may be unalienated Crown land or land titles previously registered under the Real Property Act
1900 (NSW) but subsequently acquired by the Crown or by local councils and dedicated for public use.
688
See Coffs Harbour and District Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister administering the Crown
Lands Act [2013] NSW LEC 216 (Craig J).
689
Motor vehicle use on the foreshore requires the use of only formal vehicle beach access points,
observance of certain off-limits areas, such as dunes and bird nesting areas, the use of only vehicles
registered under the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), the driver being licensed, a maximum speed limit
of 30 kph and a general right of way non-vehicle beach users. See for eg <
http://www.richmondvalley.nsw.gov.au/page/Economic_Development/Tourism/Beaches_4WDs_and_Dogs/ >.
690
If regulations are observed. This includes use of only formal vehicle beach access points, observance
of off-limits areas, such as dunes and bird nesting areas, use of only registered 4WD vehicles, the driver
being licensed, a maximum speed of 30 kph and a general right of way for non-vehicle beach users. See
< http://www.richmondvalley.nsw.gov.au/page/Economic_Development/Tourism/Beaches_4WDs_and_Dogs/ >
691
While riding horses along the beach may constitute pedestrian access, horse-drawn vehicles would not.
Use of horses on beaches is usually either prohibited or regulated by local councils like 4WD vehicles
and/ or dogs, with their use being permissible in only designated areas. See Regulation (g) at <
http://www.richmondvalley.nsw.gov.au/page/Economic_Development/Tourism/Beaches_4WDs_and_Dogs/ >
692
In Tweed Shire this is only permissible on certain sections of beach, and is restricted to only a limited
number of licensed drivers, with permits from the local council. A Beach Vehicle Permit may be issued
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Recognition of this public right of pedestrian access to the beach has been made less explicit
with the repeal of the Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW), however ss 27 and 28 of the Coastal
Management Act 2016 (NSW) continue to protect this important statutory public right.693

This concludes my exposition of property and rights, private and public.

10. Conclusions
My aim in this chapter was to explain key terms, including ‘property’ and examine the nature
and extent of private property rights and public rights, to use coastal land, in New South Wales.
From this initial review emerges a clearer picture of those rights under discussion. From these
expositions several working conclusions may be drawn.

It is apparent that common law public rights to access the foreshore and coastal waters have a
venerable jurisprudence and have applied in New South Wales since the time of colonization.
Public use of coastal lands and waters continue to have great social and economic significance.

Private property rights however are more recent conceptualizations, which have evolved over
time. Liberal property theory is beset with problems defining property and its purposes, and
morally justifying the origins of private property in land, in post-colonial settings such as New
South Wales. Some ideas about private property rights have been overtaken by modern property
theory, while other views on rights in other jurisdictions, have limited relevance to New South
Wales. Nonetheless private ownership of coastal land also has great social and economic value.

Thus it is apparent that, whatever the theory, the private or public rights available in practice are
created and limited by the laws applying to real property in that jurisdiction, which is likely to
be a combination of surviving common law rules and current statutes and regulations.

Having clarified what is meant by private property rights and public rights in this jurisdiction, in
the next two chapters I report the weight attributed to these rights by the courts and legislature.

to fishers, or to enable disability access to the beach. Some beaches are seasonally closed. General
public access and commercial beach tours are prohibited. See < http://www.tweed.nsw.gov.au/Parking >
693
Sections 27 and 28 Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW) reproduce ss 55M -55N of the CPA 1979.
Approval of coastal protection works, and landowners’ applications to claim ownership of new land
formed on their boundary under the doctrine of accretion, may not be approved if the works, or the
extension of land title, would limit public access to the foreshore or poses a risk to public safety.
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“I walked beside the evening sea
And dreamed a dream that could not be;
The waves that plunged along the shore
Said only: "Dreamer, dream no more!"
George William Curtis (1824-92)
‘Ebb and Flow’694

Chapter III – The Courts’ responses
Introduction to Chapter III
To address the future-focused question - ‘Will private property rights trump public rights and
interests in coastal land under climate change conditions? - two sources of guidance were
identified: the courts and the legislature. In the next two chapters I outline the material I have
selected from these arbiters of conflicting rights, relevant to the topic.

In this Chapter I consider court decisions on past disputes between these competing rights,
which refer to an element of the primary research question. Cases on public rights, private
property rights, location of property boundaries and ownership of coastal lands are considered.
However, before examining them, it is apt to first state what constitutes ‘the court’ for the
purposes of this chapter; and outline the relevance of the cases selected.

Part A. ‘The court’ as an arbiter of societal conflicts
1. Defining ‘the court’
For the purposes of this thesis I use a generic definition of ‘the court’. I adopt the usual meaning
as ‘the place where the law is judicially administered, the decision-maker or decision–makers
who comprise the court’ and generally as ‘a body or organ of the judicial system of a state’.695
Hence the definition of ‘the court’ is well understood.

Considered below are decisions of courts in England, New South Wales and New Zealand.
Senior English appeal court cases are reviewed, however a recount of the history of English
courts is not needed here since other accounts are available.696 Decisions of the Land and
Environment Court and the Supreme Court of New South Wales sitting as the Court of Criminal

694

in Edmund Clarence Stedman (ed) An American Anthology (1787 - 1900).
Butt and Hamer (eds), above n 207, 141.
nd
696
Harold Potter, An Historical Introduction to English Law and its Institutions (S & M, 2 ed 1943).
_____________________________________________________________________________________
695

Page 103

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Laws)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

Chapter III – The Courts’ responses

© John R Corkill
Student No. 2376398

Appeal are also considered, but a history of these courts is also not possible here.697 Decisions
of the High Court of Australia,698 and the High Court of New Zealand699 are also considered. I
explain my selection of these cases next.

2. The relevance of the cases selected
Though many cases were found relevant to the primary research question, due to limits on space
only eight cases were selected for inclusion in this chapter. All are decisions of senior courts on
questions of law in appeals of matters previously determined by a lower court or tribunal. Three
19th century cases are considered briefly, and five 20th century cases are considered in depth.
Each case has been selected for closer review and analysis in Part B below, because of their
direct relevance to an element of the primary research question.
In Blundell v Catterall (1821)700 where the issue was whether a public ‘right to bathe’ existed,
the court usefully described the public rights to use the foreshore and coastal waters and
considered the claimed right’s impact on the plaintiff landowner’s private property rights.
In Hudson v Tabor (1876, 1877)701 and Attorney General (UK) v Tomline (1880)702 the appeal
courts addressed whether, at common law, a landowner had a private property right to defend
their land, or compel others to defend it, against the sea.
The 20th century cases also directly address key elements of the research question. In Attorney
General (UK) v McCarthy (1911)703 the location of the legal boundary of land adjoining tidal
waters, was a key issue and the court resolved a lingering uncertainty about the nature and
location of the boundary between private land and public land.

The decision of the Privy Council in Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia
[1982]704 is of unimpeachable authority as the highest appeal court in the English legal system.
Most usefully, the court comprehensively stated the common law rules governing the movement
of natural boundaries, and ownership of land below tidal waters, known as the ‘doctrine of
697

But see NSW Government Justice, ‘History of New South Wales Courts and Tribunals’ <

www.courts.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/cats/history/history.aspx >
698

See section 71 of the Australian Constitution, (1901) (Cth). For the history of the High Court of
Australia see < http://www.hcourt.gov.au/about/history-of-the-high-court >.
699
The High Court of New Zealand hears appeals from lower courts, but its position in the judicial
hierarchy of New Zealand is not equivalent to the High Court of Australia. For the history of the High
Court of New Zealand see < https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/the-courts/high-court/history >.
700
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & A 268; 106 ER 1190.
701
Hudson v Tabor (1876) 1 QBD 225, and Hudson v Tabor (1877) 2 QBD 290.
702
Attorney General v Tomline (1880) 14 Ch 58.
703
Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy (1911) 2 IR 260.
704
Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia (1982) AC 706; [1982] 1 All ER 283.
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accretion’. The original decision705 is also directly relevant because the court applied existing
rules of law to novel circumstances to resolve the protracted conflict between the parties.
The two cases brought by the NSW Environment Protection Authority706 are directly relevant to
multiple elements of the research question but have not been discussed by other writers. The
lower court rejected the landowner’s claimed right to defend against erosion by the sea, applied
common law rules to determine the location of the boundary to the lots in question, and ruled on
the ownership of land below tidal waters. These findings, confirmed by the Court of Criminal
Appeal, provide authoritative statements of the relevant law in New South Wales.
The High Court of New Zealand’s decision in Falkner v Gisborne DC707 also focused on a key
issue: landowners’ claim that their private property rights to defend their land against the sea
exists despite the legislation governing the management of the coast in New Zealand. Though
not a binding precedent in this jurisdiction, the court described the legal principles under which
legislation may overrule common law property rights. Its reasoning has wider application where
analogous circumstances exist.
The final case, Durham Holdings v Minister,708 a decision of the High Court of Australia, also
addressed a key claim: the existence of common law ‘right to compensation’ for private
property acquired by the State; and illuminated the New South Wales legislature’s power to
enact laws affecting property rights.

Having explained their relevance, in the next Part I describe and discuss these cases and outline
how they assist in answering the primary research question.

Part B. Nineteenth century cases
During the early 19th century, the courts made several key decisions709 which clarified and
explicated elements of the doctrine of accretion710 as it applied to tidal waters.711 However
limited space prevents an in-depth review of these cases here, and others deserve focus.

705

Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia [1978] 19 SASR 389 (Walters J).
Environment Protection Authority of NSW v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655, and Environment
Protection Authority v Leaghur Holdings PL [1995] 87 LGERA 282.
707
Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622 (Barker J).
708
Durham Holdings PL v State of New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399; 177 ALR 436.
709
Notably Rex v Yarborough (1824); 107 ER 668 and Gifford v Lord Yarborough (1828), 4 ER 1087;
which clarified that new land that formed against existing land by accretion or deposit of alluvion,
belonged to the owner of the existing land, not the Crown; and Re Hull and Selby Railway Co (1839)
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The first case I consider closely concerned, on the face of it, was a dispute between private
property rights and public rights to access the foreshore but was actually a commercial dispute.

3. Blundell v Catterall (1821)
This case712 was brought by the lord of the manor, who possessed an exclusive private right of
fishery in the tidal waters of the river Mersey, using nets staked to the seabed.713 He objected to
the nearby hotel, conducting a business which involved hotel guests crossing the foreshore,
being his private property, with horse-drawn bathing machines, to bathe in the sea. 714 The
defendant’s counsel argued that the privately-owned foreshore was affected by a public right of
access along it, but the evidence showed that the bathing machines did not use land customarily
used as a public highway,715 that they disturbed the owner’s quiet enjoyment of his property,716
and that no consideration had been offered for the inconvenience.717

The court examined the authorities and the majority agreed that there were long-established
customs, and common law rights of public access to and use of the foreshore for fishing and for
navigation, but held that these rights were ‘rights upon the water, not upon the land’. 718 Further,
the majority did not agree that the public right of access to foreshore carried with it a right to
trespass on private property, 719 and they found that there was no common law right to bathe.720

151 ER 139, which ruled that the relevant rule of law worked both ways, to add and subtract land,
through the processes of sediment transport and change in the level of the bounding water body.
710
The term ‘doctrine of accretion’ was first used in Foster v Wright (1878) 4 CPD 438, 447 (Lindley J).
711
The common law rules on land boundaries formed by tidal waters were first cited, in Latin, by the
author known as Bracton, in De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, circa 1256, and were first applied
to tidal waters in the case Anon (1348) 22 Lib Ass fo 106, pl 93, also cited as the Yearbook case (22 Ed
III, 93) circa 1348. Hale cited this case in De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem c. 1667 (Cap IV.II.2)
and in Attorney General (NSW) v Merewether (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 157, 161, it was recognised as ‘the
earliest authority referred to’ (Simpson CJ).
712
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & A 269; 106 ER 1190 [hereafter Blundell v Catterall (1821).]
713
These were cited as ‘stake nets’ Blundell v Catterall (1821) 304; 1191.
714
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 269; 1191. The defendant, Catterall, was a servant of the hotel.
715
The landowner argued that it was not the public’s use of the foreshore as a highway which was at
issue, and asserted that the defendant’s use was ‘for other purposes than as a general public highway’,
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 269, 289; 1191, 1198.
716
Ibid 268, 268; 1190.
717
Ibid 279; 1194, (Best J). At 390, 1207, Abbott CJ held that ‘… where one man endeavours to make his
own special profit by conveying persons over the soil of another, … it does not seem to me that he has
any just reason to complain, if the owner of the soil shall insist upon participating in the profit, and
endeavor to maintain his own private right…’
718
Ibid 301; 1202 (Holroyd J).
719
It was significant in the court’s view that the foreshore was privately owned, not held by the Crown,
and that the public right to fish had been extinguished by the long-practiced exclusive right of fishery.
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 288-9 (Holroyd J); 1197-8.
720
Ibid 304 (Holroyd J), 310 (Bayley J), 312 (Abbott CJ); 106 ER 1190, 1203, 1205, 1206.
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In a separate judgment however, Best J disagreed. He noted that Hale had cited a ‘general right’
of the subject ‘to the sea and its shores’ of which the public right to fish was an example.721
He found ‘the existence of a universal custom in favour of a public right of way over the sea
shore’ and characterized it as the ‘right of free passage’. 722 He held that ‘the interruption of free
access to the sea is a public nuisance’,723 but did not explicitly rule that a public right to bathe
existed. The case’s headnotes noted Best J’s dissenting opinion ‘on the ground that the public
have a right to use the sea-shore for bathing’.724

a. Clarification of the relevant law by the court
Several matters were clarified by this case: the origin of public rights in the foreshore in the
civil law, its development in English common law; the nature of these public rights; and the
operation of the jus publicum and the jus privatum.

The origins and development of public rights in the foreshore
The judges acknowledged the Roman civil law as the source of authority for public rights in the
foreshore and coastal waters,725 and they discussed its modification in English law by writers,726
including Bracton,727 Callis,728 and Hale.729 After considering authoritative English cases the
court held that English common law had adopted different rules to those of the civil law. Two
members of the court referred to tests employed in determining whether a claimed common law
right was able to be recognised as lawful,730 or actually existed.731

The nature of the public rights
Several insights into the nature of the public rights can be gained from these proceedings. From
the case report, it seems there was no dispute that a common law public right of way existed
721

Ibid 284; 1196.
Ibid 280; 1194-5.
723
Ibid 287; 1197 (Best J).
724
Ibid 268.
725
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 278 (Best J), 290 (Holroyd J).
726
Ibid 282 (Best J), 291-4 (Holroyd J), 307-8 (Bayley J), 312 (Abbot CJ).
727
Sir Henry Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (c 1260)
728
Robert Callis, Upon the Statute of Sewers 23 Henry VIII c 5 (1622) (first pub 1647, 4th ed 1824).
729
Sir Matthew Hale, De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem (c 1667, first pub 1786); De Portibus Maris
(c 1670, first pub, 1786); The History of the Common Law of England (first pub 1739).
730
Best J quoted Lord Kenyon in Ball v Herbert (1789) 2 D & E 253, ‘Common law rights are either to
be found in the opinions of lawyers, delivered as axioms, or to be collected from the universal and
immemorial usage throughout the country,’ Blundell v Catterall (1821) 279; 1194.
731
Holroyd J quoted Buller J’s approach: ‘Then the question is, whether in our books, or on records, that
right is established for which the defendant contends. … whether or not that has been adopted by the
common law, is to be seen by looking into our books, and there it is not to be found.’ Blundell v
Catterall (1821) 301; 1202.
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along the foreshore, as a ‘public highway’, even if the foreshore was privately owned.732 This
public right was argued as a defence to the alleged trespass, but the plaintiff insisted that he
objected to use of horse-drawn bathing machines on part of the beach not used as a highway.733

The landowner accepted public use of the foreshore as a highway but did not accept that the
public had a right to use any part of the foreshore in any way they pleased, or that the nearby
hotelkeeper could profit from its use, since this trampled on his private property rights. The
court found clear evidence of long-established customs across the realm which provided a
foundation for the public rights.734 Best J agreed and expressed his view, based on Hale’s
authoritative text,735 that there was a general public right to use the sea.736 However, the court
rejected a ‘general right of using or appropriating the soil of the sea-shore’.737

The nature of the ‘jus publicum’ and the ‘jus privatum’
Two legal concepts relevant to privately-owned coastal land in England were clarified by the
court. These concepts referred to the private and public rights in the foreshore, where land
below the high-water mark had been granted by the Crown to a subject as private property.
The jus publicum were the public rights of navigation over, and of fishing in, tidal waters,738
which applied up to the line of the high-water mark. These public rights were said to be held ‘in
trust’ by the Crown, who was duty bound to protect them while the foreshore was held by the
Crown, and to ensure their operation could continue if the land was granted to a subject. 739 The
jus privatum were the private property rights which existed in the privately owned foreshore
(and or other areas of land submerged below the low water mark, such as oyster grounds).

Together these terms created a conceptual scheme where it was possible for two separate layers
of ‘rights’ to exist over the foreshore and submerged lands.740 The dominant ‘right’ was the
‘use’ right available to members of the public to pass freely over the waters, which overlaid the
732

Blundell v Catterall (1821) 269; 1191. Typically use of the foreshore by carriages occurred on a falling
tide, when large flat areas of hard sand might be left uncovered by the tidal waters for some hours.
733
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 289; 1198.
734
The majority found that the public rights of navigation and of fishing were ‘rights upon the water not
upon the land’, and held that the right to navigation existed ‘for the purposes of commerce, trade and
intercourse’ or for ‘any lawful purpose’. Blundell v Catterall (1821) 285 (Best J), 298 (Holroyd J), 304
(Bayley J), 311 (Abbott CJ); 119, 1201, 1203, 1206.
735
Hale, De Jure Maris, above n 704.
736
and its use by the public for navigation or fishing were two specific examples of this general right.
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 284, 1196 (Best J).
737
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 299; 1201 (Holroyd J).
738
See Blundell v Catterall (1821) 298; 106 ER 1201, (Holroyd J).
739
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 287; 1197 (Best J).
740
Ibid.
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‘private’ right in the soil acquired by the landowner, directly or indirectly, from the Crown. This
conceptual scheme reconciled the Crown’s duty to maintain the public’s rights ‘in trust’ with
the reality that early Crown grants had transferred large areas of the English coast into private
hands.741 However the jus publicum and jus privatum have had no application in New South
Wales, since the Crown retains ownership of the foreshore and adjacent submerged lands.742

b. Views on the relative weight of private and public rights
Since the proceedings were based on a purported conflict between competing rights, several
very useful statements regarding the relative weight of private and public rights were made.

Discussing the private ownership of the foreshore, Best J observed that originally the land was
held by the King, and ‘the public had a right of way over it’. He held that ‘the King’s grantee
can only have it, subject to the same right’, 743 and quoted Lord Hale’s De Jure Maris.744

The jus privatum that is acquired to the subject, either by patent or prescription, must not prejudice
the jus publicum wherewith public rivers and arms of the sea are affected for public use. 745

Further Best J said
In all countries, it has been matter of just complaint that individuals have encroached on the rights
of the people. … The principle of exclusive appropriation must not be carried beyond things
capable of improvement by the industry of man. If it be extended so far as to touch the right of
walking over these barren sands, it will take from the people what is essential to their welfare,
whilst it will give to individuals only the hateful privilege of vexing their neighbours. 746

He thus held that public rights to use the foreshore prevailed over private property rights.747

Abbot CJ also addressed the issue of the relative weight afforded by the court to private
property rights and public rights. He considered the argument that ‘public convenience’
provided a rationale for recognizing a public right to bathe, but was not inclined to agree that a
‘general right’ of access to the sea, or a specific ‘right to bathe’ existed and he queried how such
rights could be consistent with the private rights and uses of private property.748
741

See Moore, above n 37, 653.
The terms continue to have currency in the United States of America, however, where some states
have granted lands down to the line of low water, creating a jus privatum, but retain the public right to
access and use the foreshore, as a jus publicum. See Slade, above n 525, 6-7, 217-9.
743
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 276; 1193 (Best J).
744
Hale, above n 704, 22.
745
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 276; 106 ER 1193 (Best J).
746
Ibid.
747
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 287; 1197.
748
He said ‘Public convenience, however, is, in all cases, to be viewed with a due regard to private
property, the protection whereof, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the law of England.’
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 313; 1206.
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This statement indicated that though specific public rights were dominant, they did not prevail
totally in the sense that private property rights ceased to exist or operate, and showed the
considerable weight afforded private property rights by the court, and the importance of private
property in the English legal system. Further, as the court’s narrow approach made clear, the
existence of these common law public rights did not permit any and all activity by members of
the public. Thus the court signaled that the weight attributed to both private property rights and
public rights were closely balanced, and neither should be so heavily weighted as to outweigh
the other. The dominant impact of public rights on private land was explained by Abbott CJ:
Every public right to be exercised over the land of an individual is pro tanto, a diminution of his
private rights and enjoyments, both present and future, so far as they may at any time interfere
with or obstruct the public right. 749:

He thus acknowledged that public rights had priority, but reiterated that they should be
exercised with ‘due regard’, since they diminished the highly valued rights and enjoyment of
private landowners. Thus it is apparent that at that time greater weight was attributed by the
courts, to public rights to use the foreshore than to private property rights over the same area.
Two rulings by the Queen’s Bench were especially instructive as to the nature and extent of the
private property rights available to an English coastal landowner. I consider these cases next.

4. Hudson v Tabor (1876) and (1877)
In Hudson v Tabor (1876) 1 QBD 225 the court determined that one landowner, Hudson, whose
land was protected from the tidal waters by a seawall built on his land, could not compel a
neighbour, Tabor, whose property was also bounded by tidal waters, to build or maintain sea
defences for his, that is Hudson’s, benefit,750 and found that Tabor had no liability for damages
to Hudson’s land if Tabor failed to defend his land against the sea.751 The decision was affirmed
on an appeal, in Hudson v Tabor (1877)752 where, having discussed earlier authoritative cases
and the development of the relevant statutes, Lord Coleridge CJ said
And the whole of this procedure is entirely inconsistent with the notion that at common law the
frontager could be compelled by action to repair any part of such defences which had been injured
“by the outrageousness of the sea”. 753

Hence the court held that a coastal landowner had no private property right of protection from
the sea. However this was not the last word on this claimed right.
749

Blundell v Catterall (1821) 315-6; 1207 (Abbott CJ).
Hudson v Tabor, [1876] 1 QBD 225, Cockburn CJ for Mellor and Quain JJ at 234.
751
Ibid 233.
752
The Court of Appeal comprised Lord Coleridge CJ, Mellish, Brett and Amphlett, L JJ.
Hudson v Tabor, [1877] 2 QBD 290, at 294.
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5. Attorney General (UK) v Tomline (1880)
The claimed right to be protected from the sea was further considered by the Court of Appeal754
when an inland landowner sought to prevent his neighbour from removing shingle from his own
land, because the shingle bank formed a ‘natural protection against the sea’ and the inland
landowner feared that its removal would expose his adjoining land to inundation and damage.755
The appeal court affirmed the original decision and held that the adjoining landowner was
entitled to an injunction,756 because the land in question was still affected by the Crown duty to
protect the realm against the sea. It ruled that the frontager landowner ‘cannot be allowed to use
the land in such a way as to destroy the natural barrier against the sea’.757 Brett LJ cited the
decision in Hudson v Tabor [1877] 2 QBD 290, as ‘a binding authority upon us to say that there
was no obligation on the part of the Defendant to keep up this bank … and … keep the sea
out’,758 despite potentially disastrous consequences. He summarised the state of the law thus:
Therefore it comes to a nice point. There is no dominant right of the Plaintiff over the land of the
Defendant. There is no obligation on the Defendant to keep the sea out, and therefore the question
comes to this, whether one can find any principle upon which, although he is not bound to keep the
sea out, yet he must not do an act which will let the sea in. I think there is such a principle, and that
is the principle which has been enunciated by the learned Judge, and the principle upon which he
has acted. 759

This ruling, rejecting the claimed ‘right’, determined the matter conclusively in English
common law. Hence the “imperfect” nature of the claimed private property right to be protected
from the sea, said to be a “fundamental right”,760 has been long explicit in English law.
I next consider five modern cases which rule on the location of the shoreline boundary, who
owns land below MHWM, and claimed private property rights compatibility with statute law.

Part C. Twentieth century cases
Questions regarding the operation of the doctrine of accretion remained unresolved however761
until the law was clarified in an Irish case determined in 1911, discussed below. More recent
decisions which clarified the nature of public and private property rights and the law on
ambulatory boundaries, applicable to coastal lands, are then considered.
754

Attorney General (UK) v Tomline (1880) 14 Ch 58 [hereafter AG v Tomline (1880)].
The ‘great danger of the sea breaking through’ AG v Tomline (1880) 64-5.
756
Ibid 64 (James LJ), 67 (Brett LJ), 70 (Cotton LJ).
757
Ibid 70 (Cotton LJ).
758
Ibid 65.
759
Ibid.
760
See Coleman, above n 13, 421.
761
These questions included whether the doctrine applied if the boundaries of the land could be identified;
whether and how the doctrine was affected by changes brought about by human engineering.
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6. Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy (1911)
This case was the culmination of proceedings against a landowner, McCarthy, over ownership
of accretions to land adjoining the foreshore in Ireland,762 who had installed stakes to mark his
boundary and prosecuted those who trespassed over the dunes above high water mark.763 The
Attorney General objected to McCarthy’s claim to own the accretions764 and, after a case in
1910 where the jury found in favour of McCarthy,765 brought an appeal to the Kings Bench.766
A principal ground for the appeal was the Attorney General’s assertion that the accreted lands
could not be claimed by, or awarded by the Court to, McCarthy, as the adjoining landowner (in
accord with the general rule) because the common law doctrine of accretion did not apply if the
original boundaries could be ascertained.767 However, it was also alleged that McCarthy’s claim
and conduct adversely affected public interests, by excluding the public from the foreshore.768
Characterized thus, McCarthy’s conduct was a serious challenge to public rights under English
common law, for members of the public to access the foreshore, for navigation and fishing.769

That there was no such challenge became apparent when McCarthy denied that he claimed to
own the foreshore, ie land between high and low water mark’, disavowed that he had ever
excluded the public from the foreshore, admitted that he had only brought proceedings for
trespass over his land above mean high water line, and said he was ‘within his rights’.770 The
court canvassed prior cases for their relevance, clarified the common law regarding the location
of the boundary between land and sea, and rejected the Crown’s claim finding for McCarthy.
762

Lying between the villages of Ardroe and Inch, known as Inch Strand, which faces Dingle Bay, and
the tidal waters of the North Atlantic Ocean.
763
As part of its case the Crown alleged that the stakes “assisted” ‘the recession of the sea …’ and formed
‘accretions’ which were owed by the Crown due to their location below “the former line of ordinary
high water … being a cliff further inland than the existing line of ordinary high water”. See Attorney
General (Ireland) v McCarthy (1911) 2 IR 260, 261 [hereafter AG v McCarthy (1911)].
764
The Attorney General sought to deny McCarthy’s claim by arguing that it amounted to a claim of “title
to what had been part of the bed of the sea, and, therefore, vested in His Majesty the King by his Royal
Prerogative and in the right of his Crown.” He also argued that the land in question had never been
relevantly granted by the Sovereign, but this ground failed when Letters Patent were produced, which
showed that “the lands in question down to the actually existing ordinary high water mark” had been
granted by Charles II, to a subject, Arthur Earl of Anglesea on 26 June 18 th year of his reign” (c 1678).
It was also asserted that the accretions extended beyond the area shown in a Landed Estates Court
Conveyance of 1867, and the Letters Patent’s original grant of land. See AG v McCarthy, (1911) 261.
765
This led to an order by Dodd J “that the land above, viz., to the landward side of the line … of the high
water mark is not in His Majesty the King, but is in the defendant as owner of the adjoining land’. See
AG v McCarthy (1911), 274-275.
766
The appeal was heard by three judges of the Kings Bench, Palles CB, Gibson and Boyd JJ.
767
AG v McCarthy (1911), 263.
768
Further, he argued that the stakes were “an injury to the public’, and sought their removal. Ibid 264.
769
See Bagott v Orr (1821) 2 Bos & P 479; 126 ER 1391; Hale, above n 704.
770
AG v McCarthy (1911), 269-270.
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In the next sections I consider relevant observations of members of the court771 on the history
and operation of the doctrine of accretion, the important clarification of law they provided, and
the court’s views on the relative weight of private property rights and public rights.

a. The history and operation of the doctrine of accretion as clarified by the court
The McCarthy case was significant because it acknowledged the doctrine of accretion’s origin
in Roman civil law,772 traced its reception into English common law,773 noticed its earliest
recognition by English courts,774 and reviewed the authoritative cases in its development.775
Palles CB, lamented that the case
shows … the length of time during which the application of a principle of law most clearly
determined by our highest legal tribunal can remain confused and unsettled …. 776

referred to cases he saw as immaterial,777 or peripheral,778 and denied the appeal based ‘solely’
on the decision in Gifford v Yarborough (1828)779 which he said
establishes, as against the Crown, the absolute right of the owner of lands adjoining the sea to any
accretion thereto which accrues by the gradual and imperceptible action of “alluvion”; and I hold
that, after that determination, it is not competent to us, or to any Court, to hold that this right is
conditional upon the non-existence of marks sufficient to designate the former high-water mark.780

Judgments were given by Palles CB, 276 – 294, and Gibson J, 294 - 300. Boyd J, at 300, concurred.
Palles CB cited, at 277, the Institutes of Justinian, lib. ii; tit 1, ss 20-21 as the relevant source.
773
Bracton’s adoption of this doctrine of civil law and his modification of it in his work De Legibus et
Consuetudinibus Angliae (c. 1268) was discussed by Palles, at 277, 286 and by Gibson J at 295. The
doctrine’s recitation in subsequent law texts: Rolls Abridgement, Comyn’s Digest, Callis (Broderip’s
Edition) and Blackstone’s Commentaries, were cited by Palles CB at 286. The treatment of the relevant
law by Chief Justice - later Sir Matthew - Hale in his treatise De Jure Maris (c 1667) was outlined by
Palles CB at 278 – 281, and was averted to briefly by Gibson J at 299.
774
Two cases considered by Palles CB, 279 - 280, were the Abbott of Ramsey (43 Edw III Exchq, c 1370)
and the Abbott of Peterborough (begun 23 Edw III, c 1349, decided 41 Edw III, BR Rot 28, c 1368).
775
Palles CB briefly considered Anon, 22 Ass 93 before he considered in depth Rex v Yarborough (1824)
3 B & C 91; the finding of the House of Lords in Gifford v Yarborough (1828) 5 Bing 168, and in Re
Hull and Selby Railway Co (1839) 5 M & W 327. He then considered the ‘unhelpful’ decision of Lord
Chelmsford in Attorney General (UK) v Chambers (1859) 4 DG & J 55, 45 ER 22, which expressed
doubt that the doctrine of accretion applied when the boundaries were known, a matter which, the court
ruled, had been clarified many years before by the Privy Council in Gifford v Yarborough in 1828.
776
Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy [1911] 2 IR 260, 276.
777
AG v McCarthy (1911), 289. Scratton v Brown (1825) 107 ER 1140; (where an estate in the sea-shore
is said to be a movable freehold), Ford v Lacy (1861) 158 ER 429; (deemed not relevant); Attorney
General (UK) v Reeves (1885) 1 TLR 675, (recessions of the sea); Mercer v Denne [1904] 2 Ch 534,
(land was added by accretion…); and Mellor v Walmesley [1905] 2 Ch 164, (deemed not relevant).
778
See Palles’ comments on “the instructive judgment of Lord Lindley” in Foster v Wright (1878) 4 CPD
438, Rex v Yarborough (1824), Gifford v Yarborough (1828) and Re Hull and Selby Railway Co (1839),
that they “do not seem ... to bear directly upon the question here …” AG v McCarthy (1911), 290 - 293.
779
Gifford v Lord Yarborough (1828), 5 Bingham 163; 2 Bligh NS 147; 1 Dow & Cl 178; 4 ER 1087
780
AG v McCarthy (1911), 284 (Palles CB).
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Gibson J noted the Attorney General’s two contentions that the property boundary could be
ascertained, and therefore the doctrine of accretion did not apply, but doubted that the original
boundaries could be ascertained. Assuming that they could be, he addressed the two questions
of law which he nominated as requiring the court’s adjudication:
(1) assuming that the original boundaries are ascertainable and ascertained, is the principle of
accretion by insensible alluvion thereby excluded? (2) assuming that the accretion, or the portion
accrued, before the date of the defendant’s instrument of title, are not included in such instruments,
is title in the Crown thereby established?781

He also briefly traversed the authorities before commenting on a key difficulty
What is the unit or measure of time for “gradual and imperceptible”? What is the base to which the
addition is to be made, and what is to be the method of observation? Is the increase latent at the
end of a week or of a month (Rex v Yarborough (1824), or for longer periods?

Gibson did not answer the first two questions, but observed that the dictum that “latent increase
is where no one can perceive how much is added at any moment of time” was so broad it
“would, literally understood, apply to all increments save those caused by sudden convulsion or
avulsions.” He contrasted the doctrine’s reliance on ‘imperceptibility’ with “modern methods
of scientific measurements” which might enable the rate of progress to be ascertained.782

On the third question Gibson concluded that
“gradual and imperceptible” must be understood, according to our Common Law, as referring to
the faculties of average humanity, and to the transactions of every-day life. The question is
peculiarly one for a jury, and, indeed, the contrary has not been argued. 783

Discussing Re Hull and Selby Railway (1839) 5 M&W 327, Gibson J observed that “it would
seem that the original coast-line was ascertainable, or, at least, that the then coast-line had
moved a considerable distance inland,” noted that it “would have been plainly impossible to
affirm that the coast-line had always remained the same”784 and cited well-known examples.785
Gibson J then made a general statement of the law: ‘There is no distinction between gradual and
imperceptible addition and gradual and imperceptible subtraction.’786 Further, he rejected the
claimed disqualification of the doctrine if boundaries were known, and asserted its unity.

781

Ibid 294.
AG v McCarthy (1911), 296.
783
Ibid.
784
He held that “A conclusive presumption that it had never been altered would have been a legal fiction
wholly opposed to truth and fact.” AG v McCarthy (1911), 297 - 98.
785
‘In some districts the sea has receded, leaving places (for example Sandwich), once ports, now far
removed from the water; elsewhere the mainland, as at Shankill and Wicklow, has been eroded and
washed away. In both classes of case the original boundaries can be fixed.’ AG v McCarthy (1911), 298.
786
Ibid.
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Whether the original boundaries of the lands were fixed by natural objects, or by constructions,
such as sea-walls. Martello towers, &c., or by measurements and maps, or by the testimony of
faithworthy old witnesses, the principle governing the ownership of alluvion growing by
imperceptible process of nature is the same. The Ordnance Survey, in determining boundaries, can
hardly be supposed to have had the effect of depriving the subject of alluvial rights as against the
Crown. 787

Gibson J explained the process by which accretions were awarded to the adjoining landowner:
In our law, each insensible addition attaches itself to the principal land, and though in result, the
aggregate of additions may show a substantial enlargement of the original territory, this cannot
displace retrospectively the ownership of the previous minute accruing accretions. 788

He observed that it ‘operates for or against the Crown as well as for or against a private owner’,
and found against the Crown’s claim to own the accretions formed against McCarthy’s land.789
This settled a question which had long been uncertain.790 Thus an 'ancient qualification’791 was
extinguished in a series of cases,792 which relied on Gifford v Yarborough (1828).793

b. Views on the relative weight of private and public rights
The court did not explicitly address the relative weights of private property rights and public
rights in Ireland at that time. Nonetheless several relevant facts offer potentially useful insights.
Initially this case alleged that McCarthy’s assertion of his private property rights conflicted with
public rights to use the foreshore, and was contrary to law. That public rights of access were
likely to prevail over a claim of private property in the foreshore was recognised by McCarthy’s
denial that he had ever claimed to own any part of the foreshore. Thus it seems that in early 20th
century Ireland the Crown, landowners and many members of the public, understood that the
public rights of access prevailed over any claimed private property right in the foreshore.

The nature of the right to claim accretions were discussed by Gibson J. He said
If the words “gradual” and “imperceptible” relate to the process or progress of alluvion, and not to
the result after a substantial or defined space of time, and if the right is inherent in and an essential
attribute of the property, resulting from natural law, in consequence of the local situation - an
accessory to the principal estate of land - a right founded on justice, arising from the risks to which

787

Ibid.
Ibid.
789
Ibid 299. At 300 Boyd J concurred, noting a similar but case decided in 1896, re Hickson’s Estate.
790
Since the unsettling ruling of Lord Chelmsford in Attorney General (UK) v Chambers (1859) 4 De G
& J 55; 1843-60 All ER 559, 45 ER 22.
791
William Howarth 'The Doctrine of Accretion: Qualifications Ancient and Modern' (1986) The
Conveyancer 247-256.
792
Foster v Wright (1878) 4 CPDM 438, Hindson v Ashby [1896] 2 Ch 1, Attorney General (Ireland) v
McCarthy [1911] 2 IR 260, Brighton and Hove General Gas Co. v Hove Bungalows Ltd [1924] 1 Ch
372, Attorney General (Southern Nigeria) v John Holt and Co Ltd [1915] AC 599.
793
Gifford v Lord Yarborough (1828), 5 Bingham 163; 2 Bligh NS 147; 1 Dow & Cl 178; 4 ER 1087.
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the land is exposed, and recommended by public policy - does the ascertainability of the original
basal line exclude the right?794

However he characterized this right as a ‘public right’, not a private property right. He said
We have to deal with public rights, not rights founded on a contract as between landlord and
tenant, where it might be a question whether an accretion outside the limits of the holding was to
be dealt with as belonging to the landlord or as attached to the holding in the same way as an
encroachment would be.795

Thus the case upheld McCarthy’s claimed ownership of accretions formed against his land,
under the doctrine of accretion, but did not defeat public rights of access over the foreshore.
As a result of this decision a key issue in English common law was settled and an important
precedent was established, which would be followed in later cases.

I consider next decisions of the court where this common law precedent from Ireland formed an
important part of the rationes decidendi. The first are a decision, an appeal, and a second appeal
to the Privy Council, in a dispute over the location of the boundary of a lake in South Australia.
The second set of cases are criminal prosecutions of landowners for polluting tidal waters in
New South Wales, where the property boundary’s location and ownership of the land below
tidal waters were central issues.

7. Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia (1978), (1979) and (1982).
These three cases concerned the ownership of accretions formed against land which was
bordered by a large, inland, tidal lake, Lake George, in South Australia, leased by the Southern
Centre of Theosophy Incorporated (SCoTI) from the State of South Australia.796 The case began
in the SA Supreme Court,797 was then appealed798 to the Full Bench of the SA Supreme Court,799
and the subject of a further appeal to the Privy Council, who granted the appeal, set aside the
appellate court’s decision, awarded costs against the State and restored the original decision.800
The development of relevant law by the Supreme Court of South Australia, the Privy Council’s
declaration of the whole of the doctrine of accretion, and these courts’ views on the relative
weight of public and private property rights are considered in the next sections.

794

Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy (1911) 2 IR 260, 296.
Ibid.
796
Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia [1978] 19 SASR 389, 390-1 (hereafter SCOTI v
SA [1978]).
797
SCOTI v SA (1978) 19 SASR 389 (hereafter SCOTI v SA (1978)).
798
South Australia v Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc [1979] 21 SASR 399.
799
The bench consisted of King CJ, Zelling and Wells JJ.
800
Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia (1982) AC 706; [1982] 1 All ER 283, 293
(hereafter SCOTI v SA [1982]).
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i. Development of the doctrine of accretion by the Supreme Court
The original proceedings centred on the ownership of accretions which had formed along the
shore of Lake George.801 The lake was not naturally connected to the sea, but after a channel
was dug in 1913 it was intermittently subject to tidal influence, and when a new channel was cut
in 1963, the lake became ‘almost constantly’ subject to the tides and tidal currents.802
Walters J reviewed the then leading case on lakes, Trafford v Thrower (1929) 45 TLR 502 and
ruled that because Eve J’s comments were obiter, the case was not a binding authority.803 He
found that the doctrine of accretion did apply to lakes804 and cited several cases for his ruling.805
Walters J found ‘that change, in a practical sense, has been slow, gradual and imperceptible in
its progress’,806 preferring the plaintiff’s marine geologist’s evidence that longshore drift,
created by actions of wind and current in the lake, has tended to build up the alluvion on the
fringes of the lake’.807 Further, Walters J recognised the ‘action of the wind’ in driving sand into
the water was one of the causes of accretions formed ‘the operation of nature’. 808
Windswept sand was not held to be a specific cause of accretion capable of recognition by the
common law, but was recognized as ‘partly’ contributing to the accretion on the lake’s margin.
By so reasoning Walters J accepted ‘the action of the wind’ as an agent of accretion which fell
within the doctrine.809 Thus it was the evidence which led to an important finding - that ‘these
factors’ had produced ‘a natural change’ in the foreshore - before Walters J concluded that since
the change had been ‘slow, gradual and imperceptible in its progress, it met the test of the
doctrine of accretion.810 As a consequence, Walters J found in favour of the plaintiff.
This decision might have been a logical step in the development of the doctrine of accretion, but
the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court reversed the decision on three grounds
SCOTI v SA (1978) 391.
Ibid.
803
SCOTI v SA (1978) 395.
804
Ibid 397.
805
Ibid 395-6. Walters J referred to Williams v Booth (1910) 10 CLR 341, where ‘the High Court seem to
have left open the question …’; Attorney General of Southern Nigeria v John Holt & Co Ltd [1915] AC
599 where ‘the Privy Council applied the doctrine of accretion to land described as “facing a lagoon” ’
and quoted, at 395-6, from Angell’s Treatise on the Law of Watercourses (6th ed. 1869) Ch.2 par 59.
806
SCOTI v SA (1978) 394.
807
Ibid 397
808
Ibid. “…partly by longshore drift, partly by the action of the wind on the sandhills … and the transport
of that sand to the body of water in the lake, and partly by retreat of waters from the body of the lake
resulting from the construction of channels from the lake to the shores of Rivoli Bay.”
809
Ibid.
810
Ibid.
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which do not warrant detailed discussion here.811 A further appeal to the Privy Council was
mounted by the Centre, where Walters J’s recognition of the action of wind and windswept sand
as falling within the doctrine of accretion, was affirmed. I consider this ultimate appeal next.

Southern Centre of Theosophy Incorporated v South Australia [1982]
In this appeal the same evidence was tended: some accretions had formed on the shores of Lake
George through the deposition of alluvion by the tidal waters, some were the result of human
action and some had been ‘caused, or mainly caused, by windswept sand’.812
The Privy Council’s decision first recited the facts of the case tendered in evidence813 then
addressed two subsidiary questions of law.814 It considered if any legislation prohibited the
doctrine of accretion’s application to lakes and concluded that, since there was not, ‘the question
is one of common law’.815 Consequently it considered relevant precedents. Trafford v Thrower
(1929) 45 TLR 502 was considered but the court held that the facts regarding Lake George in
South Australia, were different to the Norfolk Broads.816 The court clarified that the ratio of Eve
J’s decision was that the claimed accretion had been ‘liberally assisted’ by the dumping of fill.817
Thus the case was an authority for the doctrine’s requirement for ‘natural processes’ to operate
and no authority on its application to lakes generally.818 The court found the case distinguishable
and held that Trafford did not bind the court.819 It cited two United States cases820 as authority
for finding that the doctrine did apply to lakes, and Lake George,821 and held that the doctrine
also applied to leased land.822 The court stated the doctrine of accretion’s rules,823 quoted the
decisions in AG v McCarthy (1911)824 and AG v John Holt & Co [1915]825 and cited other cases
South Australia v Southern Centre of Theosophy Incorporated (1979) 145 CLR 246. The Full Court
held that since the boundary had been measured and was shown on a map and the ‘perpetual lease
contained a covenant to fence’ which indicated a ‘fixed rather than an ambulatory boundary’ the
doctrine of accretion did not apply. Further, government policy was to reserve a strip of land along ‘the
water’s edge’. See the rebuttal of these grounds by the Privy Council in SCOTI v SA [1982] 289.
812
SCOTI v SA [1982], 284.
813
SCOTI v SA [1982], 285-6 (Lord Wilberforce).
814
SCOTI v SA [1982], 286.
815
Ibid.
816
Ibid.
817
Ibid 286-7.
818
Trafford v Thrower (1929) had been used as the precedent justifying an amendment to the Crowns
Lands Act in 1931. See the discussion of this in Chapter IV.
819
SCOTI v SA [1982], 287. Since Eve J, ‘even if right’, did not cite any ‘authority or reason based on
principle’. As a decision of the highest English common law court, this ruling has great authority.
820
SCOTI v SA [1982], 287. The cases cited were Banks v Ogden (1864) 69 US 57 and Lamprey v Metcalf
(1893) 53 NW 1139 (Supreme Court of Minnesota).
821
SCOTI v SA [1982], 287.
822
Ibid.
823
Ibid 287-8.
824
Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy (1911) 2 IR 260, 298, quoted in SCOTI v SA [1982], 288.
825
Attorney General of South Nigeria v John Holt & Company (1915) AC 599, 612.
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as authorities.826 It then addressed the ‘three special arguments’ favoured by the Full Court, and
ruled that the doctrine was not excluded by the terms of the lease.827
The court then addressed the facts of the case, and noted accretions ‘caused by human action
(other than the deliberate action of the claimant)’ were ‘within the doctrine of accretion’.828
Weighing the evidence regarding accretion formed by windswept sand, the court considered
whether a valid basis existed for the doctrine to be held not to apply, but found none.829 The
court did not try to identify the accretions that were attributable to the ‘waters of the lake’ or
‘the wind’830 but rather considered them as part of a wider category of ‘natural causes’, and
concluded that the doctrine could be applied to accretions largely ‘brought about by wind force,
but presumably to a minor extent by water’.831 It reasoned that to not recognize such application
would be inconsistent with the doctrine’s rule recognizing accretions caused by human acts.832
Thus no new rule was created: the court adapted an existing rule, used higher-level considerations of ‘natural causes’, and applied it to the facts of the case.833 Hence the Privy Council
upheld the appeal, set aside the Full Bench’s decision834 and restored Walters J’s decision.835

ii. Views on the relative weight of private and public rights
I next focus on passages in the decision which refer to private property rights, long-term ownership of land, boundaries of real property, and lack of compensation for land lost to the sea.

The nature of long term ownership of land;
In the Privy Council’s decision, Lord Wilberforce, was straightforward about the origin of the
doctrine of accretion and its relevant application to the land under consideration. He said it
… is a doctrine which gives recognition to the fact that where land is bounded by water, the forces
of nature are likely to cause changes in the boundary between the land and the water… The
doctrine of accretion, in other words, is one which arises from the nature of land ownership from,
in fact, the long-term ownership of property inherently subject to gradual processes of change.836
SCOTI v SA [1982] 288-9. These were Secretary of State for India v Foucar & Co (1933) 50 TLR 240;
City of London Land Tax Commissioners v Central London Railway Co [1913] AC 364; government of
the State of Penang v Ben Hong Oon [1971] 3 All ER 163, [1972] AC 425; Baxendale v Instow Parish
Council [1981] 2 All ER 620.
827
SCOTI v SA [1982], 290.
828
Ibid.
829
Ibid.
830
SCOTI v SA [1982], 290. The court noted that ‘it may be impossible in practice’.
831
Ibid.
832
Ibid.
833
Ibid.
834
SCOTI v SA [1982], 292-3.
835
South Australia v Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia (1978) 19 SASR 389.
836
SCOTI v SA [1982], 287.
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Thus Lord Wilberforce made it plain that land is subject to natural processes, which ‘are likely’
to change the land over the long term, and indicated a landowner’s expectation of ‘permanent’
land would ignore this fact. This is relevant to the discussion of private property rights because
coastal land is often mistakenly characterized as a static asset, and private property rights have
been invoked to ‘protect’ the land from any changes by natural forces. This declaration of the
law makes it plain that - because land is inherently subject to change by natural forces - the idea
of a private property ‘right’ to protect it from such change, does not make sense logically.837

The nature of property boundaries
The court reviewed the authoritative cases which clarified the doctrine’s application to property
boundaries838 and Lord Wilberforce was unequivocal about their changeable nature. He said
When land is conveyed, it is conveyed subject to and with the benefit of such subtractions and
additions (within the limits of the doctrine) as may be take place over the years… where land is
granted with a water boundary, the title of the grantee extends to that land as added to or detracted
from by accretion, or diluvion, and that this is so whether or not the grant is accompanied by a map
showing the boundary, or contains a parcels clause stating the area of the land, and whether or not
the original boundary can be identified. 839

Lord Wilberforce discussed the decision in Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy (1911) 2 IR
260, that “… it makes no difference whether the original boundaries are fixed by natural
objects, or by constructions, or by measurements and maps. The principle governing the
ownership of alluvion growing by imperceptible process of nature is the same…”840 and found
the claim that private land continued to exist below the tidal waters unsustainable. Referring to
the boundary of the lease and a covenant requiring it to be fenced, he said:
If on the other hand the land were to shrink, it is absurd to suppose that the tenant was obliged to
maintain the fence in the water of the lake.841

Hence the court affirmed the decision in McCarthy (1911) that an original boundary may be
legally modified by a gradual change in the position of the bounding water line.

837

This would displace the private property right to claim, and be awarded, ownership of accretions.
SCOTI v SA [1982], 287. Considered were Tilbury v Silva (1890) 45 h D 98 (Kay J); Mercer v Denne
[1904] 2 Ch 534, [1904-7] All Eng Rep 71, and Re Hull and Selby Railway co (1839) 5 M & W 327.
839
SCOTI v SA [1982], 287-8.
840
SCOTI v SA [1982], 288, citing Gibson J in AG (Ireland) v McCarthy (1911) 2 IR 260, 298. Though
Wilberforce quoted Gibson J as saying it makes ‘no difference’, Gibson stated that there ‘is no
distinction between gradual and imperceptible addition and gradual and imperceptible subtraction.
841
SCOTI v SA [1982], 289.
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The lack of compensation for land lost
The court also made another important statement on the effect of changes in the boundary of
privately owned ‘real property’. Lord Wilberforce declared
If part of an owner’s land is taken from him by erosion, or diluvion (i.e. advance of the water) it
would be most inconvenient to regard his boundary as extending into the water; the landowner is
treated as losing a portion of his land. So, if an addition is made to the land from what was
previously water, it is only fair that the landowner’s title should extend to it.842

Thus the court found a landowner could involuntarily lose part of their land, and no remedy or
compensation was available other than the converse process of gaining land.843 Discussing the
rationale for this rule, Lord Wilberforce opined that a ‘more realistic explanation’ for its
existence was ‘in recognition of the fact that a riparian property owner may lose as well as gain
from changes in the water boundary or level.’844 Thus the court acknowledged the ability to
claim ownership of newly formed land was a private property right, but one which worked both
ways.

I next consider two decisions from the jurisdiction of New South Wales, where a finding of
criminal liability for pollution depended on proof of the ownership of land, and the doctrine of
accretion as described in SCOTI v SA [1982] was applied to determine the location of the
property boundary and the ownership of allotments located below MHWM.
8. EPA v Saunders (1994) and EPA v Leaghur Holdings Pty Ltd [1995]
Two cases, in which the Environment Protection Authority of NSW (hereafter ‘the EPA’)
brought criminal prosecutions against a landowner, Mr Saunders and his company, Leaghur
Holdings PL, for polluting the River Clyde’s tidal waters with rubber tyres845 are especially
relevant. In the initial criminal proceedings Saunders was convicted, but the company was
not.846 The EPA appealed against the failure to convict the company,847 but Court of Criminal
Appeal upheld the original decision.848 The courts’ decisions explained the operation of the
doctrine of accretion, the nature of ‘real property’ and the law regarding ownership of land
below mean high water mark. I discuss the significance of these cases next.
SCOTI v SA [1982], 287.
SCOTI v SA [1982] 291. The court discussed the King’s Bench’s decision to recognize gradual gain of
land, by recession of the sea, in R v Lord Yarborough (1828) 3 B&C 91; 107 ER 668.
844
SCOTI v SA [1982] 291.
845
The case was brought under s 27A of the Clean Waters Act 1970 (NSW) in the NSW Land and
Environment Court in its Class 5 jurisdiction before Bannon J. The tyres had been placed on the
foreshore by Saunders, in an attempt to arrest the erosion of the shore.
846
Environment Protection Authority (EPA) of NSW v Saunders and Leaghur Holdings Pty Ltd (1994) 6
BPR 13,655. To prevent confusion the case is given hereafter as EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994).
847
the case was heard in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, before Allen, Sully and James JJ.
848
Environment Protection Authority v Leaghur Holdings Pty Ltd [1995] 87 LGERA 282.
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a) Clarifications of law
The main matters clarified were the definition of ‘real property’, ownership of land below
MHWM, impact of the ambulatory boundary, and effect of the statute law on the common law.
The ownership of land below MHWM
The first clarification of law concerned the ownership of the lots in the subdivision. Bannon J
observed that ‘[i]n the course of time, the shoreline has changed … due to steady erosion’ and
he cited as evidence for this conclusion the lots’ purported location in the sub-division.849
Bannon J noted that based on these surveys, ‘much of the reserve’, all of some lots, and parts of
some lots created by the subdivision, ‘… now lie below the High Water Mark’.850 He considered
the law of real property in some detail, the lack of evidence from witnesses as to ‘any sudden
avulsion’, ‘the time frame over which erosion has occurred … the position of the high water
mark as depicted in the surveys made at different times’ and the evidence of the aerial
photographs, before concluding that the affected lots had been gradually eroded away.851
Bannon J rejected ‘Mr Saunders’ statement regarding king tides causing erosion’ and relied on
Jacobs J’s declaration852 that the foreshore was vested in the Crown under common law.853
Bannon J discussed the Torrens system of land registration, distinguished a case on the ownership of land below the waterline where a river was the boundary,854 and quoted the Land Titles
Office Practice, ‘… where the boundary is a fixed boundary, the title is open to correction or
amendment if land is gained or lost by accretion or erosion…’855 He then stated the relevant law.
While it is open to the Crown to grant title to the bed of a river, a grant [of land] defined by metes
and bounds as set out in a Certificate of Title is not to be presumed to be a grant of the bed of a
tidal river, or of land elsewhere below High Water Mark. The Torrens system was intended to
provide certainty as to title, but not to otherwise displace those parts of the law of property dealing
with the gain or loss of title by accretion or diluvion. Defined boundaries make no difference.
Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v State of South Australia 1982 AC 706 at 716, 717.856

Having found that the erosion had been gradual and imperceptible, Bannon J noted how the law
would operate under different circumstances.

This included aerial photographs (Exhibit D), a survey made in 1988 (Exhibit H), two surveys made in
1991 and 1992 (Exhibit K), and another made in 1993 (Exhibit G).
850
EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994) 13,658.
851
Ibid 13,659.
852
New South Wales v The Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 486.
853
EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994) 13,659.
854
Lanyon Pty Ltd v Canberra Washed Sands Pty Ltd & Another (1966) 115 CLR 342; 40 ALJR 363 in
which the court found the boundary to be the line of ad medium filum.
855
Baalman and Wells, Land Titles Office Practice 4th ed, par 7, in EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994) 13,659.
856
EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994) 13,659.
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If the property delineated by metes and bounds had been lost by a sudden intrusion, no doubt the
owners would have been entitled, subject to any environmental law, to attempt to reclaim their
properties by building sea walls and groynes.857

In so observing Bannon J did three things: contrasted gradual imperceptible erosion with a
sudden intrusion, to explicate the operation of the doctrine of accretion; acknowledged that the
former landowner was ‘entitled’ to attempt to recover their suddenly inundated or eroded land;
and confirmed that reclamation of suddenly ‘lost’ land was subject to statute law.858
Further, he put the loss of ownership of lots below MHWM beyond doubt when he ruled that
… in spite of the Certificate of Titles …. There was no land in the subdivision extending beyond
high water mark … Those Certificates of Titles need to be corrected pursuant to s.42 of the Real
Property Act, 1900.859

This finding of fact - that no lots existed below MHWM - was significant because the logical
result was that the company could not be ‘the occupier’ of these lots if they did not exist, and
hence could not be held to be liable for prosecution for pollution emanating from those lots.

The definition of ‘land’ as ‘real property’
The second clarification related to the definition of ‘land’ as ‘real property’. Bannon J found that
the definition of “land” under s 3 of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) was not intended to affect
the bed of the sea, or tidal waters below High Water Mark, or ‘land below High Water Mark in
tidal estuaries (unless otherwise indicated on the Certificate of Title).860

and held that such land ‘is vested in the Crown’, unless there was evidence of a grant of land
below HWM.861 In thus stating the law, with its caveat, Bannon J reflected a key presumption
underpinning judicial interpretation of statutes and deeds created by the Crown: that the words
of the instrument are to be read narrowly, and evidence of the author’s intention is required for
any wider interpretation to apply.862 He made it clear that real property was not immutable, but
was subject to natural processes which may add, or subtract land from it. He said
The Torrens system is not a guarantee of the permanence of land. In the course of history, land is
created and land disappears owing to the movements of nature. The Torrens system only

857

EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994) 13,659.
The sudden nature of the intrusion or loss of land was the crucial factor. Under the doctrine, legal
boundaries do not move suddenly if the bounding water line suddenly moves. The doctrine’s vital
condition of gradual, imperceptible movement is not satisfied and the boundary remains where it was.
859
EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994) 13,660. While s 42 was cited, it is s 12(d) of the Real Property Act
1900 which empowers the Registrar-General to correct errors to the Register. It is possible that this
discrepancy is a typographic error.
860
EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994) 13,660.
861
Ibid.
862
Ibid.
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guarantees title to existing land, the subject of the Certificate of Title, being land within the State
of New South Wales... 863

Importantly he did not find that land below HWM could not be ‘real property’. He ruled that if
it were to be registered as ‘real property’ under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), evidence of
a valid grant would be required, and the fact that the lot was, or included, land below HWM
would need to be shown on the Certificate of Title.864 Without this evidence the court would
presume land below MHWM was owned by the Crown. The result of Bannon J’s decision is
that, unless there is evidence to the contrary, if land which was once above MHWM comes to lie
below MHWM, it is no longer part of that ‘real property’ and is owned by the Crown.

The precedence of the ambulatory boundary
Bannon J’s decision further clarified the law regarding the precedence of property boundaries.
Saunders claimed his original boundary, defined by survey, survived despite evidence that it had
been overtaken by the high water mark.865 Bannon J did not accept this claim and concluded that
‘… in spite of the Certificate of Titles... there was no land in the subdivision extending beyond
High Water Mark’.866 These declarations that the original boundaries had been lost to the sea,
that many lots had acquired a MHWM boundary, and the ambulatory boundary of MHWM
prevails over the original boundaries, thus clarified the operation of current property law:867
However the Environment Protection Authority did not accept that the company should escape
liability for the pollution and appealed the decision to acquit the company Leaghur Holding PL.
EPA v Leaghur Holdings PL [1995]868
The Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed Bannon J’s declarations of law on the effect of the
doctrine of accretion,869 noted that ‘… the relevant land had been lost to the sea, becoming part
of the bed of the sea …’ and found that Leaghur Holdings PL, ‘did not own the land so taken

863

EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994) 13,660. This statement of the dynamic nature of land, that a property
may have land added to it or subtracted from it by natural processes, has been made in many cases. See
also Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy (1911) 2 IR 260, 298 (Gibson J).
864
See for example the registration of the bed of the Sydney Harbour, being land below mean high water
mark, under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) discussed in detailed in Verrall v Nott (1939) 39 SR 89.
865
See EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994) 13,657. ‘Mr Saunders pointed to the water and told the
Prosecutor’s surveyor, Mr P Gibson, that the land under the water was his’.
866
Ibid, 13,660.
867
Ibid, 13,659. Bannon J used the term ‘fixed boundary’, but this term is ambiguous because it is
capable of being interpreted as implying permanence, or immutability, rather than simple immobility.
868
Environment Protection Authority v Leaghur Holdings PL [1995] 87 LGERA 282.
869
Ibid, 284. Allen J noted the evidence ‘showed there had been extensive loss of the land to the waters of
Bateman’s Bay’, to the extent that ‘[a]ll the front row of lots were lost’ and ‘[m]uch of the second row
of lots was also under water.’
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back by the sea’ and hence could not be held liable for the pollution as ‘occupier’ of the lots.870
Allen J observed that Bannon J
found as a fact that the land lost to the sea was lost by erosion which was “gradual and
imperceptible” within the meaning of those terms as explained by Lord Wilberforce in Southern
Centre of Theosophy Inc v State of South Australia [1982] AC 706 at 720” and that the ownership
of it reverted, accordingly, to the Crown. He held further that the reversion of ownership to the
Crown ensued notwithstanding the provisions of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). The
correctness of the law in that regard, as stated by his Honour, is not challenged.871

As a result of this legal fact, the charges against Leaghur Holdings PL were dismissed.872
It is fortunate that the doctrine of accretion’s application where the former property boundaries
can still be ascertained has been settled in law, since gradually rising seas’ inundation of littoral
lands is likely to become commonplace over the next century, as global climate changes.
b. Views on the relative weight of private and public rights
Bannon J did not explicitly refer to the relative weight of public or private rights. However from
the facts and result it is apparent that in this case the public interest prevailed over claimed
private property rights. The landowner’s claimed right to defend his land against the sea did not
prevail over the law protecting (the public interest in) the quality of the state’s tidal waters.

Private property may ‘revert’ to public ownership
However, two findings did relate directly to coastal landowners’ private property rights. Bannon
J ruled and the appeal court agreed that under current law, when land is affected by subtractive
processes, ie gradual erosion or diluvion, the land lost below MHWM ceases to be part of the
‘real property’ registered under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).873 As a result, private
property rights over any land below MHWM are lost,874 and ownership of the land lost below
MHWM is ‘silently transferred’ to the Crown.875 This loss of land below MHWM to the sea,
and its transfer to the Crown occurs irrespective of whether the land title originally had an
ambulatory tidal boundary, or a boundary defined, or ‘fixed’, by survey. Bannon J said
But where the boundary is a fixed boundary, the title is open to correction or amendment if land is
gained or lost by accretion or erosion… The Torrens system was intended to provide certainty as
870

Ibid, 287.
Ibid.
872
Ibid, 290.
873
EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994) 13,660.
874
Environment Protection Authority v Leaghur Holdings PL [1995] 87 LGERA 282, 287 (Allen J). See
also Attorney General (UK) v Chambers (1859) 4 De G & J 55, 68 (Lord Chelmsford); Mahoney v
Neenan [1966] IR 559, 565 (McLoughlin J).
875
Environment Protection Authority v Leaghur Holdings PL [1995] 87 LGERA 282, 287. See also
Blundell v Catterall (1821) 5 B & A 268, 292-4 (Holroyd J).
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to title, but not to otherwise displace those parts of the law of property dealing with the gaining or
loss of title by accretion or diluvion. Defined boundaries make no difference. Southern Centre of
Theosophy Incorporated v South Australia [1982] AC 706 at 716, 717.876

Hence it is clear that private property rights do not extend to a landowner taking ‘any’ actions
they deem necessary to ‘preserve’ their land’s boundaries as ‘fixed’ at time of first survey.

With the benefit of these rulings, it would be incorrect to assert that a section of beach below the
mean high water mark is privately owned simply by referring to original survey measurements
on a plan,877 because the measurements may not actually define the position of the boundary.878
Indeed the nature of the legal property boundary may change from a boundary originally
defined by survey to a natural boundary formed by the mean high water mark of tidal waters,
converting a static boundary into an ambulatory boundary.879

The effect of an ambulatory boundary on private property rights are limited however. The
transfer of ownership only applies to that land which falls below MHWM, not the whole parcel,
and does not affect the property owner’s registration as the proprietor of the land title.
Further, because registration of a land title does not certify the boundaries880 a change in the
boundaries does not require a change in the land title’s registration. This continuous incremental
transfer of the ownership of land that comes to lie below MHWM, does not affect the
landowner’s indefeasibility of title because the landowner’s primary position as the registered
proprietor of the land title to lands above MHWM, remains unaffected. Thus the indefeasibility
conferred by the statute does not extend to land included in the certificate by a wrong
description of boundaries, or where the description of boundaries later becomes erroneous.881
Though loss of land to the sea is unthinkable to some, there is no doubt that under current NSW
law a surveyed boundary does not survive the gradual movement of the receding shoreline. 882
Further, it is clear that, as sea levels rise, some land titles will be wholly lost below the tidal
waters, and the owners’ private property rights will be overridden by the Crown’s ownership of
the bed of the tidal waters, and public rights to access and use the foreshore and tidal waters.
EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994) 13,659. Such a ‘fixed’ boundary is not fixed forever.
Ibid 13,660.
878
Ibid. See also Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy (1911) 2 IR 260, 284 (Palles CB); Beames v
Leader (2000) 1 Qd R 347.
879
EPA (NSW) v Saunders (1994), 13,660.
880
Butt, above n 209, 756, [20 20]. Butt cited Boyton v Clancy (1998) NSW ConvR 55-872 and Comserv
(No.1877) PL v Figtree Gardens Caravan Park (1999) 9 BPR 16,791 at 16,796.
881
See s 42(1)(c) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). See also LexisNexis Halsbury’s Laws of
Australia 355 Real Property/VI Other /(2)Boundaries, Fences and Encroachments /(B) Boundaries for
Land Abutting Water/(I) Tidal Water Boundaries, [355-14000] fn5. That errors in boundaries can occur
after the Certificate of Title is issued, through erosion, was stated by the Land Titles Office Practice
(Baalman and Wells, 4th ed, rel 19, 1990) cited by Bannon J at 13,659, which describes procedures to
amend legal boundaries where the title 'has become erroneous ex post facto' (see paragraph 7).
882
Bannon J’s decision was upheld in EPA v Leaghur Holdings PL (1995) 87 LGERA 282, 287.
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The transfer of land which falls below MHWM from private to Crown ownership might be seen
to place greater legal weight on public rights. However, the converse operation of the doctrine is
also possible: if accretions occur or sea-level falls a reciprocal transfer of land from the Crown
to private ownership would be recognised. While these clarifications of law assist landowners
whose lands have benefitted from accretion, they have adverse impacts for the owners of land
affected by gradual erosion or diluvion, and the private property rights available to them.883
The nature and extent of the private property rights of coastal landowners and the effect of
modern statute law on these rights was closely examined in the next case.

9. Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995]
This 1995 decision of the High Court of New Zealand884 directly addressed the conflict between
the private property rights claimed by beachfront landowners at Wainui Beach, on New
Zealand’s North Island, and the effect of the Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ) [hereafter
RMA 1991 (NZ)]. Erosion of the beach had been managed by public authorities for many years,
but when the seawalls proved ineffective in preventing further erosion, the Council proposed to
remove them.885 Local residents opposed the structures’ removal886 before the Planning Tribunal
unsuccessfully,887 then mounted an appeal to the High Court of New Zealand asserting that: the
Crown had a common law duty to ‘preserve’ the realm against the sea; and landowners had a
common law private property right to defend their land from the sea.888
Though the appeal failed, the court made several rulings on landowners’ private property rights.

a. Clarification of the relevant law
The case clarified whether a Crown’s duty to defend against the sea existed, the extent of
landowners’ private property rights, and the effect of statute law on common law rights.

883

See EPA v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,665, and EPA v Leaghur Holdings PL (1995) 87 LGERA 282.
Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622.
885
See the history of the location and the works recited in the decision of Sheppard PJ in See Gisborne
District Council v Falkner [1994] NZPT 270.
886
See Gisborne District Council v Falkner [1994] NZPT 270, Sheppard PJ.
887
See Gisborne District Council v Falkner [1994] NZPT 270. The Court granted an order sought by the
Council: ‘That the works done by the residents in the winter of 1992 on Wainui Beach were not
authorised under section 330 of the Resource Management Act as emergency works.’
888
Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622, at [*3].
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The Crown’s duty to ‘preserve the realm’ from the sea
The existence of a Crown duty to ‘preserve the realm’ and a corresponding private property
right to defend, or be defended from the sea, were central issues in the proceedings.
Barker J examined the Crown’s duty to preserve “the realm” against attacks by the enemy, the
sea,889 and ‘the corresponding right of citizens to protect their properties’ from the sea.890 He
noted the imperfect nature of the duty ‘in that it cannot be enforced’ and agreed that the ‘right’
had been ‘overtaken by developments in the law of private nuisance.’891 He also noted that the
Tribunal had ‘accepted that the duty was part of English common law’ and found that the ‘duty
and right’ had become part of the law of New Zealand. Barker J agreed and concluded that the
duty and right were applicable in New Zealand, ‘unless affected by a New Zealand statute’.892
The court then considered the nature of the Crown duty, reviewed the authorities893 and noted
that this ‘duty’894 did not aim to protect private interests. Barker J said
… it is clear that the underlying premise of the duty is that it is in the interests of the general public
to protect land from encroachments of the sea. It is not exclusively for the benefit of frontagers to
the sea…895

Barker J noted that references to “larger public purposes” and “general safety of the public”896
indicated that the duty was oriented toward public rather than private interests. He said
It would be wrong to frame the duty in terms of an absolute, positive duty on the Crown to
construct and maintain sea walls, if such construction and maintenance be not in the wider public
interest (for example, if it would cause greater damage to other areas of the coastline, or if it were
geographically impracticable). 897

The court recited the history of dealings between residents and authorities, and the residents’
claim that levying landowners to pay for protective works gave rise ‘a statutory duty’ on the
council to continue the protective works, but observed there had never been a ‘guarantee of
permanent protection’ and the council ‘was unwilling to enter into further commitments’.898
Barker J noted ‘the futility’ of the works, that their ‘essentially temporary nature was signaled
The origin of this characterization of the sea as ‘the enemy’ lies in comments made by Lord Coke in
Isle of Ely (1609) 10 Rep 141a cited in Attorney General v Tomline (1880) 14 Ch 58, 66 (Brett J). See
the discussion of the survival of this claimed right in NSW in Corkill, ‘Claimed’, above n 347, 49-58.
890
Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622, at [*11]
891
Ibid [*15]
892
Ibid.
893
Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed) vol 6, par 319; Coulson & Forbes The Laws of Waters (6th ed,
1952) p 44; Hudson v Tabor (1877) 2 QBD 290, 294; Board of Works for Greenwich District v
Maudslay (1870) LR 5 QB 397, 401-402; Attorney General v Tomline (1880) 14 Ch 58;
894
‘framed by Lord Coleridge as a “right”, and by Cockburn J as a “power”, in Board of Works for
Greenwich District v Maudslay (1870) LR 5 QB 397, 401-402.
895
Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622, 628 at [*19].
896
Board of Works for Greenwich District v Maudslay (1870) LR 5 QB 397, 401 (Cockburn CJ).
897
Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622, 628 [*19].
898
Ibid [*20]-[*21].
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… 20 years ago’,899 and did not agree that the Soil and Rivers Control Act 1941 (NZ) created a
Crown duty to build and maintain seawalls.900 The ‘imperfect nature of the duty’ and its
enforceability in New Zealand were canvassed, but the idea was dismissed as ‘academic’.901
The extent of landowners’ private property rights,
The nature of the common law right claimed by the private landowners was examined,902 but
Barker J disagreed that a citizen’s ‘right’ was properly described in absolute terms. He said
…such an approach manifests a narrow nineteenth century preoccupation with proprietary rights,
out-of-keeping with the more holistic policy concerns of sustainability and environmentalism
popular today. 903

Further, he agreed that recent developments in the law of nuisance would apply, and held that
[a]ccordingly, it can no longer be safely asserted that frontagers to the sea can construct artificial
protective barriers, irrespective of the consequential damage to the foreshore and to other
properties.904

The court rejected the claim that the landowner’s property rights continued to exist notwithstanding the enactment of relevant legislation,905 and held that the Act’s effect was to limit some
common law private property rights and extinguish others.906 It also rejected the argument that
loss of land to the sea was an unlawful seizure of private property without compensation
contrary to the common law,907 and prohibited by the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ).908
Barker J then included obiter criticisms of the “managed retreat” policy and the compensation
scheme then in place, noted the policy’s ‘seemingly insensitive application’, the scheme’s
limited effectiveness,909 and recommended an improvement. In a prompt to the legislature, he
quoted an extract from the Coastal Protection Act 1949 (UK) which authorised the payment of
compensation for loss or damage to land caused by coast protection works, as model provisions

899

Ibid [*21].
He said ‘… there is nothing in the Act stating that the erection and maintenance of sea walls or other
protective barriers is mandatory, wherever land is affected by erosion’. Ibid [*21]-[*22].
901
Ibid 629 [*24]. The court contemplated an action under the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 (NZ).
902
Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed) vol 6, para 321: ‘At common law a subject might erect groynes or
such other defences as were necessary for the protection of his land on the sea coast, even if such
erections have the effect of rendering it necessary for his neighbor to do the same …’
903
Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622, 630 at [*25]-[*26].
904
Ibid [*26].
905
Ibid 631 [*28].
906
Ibid [*29].
907
Ibid 633 [*34]-[*35].
908
Ibid [*35]-[*36]. Barker J ruled that the statutory scheme took ‘priority over private property rights’
and disagreed that erosion of land by the sea amounted to a ‘seizure’ by the Crown.
909
Ibid [*36]-[*37]. That the relevant provision, s 85, was not readily adaptable to the situation; that the
compensation provisions were ‘notoriously opaque’; and excessively restrictive. He said, ‘I for one
never encountered anybody who mounted a successful claim … though I knew of several attempts’.
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which might be ‘helpful’, if incorporated into New Zealand law.910

It is significant that Barker J made this recommendation because, having ruled on the questions
of law, further judicial comment was unnecessary. It appears he did so because the evidence
showed the adverse impacts of the Council’s policy of ‘managed retreat’ on the viability and
marketability of the residents’ properties, 911 and the possibility of a lose-lose outcome. There
was, he noted, a distinct prospect of the residents ‘losing their homes without compensation and
without the ability to erect coastal protection works.’912

The effect of statute law on the common law
That private property rights existed, despite the intention of legislation, was the key premise
behind the proceedings, according to Barker J.913 He considered whether the ‘duty and right’
had been affected by the RMA 1991 (NZ) saying it ‘comes down to an exercise in statutory
interpretation’. He began by noting the ‘legislative background’. He said
… the statutory implementation of integrated planning and environmental regimes represents a
clear policy shift towards a more public model of regulation, based on concepts of social utility
and public interest. Private law notions such as contract, property rights and personal rights of
action have consequently decreased in importance.914

He cited the Coastal Protection Act 1949 (UK) as an example of a statute affecting the common
law, ruled there was ‘nothing in principle to prevent a duty sourced in the Crown’s prerogative
power, or an established common law right being overridden or restricted by statute’,915 and
dismissed the claim the rights were ‘saved’ by s23 of RMA 1991 (NZ).916 Barker J noted that the
Act had ‘repealed 59 enactments and amended many others’ and quoted its long title as ‘An Act
to restate and reform the law relating to the use of land, air and water’. After noting that the
Act’s purpose, ‘promotion of sustainable management’ as defined in s 5, was paramount, Barker
J found that the Act did affect the ‘duty and right’, and had supplanted the common law.917 He
explained the interaction of the statute law and common law, thus
… where pre-existing common law rights are inconsistent with the Act’s scheme, those rights will
no longer be applicable. Clearly a unilateral right to protect one’s property from the sea is
Ibid [*37] – [*38]. See s 19(1) – 19(3) of the Coastal Protection Act 1949 (UK).
Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622, 633 [*36].
912
Ibid 634 [*38].
913
Ibid 625 [*11].
914
Ibid 631 [*28].
915
Ibid [*29].
916
Ibid [*30]. He said the savings section ‘cannot be invoked to protect a right or rule of law which, upon
proper construction of the statute as a whole, would otherwise impliedly be restricted or abolished.’
917
Ibid 632 [*31]-[*32]. ...with a ‘comprehensive, interrelated system of rules, plans, policy statements
and procedures, all guided by the touchstone of sustainable management of resources.’
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inconsistent with the resource consent procedure envisaged by the Act; accordingly, any protection
works proposed by the residents must be subject to that procedure. 918

He was explicit about the effect of statutes and the weight of private and public interests.
…there is nothing in the Act to suggest that the common law right cannot be infringed – quite the
reverse. The Act is simply not about the vindication of personal property rights, but about the
sustainable management of resources. … the governing philosophy of sustainability does not of
itself require the protection of individuals’ property to be weighed more heavily than the
protection of the environment and the public interest generally. 919

Further, he made plain that the statute law had replaced the common law. He said
[t]he relevant statute … deliberately sets in place a coherent scheme in which the concept of
sustainable management takes priority over private property rights. 920

Thus the High Court clarified that in New Zealand, a citizen’s private property rights in coastal
land were limited by the RMA 1991 (NZ), and rejected the claim that private property rights
continued to exist despite the Act. The court did not rule that the landowners had no private
property rights, but found their rights did not include rights to defend their real property against
the sea, to require their neighbours to erect defences for their benefit, or to compel the Crown or
Council to erect and maintain sea defences. The court held that if they had existed, these rights
had been extinguished by the legislation. However, other property rights were undisturbed.921

b. Views on the relative weight of private and public rights
Since it involved a contest between landowners’ claimed rights and the public law, this decision
made several important statements on the nature, extent and weight of private property rights.
The private property rights claimed by the residents were plainly stated, but the public rights
likely to be affected were not argued by Council’s lawyers or noted in the court’s decision.
However, it is possible, even likely, that wider considerations of public interest, beyond
administering public law and managing coastal hazards, were behind Council’s decision to
discontinue the foreshore protection scheme. Considerations may have included: the need to
ensure public safety, and preserve public rights to access and use the foreshore, the (f)utility of
the works, and other public interest priorities competing for limited public funding. It is
unsurprising that the tribunal and court decisions do not mention public rights, and other

918

Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622, 632 [*33].
Ibid [*34].
920
Ibid 633 [*35].
921
Though the matter was not canvassed in the proceedings, presumably the landowners’ remaining
private property rights would include, if the physical circumstances arose in the future, the right to
claim ownership of any accretions of land which form against their private land above HWM.
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elements of the public interest except in passing,922 because they did not bear directly on the
questions of law nominated for the court’s adjudication by the appellant.

The weight of private property rights in formal decision making
Barker J also addressed the question of the weight private property rights should have in a
consent authority’s decision-making. The landowners had argued that their property rights were
the primary consideration when public authorities decided whether to rebuild the seawalls,923
and that their property rights were so important that any council decision which did not
recognize them was ultra vires.924 However Barker J did not agree. He observed that
The Act is simply not about the vindication of personal property rights, but about the sustainable
management of resources. … the governing philosophy of sustainability does not of itself require
the protection of individuals’ property to be weighed more heavily than the protection of the
environment and the public interest generally.925

Thus, by recognizing, but not according them priority, Barker J rejected the claim that private
property rights were pre-eminent in New Zealand’s legal framework for managing its coasts.
Though not a binding precedent in this jurisdiction, this case provided very useful guidance in
answering my research question, because an analogous comprehensive scheme of legislation
which supplants prior private property rights, has been enacted in New South Wales.926

Next, a key decision on the claimed common law right to compensation and the NSW
legislature’s power to amend common law property rights is examined.

10. Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (2001)
Further clarification of NSW law regarding claims of paramount private property rights and
State Parliaments’ powers were provided by the High Court of Australia in Durham Holdings
Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001),927 after a series of earlier unsuccessful legal actions. 928

922

Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622, 628 [*19].
Ibid 632 [*33].
924
Ibid.
925
Ibid 632-3 [*34].
926
See my discussion of the analogous application this decision to New South Wales in John R Corkill
‘Claimed property right does not hold water’ (2013) 87(1) Australian Law Journal 49, 53-4.
927
Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2001] HCA 7; (2001) 205 CLR 399; 177 ALR
436; 75 ALJR 501, before Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Kirby and Callinan JJ. Though the
date of this decision is 2001, earlier proceedings were heard in the 20 th century. See cases cited below.
928
These included an appeal to the Coal Compensation Review Tribunal, interrupted proceedings in the
Supreme Court, and a decision of the NSW Court of Appeal, Durham Holdings PL v State of New South
Wales [1999] NSWCA 324; 47 NSWLR 340, which dismissed the entire matter.
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The facts of the case were as follows. Durham Holdings PL had held coal leases in coal reserves
under state-owned land that were revoked when the area was dedicated as a National Park.929
The enabling legislation930 provided for the payment of $23.25 million as compensation for the
cancelled coal leases, not its market value,931 while the company asserted it had a right to the
payment of compensation at their full market value of $93.4m.932 The company argued that the
court should rule the Act invalid933 because the ‘arrangements’ for compensation were beyond
legislative authority, and the ‘right’ to “just” or “properly adequate” compensation was ‘such a
“deeply rooted right” it restrained the legislative powers of the New South Wales Parliament’.934
The court considered the company’s arguments on the court’s power to invalidate legislation
and discussed its and other courts’ decisions on Parliament’s power to affect common law
rights.935 It read closely the NZ cases which the company argued supported the proposition that
there might be rights which “lie so deep that even Parliament could not override them”.936
However the court disagreed, ruling that the Act governed the matter, not common law. It
rejected the application, affirming the Court of Appeal’s decision.937

a. Clarification of the relevant law by the court
This decision’s clarification of whether a ‘fundamental’ right to compensation existed, its
statement on the mutable nature of private property rights and description of State legislatures’
extensive powers to affect private property rights, are described next.

The existence of a ‘fundamental’ right to compensation
The decision of Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ restated the plaintiff’s claim as:
‘whether or not the right to receive “just” or “properly adequate” compensation is such a
“deeply rooted right” as to operate as a restraint on the legislative power of the New South
Wales Parliament’.938 However, they found that there was no supporting authority for the claim,
929

Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2001] HCA 7, [4] (Gaudron, McHugh,
Gummow, and Hayne JJ). [hereafter Durham v NSW [2001].
930
Coal Acquisition Act 1981 (NSW) as amended by the Coal Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1990 (NSW).
931
Durham v NSW [2001] [5] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Hayne JJ).
932
Ibid. Or precisely, $93,397,327.
933
Ibid [6]-[7] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Hayne JJ), [39] (Kirby J).
934
Ibid [12] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Hayne JJ).
935
Ibid [8]-[12] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Hayne JJ), [39] ]-[66] (Kirby J).
936
See e.g. Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394, at 398; Simpson v AttorneyGeneral (NZ) (Baigent’s Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667, and others cited in Durham v NSW [2001] [47]
(Kirby J). See fn 91. In Taylor it was argued that such a fundamental right would prevent the Parliament
of New Zealand from enacting “literal compulsion, by torture for instance”.
937
Durham v NSW [2001] [1]-[14] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Hayne JJ), [15]-[78] (Kirby J).
938
Ibid [12] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Hayne JJ).
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affirmed the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s decision, and quoted it with approval.939
Kirby J concurred.940 Thus the court rejected the claim that a common law private property right
to compensation at full market value existed in Australian law, expressly negating the claim it
was a “fundamental right”.941 By holding that ‘any’ compensation payable was governed by the
relevant statute, not the claimed private property ‘right’, the court rejected the idea that the
claimed right was in any way ‘absolute’. Indeed, it ruled that no evidence had been advanced
which could form the basis for such a claim.942 Thus there can be no doubt, and the issue may be
described as ‘settled’ law in Australia.

The nature and extent of private property rights
The company characterized its claimed private property right to receive “just” compensation, in
absolute terms, as a “fundamental” right which was paramount, and limited Parliament’s action.
However, the majority of the court did not accept this characterization of the right.943 Kirby too
rejected it, and cited as a precedent, the Queensland government legislation to deprive
Queensland Aboriginal people of their “native title” – a species of legal property.944 Thus
common law private property ‘rights’ are not absolute, or immutable, but amenable to change or
repeal by legislation. They persist only to the extent that they are not affected by the statute law.

The scope and extent of powers available to the state Parliament
The High Court considered closely the company’s claims that the NSW Parliament was bound
to recognise and protect this claimed property right to compensation,945 and that legislation
which did not recognise and protect this claimed right was invalid, because it was beyond the
power of the Parliament.946 The joint decision the Court rejected this argument, and said ‘[t]here
are numerous statements in this Court which deny that proposition.’947
While Kirby J agreed that there was a convention for governments to provide compensation if
they acquired a citizen’s private property, he rejected the argument that the NSW government
939

Ibid.
Ibid [52] (Kirby J).
941
Ibid [14] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Hayne JJ), [57] (Kirby J).
942
Ibid [12]. ‘The [applicant] was unable to point to any judicial pronouncements, let alone a decided
case, which indicated that, at any time, that any such principle existed in the common law of England,
or of the colonies of Australasia, or of Australia.’
943
Durham v NSW [2001] [12] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Hayne JJ).
944
He held that the subsequent decision of the High Court in Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186
upholding it as valid legislation, was an authoritative decision which ‘bars the way of the applicant’s
arguments’. Durham v NSW [2001] [52] (Kirby J).
945
Ibid [7] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Hayne JJ).
946
Ibid.
947
Ibid. See fn 4 for those decisions.
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was obliged to follow this convention.948 He made it clear that State legislatures were able to
deal with private property through legislative acts, and had done so many times before.949
Further, he dismissed the claim of a constitutional right to compensation on ‘just’ terms if the
State acquired private property, noting that s 51 (xxxi) of the Australian Constitution, required
the Commonwealth to provide ‘just terms’ compensation if it acquired private property, but did
not include an ‘equivalent provision’ relating to State governments. He found it significant that
a 1988 referendum to insert such a clause into the federal Constitution, had failed.950

Thus the court ruled that not only were State Parliaments not bound by common law rights, but
these legislatures’ powers were extensive, and included a power to legislate to acquire private
property with, or without, “just” compensation. On this point too, the company’s case failed.

b. Views on the relative weight of private and public rights
Since it focused on questions of private property rights when they are affected by actions of
government pursuing public policy goals, the court’s decision provided more than mere views.
It directly commented, and ultimately ruled on the nature and extent of private property rights
more generally and the weight which should be afforded them in the decision making process.

The nature and extent of private property rights
These rulings above, indicated that there were limits to private property rights, under both the
common law and under statute law. It held that because they are not ‘absolute’, but socially
constructed, private property rights are amenable to modification or repeal by legislation.

The court placed no weight on claims that private property rights were so significant as to
negate the legislation and were beyond Parliament’s reach, because no evidence was tendered
supporting these claims, and a clear line of authority existed to the contrary. As a result, it
rejected these claims, and upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision to dismiss the matter. The
court did not find that the company had no property rights, but the rights it had were prescribed
by the legislation and not by a claimed common law right to compensation at full market value.

948

Ibid [55] (Kirby J). No obligation to do so existed under the Commonwealth Constitution, or
international law. He noted that in Union Steamship Co PL v King (1988) 166 CLR 1, 9, the High Court
had determined that state Parliaments’ legislative powers had “the widest possible operation”
949
Ibid [56] (Kirby J). He said ‘…so far as the powers of a Parliament of a State of Australia to permit the
acquisition of property without the payment of compensation are concerned, a long line of opinions of
the Court upholds the existence of that power.’
950
Durham v NSW [2001] [63] (Kirby J). He discussed the relevance of this at [64]-[66].
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Page 135

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Laws)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

© John R Corkill
Student No. 2376398

Chapter III – The Courts’ responses

The cases considered above are summarized in Table 4 below.
Cases examined
(in order)
Blundell v Catterall
(1821) 106 ER 1190

Court /
Jurisdiction
Kings Bench
United Kingdom

Hudson v Tabor
(1876) 1 QBD 225, and
(1877) 2 QBD 290.

Queens Bench
Court of Appeal
United Kingdom

Attorney General (UK)
v Tomline (1880) 14 Ch
58
Attorney General
(Ireland) v McCarthy
(1911) 2 IR 260

Court of Appeal
United Kingdom

Southern Centre of
Theosophy Inc v South
Australia (1978) 19
SASR 389
Southern Centre of
Theosophy Inc v South
Australia [1982] 1 All
ER 283
EPA v Saunders (1994)
6 BPR 13,655

Supreme Court of
South Australia

EPA v Leaghur
Holdings Pty Ltd
[1995] 87 LGERA 282
Falkner v Gisborne
District Council [1995]
3 NZLR 622

Court of Criminal
Appeal of NSW

Durham Holdings Pty
Ltd v State of New
South Wales (2001)
177 ALR 436

High Court of
Australia as final
appeal court for
New South Wales

Kings Bench
United Kingdom
as final appeal
court for Ireland

Privy Council UK
as final appeal
court for South
Australia
Land and
Environment
Court of NSW

High Court New
of Zealand

Outcome
Found that public rights to use the foreshore and tidal
waters existed; but rejected claimed right to bathe
(using bathing ‘machine’).
Held that a landowner has no private property right to
compel a neighbour to build defences to protect land
from the sea: found neighbour was not liable for any
damages due to inaction.
Affirmed landowner has no right to compel a
neighbour to keep the sea out; but found that the
neighbour is obliged not to… ‘let the sea in’.
Ruled that the location of a property boundary may
move under the doctrine of accretion even if the
boundary’s original location is known. Accretions
formed above MHWM belong to the adjoining
landowner, not the Crown.
Found that the natural processes able to move a real
property boundary under the doctrine of accretion
included deposits of wind-swept sand.
Overturned SA Supreme Court’s Full Bench
decision; restored Walter J’s original decision;
recited relevant common law property rules regarding
the movement of natural boundaries.
Applies common law property rules re location of
real property boundary; finds no real property below
MHWM, hence land not owned by company;
convicts Saunders, acquits company
Affirmed L&EC decision: recited common law rules
re property boundaries and transfer of ownership of
land below MHWM to the Crown.
Rejected claims that: Crown in NZ had a duty to
protect private land under NZ law; landowners have a
right to defend against the sea. Ruled that private
property rights are amenable to modification or
repeal by statute law.
Rejected claims that a common law or a
constitutional ‘right to compensation’ exists in NSW;
ruled that compensation, if any, is governed by NSW
legislation; State Parliaments have extensive powers
to modify or repeal private property right.

Table 4 – Summary of cases considered and their results
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Part D. Discussion
11. Observations on the cases considered
All the cases examined above were decisions by senior courts which clarified or developed
relevant elements of the common law, and or ruled on the effects of applicable statute law on
common law rights. While these modern cases of McCarthy, SCOTI v SA, and Falkner are
persuasive analogies, but not binding on NSW courts, the declarations of law in the EPA v
Leaghur and Durham cases constitute authoritative precedents of the highest standing which
other courts in this jurisdiction are bound to follow, under the principle of stare decisis.
Generally speaking, where cases involve the operation of legislation, and its effect on common
law rights, the courts have held statute law to be superior and governing the relevant matter(s),
not the common law. This reflects a core principle of the legal system in New South Wales (and
other nations with a Parliamentary democracy) that the legislature is the ultimate law-maker.
Hence it is often said Parliament makes the law and the courts declare it. These declarations of
law thus apply this principle underpinning statutory interpretation: where there is an apparent
contradiction between ‘rights’ under common law and the operation of statute law, unless a Bill
of Rights or a constitutional right exists, the court will usually find that the legislation prevails
and the common law has been limited, modified or repealed.
As the cases above illustrate, the effects of the courts’ rulings are that private property rights are
not ‘absolute’ in the sense of being immutable, but rather are amenable to modification or repeal
by ‘clear terms’ expressed in statutes enacted by the legislature. Since the mid-19th century an
individual’s private property rights have been seen as social constructs which rely on the
explicit or implicit recognition in laws enacted by the legislature. That private property rights
were not sacrosanct but contingent, has been well known since Blackstone’s time.951
Claims that private property rights are ‘paramount’, hold the primary position when determining
rights to use coastal lands, and constrain decision-makers in their decision making were not
accepted by the court. Indeed, the court has found that no basis for such a significant claim, and
doubted that one might exist,952 holding that private property rights should be considered by
decision-makers, as one of many considerations, but should not be afforded undue weight.953
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, (1st pub, 1765) recognised the
legislature’s power to authorize the acquisition of private land for a public purpose (see vol 2, 2-11).
952
In the Durham cases, both the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Australia noted that there were
no ‘judicial pronouncements, let alone a decided case’ in ‘England, the colonies of Australasia or
modern Australia, to support its argument’ for a fundamental right to compensation.
953
Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622, 632-3 [*34] (Barker J).
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The substance of common law private property rights has been read narrowly by the courts, and
in the cases above some rights claimed were found to not exist.954 Each case ruled on the claims
made, but together they indicate landowners’ tendency to overstate their property rights.955
The issue of ‘public rights’ was only apparent in three cases, each distinctive due to their facts.

In Blundell v Catterall (1821) the public right of way over the foreshore was claimed as a
defence, and a public right of bathing was asserted. However while the court, and apparently the
plaintiff, were prepared to accept that a public right of way along the foreshore, as a public
highway, existed, this right did not extend to other uses of the plaintiff’s private property.
Though the majority of the court held that there were common law public rights to access the
foreshore for navigation and for fishing, they did not accept that a ‘right to bathe’ existed. Thus
no established public right was overturned by the court when it reached this decision.

In Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy (1911) the Attorney General charged that the
adjoining landowner McCarthy had interfered with the public’s access to the foreshore.
McCarthy disavowed any interference with public use of the foreshore and any claim to own
land below the high water mark, so this was not an issue at final hearing, and the case turned on
evidence of McCarthy’s title extending “down to the water”, ie high water mark. From the
particulars of this case however, it is clear that both parties regarded the public rights to access
and use the foreshore as paramount, and that by the end of the 19th century, this was settled law.

Those cases that have involved a public authority as one of the parties have highlighted the
inexact fit of a public authority, charged with specific functions, with the more general role of
trustee for public rights and interests. In some cases, the public authority’s argument has been
clothed in a public interest rationale, obscuring a secondary, more economic, motivation.956

954

No right to build defences against the sea (Falkner v Gisborne DC) [1995]; no right to compel
neighbour to defend against the sea (Hudson v Tabor (1877); no right to own land below HWM (EPA v
Saunders (1994); no right to compensation for land lost to the sea (SCOTI v SA [1982]; no
‘fundamental’ right to “full” compensation (Durham v NSW [2001); no right to exclude the public from
the foreshore (ie land between high and low water marks) (AG (UK v McCarthy (1911).
955
The unwillingness of the court to define more private property ‘rights’ accords with the principle of
numerus clausus. See Brendan Edgeworth ‘The Numerus Clausus Principle in Contemporary Australian
Property Law’ (2006) 32 Monash University Law Review 387.
956
See for eg Hill v Lyne (1894) 14 LR NSW 449. In this appeal of the valuation of the land being
acquired by the Crown, the Crown’s prerogative ownership of all lands below the high water mark of
tidal waters was recognised, contrary to the vendor’s assertion of his ‘right’ to dredge.
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In others, public rights and interests have remained in the background as part of the rationale for
certain decisions,957 or were no more than implied.958 Further, in Southern Centre of Theosophy
Inc v South Australia, the potential for conflict between genuine ‘public interests’ and the
interests of a State government with a larger corporate and economic agenda may be seen.959
Usually, in cases where private property rights have been adversely affected by the exercise of
public rights, the landowner has been the plaintiff and members of the public the defendants.
Private landowners can usually easily prove their private property interests in the land, quickly
obtain standing before the court, and gain the advantage of nominating the grounds of the
action, the nature of the proceedings and the court in which an application might be heard.
Where members of the public are the plaintiff they gain the advantage of nominating the
grounds for the action, but they face a challenge in establishing their public interest in the land
in question, in order to gain ‘standing’ before the court. Public interest plaintiffs face many
other challenges including the time commitment and the financial costs involved in such
proceedings and often must overcome other hurdles including adverse impacts on their health,
livelihood, family relations, and employability and potential political consequences.
When the courts have recognised private property rights as prevailing over public rights they
have required clear evidence of Parliament’s express intention to modify the relevant public
rights to achieve ‘larger’ goals of private and public ‘good’. When interpreting statutes the
courts have adopted a presumption that public rights are affected, modified or repealed only to
the extent explicitly indicated by the legislature. Where the extent of effect is ambiguous in the
statute, the court presumes that the effect, modification or repeal extends only so far as
necessary to achieve the ‘larger’ goal. The corollary of this presumption is that the public rights
continue to exist where, or are restored when, the effect of the statute does not apply.

12. A summary of judicial responses
The responses to conflicts between private property rights and public rights over use of lands by
common law courts have largely depended on the questions nominated by the plaintiff for
adjudication, and the arguments advanced by the parties. Judges cannot consider theories or
It is likely that the council’s decision to not continue to maintain coastal defensive structures to protect
private property at Wainui Beach Gisborne, at issue in Falkner, was based on important elements of the
public interest, such as the public right of access to and use of the foreshore, potential risks to public
safety which might arise, and the cost of the works – which were deemed ‘futile’ - to the public purse.
958
The essential public interest at issue in EPA v Saunders (1994) was the protection of the water quality
of the River Clyde, and the statutory prohibition on their pollution, unless duly licensed. The hazard to
the public right of navigation across tidal waters created by the use of car tyres was not an issue.
959
The State of South Australia gained no extra revenue for the larger area of the lease and had a policy,
albeit latent in this situation, of reserving land along the water’s edge.
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propositions not argued before them, and must consider only the evidence adduced in the
proceedings. In this way judicial responses to conflicts between competing rights have been,
and will continue to be, reactive rather than proactive or innovative.
Though largely bound by precedent, judges are able to apply and develop existing rules of
common law, as appropriate, to address new circumstances: though in doing so must
demonstrate a carefully reasoned, logical approach if the decision is to survive an appeal. Judges
use extant rules of construction when they interpret and apply legislative provisions, and may
refer to the intention of the legislature, or where this is absent or ambiguous, may consider the
relevance or adaptability of existing common law rules when other guidance is not available.
Generally speaking, judges are well acquainted with philosophical approaches and theories of
property and have been prepared to indicate their relevance where this is appropriate but, as a
rule, do not employ or apply philosophies or theories of property as the basis for their decisions.
Where a philosophy such as ‘sustainability’ lies at the core of the legislative provisions being
considered, as in the Falkner case, or forms a part of the common law, as the ‘public trust’ does,
it will be given weight by the courts because it has, in those instances, the force of statute law.

As the cases above illustrate, the judicial view has been, and currently is, that public rights to
use coastal lands and waters have greater weight at law, and private property rights should yield.

In this chapter I considered the weight attributed to competing rights by the courts. In the next
chapter I report responses of a second arbiter, the NSW legislature.
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The western tide crept up along the sand,
And o’er and o’er the sand,
And round and round the sand,
As far as the eye could see,
The rolling mist came down and hid the land:
And never home came she.
Charles Kingsley, The Sands of O’Dee (1848)

Chapter IV – Statutory responses to conflicts
Introduction to Chapter IV
In this chapter I explore the responses to conflicts between private property rights and public
rights made by the legislature of New South Wales via its enactments of statutes. Initially it was
titled ‘Parliamentary responses’, but as my research progressed I realized that a narrow focus on
Parliament would preclude consideration of relevant early Crown Instructions regarding coastal
lands in New South Wales, issued before responsible government began in 1856.960 Further, it
would preclude sub-ordinate legislation, not enacted by the Parliament. Hence I adopted the
broader title ‘Statutory responses’ so these matters could be considered.

In Part A I briefly describe the legislature of New South Wales and provide an overview of
statute laws selected for their potential guidance in answering the primary research question.

In Part B I consider five fields of law which are relevant to the use of coastal lands or conflict
between competing private and public rights: Crown lands ownership and management;
compensation for acquisition of property by the State; coastal lands protection and management;
environmental planning; and public use of coastal waters. In each field I report on statutory
provisions which recognize private property rights or public rights, acknowledge conflict
between competing rights, address or resolve competing claims; or which indicate the weight of
private and public property rights.

In Part C I discuss these statutory responses and the indications they give of the relative weight
attributed by the legislature to private property rights and public rights. I then summarise the
statutory responses made by the legislature, answer my secondary research questions and state
my conclusions on which set of competing rights is dominant under current law in 2020.

960

The New South Wales Act 1823 (UK) constituted the first legislature for the colony. The seven
member Legislative Council first met in 1824. A bi-cameral Parliament was not constituted until 1856.
See < http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/common.nsf/key/HistoryFirstLegislature >.
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Part A. Introduction: the legislature and relevant statutes
1. The legislature of New South Wales.
This chapter is focused on NSW statutes because the legislature is acknowledged in liberal
democracies, as the supreme law-making body.961 In New South Wales, the legislature consists
of the Sovereign, the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council.962 Government is formed
by the political party with most Members of the Legislative Assembly,963 but a majority in both
chambers is required to enact Bills.964 The legislature’s powers enable it to enquire into matters
of public concern,965 and resolve disputes between competing rights by creating administrative
procedures, which deal with conflicts of interests, with legislation.966 It also has a supervisory
role over statutory rules made under an authorizing Act, by the Governor on a Minister’s
advice,967 since a rule or instrument made by the Governor can be ‘disallowed’ by a motion
carried by either chamber.968 A range of instruments thus come within the legislature’s
purview.969 However I do not intend to summarise here the arrangements which govern these
chambers, or detail the procedures for enacting legislation, since other texts are available.970
What is relevant to clarify here is the legislature’s crucial role in law-making, as distinct from
the government’s role. My focus on the legislature is apposite because in the last thirty years the
government has not had a majority in the upper house,971 and has needed the support of crossbench Members of the Legislative Council (MLCs) to pass its legislation.972

961

See Catriona Cook, et al (eds), Laying Down the Law (LexisNexis, 7th ed, 2009) 173 -175.
S 3 Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) cites ‘the King with the advice and consent’ of these chambers.
963
See ‘How Parliament Works’, < https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/about/howparliamentworks/Pages/How962

Parliament-Works.aspx >.
964

See s 8A Constitution Act 1902 (NSW). Bills supported by both chambers require the assent of the
Governor and their provisions commence on the dates specified.
965
Committees may be formed by a motion of the chamber to inquire into any relevant matter. See NSW
Legislative Assembly, Practice, Procedure and Privilege, Chapter 26 Committees, Standing Order 315.
966
Enactment of legislation is a primary role of the legislature. See s 5 Constitution Act 1902 (NSW).
967
See for eg the authorisation of Regulations by s 9.25 Crown Land Management Act 2016.
968
under s 41 Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW). A ‘disallowance’ motion must be brought within 15 sitting
days of notice being given of the rule or regulation coming into effect. See Standing Order 116, in
Consolidated Standing and Sessional Orders—New South Wales Legislative Assembly – 57th
Parliament, 2019. See the list of ‘Motions to disallow statutory rules and regulations since 1995’ at
< https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lc/pages/statistics-of-the-legislative-council.aspx >.
969
Section 3 Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) defines ‘instrument’ as including both ‘statutory rules’ and
‘environmental planning instruments. ‘Statutory rules’ are defined by s 3 of the Subordinate Legislation
Act 1989 (NSW) as including ‘regulations, by laws, rules or ordinances’.
970
See the Standing Rules and Orders for the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council adopted
under s 15 Constitution Act 1902 (NSW).
971
The last State government to have a majority in the Legislative Council was the Wran / Unsworth
Labor government in the 48th Parliament 1984-1988. See the lists of Members of the Legislative
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This support has not always been forthcoming and government Bills have been amended or
rejected by the upper house.973 Thus the statutes of recent Parliaments have reflected the
legislature’s intentions, not necessarily the government’s.974 This history demonstrates that,
though a future government’s policy on whose rights should prevail is central, what is also
crucial is support for that position by cross-bench MLCs. If a future government were to win a
majority in both chambers, cross-bench MLCs’ role would be diminished and the executive’s
decisions simply implemented by the legislature. However, this is unlikely since proportional
representation favours the election of minor parties to the Legislative Council.975

2. Overview of the statutes selected

.

The main criterion adopted for selecting statutes relevant to conflicts between competing rights
is their thematic link to coastal land in New South Wales. A suite of statutes, grouped as five
fields of law are examined. I provide an overview of the principal statute then focus on key
parts, in accordance with standard practices in statutory interpretation.976
The first set of statutes relate to the management of coastal Crown lands in New South Wales.977
The second group relate to the construction of structures to protect land in the State’s coastal
zone from the sea and the management of coastal hazards affecting lands of all tenures.978
The third field includes environmental planning, land-use regulation, development control and
the creation of strategic planning instruments to protect the public interest.979
A fourth category focuses on statutes governing acquisition of private land by public authorities,
payment of compensation, and creation of easements for public purposes over private land.980
The fifth encompasses statutes which create private interests in the state’s coastal waters.981
Council in previous NSW Parliaments in ‘Party composition in Legislative Council since 1978’ at <
https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lc/pages/statistics-of-the-legislative-council.aspx >.
972

See for eg the Game and Feral Animal Control Act 2002 (NSW).
In the 55th NSW Parliament, the Coalition government’s planned repeal of the EPAA 1979 (NSW) was
thwarted by cross-bench and opposition MLCs. See Planning Bill 2013.
974
In the 50th NSW Parliament the Greiner Coalition government did not have a majority in either
chamber and the Parliament enacted the Endangered Fauna (Interim Protection) Act 1991 (NSW).
975
No NSW government has had a majority in the Legislative Council since 1988. The number of minor
party and independent MLCs has increased since 1988. See ‘Party composition in Legislative Council’
at < https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lc/pages/statistics-of-the-legislative-council.aspx >.
976
See Michelle Sanson, Statutory Interpretation (OUP, 2012) 161 - 171; Elizabeth Ellis, Principles and
Practice of Australian Law (Lawbook, Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2013) 227 – 229.
977
Considered are early Crown policy, colonial statutes and modern Acts, with a focus on the Crown
Lands Act 1989 (NSW) and the Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW).
978
The Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW) and the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW).
979
Considered are the principal statute, the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) and
planning instruments, including LEPs and SEPPs, made under this Act as sub-ordinate legislation.
980
The Land for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1880 (NSW), Roads Act 1993 (NSW), the Land
Acquisition (Just Terms) Compensation Act 1991 (NSW) and the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).
981
The Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW), Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW), Petroleum
(Offshore) Act 1982 (NSW), and Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW).
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In the first field I trace the historical origin of the policy of reserving Crown land for public use
and the statutes which continued this policy as law. In other fields I focus on current statutes
since space does not permit a detailed account of their development. Where longstanding Acts
have recently been replaced,982 I adopt a ‘snap shot approach’, describing elements of the
statutory framework relevant to private or public rights over coastal lands, under the former
statute, and under current law as at mid-2020. I then discuss the indications of the weight
attributed by the legislature, to competing rights, and any evidence of rights acting as ‘trumps’.

Part B. Relevant Statutes in five fields of law
In this Part I outline provisions in NSW statutes which relate to private property rights or public
rights in coastal lands. Prior and current Acts, and statutory instruments are considered.

3. Crown lands
In this section I trace the history of laws governing the ownership and use of coastal lands, and
highlight the weight attributed to competing rights by the Crown, and by the legislature.

3.1 Relevant statutes
18th century Crown policy

The earliest statute relevant to public use of coastal lands in New South Wales983 would appear
to have been Instructions issued by the British Colonial Secretary under the Crown’s
authority,984 to Governor Brisbane,985 to reserve ‘lands in the neighbourhood of navigable
streams or the sea coast’ for public purposes,986 so that public uses
‘should, as far as possible, be anticipated and provided for before the waste lands of the Colony
are finally appropriated to the use of private persons…’. 987

982

The Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW) was replaced by Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW), and
the Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW) was replaced by the Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW).
983
See Peter Cabena, Victoria’s Water Frontage Reserves – An Historical Review and Resource
Appreciation (Department of Crown Lands and Survey Victoria, 1983), 14-20. Prior to 1851 Victoria
was part of the colony of New South Wales. The earliest evidence of this policy identified by Cabena,
were written Royal Instructions to the Governor of the British colony of Nova Scotia, in 1719.
984
See Cabena, above n 960, 16, fn 14.
985
Ibid. Issued in 1825, the instructions included reserving ‘lands in the neighbourhood of navigable
streams or the sea coast’ for public purposes.
986
Ibid.
987
Ibid. Cabena cited as authority Historical Records of Australia v.10 p 434, Earl Bathurst to Sir
Thomas Brisbane.
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These Instructions applied a Crown policy which had been in use in other Crown colonies, but
the widths of lands to be reserved under this Crown policy varied between colonies.988
In 1826 similar Instructions were issued to Governor Darling989 and the policy was proclaimed
in a public notice in the Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser
“The government will further reserve to itself all land within One Hundred Feet of High Water
mark on the Sea Coast, Creeks, Harbours and Inlets.” 990

It is not surprising that this policy was adopted because a controversial case over the ownership
of coastal land was decided in England in 1824,991 and confirmed on appeal in 1828.992 Thus the
Crown policy of retaining ownership of coastal lands to allow public use, was confirmed.993
This policy remained in force in the 1830s,994 during the colony’s exploration by early settlers995
and was affirmed in 1840,996 but was rescinded by the Colonial Secretary in 1841.997
Following Surveyor General Thomas Mitchell’s advice to the Colonial Secretary that “the
reservation of the Shore may indeed be considered an important public purpose,” the policy was
reinstated in 1843, ‘not as a universal principle’ but at the Governor’s discretion.998 Hence due
to its intermittent application,999 the pattern of land release in the colony was not uniform: some
parcels of coastal land abut a Crown reserve, while others are bound by MHWM.1000

This policy of reserving coastal lands from sale and dedicating them for public purposes was
subsequently pursued in New South Wales after the institution of colonial self-government in
988

Ibid 14. Cabena noted that Royal Instructions issued to the Governor of Nova Scotia in 1719, sought
the reservation of ‘at least two hundred yards distant from the sea or harbour’.
989
Ibid 16.
990
Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser, 22 August 1828. Cabena, above n 960, 16.
991
See Rex v Yarborough (1824) 3 B&C 91; 107 ER 668. The case was remarkable because it resulted in
coastal land thought to be held by the King, being successfully claimed by a subject.
992
See Gifford v Lord Yarborough (1828), 5 Bingham 163; 2 Bligh NS 147; 4 ER 1087.
993
The policy was published in August 1828.
994
In 1831 the Crown policy was amended to reserve coastal lands from sale unless required for
‘commerce or navigation’. See Cabena, above n 960, 16.
995
Ibid 17. It appears that the Crown intended to prevent similar private claims of land in the colonies,
and maintain Crown control over strategically important, or commercially valuable locations, in the
‘new’ land gained through colonization.
996
Ibid 18. Cabena cited the Surveyor-General Circular 40/289, SA Perry to Assistant Surveyor
Townsend, 7.8.1840. PRO Series 97/1.
997
Ibid. Cabena reported that the policy was put in abeyance ‘when new land regulations were received
from England.’
998
‘whenever it may be thought necessary’. Cabena, above n 960, 18. According to Cabena, the policy’s
application in Victoria after 1851, was different, with large areas of coastal land being reserved.
999
Initially, from 1825-1841, in abeyance (1841-1843), then discretionary application (1843 ->).
1000
The application of the policy of reserving land 100 feet from high water mark to a grant of land made
in 1829 and re-granted in 1840 was the central issue in Attorney General (NSW) v Dickson (1904) AC
273. The Privy Council ruled that the re-grant in 1840 had included the land ‘down to the water’s edge’.
See also McGrath v Williams (1912) 12 SR (NSW) 477, where the evidence was that the original
Crown reserve had been wholly eroded away, and the Crown grant of land had been made in 1843.
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1856, in the Crown Lands Alienation (Public Purposes) Act 1861 (NSW), in response to public
statements asserting a public right of access to the beaches and coasts of New South Wales.1001
As well as authorizing its sale, the Act authorized the reservation of Crown land from sale and
dedication for a range of ‘public purposes’.1002 Subsequently, calls to reserve lands for
recreational purposes, were repeatedly made.1003 Under this Act, coastal lands reserved from
sale by the Crown, when adjoining lands were sold, were subsequently gazetted as dedicated for
public purposes, while other reserved lands were sold, or leased to adjoining landowners.1004
The Act also afforded the Governor discretion in removing the reservation of Crown land from
sale.
‘The Governor may with the like advice rescind any reservation of water frontage on the sea coast
or any bay inlet harbour or navigable river or land adjoining such frontage contained in any Crown
grant either wholly or to such extent and subject to such conditions or restrictions as shall be
deemed advisable … on payment of an adequate money consideration … not less than the
minimum upset price per acre...1005

However explicit constraints on this discretion were also stated
…nothing contained in this clause shall empower the Governor to grant any land below high-water
mark or to interfere with any land used as a public thoroughfare or with any land set apart and
dedicated for any public purpose.1006

In this prohibition on granting lands below MHWM, the colony’s responsible government
formalized earlier Crown policy and codified the common law as it then stood in England.1007

Provisions for reserving and dedicating Crown land for public purposes were included in the
Crown Lands Act 1884 (NSW)1008 and the post-federation Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913
(NSW).1009 Note that in the period between these statutes, the power to dedicate lands for public
purposes had passed from the colony’s Governor, to the Minister. Important policies for public
access to and use of Crown lands were reiterated in a new statute, enacted in 1989.

Ford, ‘The Battle’, above n 325, 262.
including for ‘public health recreation convenience or enjoyment’. See section 5 Crown Lands
Alienation Act 1861 (NSW). See ‘Acts as Made’ at < http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/num_act/ >
1003
Ford, above n 325, 257, quoted a letter from Waverley Council to Secretary of Lands, 7 April 1864.
1004
Ibid 256. Ford noted the subsequent struggle of the NSW government to retain control over an area of
foreshore reserve adjacent to private landowners, at Nelson’s Bay (now Bronte Beach).
1005
See section 12 Crown Lands Alienation (Public Purposes) Act 1861 (NSW).
1006
Section 1 Crown Lands Alienation (Public Purposes) Act 1861 (NSW).
1007
Consequently, unlike in England, in New South Wales few, if any, land grants included land below
the high water mark. As a result, the operation of the jus publicum over the jus privatum in coastal
lands, under the English common law, was made wholly unnecessary in the colony.
1008
Section 104 provided that ‘The Governor may by notice in the Gazette reserve or dedicate Crown
Lands …. for the public interest for any …public quay or landing-place …. or other institution for …
public health or recreation convenience or enjoyment… public baths or … other public purpose.
1009
Section 24 stated uses for which the Minister’s dedication of Crown lands would be in the public
interest. Relevantly, it referred to land for ‘…permanent common … public health or recreation
convenience or enjoyment … public baths or for any other public purpose.’
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Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW)

The Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW) replaced the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913 (NSW)
with a modern statute and new regulations streamlined Crown land administration
procedures.1010 It recognized public rights of access to and use of the foreshores, in its
objects,1011 and Guiding Principles.1012 Powers to dedicate or reserve Crown land for public
purposes,1013 and to manage them, were updated.1014 The forms of Crown tenure offered were
clarified and the ‘right to convert’ Crown leasehold lands into freehold title was reduced. The
sale1015 or lease1016 of Crown land was permitted under certain conditions, and the ‘care, control
and management’ of Crown reserves were vested in local councils.1017 Consequently, many
coastal Crown reserves were included in councils’ strategic vegetation mapping, estuary
management plans, reserve management strategies or coastal management plans.1018 Other
coastal reserves1019 were the subject of development proposals.1020 However the CLA 1989 did
not readily permit private use of Crown lands dedicated for public purposes.1021

Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW)

Recently, the law governing Crown lands was again revised with the passage of a new
statute,1022 which continued many provisions in the former Act,1023 modified several
‘problematic’ provisions,1024 and created new provisions.1025 While a comprehensive review of
1010

Crown Land Regulations 1990 (NSW).
See s 10 (e) the reservation or dedication of Crown land for public purposes and the management and
use of the reserved or dedicated land,’Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW) [hereafter CLA 1989 (NSW)].
1012
See s 11(c) CLA 1989 (NSW) ‘that public use and enjoyment of appropriate Crown land be
encouraged’.
1013
See s 80, for power to dedicate land, and s 87 CLA 1989 (NSW) re powers to reserve land.
1014
See section 11, Principles and ss 112 - 116 CLA 1989, re plans of management or Crown land.
1015
Sections 75, 76, 77 CLA 1989 (NSW).
1016
Sections 41 – 44AA CLA 1989 (NSW).
1017
Sections 75 – 77 CLA 1989 (NSW).
1018
Eg Tweed Coast Regional Crown Reserve Plan of Management 2008; Tweed Shire Council Coastal
Zone Management Plan
1019
Eg Fingal Head, Tweed Shire and Broken Head Reserve, Byron Shire.
1020
Many development proposals were highly controversial. See Independent Commission Against
Corruption Report of Inquiry into North Coast Land Dealings (ICAC, 1990).
1021
See Friends of King Edward Park Inc v Newcastle City Council (No 2) [2015] NSWLEC 76
[hereafter FoKEPI v NCC [2015].
1022
The Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW) [hereafter, CLMA 2016 (NSW)].
1023
For eg the authority to grant leases, and licences over Crown land continued, albeit under updated
conditions. See ss 5.16 – 5.20 and ss 6.21 – 6.28 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1024
It appears that the new Act’s provisions regarding changes of purposes and approval of activities on
Crown land dedicated for public purposes, were intended to overcome the legal obstacles to permitting
new commercial uses of public parks and reserves, highlighted in the FoKEPI v NCC [2015] case. The
court found against the Minister’s approval of a proposed development of the King Edward Headland
Reserve in Newcastle, on the basis that the public recreation reserve could not be developed for a
purpose which excluded the public.
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all its provisions is not necessary here, the Act provided many indications of the weight
attributed by the legislature to competing rights over coastal land.1026 I next describe those
provisions which refer to public rights of access, public interests in coastal lands, private
ownership of land, or affect private property rights.

Relevant provisions
Like its predecessor, this Act includes a statement of Objects and ‘principles of Crown land
management’ to guide its implementation.1027 The Objects encompass many public interests,1028
and intend that Crown land management be “for the benefit of the people of New South
Wales.”1029 These principles recognize diffuse, non-use elements of the public interest,1030 and
seek to encourage ‘public use and enjoyment of appropriate Crown land’.1031 Another part of the
statutory framework, the Crown land management rules,1032 also include public access,1033 and
other elements of the public interest among matters for which rules may be made. 1034
Private interests are accommodated1035 in provisions governing the sale1036 of, and leases,
licences and special holdings over, Crown lands.1037
The Act restates the Minister’s powers to dedicate and reserve Crown land ‘for one or more
purposes specified in the notice’,1038 but this statement of power lacks the former emphasis on
‘public purposes’.1039

1025

The Minister has wide discretionary powers to deal with Crown land. See s 5.3 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
The Fifty-Sixth Parliament of New South Wales (May 2015 – February 2019).
1027
See s 1.3 Objects, and s 1.4 Principles of Crown land Management, CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1028
The objects require ‘environmental, social, cultural heritage and economic considerations to be taken
into account’ See s.1.3(c) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1029
See s 1.3 (d) CLMA 2016 (NSW). Further, object (e) aims ‘to facilitate use of Crown land by
Aboriginal people of New South Wales because of the spiritual, social, cultural and economic
importance of land’ to them.
1030
See ‘environmental protection’ in s 1.4 (a), and the conservation of natural resources (including water,
soil, flora, fauna and scenic quality) in s 1.4 (b), and the use and management of Crown land and
resources ‘in such a way’ that they ‘are sustained in perpetuity’ in s 1.4 (e) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1031
See s 1.4(c) CLMA 2016 (NSW). Note the qualification ‘appropriate’ Crown land.
1032
See s 3.15 CLMA 2016 (NSW) ‘Crown land management rules’.
1033
See s 3.15 (5) (i) CLMA 2016 (NSW) ‘public access to, and the use (including by the Aboriginal
people of the State) of, dedicated or reserved crown land’.
1034
See s 3.15 (5) (h) CLMA 2016 (NSW) ‘environmental standards or considerations’, and s 3.15 (5) (k)
compliance with heritage requirements’ and ‘other requirements for the protection of dedicated or
reserved Crown land.’
1035
See s 1.4 (f) CLMA 2016 (NSW). Private, commercial uses of Crown lands are now possible under s
1.4 (d) ‘that, where appropriate, multiple use of Crown land be encouraged…’.
1036
See s 5.3 (3) re Minister’s power, and ss 5.9 – 5.15 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1037
See ss 5.16 – 5.20 (leases); ss 5.21 – 5.28 (licences); ss 5.29 – 5.32 CLMA 2016, (special holdings).
1038
See s 2.3 Minister may dedicate Crown land, and s 2.8 may reserve Crown land, CLMA 2016 (NSW).
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Moreover, Crown lands already dedicated and reserved for public purposes, may be added
to,1040 or subtracted from,1041 re-dedicated or reserved again,1042 but not sold,1043 and the
purposes for which they are managed may be extended, altered or removed.1044

When operating their powers however, the Minister must, at relevant times, be satisfied their
actions are ‘in the public interest’.1045 Highly relevantly, a new provision declares that the
dedication or reservation of Crown land … for ‘use by members of the public does not:
(a) prevent its use for commercial purposes,
(b) prevent fees being charged of its use, or
(c) entitle members of the public to have unrestricted access to the land…’1046
The Act provides for private land being acquired for public purposes1047 using an existing
statute,1048 and allows dedicated or reserved Crown lands to be managed by a non-council
manager, such as a corporation,1049 with extensive powers to control public access and use.1050
A ‘community engagement strategy’ is required to inform the public about dealings in Crown
land,1051 and documents relevant to its management must be publicly available.1052 Also relevant
are provisions which continue existing private interests in Crown land, leases, licences or
special holdings,1053 and create new private interests.1054 However leases and licences over
Crown land are limited in scope and extent,1055 often temporary,1056 and may be revoked.1057
1039

Under savings and transitional provisions of the new Act, dedications and reservations of Crown
lands made under the prior statute continued in force, and plans of management then current continued
to have effect. See Schedule 7 clause 17 (1) and (2) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1040
See s 2.4 and s 2.9 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1041
See s 2.7 Revocation of dedication and s 2.11 Revocation of reservation, CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1042
See s 2.6 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1043
See s 5.3 (5) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1044
See section 2.14 – s 2.16 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1045
The public interest test applies to the Minister’s powers to dedicate Crown land under s 2.3 (2)(b), to
reserve lands per s 2.8 (2)(b); for additional purposes s 2.14 (2)(b); altered purposes per s 2.15 (2)(b);
grant a ‘relevant interest’ in Crown land per s 18 (2)(c); or a secondary interest, under s 2.19 (2)(a)
CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1046
See s 2.17 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1047
See s 3.28A, s 4.2 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1048
The Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW).
1049
See s 3.3 CLMA 2016 (NSW). Others able to be appointed as Crown land manager are Local
Aboriginal Land Councils, a body corporate under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), a statutory land
manager, an association, a body corporate constituted under another Act, or the head of a government
sector agency.
1050
See ss 3.24 – 3.31 CLMA 2016 (NSW). S 9.25 (2) authorizes Regulations for (a) use and enjoyment
of Crown land; (f) charging fees for entry; (g) the closure of Crown land to the public and other persons.
1051
See sections 5.4 – s 5.8 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1052
Most notices require publication in the Gazette, see for eg s 2.3 (1) notice of the dedication of Crown
land, while a copy of other documents is to be published on the Department’s website: eg Plans of
Management, under s 3.40 and community engagement strategies under s 5.5 (5) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1053
See CLMA 2016 (NSW) Schedule 7 Savings and transitional provisions, cl 5 (2) Continued persons.
1054
Leases may be granted by the Minister over Crown land under s 5.17, licences may be granted under s
5.22 and special purposes holdings may be granted under s 5.30 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1055
See s 5.17 CLMA 2016 (NSW): a dealing in land ‘is a lease even if exclusive possession of the land is
not conferred’ and s 5.22: a dealing ‘is a licence even if exclusive possession of the land is conferred…’
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The Act also authorizes easements1058 for private1059 or public purposes,1060 for public access,1061
conditions of sale,1062 public positive covenants to protect public interests in Crown land,1063 or
other land.1064 Easements affect owners’ rights slightly,1065 but not outside the easement area.1066

Also relevant to competing private and public interests in coastal land are provisions which
permit the Minister to withdraw Crown land from a holding, for public purposes,1067 protect
public interests in Crown lands from prohibit pollution or contamination,1068 authorize an order
to stop an activity ‘that poses a threat to public safety or the environment’,1069 and impound
animals trespassing on Crown land.1070 Relevant too are provisions on ‘unauthorised use’ of
Crown land;1071 improper use of vehicles;1072 and those authorizing removal of ‘persons’ from
Crown land through a Court order,1073 or by a Crown land manager’s employee.1074
Authorized officers have extensive powers, to enter and search leased Crown land,1075 private
land,1076 and over vehicles.1077 ‘Things’ seized from Crown land may be returned,1078 or retained
1056

While a lease over Crown land may be issued for a maximum term of 100 years under s 5.16, a lease
over a specified part of the bed of tidal waters, to permit the construction of a private jetty is limited to a
maximum period of twenty years, under Crown policy, but may be renewed repeatedly.
1057
Licences may be revoked by the Minister, without compensation. See s 5.23 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1058
See s 5.47 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1059
Though easements generally require the burdened landowner’s consent, (see s 5.48) the Minister may
create easements without their consent to enable access or ‘to preserve or protect’ the Crown’s interest
in the land, see s 5.49 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1060
Local councils may seek the creation of easements over Crown land to allow the council to ‘enter
Crown land and carry out work’ such as the construction and maintenance of water supply, sewerage
and stormwater drainage. See s 5.50 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1061
See s 5.51 CLMA 2016 (NSW). An easement for public access ‘confers on the public a right to enter
the land and carry on any activity’ other than a ‘prescribed activity’. See s 5.51 (4) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1062
See s 5.11 and s 5.12 CLMA 2016 (NSW). Under s 5.11 (2) the Minister may include ‘any conditions
the Minister determines’ to a contract of sale or an application to purchase Crown land.
1063
See s 5.56 (1) CLMA 2016 (NSW). See also s 88D of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).
1064
Covenants may be created over other land under s 88E of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). See s
5.56 (2) CLMA 2016 (NSW). A covenant created under s 5.56 ‘extends to any separate lots created by a
subsequent subdivision of the land’. See s 5.56 (3) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1065
since the Minister’s consent is required to erect any structure, See s 5.52 (1) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1066
A landholder may recover damages from a person using an easement for public access who damages
their property. See s 5.52 (4) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1067
A holding may be a lease, licence or special holding. See s 7.8 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1068
‘… or any waters in, on or under the land’. See s 9.3 CLMA 2016 (NSW). The Act allows the making
of restoration orders ‘to prevent, control, abate or mitigate’ harm to Crown land, make good damage
and ‘prevent the continuance or reoccurrence of the offence’. See s 11.11 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1069
See s 9.18 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1070
See s 9.24 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1071
See s 9.2 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1072
See s 9.6 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1073
See s 9.11 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1074
See s 9.12 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1075
These powers extend to Crown land, land ‘subject to land use restriction’, such as a public positive
covenant, and to any other land, in order to gain access to Crown land or land ‘subject to land use
restriction’. See s 10.15 (1) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
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by the Crown.1079 Compensation is authorized for the State’s acquisition of ‘property’,1080 under
some provisions,1081 but is not available for other actions.1082 Three miscellaneous provisions
also address private property rights. The first denies claims title to Crown land based on adverse
possession,1083 a second excludes minerals from land sold or leased,1084 and a third restates the
limits on rights over land bounded by lakes, rivers or roads.1085
Regulations authorized by the Act for the ‘care control and management’ of Crown lands,1086
may include their ‘use and enjoyment’1087 entry fees,1088 closure to the public,1089 and commercial use.1090 Hence the Crown Land Management Regulation 2018 (NSW)1091 is also relevant.
It limits public access;1092 allows lands dedicated for public use to be ‘set aside’ for certain
uses,1093 authorizes entry fees,1094 states conditions of entry,1095 and prohibits some activities.1096

I next consider the indications of the relative weight attributed to competing private and public
rights or interests, by the legislature through relevant provisions in this field of law.

3.2 Indications of relative weight
Instructions to the colony’s Governors and later statutes demonstrate the Crown’s and
legislature’s intention that public rights, public purposes and other public interests have priority
over private interests in NSW coastal lands. This priority was restated in many statutes over
decades, but the public interest did not ‘trump’ private interests altogether, since these statutes
1076

Authorised officers may take a range of actions upon gaining entry. See s 10.17 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
See s 10.26 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1078
See 10.29; seized things must be returned, see s 10.30; or certified as unable to be returned, see s
10.31; or may be returned on the court’s order, see s 10.32 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1079
A seized thing may be forfeit per s 10.33, or dealt with by the Crown per s 10.34 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1080
See s 2.24 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1081
For compensation re native title interests, see s 8.12; to make good damage sustained in gaining entry,
‘unless the occupier obstructed or hindered’ the authorised officers, see s 10.22 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1082
Eg actions of Crown land managers, see s 3.46; or licence revocation, s 5.23 (2) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1083
See s 13.1 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1084
See s 13.2 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1085
See s 13.3 (1) and (2) CLMA 2016 (NSW), s 13.3 (3) restated the negation of the doctrine of accretion
over non-tidal lakes, introduced in 1931, and restated in s 172 (4) Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW).
1086
See s 9.25(1) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1087
See s 9.25 (2)(a) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1088
See s 9.25 (2)(f) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1089
See s 9.25 (2)(g) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1090
See s 9.25 (2)(h) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1091
made under s 9.25 CLMA 2016 (NSW). See Crown Land Management Regulation 2018 (NSW) at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdb/au/legis/nsw/consol_reg/clmr2018290/ [hereafter CLMR 2018 (NSW)].
1092
See Regulation 5 CLMR 2018 (NSW).
1093
Regulation 6 CLMR 2018 (NSW).
1094
Regulation 7 CLMR 2018 (NSW).
1095
Regulation 8 CLMR 2018 (NSW).
1096
Regulations 9 and 13 CLMR 2018 (NSW).
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also permitted Crown lands sale or lease.1097 Further, statutory powers to reserve and dedicate
Crown lands for public purposes, and manage them in the public interest show the significant
weight attributed by the legislature over decades to public rights and interests in coastal lands.

The primacy of public rights under the CLA 1989, was demonstrated in a 2015 case, where the
court found the private use of a park permitted by the Minister, was not properly authorized.1098
Hence public use of land dedicated for public recreation did ‘trump’ private interests in the park.
However the legislature’s enactment of the CLMA 2016 (NSW), ostensibly to manage the
State’s Crown lands in the public interest,1099 explicitly permits commercial uses of public
reserve land which exclude the public,1100 that were impermissible under the CLA 1989.1101
Further, provisions authorizing non-council managers’ control and management of Crown
land1102 create significant concessions to private interests,1103 which may be a precursor for the
sale of some privately-managed Crown lands to private corporations.

Provisions which confer wide ministerial power and discretion to add, amend or delete purposes
for dedicated Crown lands,1104 allow their use by private interests,1105 and ‘set aside’ parts of
such lands for ‘certain uses’,1106 overcome legal and administrative difficulties in permitting
commercial use of Crown lands dedicated for public use, highlighted in the FoKEPI decision.

Other evidence of a shift in emphasis can be seen in provisions which permit a Crown land
manager to charge an entry fee,1107 restrict or suspend public access,1108 and remove persons
from Crown land1109 and hence limit ‘public rights’ to enter and use coastal Crown reserves.
Thus it would appear that in the CLMA 2016 (NSW) and its Regulations,1110 the legislature
increased the weight it attributed to private interests and uses of coastal Crown lands and
See for ss 36 – 40 CLA 1989 (NSW) re sale of land; ss 41 – 44E re leases, and ss 45 – 50 re licences.
See FoKEPI v NCC [2015].
1099
See s 1.3 Objects of the CLMA 2016 (NSW), and s 1.4 Principles of Crown land management.
1100
See s 2.17 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1101
Such as FoKEPI v NCC [2015]. Other provisions which overcome the obstacles to private
commercial use of public lands identified in the FoKEPI case are s 3.33 which allow a plan of
management to be prepared for uses and purposes ‘in addition to the purposes for which it is currently
dedicated or reserved’; and s 3.38 which allow land to be used for purposes specified in the plan of
management, additional to the purpose for which the land is dedicated or reserved.
1102
See ss 3.24 – 3.31 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1103
Non-council Crown land managers have powers to enter into leases, licences and easements and with
the Minister’s consent can exercise the Minister’s functions. See ss 3.26 and 3.27 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1104
See sections 2.3 – s 2.16 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1105
See s 2.17 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1106
See s CLA 1989 (NSW), Reg 6 Crown Land Management Regulation 2018 (NSW).
1107
See s 9.25(2) (f) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1108
See s 9.25(2) (g) CLMA 2016 (NSW). See also Reg 5 Crown Land Management Regulation 2018
(NSW) ‘Public Access to Dedicated or Reserved Crown Land’.
1109
See s 9.11 and s 9.12 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
_____________________________________________________________________________________
1097
1098

Page 152

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Laws)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

Chapter IV – Statutory responses

© John R Corkill
Student No. 2376398

diminished the weight of public rights by limiting public access and use through regulation. The
new Act makes ministerial decisions to allow temporary commercial use of Crown land
permissible, and administratively simple, but a ‘public interest’ test still applies. Where private
use of dedicated Crown lands, or parts of Crown lands, are permitted, public uses may continue
elsewhere on the land at that time, or when that part is not in private use. Thus in the CLMA
2016 (NSW), the legislature intended that private uses of Crown lands dedicated for public use
would be permissible, but would co-exist with public use, as far as possible.

I conclude, from my review of this field of law, that public rights to use Crown lands have had
priority over private interests for decades, but have not ‘trumped’ all private interests. The new
CLMA 2016 (NSW) increased the private interests in Crown land, by permitting private use of
some land dedicated for public use. However these private uses do not ‘trump’ public rights
entirely, since public use continues elsewhere and revives when the private use concludes.

4. Coastal lands protection and management
I next look for evidence of private property rights’ ability to ‘trump’ public rights in coastal
lands in a second field of law: the management of land in the State’s coastal zone.

4.1 Relevant statutes
This field of law is especially relevant since the regulatory framework originally created by the
Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW), as amended1111 and substantially continued by the Coastal
Management Act 2016 (NSW),1112 governs the management of all lands in the ‘coastal zone’.1113

Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW)

The CPA 1979 (NSW)1114 was originally directed towards broad public interest objectives.1115

1110

S 9.25 CLMA 2016 (NSW) authorizes the making of regulations for the management of Crown land.
[Hereafter CPA 1979 (NSW).] The CPA 1979 was amended in 1998, 2002, 2010 and 2012. Relevant
amendments are discussed in the following sections.
1112
[Hereafter the CMA 2016 (NSW).]
1113
Section 4 CPA 1979 (NSW) defined the ‘coastal zone’ as: ‘a) the area within the coastal waters of the
State as defined in Part 10 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (including any land within those waters), and
(b) the area of land and the waters that lie between the western boundary of the coastal zone (as shown
on the maps outlining the coastal zone) and the landward boundary of the coastal waters of the State,
and (c) the seabed (if any) and the subsoil beneath, and the airspace above, the areas referred to in
paragraphs (a) and (b).
1114
For Hansard reports of the passage of the Bill see the Index to New South Wales, Parliamentary
Debates Legislative Assembly, First Session of the Forty-Sixth Parliament 1978-79. Vol. 141-146.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
1111

Page 153

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Laws)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

Chapter IV – Statutory responses

© John R Corkill
Student No. 2376398

It had five parts,1116 and unusually, was administered by two ministers.1117 Its provisions set out
arrangements for a new public authority,1118 procedures for the Minister’s concurrence’ in
approving development in the coastal zone,1119 and for authorizing public expenditure.1120
Privately and publicly owned lands fell within the ‘coastal zone’ defined by the Act, and the
provisions requiring ministerial concurrence,1121 applied to all lands in the coastal zone. The Act
authorized the construction of seawalls and other structures, but ‘works’ were only part of the
Act’s scope. The focus of the protection was the coastal environment, not ‘private property’.

That the government intended to protect the coastal environment from the adverse impacts of
development, was made plain by Minister Ferguson’s Second Reading Speech. He said
“experience has shown conclusively that our beaches and coastline cannot be taken for granted,
and that careless development and misuse can endanger a fragile, natural system.”1122

He explained the problem being addressed by the Bill: the government’s recognition of a
“serious long term erosion trend” and the threat posed by heavy seas to dwellings in some
locations “because they were built too close to the shoreline”.1123 The minister emphasized that
his role was to ensure expert coastal engineering advice was considered by public authorities
when assessing development applications in hazardous areas.1124

The Act authorized the Coastal Council to recommend land for purchase by the State
government if required,1125 but did not refer to private property rights at all. The minister’s

These were “to constitute the Coastal Council of New South Wales and to specify its functions; to
make provisions relating to the use and occupation of the coastal region; and to facilitate the carrying
out of certain coastal protection works.” See the explanatory note Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW).
1116
Part 1 encompassed Preliminaries, Part 2 constituted the Coastal Council of New South Wales; Part 3
provided for Use of the Coastal Zone; Part 4 related to Carrying out of Works in the coastal zone by the
Minister; and Part 5 General, authorised the making of Regulations. A lengthy Schedule 1 cited the
Central Mapping Authorities map-sheet numbers which contained lands designated as within the
‘coastal zone’. Additional Parts were added by subsequent amending legislation, discussed below.
1117
Part 2 by the Minister for Planning and Environment, and Parts 3 and 4 by the Minister for Public
Works. See Acts as made: at < http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/num_act/cpa1979n13237/ >.
1118
The Coastal Council of New South Wales, see ss 6 – 35 Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW).
1119
See ss 36 – 53 CPA 1979. The Minister’s concurrence role was triggered, under s 38(1), if the
Minister formed the opinion that, as advised from time to time by the Minister to the public authority,
the development or the use or occupation may, in any way (c) adversely affect the behaviour or be
adversely affected by the behaviour of the sea or an arm of the sea …. or (d) adversely affect any beach
or dune or the bed, bank, shoreline, foreshore, margin or flood plain of the sea or an arm of the sea …..
1120
Funds were able to directed to a diverse range of works “for the preservation, protection, maintenance, restoration or improvement of the coastal zone”, or any part of it. See s 55 CPA 1979 (NSW).
1121
‘… development which may “adversely affect the behaviour or be adversely affected by the
behaviour of the sea…” see s 38 CPA 1979 (NSW).
1122
See New South Wales Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 20 February 1979, 2096-7.
1123
Ibid.
1124
Ibid. Areas such as “… dunes and erodable lands adjacent to the open coast.”
1125
See s 28 (2) (c) CPA 1979 (NSW). This provisions indicates that the legislature foresaw the potential
need to acquire private land, where this was necessary for public purposes.
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references to rights concerned rights of appeal and rights of local governments.1126 Concluding
his speech Minister Ferguson noted that the ‘basic aim’ of the legislation was “to protect the
public” from development approvals which could be “multimillion dollar disasters”.1127

The CPA 1979 was amended several times, however the history of the amending Acts cannot be
recounted here, so I provide a snapshot of the Act, as amended, prior to its recent repeal,1128
focusing on key elements of its statutory framework relevant to competing rights. I then
consider how these elements have been continued or reworked in the CMA 2016.

Objects of the Act

Though the Act’s purposes were stated on its introduction, objects were first inserted,1129 in
2002. 1130 The objects aimed to guide and direct the Act’s administration, assist the court in
interpreting key provisions, and recognized diverse public and private interests in the coastal
zone through an over-arching object,1131 and eight supplementary objects. Two objects related to
competing rights.1132 Object 3 (d) “promote public pedestrian access to the coastal region and
recognise the public’s right to access”,1133 made clear the legislature’s intention that “public
access” be encouraged and facilitated, and extended to the larger area of “the coastal region”, as
defined.1134 Further, by using “recognize” the legislature clearly intended that the common law
public right be ‘visible’ and prominent in the statutory framework, and unmodified by the Act.

In contrast, no object referred to protecting private property or private property rights per se.
Indeed, object (e) providing for the “acquisition of land” for public purposes,1135 was the
legislature’s clearest indication of the puisne status of private property ‘rights’ relative to the

1126

See New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 20 February 1979, 2098 (Mr
Ferguson). First he advised that the legislation did not affect “the rights of appeal of a person against the
decision of an approving authority”, a statutory procedural right to an appeal. Second, he dismissed the
proposition advanced by Members of the Opposition that the Act would “override the rights of local
government”, noting that public authorities such as local government still had a major role to play.
1127
Ibid 2103.
1128
On 3 April 2018, by s 35 of the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW). See <
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/nsw/repealed_act/cpa1979210/notes.html >
1129

as a new s 3 of the CPA 1979 (NSW).
by the Coastal Protection Amendment Act 2002 (NSW). See New South Wales, Parliamentary
Debates Legislative Assembly, 20 March 2002, 811 (Mr Aquilina).
1131
This goal was “to provide for the protection of the coastal environment of the State for the benefit of
both present and future generations.”
1132
See s 3 (d) and (e) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1133
Use of the word “pedestrian” was deliberate, since it unequivocally excluded use of recreational
vehicles such as dune buggies and motorbikes. See Recreational Vehicles Act 1983 (NSW) and
Recreational Vehicles Amendment Act 1988 (NSW) both repealed.
1134
See s 4 Definitions CPA 1979 (NSW).
1135
See s 3 (e) CPA 1979 (NSW), ‘to provide for the acquisition of land in the coastal region to promote
the protection, enhancement, maintenance and restoration of the environment of the coastal region.’
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wider public interest in the coastal zone’s ecologically sustainable management. By authorizing
future acquisitions of private land to enable the Act’s successful implementation, the legislature
clearly intended that this public purpose continue to prevail in the future.
The Act’s objects were augmented by two new objects,1136 in 2010.1137 Their inclusion did not
affect private or public rights, but signaled the government’s and legislature’s concerns about
climate impacts on coastal management and coastal areas most at risk from extreme storms.

Coastal hazard management via CZMPs

The 2002 amendments also mandated the preparation of coastal zone management plans
(CZMPs) to manage coastal hazards,1138 and other public interests in privately and publicly
owned coastal land.1139 Relevant procedures to complete these plans, described in the Coastline
Management Manual (1990),1140 were also authorized.1141 Further, coastal protection works
were required to be consistent with a CZMP,1142 the subject of a development application,1143
environmental impact assessments,1144 and receive local and state government approval.1145
These provisions show it was the legislature’s intention that local councils manage coastal
hazards through strategic planning, not landowners under a claimed private property right.

Modification of the common law doctrine of accretion

Significantly, two new provisions modified landowners’ private property rights. The first,
section 55M, limited a landowners ability to obtain a development consent for coastal protection
works by prohibiting a consent authority from granting approval if the works were likely to

See s 3 (h) ‘to encourage and promote plans and strategies for the adaptation in response to coastal
climate change impacts, including projected sea level rise’, and s 3 (i) ‘to promote beach amenity’.
1137
by the Coastal Protection Amendment Act 2010 (NSW).
1138
Coastal hazards were to be addressed when preparing a CZMP under s 55C (1) (d) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1139
See s 55C (1) (a) protecting and preserving beach environments and beach amenity, (b) works for the
protection of property affected or likely to be affected by beach erosion, (c) maintenance of public
access to the beach, (e) the management of estuary health, (f) impacts from climate change, and (g)
arrangements for maintaining any coastal protection works proposed.
1140
New South Wales Government, Coastline Management Manual (PWD, 1990) ISBN 0730575063.
1141
Councils were directed to comply with the Manual in a Direction issued per s117 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1142
See s 55K (1)(a) CPA 1979 (NSW). A breach of a CZMP was an offence.
1143
See s 55K (1)(b) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1144
Assessments of environmental impact were required under s 38(1) (c) and (d), s 39(4)(a) and (b) and s
44(a) and (b) of the CPA 1979 to determine if the proposed works were likely to ‘(a) adversely affect
the behaviour or be adversely affected by the behaviour of the sea or an arm of the sea … or (b)
adversely affect any beach or dune or the bed, bank, shoreline, foreshore, margin or flood plain of the
sea or an arm of the sea …..’ Consideration of likely impacts of works on other aspects of the coastal
environment were also required under cl 8(e)-(n) of SEPP 71 – Coastal Protection 2002 (NSW).
1145
See ss 38, 39 and 80 of the EPAA 1979 and s 55M CPA 1979 (NSW).
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‘unreasonably limit public access to a beach or headland’ or pose a threat to public safety. 1146
The second, s 55N, modified landowners’ right to claim ownership of new land formed against
their land under the doctrine of accretion,1147 to protect public access along the foreshore.1148
The Court,1149 Registrar-General of Land Titles,1150 and relevant Minister,1151 were prohibited
from granting landowners’ applications claiming ownership of newly-formed land, if the gain of
land would not be ‘indefinitely sustained’, or public access would be restricted or denied.1152
Thus the private property ‘right’ to claim ownership of new land was not extinguished but
restricted, and if either condition was satisfied, this ‘right’ would not apply.1153
Coastal protection ‘works’

The construction of seawalls and other coastal protection structures had been governed by Part 3
of the Act, since the Act’s introduction.1154 Proposed works were usually classified as
‘designated development’, subject to assessment and approval under the Environmental
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), and any approval issued by a local authority for
works which could influence or be influenced by the sea, required the relevant Minister’s
concurrence.1155 Later following the completion of coastal zone management plans, proposals
for seawalls or other works would need to show their consistency with the adopted CZMP.1156
The creation of a new category of ‘emergency works’ in 2010,1157 which were exempt from
requirements for development approval,1158 was inconsistent with the prevailing policy of
integrated coastal zone management and planning, in which public access was a key concern.1159
Conceived as a way to allow landowners to take urgent action to protect their land from coastal
erosion exacerbated by severe storms, these amendments were seen by some coastal residents as

1146

See s55M (10)(a) CPA 1979 (NSW)
Section 55N was inserted in the CPA 1979, by the Coastal Protection Amendment Act 2002 (NSW).
1148
This modification addressed the issue of conflicting private property rights and public rights identified
in the report of the Emergency Beach Management Review. See the discussion of this in Thom, above n
40.
1149
See s 55N (2) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1150
See s 55N (3) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1151
The Minister administering the CLA 1989 (NSW). See s 55N (4) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1152
“(a) a perceived trend by way of accretion is not likely to be indefinitely sustained by natural means,
or (b) as a consequence of making such a declaration, public access to a beach, headland or waterway
will, or is likely to be, restricted or denied.” See sub-sections 55N (2) and 55N (4) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1153
See s 55N (2) a), b) and s 55N (4) a) and b) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1154
See ss 36 – 53 CPA 1979 (NSW).
1155
See s 41 CPA 1979 (NSW).
1156
See s 55K (1)(a) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1157
Clause [26] of the Coastal Protection and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (NSW) inserted
Part C, and new sections 55O - 55Z, Emergency Coastal Protection works, into the CPA 1979 (NSW).
1158
The new Part 4C exempted certain emergency coastal protection works from the need to obtain
consent under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) or other legislation.
1159
See NSW government Coastal Policy of New South Wales (DoP 1997).
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tipping the balance between competing rights (back) in favour of private landowners. However
the legislation did not create an unfettered private property ‘right to defend’ against the sea.1160
Though a landowner could undertake ‘emergency’ works, a certificate issued by a council
officer,1161 or the Director-General was required.1162 Further, approval for ‘emergency’ works
could be refused,1163 or subject to conditions.1164 If approved, works could be undertaken only
once,1165 and ultimately would need to be removed.1166 Thus landowners’ ability to construct
emergency works was not an unfettered ‘right’ to build any structure they deemed appropriate.
Rather, the certificate might more properly be seen as a licence for a temporary use, issued
under the statute at the Crown’s discretion, delegated to the relevant authorised council officer.

Importantly these 2010 amendments did not repeal the protection of the public right of access to
and along the shoreline provided by section 55N. However, ‘emergency’ works were re-badged
as ‘temporary’ works in new amendments to the CPA 1979 introduced in 2012.1167
Though public debate on the 2012 Bill elevated expectations among landowners of ‘permanent’
protection from the sea as a ‘right’, the amendments did not facilitate this. Only ‘temporary’
works were authorized,1168 and no provision used the word ‘right’. These amendments continued
the deviation from the co-ordinated approach of ‘integrated coastal zone management’ via
CZMPs, and permitted ad hoc construction of temporary structures on private or public land.1169
However, adverse impact on public access was still recognized as a valid reason for an
authorized officer to refuse a Certificate for temporary works on public land.1170.
Regrettably, amendments permitting unapproved ‘temporary’ protection works to be built on
the beach in certain circumstances,1171 allowed landowners to co-opt public land and avoid the
issue of locating the actual position of their boundary with the public beach.
These amendments created serious legislative and philosophical contradictions: while the Act’s
A ‘right’ to defend’ was claimed some commentators. See for eg Karen Coleman, ‘Conveyancing and
property: Coastal Protection and Climate Change’ (2010) 84 Australian Law Journal 421.
1161
under s 55T CPA 1979 (NSW).
1162
See s 55T (2) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1163
Section 55P (4) CPA 1979 (NSW) states that an emergency action sub-plan, ‘may specify locations
where emergency coastal protection works… must not be placed’.
1164
Section 55T (3) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1165
See s 55S CPA 1979 (NSW).
1166
See s 55Y CPA 1979 (NSW).
1167
Schedules 1 – 3 of the Coastal Protection Amendment Act 2012 (NSW) replaced ‘emergency’ with
‘temporary’ throughout the CPA 1979 (NSW), and similarly amended the Regulation and other Acts.
1168
See ss 55O and 55P CPA 1979 (NSW).
1169
See s 55T (1) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1170
See s 55T (2A) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1171
See ss 55T (1), 55VA, 55VB CPA 1979 (NSW).
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Objects required coastal management to be consistent with the principles of ecologically
sustainable development,1172 ad hoc temporary works on public land, without environmental
impact assessment, development consent or ministerial concurrence became permissible.

The 2012 amendments also left private landowners legally liable for increased erosion caused
by their ‘temporary’ works, because the works were unassessed and unapproved. Further, by
allowing the life of ‘temporary’ seawalls to be extended,1173 the amendments created conditions
for beaches and public access to them to be caught in ‘coastal squeeze’ in the future.

Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW)

The focus of the law governing coastal land changed with the passage of the Coastal
Management Act 2016 (NSW),1174 due to its emphasis on management, its re-instatement of a
co-ordinated approach, recognition of climate change,1175 reconstitution of the Coastal
Council,1176 and its brevity. As I describe next, the CMA 2016 (NSW) provided continuity by
reproducing some sections of the CPA 1979 (NSW), and continuing other sections’ operation
until conditions were satisfied,1177 but reworked other elements of the statutory framework.

Objects of the CMA 2016 (NSW)

Though wordings differ, many Objects of the CMA 2016 (NSW) reflect those of its predecessor.
Most objects address a diffuse non-use element of the public interest, but objects (b) and (k) in
particular address public use,1178 whilst object (l) authorizes the Coastal Council to identify land
for acquisition by public authorities, to further the public purposes stated.1179 Importantly, by
widely defining the foreshore,1180 the area subject to common law public rights was extended.

The new statute stipulated the protection of diverse elements of the public interest, as manage1172

See ss 37A, 38, 39 44 and 54A CPA 1979 (NSW).
See s 55VA(2) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1174
A public exposure draft Coastal Management Bill 2015 (NSW) was released in November 2015 for
public review with a call for submissions. A revised version was introduced in May 2016.
1175
See s 3 Objects, s 3(f) CMA 2016 (NSW).
1176
See ss 24, 25, 26 CMA 2016 (NSW).
1177
Or until the end of 2021. See Schedule 3 Clause 4 Saving of CZMPs, cl 5 General saving, cl 8
Temporary coastal protection works, cl 9 Saving of directions under s 55B(1) CPA 1979 (NSW).
1178
See s 3 CPA 1979 (NSW) Objects (b) ‘to support the social and cultural values of the coastal zone and
maintain public access, amenity, use and safety’; and (k) ‘support public participation’.
1179
See s 3 (l) CPA 1979 (NSW) ‘to facilitate the identification of land in the coastal zone for acquisition
by public or local authorities …to promote the protection, enhancement and restoration of the
environment of the coastal zone’.
1180
Section 4 CPA 1979 (NSW) defines ‘foreshore’ as land between highest astronomical tide and lowest
astronomical tide. The common law definition of foreshore refers to land between mean high and mean
low water marks.
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ment objectives for key areas in the coastal zone,1181 placing the ‘public interest’ in protecting
coastal wetlands and littoral rainforests at the top of the hierarchy of management objectives.1182
Protecting private land from the sea was not an object of the Act. However, provision was made
for this, if authorized by a ‘coastal zone emergency action sub-plan’.1183 Relevantly, as well as
including ‘public participation in coastal management and planning’ in its objects, the CMA
2016 (NSW) requires public consultation,1184 and access to public information.1185

Modification of doctrine of accretion continued

Highly relevantly the CMA 2016 (NSW) reproduced the provisions which modified the
common law, to prohibit consent for new coastal protection works,1186 and changes to a water
boundary, if they restricted public access.1187 Hence public access remains the dominant use.

CZMPs evolve into Coastal Management Programs

The CMA 2016 (NSW) allows local councils to complete CZMPs begun under the previous Act,
and authorizes existing CZMPs until 2021,1188 but requires the development of new instruments,
‘coastal management programs’ (CMPs),1189 with actions able to be implemented through the
‘integrated planning and reporting framework’ of the Local Government Act 1993(NSW).1190

Section 6 (2) (a) – (e) CPA 1979 (NSW) protects various public interest values in coastal wetlands
and littoral rainforests. Section 7 includes management objectives: (a) ‘ensure public safety (d)
‘maintain public access, amenity and use of beaches and foreshores, among other public interest values
in coastal vulnerability areas. The management objectives in s 8, for coastal environment areas include:
(f) ‘maintain and, where practicable, improve public access, amenity and use of beaches and foreshores,
headlands and rock platforms’; other public interest values. In s 9 management objectives for coastal
use areas include: (2) (a) ‘protect and enhance scenic, social and cultural values of the coast’, and items
(i) – (v) nominate elements of the public interest to be considered in the area’s management.
1182
Section 10 CMA 2016 (NSW) identifies coastal wetlands and littoral rainforests as the highest of the
coastal management objectives.
1183
See section 15 (1) (e), and s 15 (3) CMA 2016 (NSW). A ‘coastal zone emergency action subplan’
may include ‘the carrying out of works for the protection of property affected or likely to be affected by
beach erosion, coastal inundation or cliff instability’. Note this does not stipulate private property, and
could include public lands.
1184
Section 16 (1) (a) CMA 2016 (NSW) requires consultation with ‘the community’.
1185
See s 19 CMA 2016 (NSW) requiring public availability of a council’s CMP; s 21 (6) requiring the
coastal management manual to be available for public inspection; and s 26 (7) requiring the Minister to
table a report on a performance audit conducted by the Coastal Council, in each House of Parliament.
1186
See s 27 (1) CMA 2016 (NSW). ‘Development consent must not be granted’ if works (i)
‘unreasonably limit public access to or use of a beach or headland; or (ii) ‘pose a threat to public
safety’. This restates s 55M CPA 1979 (NSW).
1187
See s 28 CMA 2016 (NSW). Modification of doctrine of erosion and accretion: Three authorities were
restrained from changing a ‘water boundary’ if, ‘as a consequence, public access to a beach, headland or
waterway will be, or is likely to be restricted or denied’. See 28 (2) ‘the court’, s 28 (3) the RegistrarGeneral; and s 28 (4) (b) the Minister. This section reproduces s 55N CPA 1979 (NSW).
1188
See Schedule 3, CMA 2016 (NSW) clause 4 Saving of coastal zone management plans.
1189
See sections 12 – 16 CMA 2016 (NSW).
1190
See s 21 (3)(g) CMA 2016 (NSW).
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This includes ‘emergency’ actions to address coastal hazards, if authorized by the CMP.1191
Further, an updated NSW Coastal Management Manual, citing new procedures for preparing
CMPs,1192 and a new coastal management SEPP,1193 considered below, have statutory effect.

Coastal protection works

The CMA 2016 (NSW) continues provisions on ‘temporary’ coastal protection works, if works
on private land had begun, and notice had been given,1194 requires an emergency action sub-plan
be prepared as part of a CZMP, to address impacts on ‘property’ under storm conditions,1195 but
does not authorize new ‘unapproved’ works. Permanent coastal protection works require
consent,1196 but consent must not be granted if the works would “unreasonably limit public
access”, or “pose a threat to public safety”.1197 Hence, the processes and approvals required for
works to protect private land, mandatory before the 2010 amendments, have been restored.

4.2 Indications of relative weight
Both statutes considered contain clear indications of the weight apportioned by the legislature to
competing rights. In the CPA 1979 protection of the coastal environment, public access to the
foreshore, and other elements of the public interest in coastal lands, were key objects,1198 but
protecting private land was not. Other provisions which prevented changes in property
boundaries,1199 and required development consent to be refused, if public access or public safety
were likely to be reduced, 1200 clearly indicated that public rights of access and use of the beach
were dominant over the private property rights of coastal landowners. Further, local councils
were designated responsibility for managing coastal hazards and processes were constituted for
preparing coastal zone management plans.1201 These CZMPs were intended to serve the public
interest and forestall landowners’ ad hoc attempts to protect their private interests.1202

1191

See s 15 (1)(e) CMA 2016 (NSW).
See ss 21(1), 21(2) CMA 2016 (NSW).
1193
State Environmental Planning Policy (Coastal Management) 2018 (NSW).
1194
See Sched 3 CMA 2016 (NSW), cl 8 Temporary coastal protection works.
1195
See s 15(1) and 15(3) CMA 2016 (NSW).
1196
See s 4.16 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1197
See s 27 (1)(a)(i) and (ii) CMA 2016 (NSW). Proposals for such works must also demonstrate
“satisfactory arrangements have been made” for restoring any land affected by the works, and for
maintaining the works. See also s 27 (1)(b)(i) and (ii) CMA 2016 (NSW).
1198
See s 3 CPA 1979 (NSW).
1199
See s 55M CPA 1979 (NSW).
1200
See s 55N CPA 1979 (NSW).
1201
The requirement to prepare CZMPs was introduced by a new Part 4A, ss 55A – s 55M, CPA 1979
(NSW) inserted in 2002.
1202
For private landowner legal action see Egger v Gosford Shire Council (1989) 67 LGRA 304.
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The weights attributed to these competing rights by the legislature were adjusted however in
amendments to the CPA 1979 in 2010 and 2012. These amendments did not repeal sections
protecting public access and public safety,1203 but allowed landowners affected by coastal
erosion to build ‘emergency’1204 and later ‘temporary’, works1205 without the usual approvals,1206
and permitted private use of the public beach to build such works1207 if damage to assets,
vegetation, and impacts on public safety and public use of the beach were minimised.1208 Thus
the legislature increased the weight it placed on private property rights, but did not abandon
public rights of access to the beach. However these amendments created conflicting approaches:
the Act mandated ecologically sustainable management through a planned, co-ordinated,
strategic approach, managed by local councils, while the amendments permitted ad hoc
unassessed and unapproved ‘emergency’ or ‘temporary’ works by landowners.

This inconsistency was resolved by the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW) not reproducing
the conflicting provisions of the CPA 1979 (NSW) which facilitated ‘temporary’ works, though
transitional arrangements saved and continued those provisions for works already underway.
Otherwise, new ‘temporary’ works without consent were prohibited. In the CMA 2016 (NSW)
protecting public access, public safety and other elements of the public interest, remain key
objects,1209 but private land protection is not afforded a senior position.

Crucially the CMA 2016 (NSW) did reproduce key sections of the CPA 1979 (NSW) which
prohibit development consent for works,1210 and bar the exercise of private property rights to
claim ownership of new land,1211 if public access or public safety would be reduced. Protecting
private land in ‘emergencies’,1212 and constructing coastal defences are possible under the CMA
2016 (NSW) but only through an ‘emergency sub-plan’ adopted as part of a CZMP, if public
safety and public access are protected.1213 Hence by enacting the CMA 2016 (NSW) the
legislature continued the delegation of responsibility for managing coastal hazards to local

1203

Inserted in 2010, s 55M and 55N CPA 1979.
The 2010 amending Act inserted a new Part 4C ‘Emergency coastal protection works’, into the Act.
See sections 55O – 55Z CPA 1979 (NSW).
1205
The CPAA 2012 (NSW) re-wrote Part 4C to refer to ‘Temporary’ coastal protection works.
1206
See s 55O and s 55W CPA 1979 (NSW).
1207
See s 55Z (1) CPA 1979, inserted by the 2010 amending Act.
1208
See s 55T (3A) and s 55VB CPA 1979 (NSW) inserted by the 2012 amending Act.
1209
See s 3, especially s 3(b) CMA 2016 (NSW).
1210
See s 27 CMA 2016 (NSW).
1211
See s 28 CMA 2016 (NSW).
1212
Through actions approved as part of a ‘coastal zone emergency action sub-plan’ prepared pursuant to
s 15 (1)(e) CMA 2016 (NSW).
1213
Consent must not be granted if it is likely the works will unreasonably limit public access to or the use
of a beach or headland, or pose a threat to public safety. See s 27(1)(a)(i) and (ii) CMA 2016 (NSW).
_____________________________________________________________________________________
1204

Page 162

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Laws)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

Chapter IV – Statutory responses

© John R Corkill
Student No. 2376398

councils through their CZMPs, implemented through coastal management programs,1214 and deemphasized the role of individual landowners.
By not continuing provisions which allowed ‘emergency’ or ‘temporary’ coastal protection
works without assessment or approval, the legislature readjusted the weight attributed to the
competing rights, reducing the weight placed on private property rights. By reproducing key
provisions from the prior Act, protecting public access and public safety in the new Act, the
legislature re-emphasized the importance of public access to the foreshore. Further, by
discontinuing provisions for ad hoc works, it re-instated the coordinated approach to coastal
management.1215 Hence the relative weights of competing rights have returned to the levels
extant before the 2010 amendments. Under the CMA 2016 (NSW) public access and public
safety are unequivocally dominant, and protecting other public interests in coastal lands,1216 has
priority over private interests in their development.1217
I conclude that at present in this field of law, private property rights do not operate as ‘trumps’.
Rather, the legislature intended that the public right of access to the foreshore, and elements of
the public interest generally, be dominant over, and limit private property rights in coastal land.
Further, it intended that public rights’ dominance continue indefinitely into the future.

The next field of law to be considered is environmental planning and development control.

5. Environmental planning and development control
In this section I examine the statutes of a third field of law, environmental planning, for
indications of the relative weight of private property rights and public rights in coastal lands.
A history of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW)1218 is neither
possible, nor necessary here.1219 Instead I adopt a positivist approach and canvas the Act’s

1214

See Part 3, ss 11 - s 23 CMA 2016 (NSW).
See s 3 Object (h) CMA 2016 (NSW). See also s 12 which provides that the ‘purpose of a coastal
management program is to set the long-term strategy for the co-ordinated management of land within
the coastal zone, with a focus on achieving the objects of this Act.’
1216
See s 6(2), s 7(2), s 8(2) CMA 2016 (NSW).
1217
See s 10(3) CMA 2016 (NSW).
1218
[here-after the EPAA 1979 (NSW)]
1219
Thirty-five Acts amending the EPAA 1979 (NSW) are listed under ‘E’ in ‘Acts as Made’ between
1985 and 2017. See AUSTLII < http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewtoc/au/legis/nsw/num_act/toc-E.html >.
However, hundreds of minor amendments to the EPAA 1979 made as incidental amendments under
other legislation since 1980, are shown in the Table of Amending Instruments, in the Notes on the Act.
See < http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/epaaa1979389/notes.html >. Hence a
recount of all the amendments made to the Act since 1979 is entirely beyond the scope of this thesis.
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relevant application in its current form, in 2020. In the following sections I make some
observations on the Act’s relevance to the topic, outline provisions affecting private and public
rights, and discuss the indications of weight afforded to competing rights, in this field of law.

Overview of Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979

The regulation of the use of private land was not a new concept when the Act was introduced.
Many societies reject the unconstrained use of private land by its owners where this produces
adverse effects beyond the land’s boundaries. This often involves prohibiting activities on
private lands such as abattoirs or tanneries, under municipal ordinance or domestic law, because
they create noxious emissions which can adversely affect neighbors and the public. However
other off-site impacts from unconstrained uses of private land may conflict with public rights to
clean water, a healthy environment, and public safety.1220

The EPAA 1979 (NSW) provides the legislative framework for a modern scheme of
development control,1221 and strategic planning by local councils,1222 and other authorities,1223
which applies to private land and many public lands across New South Wales. The Act is
premised on the legislature’s recognition of landowners’ interests in using their land to increase
its utility, income and value, which aids the State’s economic development,1224 and its
concurrent recognition of the need to protect the public, and public interests in private lands
when approval is granted to intensify use or develop land.

The EPAA 1979 is especially relevant because it governs how the State mediates between these
conflicting private and public interests. It does this through statutory processes for identifying,
assessing and mitigating potential adverse impacts from private use of land, on public interests,
under both its main functions: strategic planning, and development assessment and approval.

1220

Off-site impacts, which can affect adjoining privately owned lands, public places or public resources
such as streams, may include: discharge of waste or contaminated water; noise, including of industrial
processes, the volume, sound quality and duration of the noise, hours when noise is made; visual
appearance, including height, scale, bulk, exterior cladding, signage, and extent of over-shadowing;
generation of increased pedestrian or vehicular traffic; increased risk created by hazards such as fire,
mass movement, accidental poisoning, chemical contamination , structural failure or building collapse.
1221
This involves application of rules regarding which land uses are permissible without consent, require
consent, or prohibited, when councils process development applications made by landowners seeking
consent for the development or new uses of their private land.
1222
The preparation of environment planning instruments (EPIs) such as Local Environment Plans (LEPs)
are required under s 3.31 EPAA 1979 (NSW), and procedures for their preparation, standardisation,
publication, exhibition and review are included in Division 3.2, ss 3.14 – 3.8 EPAA (NSW).
1223
The Secretary of the NSW Planning Department, or their designate, and any relevant planning panel
also function as ‘planning proposal authorities’, see s 3.32 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1224
See section 5 Objects of EPAA 1979 (NSW) which specifically aim “(a) to encourage … (ii) the
promotion and co-ordination of the orderly and economic use and development of land’.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Page 164

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Laws)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

Chapter IV – Statutory responses

© John R Corkill
Student No. 2376398

It would be incorrect to imply that the State government is a neutral arbiter in this mediation
between competing interests. The government is very much an interested party because, if
landowners benefit from the economic development of their land, the government also profits.
Further, the State government is also guardian of key public interests including the seabed, tidal
waters, clean air and water, flora fauna, the natural environment, heritage, and responsible for
safety from fore-seeable hazards, and the creation of safe residential, commercial and industrial
areas. Hence the State has an unavoidable conflict of interest. To overcome this conflict, the Act
includes mechanisms for both private interests and public interests to be recognised and
considered in the development control processes operated by councils, and consent authorities.

Many amendments have aimed to clarify, modify, include, and delete provisions of the EPAA
1979, however none have transformed the Act as significantly as amendments made in 2017 to
simply the Act’s structure and re-number its sections.1225 Consequently, the Act’s current form
differs markedly from its original, though many elements of its statutory framework remain.1226
There is a wealth of legal commentary on the operation of the EPAA 1979,1227 and on court
decisions on its provisions,1228 in the literature. However due to space constraints and limited
relevance to the topic, a review of these secondary sources cannot be considered here.

In the next sections I consider the relevant provisions of the Act, as numbered in mid-2020.
5.1 Principal statute’s relevant provisions
Highly relevant are provisions governing strategic planning,1229 which delegates to local
councils responsibility for preparing environmental planning instruments, to regulate the use
and development of land. Particularly relevant are provisions which allow a standard format for
planning instruments to be prescribed,1230 which require councils to recognize and protect

1225

The Environmental Planning and Assessment Amendment Act 2017 (NSW) No 60. See the historical
Notes, Table of Amending Instruments and Table of Concordance showing the new numbers for prior
sections, at < http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/epaaa1979389/notes.html >.
1226
Such as the use of state environmental planning policies, and local environment plans.
1227
See for eg Paul Stein, ‘Ethical Issues in Land-Use Planning and the Public Trust’ (1996) 13 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 493-501; Robert Ghanem and Kirsty Ruddock, ‘Are New South
Wales’ planning laws climate-change ready?’ (2011) 28 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 1735; Peter Williams, ‘The Curious Case of Property Rights in the NSW Planning System and Its Reluctance to Adopt Transferable Development Rights’ (2012) 17 (2) Local Government Law Journal 61-79.
1228
See eg Tayanah O’Donnell, ‘Legal Geography and Coastal Climate Change Adaptation: The Vaughan
Litigation’ (2016) 54(3) Geographic Research, 301 – 312.
1229
See Division 3.1 Strategic Planning Sections 3.1 – 3.46 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1230
See s 3.20 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
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elements of the public interest,1231 when preparing a local environment plan (LEP),1232 or
considering proposed re-zonings,1233 and provisions which enable LEPs to be implemented1234
and legally enforced.1235 I discuss relevant provisions of the standard LEP in the next section.
Provisions governing consent authorities’ assessment, and determination of development
applications, within the framework of the LEP, and state policies, are also relevant.1236
Particularly relevant are provisions for evaluating proposals’ potential impacts on public
interests,1237 enabling conditions to be imposed on consents to mitigate them1238 or protect
public interests on private land,1239 and for refusing consent for inappropriate development.1240
While responsibility for flora and fauna are delegated under other legislation,1241 a key function
of the EPAA 1979 is to ensure consent authorities consider relevant policies and information on
conserving threatened species, when they approve the use or development of private land. 1242
Provisions on ‘existing uses’ of land which pre-date the planning instrument, are also relevant,
but do not recognize a ‘right’, only the ‘existing use’. 1243 Other uses require consent.1244
Also relevant are provisions authorising the Minister to issue Directions,1245 to planning
authorities to apply government policies when considering proposals to rezone land or plan its

1231

See s 3.14 EPAA 1979 (NSW) Contents of environmental planning instruments. Section 3.14 lists
many ‘public interest’ matters which planning instruments may include: see esp s 3.14(1)(a) the
environment, (c) open space, public reserve, national parks and other land dedicated for public
purposes, (e) trees and vegetation, and (e1) ‘protecting and conserving native animals and plants,
including threatened species and ecological communities, and their habitats’.
1232
Section 3.25 EPAA 1979 (NSW), requires special consultation by a planning authority regarding
threatened species.
1233
See s 3.39 and 3.40 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1234
See ss 3.41 – 3.46 EPAA 1979 (NSW) regarding preparation of development control plans to
implement LEPs.
1235
See s 3.31 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1236
See Part 4 – Development Assessment and Consent, sections 4.1 – 4.70 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1237
See s 4.15(1) EPAA 1979 (NSW). See especially consideration of (b) environmental, social and
economic impacts, and (e) the public interest.
1238
See s 4.17 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1239
The NSW government has formal legal proprietorship of the native wildlife, wherever they occur, and
current law seeks to protect and conserve native wildlife on all land tenures. See the National Parks and
Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW). It follows logically that to protect native fauna, their habitat must be
protected, and so the rationale of this element of the public interest extends to protecting the native
vegetation on privately owned land which provides this crucial habitat. Now repealed, SEPP 46
Protection and Management of Native Vegetation 1995 (NSW) made this link explicit.
1240
See s 4.16 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1241
See ss 7.1 – 7.21 Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (NSW).
1242
See s 3.25 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1243
See ss 4.65 – 4.70 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1244
See s 4.66, 4.68 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1245
See s 9.1 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
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future use.1246 Several current Directions aim to protect elements of the public interest1247 and
public safety.1248 These Directions are discussed in the next section on statutory instruments.
The Act refers to ‘rights’ in several places, but they are procedural rights, not ‘private property
rights’. They include rights of appeal of refusal of integrated development,1249 an applicant’s
implied ‘right’ to appeal a decision on a development application,1250 and an objector’s ‘right to
appeal’ the consent of a designated development.1251 Noteworthy also are provisions which
require objectors to designated development to be given notice of an appeal; which confers on
them a ‘right to be heard’;1252 and which permit any person to restrain a breach of the Act.1253
Provisions requiring council to disclose zoning, planning approval, coastal hazards and other
public interest constraints on ‘planning certificates’, are also pertinent,1254 because they alert
prospective buyers to the legal limits on the land’s use.

Thus many provisions of the Act refer to public access or other public interests in land, but none
recognize private property rights, only private interests. I next review relevant instruments
applying to coastal lands, for indications they provide of the weight of competing rights.

5.2 Relevant statutory instruments and their provisions
Several statutory instruments which operate at different levels of the planning framework, are
relevant. I first consider the Order prescribing the standard format for Local Environment Plans
(LEPs), then review relevant State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs), and conclude by
noticing relevant Ministerial Directions to local councils.

Standard Instrument Order (SIO) and Local Environment Plans (LEPs)

In this section I consider the substance of LEPs prescribed by the meta-instrument, Standard
Instrument Order (Local Environment Plans) 2006.1255

1246

Policy Directions are listed at < https://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/Plans-for-your-area/Local-Planning-andZoning/Policy-Directions-for-Plan-Making?acc_section=current_and_previously_issued_section_9_1_directions >

1247

See s 9.1 Policy Directions 2.1 Environment Protection Zones, and 2.3 Heritage Conservation.
See s 9.1 Policy Directions 4.1 Acid Sulfate Soils, 4.2 Mine Subsidence and Unstable Land, 4.3 Flood
Prone Land, 4.4 Planning for Bushfire Protection.
1249
See s 4.52 EPAA 1979 (NSW) re rights of appeal on Integrated Development.
1250
See ss 8.7, 8.9 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1251
See s 8.8. See the reference to the objectors ‘right of appeal’ in s 8.12(1)(a) EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1252
See s 8.12(3). See also s 10.10 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1253
See s 9.45 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1254
See s 10.7 (formerly s 149) EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1255
The Minister may issue an Order to standardise instruments per s 3.20 EPAA 1979 (NSW) (Hereafter
SIO(LEP) 2006 (NSW), or the Order.) See < https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/EPI/2006/155a >
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When councils prepare updated LEPs after a review,1256 and allocate land into one of the ‘zones’
described in the Order, due to its character or location, they are assisted in identifying
appropriate land uses and formulating controls by applying the Order’s model provisions.1257
Uses of land are listed in ‘land use tables’ for each zone in the Order, and in adopted LEPs,
under three headings:1258 permissible without consent, ‘only with consent’ and ‘prohibited’.1259
Many zones in the Order only prohibit pond-based aquaculture,1260 while other zones cite uses
permissible ‘without’, and ‘only with’ consent, and prohibit “any development not specified in 2
or 3 above”1261 or ‘any other development’.1262 Uses permissible ‘without consent’ are typically
those with low or no adverse environmental impacts.1263 Other uses and development of land
require consent,1264 and destructive uses of land such as mining may require approvals under
other statutes.1265 Quarrying and industrial uses are prohibited in many zones, or limited to
specific zones.1266 Most relevantly, councils may prepare ‘development control plans’,1267 to
give effect to a LEP and describe the conditions under which development is permissible.1268

Thus these planning instruments control the private use of private land to protect public access
and other public interests in that land, and strictly limit landowners’ ‘right to use’.

State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs)

Like other instruments made under the EPAA 1979 (NSW), SEPPs are a form of sub-ordinate
legislation. Because they are made through proclamation, by publication in the government
Gazette,1269 SEPPs are not legislated, but they are subject to review1270 by the legislature. 1271

1256

See s 3.21 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
A list of ‘land use zones’ is given in Clause 2.1 SIO(LEP) 2006 (NSW).
1258
The planning authority determines which uses are permissible ‘without consent’ and ‘require consent’
under s 3.18, and prohibited uses under s 3.19 EPAA 1979 (NSW). Zone Objectives and Land Use
Tables are prescribed by clause 2.3 SIO(LEP) 2006 (NSW).
1259
See clause 2.3(1) SIO(LEP) 2006 (NSW).
1260
See Zones RU5 Village, residential zones R1- R5, Business zones B1- B8, industrial zones IN1- IN3.
1261
See Zone RE1 Public Recreation, and E1 National Parks and Nature Reserves. Decisions on
prohibited uses are required under s 3.18 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1262
See Zones E2 Environmental conservation, E3, Environmental Living, E4 Environmental
management, W1 Natural Waterway, W2 Recreational Waterway, W3 Working Waterway.
1263
Permissible without consent in Zone E3 are: home industries, environmental protection works, roads.
1264
As well as ‘standard’ uses permissible with consent, councils may designate certain activities or
developments as permissible in prescribed zones. See clause 2.5 SIO(LEP) 2006 (NSW).
1265
Eg Mining Act 1992 (NSW) or Water Management Act 2000 (NSW).
1266
Eg Industrial uses of land are limited to Zones IN1 General, IN2 Light, and IN3 Heavy Industrial.
1267
See ss 3.42 – 3.44 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1268
See Byron Shire Development Control Plan, Part J, Coastal Erosion Lands, adopted 2 August 2018.
1269
By the Governor, on advice of the Minister administering the Act. See s 3.29 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1270
A motion to disallow an instrument may be moved in either Chamber of the State’s Legislature. See s
41 Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) Disallowance of statutory rules.
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While their amendment is not possible, absence or failure of a motion to disallow them,1272
signals the legislature’s consent.

Three SEPPs sought to protect important elements of public interest in coastal lands. SEPP 14
conserved coastal wetlands,1273 SEPP 26 protected littoral rainforest1274 and SEPP 56 governed
development of Sydney Harbour’s foreshores and tributaries.1275 Later, SEPP 71 protected
‘sensitive’ coastal locations.1276 Recently, a new SEPP was issued to guide coastal management,1277 which replaced and repealed these SEPPs. I next provide an overview of these SEPPs,
outline provisions relevant to private property rights and public interests in coastal land, and
discuss the indications they provide of the weight of competing rights, in this field of law.

SEPP 14 – Coastal Wetlands 1985
The introduction of SEPP 14 followed the NSW government’s recognition of the ecological
value of coastal wetlands on private land, and the need to effectively control clearing, draining
and or filling of them by landowners, to protect the public interest in their ecological values.1278
The SEPP had two primary elements: accurate maps identifying areas of ‘coastal wetland’,1279
and written provisions requiring landowners to obtain local council’s consent and the Director’s
concurrence before clearing, levee construction, draining or filling a ‘coastal wetland’.1280 The
SEPP did not prohibit all use of ‘coastal wetlands’ but required a higher level of assessment.1281
By declaring these works ‘designated development’1282 preparation and consideration of an
environmental impact statement (EIS) was required before consent could be considered.1283
Further, contravening the SEPP was a prosecutable offence.1284 By requiring an EIS, council’s
development consent, and the Director’s concurrence for such works, SEPP 14 attributed
See NSW Parliament, Legislative Assembly, Standing Order 116 – Disallowance of Statutory Rules;
Legislative Council Standing Order No. 78 – Disallowance of Statutory Instruments.
1272
If carried, the motion negates the rule or instrument. See s 41 (2) Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW).
1273
State Environmental Planning Policy 14 – Coastal Wetlands was made in 1985 [hereafter SEPP 14].
1274
State Environmental Planning Policy 26 – Littoral Rainforests, 1988 [hereafter SEPP 26].
1275
State Environmental Planning Policy 56 – Sydney Harbour Foreshores and Tributaries 1998
[hereafter SEPP 56].
1276
State Environmental Planning Policy 71 – Coastal Protection 2002 [hereafter SEPP 71].
1277
State Environmental Planning Policy (Coastal Management) 2018 [hereafter SEPPCM 2018]
1278
See Coastal Council of NSW, Coastal Wetlands (NSW Government 1985). Section 2 – Aims,
objectives of SEPP 14, authorize coastal wetlands protection “in the environmental and economic
interests of the State”.
1279
using 1:25,000 scale topographical maps, based on aerial photographs, see s 3, Definitions, SEPP 14.
1280
Section 7 (1) SEPP 14.
1281
See the matters for the Director to consider when deciding to issue concurrence, in s 7 (2) SEPP 14.
1282
See s 7 (3) SEPP 14. Section 7A also required the consent of council and concurrence of the Director
for ‘restoration works’ in land where the policy applied, but these activities required a ‘restoration plan’
to be prepared and considered, rather than an EIS. See also s 3.17 and s 4.10 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1283
See cl 7 (3) SEPP 14.
1284
See cl 7(1) SEPP 14. Breach of SEPP 14 was enforceable under s 125 (now s 9.50) EPAA 1979
(NSW). See for eg Kempsey Shire Council v Thrush [2011] NSW LEC 93.
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significant weight to the public interest in conserving coastal wetlands on private land, which
prevailed over the landowner’s private property right to use the wetland.

SEPP 14 was amended many times to clarify definitions, amend its maps and fine-tune its
provisions,1285 but its aim of protecting public interests in private land, while accommodating
owners’ interests in using their land, to the extent that this was feasible, continued until 2018.1286

A similar statutory instrument was adopted three years later to protect the public interest values
in another threatened vegetation type, littoral rainforest, where it occurred on private land.

SEPP 26 – Littoral Rainforest 1988
SEPP 26 had a smaller geographic footprint and protected pockets of ‘littoral rainforest’.1287
Like its forerunner, this SEPP used maps to define land within the policy’s ambit, and written
provisions to control the use or development of land supporting these rainforest remnants.1288
Further the SEPP extended protection to a buffer area, 100m around the mapped rainforest.1289
This SEPP also left open future use of the land, if an EIS was prepared and considered for
development in the core area,1290 if council granted consent and the Director or Minister
concurred.1291 Importantly, damage or removal of vegetation protected under the SEPP became
an offence.1292 Thus the public interest in these rainforests prevailed over the owners’ interests
in their land. SEPP 26 was amended several times,1293 but remained in force until 2018.1294

A similar scheme was used to protect public interests in lands adjoining Sydney Harbour.

SEPP 56 - Sydney Harbour Foreshores & Tributaries (1998) 1295
This SEPP also had two parts: maps defining the area of application; and provisions governing
16 amendments were made 1985 – 2008. (See http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/num_epi/toc-S.html )
SEPP 14 was repealed when the new SEPP (Coastal Management) 2018 (NSW) commenced on 3
April 2018, though its provisions continued to apply for 12 months after commencement of SEPP CM
2018, under cl 21 (3) SEPPCM 2018, if preparation of an EIS had already commenced.
1287
Remnant areas of rainforest near the sea or a coastal lake, including on privately owned land.
1288
Clause 2 SEPP 26 stated its aim as being ‘to provide a mechanism for the consideration of
applications for development that is likely to damage or destroy littoral rainforest areas, with a view to
the preservation of these areas in their natural state’.
1289
See cl 4 (1)(b) SEPP 26.
1290
Clause 6 SEPP 26 declared worked in the core mapped areas ‘designated development’.
1291
See cl 7 (3) and (4) SEPP 26.
1292
See clauses 3 (1), 7 (1) and 7 (2) SEPP 26.
1293
See < http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewtoc/au/legis/nsw/repealed_reg/toc-S.html > for the Table of
Amendments in the Historical Notes, at the end the SEPP.
1294
SEPP 26 was also repealed by SEPP (Coastal Management) 2018.
1295
State Environmental Planning Policy 56 – Sydney Harbour Foreshores and Tributaries 1998 (NSW).
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use and development of coastal lands in the catchment of Sydney Harbour.1296 It aimed “to coordinate the planning and development” of designated lands, and established a “clear set of
guiding principles” for this task.1297 Mostly relevantly, several principles sought to protect
elements of the public interest,1298 and ‘public access’ featured in six guiding principles.1299

Like earlier SEPPs, SEPP 56 did not prohibit development in the designated areas, but imposed
a higher standard of assessment through a ‘master plan’,1300 which protected ‘public access’,1301
and other elements of the public interest.1302 It too was also amended,1303 but remains in force.
In 2002, a further SEPP was made to guide decisions on proposals to develop coastal lands.

SEPP 71 – Coastal Protection 2002
This SEPP1304 also used detailed maps to identify ‘sensitive’ coastal locations,1305 and written
provisions to protect ‘public access’1306 and public interests.1307 Further, it directed local
councils on how to prepare draft LEPs, and assess development proposals for these locations,1308
by stipulating matters for consideration.1309 It also left open the possibility of development
consent, where, after a higher standard of assessment, protecting the public interest elements of

See Section 4 ‘Lands to which this Policy applies’, SEPP 56.
See section 6 Objectives, SEPP 56.
1298
See (d) ‘conservation of significant bushland and natural features’; (e) public open space; (f) ‘significant natural and cultural heritage … and marine ecological values; (g) ‘the protection and improvement
of unique visual qualities’, (i) ‘conservation of items of heritage significance’; (l) ‘application of ecologically sustainable development principles’; and (o) ‘opportunities for water-based public transport’.
1299
See clause 7 Guiding Principles: (a) ‘increasing public access to, and use of, land on the foreshore’;
(b) ‘the fundamental importance of the need for land made available for public access, or use, on the
foreshore to be in public ownership wherever possible…’; (b1) ‘mechanisms to safeguard public access;
(c) ‘the retention and enhance of public access links’; (d) lands ‘availability for public use and
enjoyment, and (m) ‘provision of public access through’ working parts of the harbour ‘to the foreshore’.
1300
See clause 14 Requirement for a master plans. SEPP 56. Clause 15A prohibited the sub-division of
land ‘unless adequate provision’ is made for public access and public use.
1301
See clauses 19 (2) (c) ‘foreshore public access and open space’, (d) ‘pedestrian, cycle and road
access’, and (k) ‘provision of public facilities’, SEPP 56.
1302
See s 19 (2) SEPP 56, (i) ‘heritage conservation’, and (m) ‘lands reserved under the National Parks
and Wildlife Act 1974’.
1303
See the Table of Amendments in the Historical Notes on the SEPP at < http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/viewdoc/au/legis/nsw/consol_reg/seppn56hfat816/notes.html >
1304
State Environmental Planning Policy 71 – Coastal Protection 2002 (NSW). [Hereafter SEPP 71.]
1305
See the definition of ‘sensitive coastal location’ in cl 3 SEPP 71. This included lands within the ambit
of SEPP 26; and lands within 100m of ‘coastal wetlands’ identified in SEPP 14.
1306
See cl 2 (1) Objects (b) ‘protect and improve existing public access’ and (c) ‘ensure that new
opportunities for public access to and along coastal foreshores are identified’.
1307
See cl 2 (1) Objects, ‘to protect and preserve’ (d) ‘Aboriginal cultural heritage; (e) visual amenity, (f)
‘beach environments and beach amenity’, (g) native coastal vegetation, (h) marine environment, (i) rock
platforms; (j) principle of ecologically sustainable development’ and (k) natural scenic quality.
1308
See cl 7 SEPP 71.
1309
See cl 8 SEPP 71.
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the site was shown to be possible.1310 Relevantly, the SEPP recognised the public right of access
to beaches and foreshores, and sought to ensure its continuing recognition in local plans.1311
SEPP 71 was amended several times,1312 and repealed in 2018.1313

SEPP (Coastal Management) (2018)
Following the passage of the CM Act 2016, and extensive consultations, a new SEPP, entitled
Coastal Management, was proclaimed in 2018, to assist implementation of the CMA 2016.1314
This SEPP also uses maps to identify lands in ‘coastal management areas’,1315 and written
provisions to control development of specified areas.1316 Lands previously identified as SEPP 14
Coastal Wetlands and SEPP 26 Littoral rainforest are integrated into one map,1317 and two new
maps were created to identify a ‘coastal environment area’1318 and ‘coastal use area’.1319

This SEPP continued the requirement for higher level assessment of proposed works in
privately owned coastal wetlands and littoral rainforest areas.1320 Importantly, development
controls also apply over ‘land in proximity to coastal wetlands and littoral rainforests’, where
additional requirements must be satisfied if consent were to be granted.1321 Other controls
require consent to be refused unless elements of the public interest are protected in ‘coastal
vulnerability’1322 and ‘coastal environment’1323 areas, or considered in a ‘coastal use area’.1324
Further, the SEPP reproduced the Act’s hierarchy of management objectives, where protecting
coastal wetlands and littoral rainforests has precedence, and other public interests prevail over

1310

See cl 11. See also cl 18 - 22, which require consideration of a relevant master plan, in SEPP 71.
See cl 14 Public access, and cl 20 (2) (f) Master Plans, SEPP 71.
1312
See < http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/nsw/repealed_reg/seppn71p578/notes.html > for the
Table of Amending Instruments.
1313
SEPP 71 was repealed by cl 9(c) SEPPCM 2018.
1314
State Environmental Planning Policy (Coastal Management) 2018. [Hereafter SEPPCM 2018]. This
SEPP was made under section 3.29 of the EPAA 1979, as amended.
1315
See clause 6 SEPPCM 2018.
1316
See Part 2 clauses 10 – 18 SEPPCM 2018.
1317
See cl 6 (2) SEPPCM 2018. The SEPP advises that at its commencement no map of the ‘coastal
vulnerability area’ had been adopted. See Note at cl 6 (3) SEPPCM 2018.
1318
See cl 6 (4) SEPPCM 2018.
1319
See cl 6 (5) SEPPCM 2018.
1320
Clause 10(1) SEPPCM 2018 specifies that development consent is required for clearing of native
vegetation, marine vegetation destruction, earthworks (including filling), levee construction, draining,
and any other development of the land. These works are declared ‘designated development’ by cl 10 (2)
SEPPCM 2018, and thus require environmental impact assessment under s 5.7 EPAA 1979.
1321
See cl 11 (1) SEPPCM 2018. The consent authority must be satisfied that the proposed development
will not significantly impact on (a) the biophysical, hydrological or ecological integrity’ of the these
vegetation types, or (b) ‘the quantity and quality of surface and ground water flows…’.
1322
See cl 12 SEPPCM 2018.
1323
See cl 13 (1) SEPPCM 2018.
1324
See cl 14 (1) SEPPCM 2018.
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private land’s development.1325 Significantly, the SEPP provides for the construction of ‘coastal
protection works’ by persons other than public authorities, ‘to reduce the impact of coastal
hazards on land adjacent to tidal water’, but stipulates that they require development consent.1326
Minor coastal protection works by a public authority, or works ‘identified’ by a CMP were cited
as permissible without consent,1327 but any other works require development consent.1328
Usefully the SEPP also included savings and transitional provisions, and relevant ‘former
planning provisions’1329 continued to apply to development proposals in preparation.1330

From this review of SEPPs it is apparent that controls on private use of land have applied under
many state planning instruments, and currently apply, to protect public access and other public
interests in private land, limiting landowners’ private property right to use.

Ministerial Policy Directions

State government policies may also be given statutory effect by the Minister issuing Directions
to councils.1331 Direction 2.2 Coastal Management,1332 requires an authority, usually the council,
to include in planning proposals relevant provisions ‘that give effect to and are consistent with’
the CM Act 2016 (NSW), the Manual, and current management instruments,1333 including, the
NSW Coastal Design Guidelines, which require public access to and along the foreshore in
development of coastal land,1334 and building setbacks to ‘address coastal erosion hazards’.1335

Moreover, this Direction protects public interests in private land by stipulating that planning
proposals must not increase development or intensify use of land affected by ‘a current or future
coastal hazard,’1336 or areas of coastal wetlands or littoral rainforest.1337

1325

See cl 18 SEPPCM 2018.
See cl 19 (1) SEPPCM 2018.
1327
These are beach nourishment, placing of sandbags for less than 90 days, or routine maintenance or
repairs to coastal protection structures. See cl 19 (2) (a) SEPPCM 2018.
1328
See cl 19 (2) (b) SEPPCM 2018.
1329
Including SEPPs 14, 26 and 71, for 12 months after the SEPPCM 2018 commenced, on 3 April 2018.
1330
See cl 21 (3) SEPPCM 2018.
1331
under s 9.1 EPAA 1979.
1332
Ministerial Policy Direction 2.2 Coastal Management (effective 3 April 2018), [hereafter PD 2.2 CM]
1333
See clause (4) PD 2.2 CM. These instruments include the Toolkit; NSW Coastal Design Guidelines
2003, and any current CMP, or CZMP.
1334
Coastal Council of NSW, Coastal Design Guidelines for NSW, (2003), 58, 59. See Objective ‘provide
improved access to the NSW coast’, and Design Guidelines for Natural Edges, especially Guideline 4.
‘Provide pedestrian access to and along the foreshore with provision for those with less mobility.’
1335
Coastal Council, above n 1311. See Guidelines on Setbacks, 11 – 21, especially 12. ‘Setbacks should
also address coastal erosion hazards such as storm surge… shoreline recession and sea-level rise…’
1336
See clause (5) PD 2.2 CM.
1337
Clause (6) PD 2.2 CM.
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5.3 Indications of relative weight of private and public rights and interests
In the principal statute

The EPA Act’s statutory framework for approving use and development of land recognizes
private interests in land, but private property rights are not recognised. This is unsurprising
because the Act creates a statutory framework which replaces and overrides prior common law
‘rights’ exercisable over private land, and creates procedural rights for landowners, and others.
The Act’s provisions do not provide any explicit indications of the relative weight of competing
rights, since they define statutory processes for strategic planning, development control and
other matters. However the Act’s processes for decision-making about use and development of
land are intended to supplant the owners’ decisions in many situations. Clear indications of the
weight attributed to public access and public interests are given in the legal instruments which
control private use of private land, in order to protect public interests in that land, and effectively limit the ‘right to use’ to uses ‘permitted without consent’. Hence if land is used in these
ways under a common law right, this occurs in a statutory context. For all other uses processes
of wider consideration and approval are required. Thus the ‘right to use’ has limited application.

These statutory processes of development assessment and approval are intended to examine the
circumstances applying to the proposed use of a particular area of real property, including any
public interest in the private land. Generally speaking, these processes aim to assess the weight
of the competing rights and interests on the subject land, and appropriately accommodate them.
Usually the use or development is permitted, but conditions are imposed on the consent to
protect elements of public interest in the land. However, these processes may identify facts or
circumstances which indicate the proposed private use is incompatible with the public interests
in the private land, and justify consent being refused. Since consent can be refused, it is clear
there is no private property ‘right’ to develop.

In contrast, public access rights and interests are well recognised in the statutory framework.
The legislature clearly intended to create statutory processes through which private use of
private land could be approved in the future, provided public access, and other public interests
in the land, if any, are protected into the future, via conditions of a development consent.
However, without compliance with consent conditions protecting an element of the public
interest, a landowner cannot lawfully obtain the private benefit of the consent to use or develop
their land. It follows that, in this field of law, public interests may have equal or greater priority
than private interests, in decisions about the future use of some private land.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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Further, the Act requires that state and local government strategic plans recognize and protect
public rights and public interests in private land when identifying land for future development.
Hence the legislature clearly intended that councils ensure, through their LEPs, that public
access to the foreshore, and other public interests, continue to be protected; and that, if they
conflict, public rights and interests should prevail over private interests in land, into the future.

Thus under the processes and instruments created by this statute, public interests in and public
uses of private land have considerable weight. Indeed, in some circumstances the potential
diminution or loss of public interests in land may outweigh the private interests, and prevent the
proposed private use. No final conclusion about the dominance of competing rights may be
drawn, when private use is denied due to special circumstances applying to the private land,
except that the Act foresees circumstances where public interests may override private interests.
Therefore this statute does not provide evidence that private property rights trump public rights
and interests in coastal lands at present, or in the future. The Act does not recognize private
property rights, its processes ensure that public rights and interests in private land are protected,
and in some circumstances, permit public interests to outweigh an owners’ interests in the land.

In the instruments considered

The SEPPs considered above, indicate that the government, and impliedly, the legislature,
recognised private land owners’ interests in developing their coastal land, and their property
‘rights’ where appropriate, but did not regard them as dominant. The SEPPs sought to protect
the diverse public interests in private lands: but, though dominant, these public interests did not
veto all private use or development. The SEPPs held open the possibility of an owner gaining
development consent, to use or develop other parts of the land, provided the necessary timeconsuming and expensive studies were undertaken, if this did not adversely affect the public
interests protected by the SEPP. The SEPPs used existing processes of environmental impact
assessment to identify the private and public interests in private lands, and to weigh the
landowner’s interest in developing their land against the need to protect an element of the public
interest in that land. In a typical scenario, consent and concurrence could be issued for
development of private land affected by a SEPP, subject to conditions which protected the
public interests in the land, if this were feasible.
This ‘co-existence’ approach, in the Act and the planning instruments, is not consistent with the
idea of ‘trumps’, where one set of rights negate other rights or interests. Hence in this field of
law, there are no indications that private property ‘rights’ prevail over public rights, but clearly
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defined circumstances where public rights and interests may outweigh private interests in
decisions about the future use of coastal land.
Overall this field of law shows the legislature’s sustained intention to create effective
administrative processes to allow private landowners to use and develop their land for diverse
purposes, provided that any public interests in their private land are identified and protected.

I next consider statutes in which public rights and public interests can prevail on private land.

6. Acquisition, Easements and Compensation
In this fourth field of law private property rights and public interests directly conflict,1338 when
the State government acquires title or use of privately owned land, for public purposes. I
consider next statutes in which the legislature’s power to authorize acquisition of private land
for public purposes, on payment of compensation, has been long established.1339

6.1 Relevant statutes
Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1880 (NSW)

An early instance of the legislature creating a statutory power to acquire private land was the
Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1880 (NSW).1340 This Act allowed Crown land to be
reserved from sale and dedicated for public purposes, but also empowered the colonial
government to recover ownership of private land only recently alienated by the Crown, for
public purposes,1341 to create public access to ocean and harbour foreshores.1342 It mandated the
payment of compensation for acquired land,1343 but no private property “right” was cited.1344

1338

This conflict is both geographic, since coastal land is highly valued and sought after by private and
public interests, and philosophic, competing for a paramount moral and legal position.
1339
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (first pub 1765, 12th ed, 1978) discussed
the legislature’s power to compulsorily acquire private land in Book One, Chapter One, Cap III.
1340
hereafter LPPAA 1880 (NSW). See Acts As Made at < http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/num_act/ >
1341
S 8 LPPAA 1880 (NSW) gave legislative power to the Minister to acquire lands from private owners.
1342
Under this Act, Bondi Beach and Bronte Estate were bought and public recreational reserves at Curl
Curl and Cronulla beaches were created. See Caroline Ford, ‘The Battle for Public Rights to Private
Spaces on Sydney’s Ocean Beaches, 1854-1920s’ (2010) 41 Australian Historical Studies, 253-268.
1343
Section 10 LPPAA 1880 (NSW) only provided that an affected owner “shall be entitled to receive
such sum of money by way of compensation for the land of which they have been deprived.” Similar
provisions had been previously been enacted in s 6 Roads and Streets Act 1833 (4 Gul IV).
1344
Section 11 LPPAA 1880 (NSW) stated that the property, as an ‘estate or interest’ held by a person
‘shall be converted into a claim for compensation’ against the Minister for Public Works. Subsequent
sections of the Act set out the terms and procedures for making, valuing and settling such claims.
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Provisions entitling landowners to compensation if their private land was compulsorily acquired
by the State for a public purpose, were included in later legislation1345 and current statutes.1346
Land Acquisition (Just Terms) Compensation Act 1991 (NSW)

Concern about the compensation the State government paid when it acquired private land, led to
the enactment of a requirement for compensation on “just terms”. The Land Acquisition (Just
Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW)1347 enables compulsory acquisition of private land for a
public purpose, by ‘an authority of the State’ authorized by specific legislation.1348 It requires an
authority to adopt a ‘proposal to acquire land’, notify the owner of the proposed compulsory
acquisition,1349 guarantee compensation of ‘not be less than the market value’1350 and furnish
relevant particulars.1351 Though a landowner may appeal the value of the compensation,1352 or
failure to pay compensation,1353 no appeal of the decision to acquire the land is possible.

However, it appears that the Act does not apply to private land lost to the sea through gradual
erosion or diluvion, under the doctrine of accretion.1354 Though the State government gains
ownership, as the owner of the foreshore,1355 unless an authority gives notice of an intention to
acquire lands lost to the sea, the Act is not activated, and compensation is not payable.1356
Included in this field is the statute governing public use of private land, through easements. 1357

Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW)

Many provisions of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW)1358 authorize public use of private land.

1345

See eg ss 39, 40 Public Works Act 1912 (NSW), s 477 of the Local government Act 1919 (NSW); s
4(3) of the Land Acquisition (Charitable Institutions) Act 1946 No 55 (NSW).
1346
See eg ss 177 - 206 Roads Act 1993 (NSW).
1347
Hereafter the LAJTCA 1991 (NSW).
1348
See s 5 LAJTCA 1991 (NSW).
1349
See ss 11, 12 LAJTCA 1991 (NSW).
1350
See ss 10(1), 54, 56(2) LAJTCA 1991 (NSW).
1351
See s 15 LAJTCA 1991 (NSW).
1352
See s 66 LAJTCA 1991 (NSW).
1353
See s 67 LAJTCA 1991 (NSW).
1354
Because no action is taken by ‘an authority of the State’, and the loss of land occurs due the actions of
wind, wave and tide, the Act is not triggered. Under the common law ownership of that part of the land
which has fallen below MHWM is ‘silently transferred’ to the Crown, and no compensation is payable.
1355
See Environment Protection Authority v Leaghur Holdings PL [1995] 87 LGERA 282, 287 (Allen J).
1356
See Attorney General (UK) v Chambers (1859) 4 De G & J 55, 68 (Lord Chelmsford). See the
discussion of this in Corkill, ‘Ambulatory’, above n 63, 80-81.
1357
easement: A right attached to a piece of land giving the owner or occupant rights over another piece
of land, the exercise of which interferes with the normal rights of the owner or occupier of that other
land…. See Butt and Hamer (eds), above n 207, 195.
1358
hereafter CA 1919 (NSW).
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The CA 1919 (NSW) allows public authorities to create easements for public utilities;1359 public
access;1360 public authorities’ access,1361 maintenance and repair;1362 and the protection of
elements of public interest such as native vegetation, through the application of positive public
covenants over private land.1363 Easements over a land title may be created with the proprietor’s
consent,1364 or may be imposed by the court,1365 if the court is satisfied it is in the public interest
to do so,1366 the owner can be adequately compensated,1367 and ‘all reasonable attempts’ to
obtain their consent did not succeed.1368 Easements and covenants are recorded on the land title
and continue to apply if the land is sold.1369 Further, easements may only be extinguished by the
court,1370 and covenants revoked with the authority’s consent,1371 not by the landowner.

6.2 Indications of relative weight
These statutes clearly indicate that the legislature places greater weight on public rights and
interests in coastal lands. The legislature has long recognized private property rights but has not
held them to be immutable or paramount, and clearly intended that the public interest, or public
purposes, should overrule private property ‘rights’ if they conflicted. That compensation should
be paid to owners for the acquisition of their land for a public purpose, 1372 indicates that the
legislature recognizes private property rights, but does not afford them dominance. Moreover,
the Act’s empowering of future land acquisitions, demonstrates the legislature’s intention that
the public interest should continue to be dominant over private property rights into the future.
Thus, in this field of statute law there is no evidence that private property rights ‘trump’ public
rights or ‘public interests’ generally. Indeed, key provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1991
and the Conveyancing Act 1919 show that the legislature foresaw the opposite being necessary.
1359

Section 88A (1B) CA 1919 (NSW) authorising the creation of easements in gross for public utilities
such as gas, water and electricity, and for drainage or sewerage purposes.
1360
via an easement for ‘right-of-way’ ‘right of carriage way’, or ‘right of footway’, as a ‘right to access’;
see s 88A (2)-(2A) CA 1919 (NSW).
1361
See section 88B CA 1919 (NSW).
1362
Section 88BA CA 1919 (NSW).
1363
such as a ‘public positive covenant’ made pursuant to s 88E CA 1919 (NSW).
1364
A council is a “public authority” able to impose easements over land under s 88E CA 1919 (NSW).
1365
Section 88 K CA 1919 (NSW).
1366
See s 88 K (2) (a) CA 1919 (NSW).
1367
‘for any loss or other disadvantage that will arise from the imposition of the easement’… See s 88 (2)
(b) CA 1919 (NSW). Such compensation does not include costs which ‘may’ arise from the easement.
Note that no compensation is payable for the creation of an easement with the consent of the burdened
landowner or other parties with a registered interest in the burdened land.
1368
Section 88 (2) (c) CA 1919 (NSW).
1369
See s CA 1919 (NSW).
1370
See s 89 CA 1919 (NSW).
1371
See s 88B (3A) CA 1919 (NSW), and s 51 Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).
1372
The legislature’s approach has been recognised by the Court’s “presumption” when interpreting
statutes, “that parliament does not intend to interfere with vested property rights, and may do so only by
the use of ‘unequivocal terms incapable of any other meaning’.” See Michelle Sanson, Statutory
Interpretation (Oxford UP, 2012) 202; citing Commonwealth v Hazeldell Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 552.
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7. Private use of coastal waters
The last group of statutes relate to private use of the state’s coastal waters.1373 I outlined the
Marine Safety Act’s effect on public navigation in Chapter Two. I next consider its application
in ‘closing’ coastal waters to allow their private use, and other situations and statutes, where
private property rights or interests in the sea-bed or coastal waters, may affect public navigation.

7.1 Relevant statutes
The regulation of public use of NSW coastal waters1374 and the means of navigation1375 have
changed over time, but I cannot explore these matters here.1376 Recent legislative changes have
located public navigation within the ‘marine estate’,1377 in the jurisdiction of the Marine Estate
Management Authority and Roads & Maritime Services.1378

Major changes have also been made in national and international laws for use of the territorial
sea and international waters,1379 but here the focus is on the coastal waters of New South Wales.

Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW)

The current primary statute relevant to public navigation is the Marine Safety Act 1998
(NSW)1380 which incorporates elements of the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel)
National Law Act 2012 (Cth).1381 Other relevant statutes are the Marine Safety (General)
Regulation 2016 (NSW)1382 and Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,1383 adapted for
NSW coastal waters.1384

The State’s coastal waters include the tidal waters of the sea, any arm of the sea, estuary, coastal inlet
or tidal river or creek up to high water mark. They are sometimes referred to as ‘navigable waters’.
1374
Several early statutes sought to regulate commercial navigation in NSW. See the Shipping Act 1825
(NSW), Steam Navigation Acts of 1847 and 1850 (NSW). See also Maritime Services Act 1935 (NSW)
and Ports and Maritime Administration Act 1995 (NSW) now repealed.
1375
See the discussion of the regulation applying to personal watercraft (PWC) in Chapter II.
1376
But see Mike Richards North Coast Run: Men and Ships of the New South Wales North Coast (Turton
and Armstrong, 3rd ed, 1996).
1377
The ‘marine estate’ is defined as extending to all tidal waters up to highest astronomical tide, and
seaward for three nautical miles, in s 6 Marine Estate Management Act 2014 (NSW).
1378
See < https://www.rms.nsw.gov.au/maritime/index.html >.
1379
See Rachel Baird, ‘The National Legal Framework’, 45-66’ and Rothwell, Donald R, ‘The
International Legal Framework’, 21-44, in Rachel Baird and Donald R Rothwell (eds), Australian
Coastal and Marine Law (Federation Press, 2011).
1380
Hereafter MSA 1998 (NSW). Other Acts also apply e.g. Marine Estate Management Act 2014 (NSW).
1381
See ss 9A – 9R MSA 1998 (NSW).
1382
Other regulations include Management of Waters and Waterside Lands Regulations 1972 (NSW);
Marine Parks (Zoning Plans) Regulation 1999 (NSW), Marine Pollution Regulation 2006 (NSW)
Marine Parks Regulation 2009 (NSW); Ports and Maritime Administration Regulation 2012 (NSW).
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Under the MSA 1998, the relevant Minister may close certain areas of coastal waters to public
navigation,1385 and create an ‘exclusion zone’,1386 if justified by a special event,1387 or other
public purposes, such as channel dredging, harbour or wharf repairs, or bridge works.1388

An Aquatic Licence may be issued for
private use of a defined area such as for
a swimming or sailing race,1389 though
exclusive use may not be required. If
exclusive use is approved, the ‘closure’
occurs by the publication of a relevant
Notice in the Government Gazette,1390
and on the NSW RMS website.1391
The notice describes the period and
area

where

public

navigation

is

excluded, and contravening the notice
is an offence.1392 Areas of closed or
restricted waters are shown on larger
scale maps published on the RMS
website (see extract in Figure 12). The
effect of closure Notices varies widely.
Figure 12 – extract from RMS Map 9d – Port Jackson.

1383

See Robby Robinson, The International Marine Book of Sailing (McGraw-Hill, 2009). The rules were
adopted as international rules for international waters under the Convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972, (COLREGS) adopted 20 October 1972, Entry into
force 15 July 1977, through the International Maritime Organisation. Thus the Regulations are international law. See < http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/COLREG.aspx >. These
rules were further refined into ‘international racing rules’ which apply in all competitions held by the
International Sailing Federation. See < http://www.sailing.org/documents/racingrules/index.php >
1384
The COLREGS 1972, with some special NSW rules for Sydney Harbour, were adopted for use in
NSW coastal waters under cl 5 of the Marine Safety (General) Regulation 2009 (NSW) made under s
10 MSA 1998 (NSW). The NSW amended version of the COLREGS are Schedule 2 of the Regulations.
1385
See s 11 (2A)(f) MSA 1998 (NSW).
1386
Under s 12 MSA 1998 (NSW).
1387
Eg the public fireworks display focussed on the Sydney Harbour Bridge on New Year’s Eve.
1388
See examples of marine warnings for maintenance works at the NSW Marine Services website.
1389
See s 18 MSA 1998 (NSW).
1390
See s 12(2) MSA 1998 (NSW).
1391
See < http://www.rms.nsw.gov.au/maritime/using-waterways/restrictions-closures/index.html >.
1392
See s 12(5) MSA 1998 (NSW).
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Closures may be permanent and limited in area,1393 temporary and general,1394 or apply to a
specific type of vessel.1395 A sail-board exclusion area over Sydney Harbour is an example of
greater weight being attributed by the legislature to the public navigation of ferry services and
commercial shipping, over recreational sailing, to better serve the public interest.1396
All ‘closures’ aim to avoid risks to public safety which could arise from concurrent use of
coastal waters by conflicting private and public interests. Usually, once the reason for temporary
public exclusion ceases, and the Notice expires, public navigation in the previously closed area
is permissible again. Thus, in the MSA 1998 the legislature’s primary response to potential
conflict between private and public rights and uses1397 of the state’s coastal waters, has been to
suspend public navigation only where adequately justified, and for the minimum time and
extent necessary to ensure public safety. This legislative response more closely resembles an
accommodation between competing private and public rights to use coastal waters than
evidence of private property rights or interests operating as ‘trumps’.

Given title to and power over the seabed and coastal waters within three nautical miles of LWM
are held by the State under statute law,1398 and adjoining lands from LWM to MHWM are held
by the State under common law,1399 it seems unlikely that private property rights could exist in
the seabed or tidal waters. However there are several situations where this is possible.
I next consider statutes where there are private interests in, and uses of, lands below MHWM.

Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW)

One example of such a private interest is a jetty built by a private person or corporation under a
lease over part of the seabed, issued by the State government.1400 Typically while exclusive
private domestic use is conferred by the lease, the structure and seabed remain publicly
owned.1401 The lease creates a private interest or ‘property’ in the submerged Crown land 1402

1393

Eg the prohibition of public entry into the waters of the Australian Navy Fleet Base in Sydney
Harbour. See Figure 11.
1394
as in the closure of waters adjoining the Sydney Harbour Bridge for New Year’s Eve fireworks.
1395
Eg the standing exclusion of personal water craft (PWC) from extensive ‘PWC exclusion areas’. See
Reg 51 Marine Safety (General) Regulation 2016 (NSW).
1396
An exclusion zone was justified to overcome the conflict between windsurfers and the ferry service
and coastal commercial shipping, due to the long standing rule of navigation ‘power gives way to sail’.
1397
Or conflicts between the public right of navigation and other public interest uses: maintenance of
harbours for shipping, efficient public transport services and safety of the general public.
1398
s 4 Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth), s 4 Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980 (Cth).
1399
See New South Wales v Commonwealth [1975] HCA 58; (1975) 135 CLR 337,
1400
A lease or licence for use of the seabed may be issued under s 5.17 or 5.23 of the CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1401
See the Terms and Conditions of the standard RMS Lease for lands under its administration. <
https://www.rms.nsw.gov.au/maritime/property-planning/leasing/policy-list.html >
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which may be transferable to a new owner of the adjoining land,1403 and prohibits unauthorized
public use.1404
However, exclusive rights to use the structure and adjacent waters,1405 are not perpetual.1406

Petroleum (Offshore) Act 1982 (NSW)

Exclusive private use of the seabed and coastal waters is also permissible under the Petroleum
(Offshore) Act 1982 (NSW), when a ‘safety zone’ is declared 500m around a well or other
facility on the seabed in the state’s coastal waters, to extract oil or gas, to exclude public
navigation.1407 Private ownership of the seabed is not obtained, only temporary exclusive use of
a defined area. That use may be enduring if the consent for the resource extraction is decades
long, or unlimited. However, excluding public navigation from ‘safety zones’ around structures
in off-shore locations is a small reduction in the area available for boating, which also serves the
wider public interest of ensuring the safety of rigs, rig-operators and the boating public. It is
likely that the legislature saw the financial benefits to the State from royalties under the Act as
the ‘greater public good’, outweighing the minimal non-permanent loss of public navigation in
‘safety zones’.

Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW)

Aquaculture leases for oyster production, are another example of private interests in coastal
waters.1408 Certain private rights are assigned to the leaseholder, over the racks attached to the
seabed, but not exclusive possession of the seabed.1409 Ownership of ‘fish’ specified in the lease
are assigned to the lessee,1410 but not other fish, so oyster leases are subject to the public right of

1402

See the licences and leases over the bed of tidal waters for domestic and commercial uses available
from the RMS < https://www.rms.nsw.gov.au/maritime/property-planning/leasing/index.html >
1403
Restrictions may apply to the transfer of leases, see s 5.19 or licences, see s 5.24, CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1404
Unauthorised use of private facilities can be enforced by the person or corporation owning the
facility, through ‘trespass’ actions in the Local Court.
1405
A lease or licence over the seabed for the construction of a jetty or pier usually also includes the
exclusive use of immediately adjoining waters, for mooring.
1406
Leases of submerged lands for jetties require renewal periodically. Domestic waterfront leases are
issued for a period of between 3 and 20 years. See RMS Information Guide – Maritime Property –
Establishing a Domestic Waterfront Lease or Licence 2017, 2. See also s 5.16(1) CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1407
See s 120 Petroleum (Offshore) Act 1982 (NSW) (hereafter POA 1982 (NSW). This is consistent with
Article 60, United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982,
1833 UNTS 397, (entered into force November 1994) (UNCLOS III).
1408
Aquaculture leases, for oyster production are issued under s 163 of the Fisheries Management Act
1994 (NSW) [hereafter FMA 1994 (NSW)].
1409
See s 164 (2) FMA 1994 (NSW).
1410
See s 164 (1) FMA 1994 (NSW).
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fishing.1411 Aquacultures permits and leases also typically impose duties and responsibilities on
the lessee.1412 I next explore this reach of law for any indications of rights operating as ‘trumps’.

7.2 Indications of relative weight
In these statutes the legislature makes several indications of the relative weight of private rights
and the public right of navigation. Though they acknowledge this public right, diverse private
interests in and uses of the seabed and coastal waters are also recognized and permissible.

Where a structure is built over submerged land, under a lease or licence, the structure may be
privately owned but the State retains title to the land.1413 Further, even if the structure is
privately owned, the operation of private property rights, such as its transfer to another person,
may be limited or prevented by the terms of the lease or licence.1414 For example private use of
the seabed for a jetty or oyster lease does not exclude public navigation in adjacent waters, 1415
however private ownership of a jetty denies its use to the public, and allows trespassers to be
prosecuted.1416
In contrast, public navigation is excluded from ‘safety zones’ around off-shore resource
development facilities, typically for the life of the project.1417 Exclusive private use of some
coastal waters may be approved if the event could conflict with normal public use, in that
location.1418 However, many private uses of the state’s coastal waters do not require exclusive
use and co-exist with public navigation.1419 Permanent closures of coastal waters are often due
to other priority public uses eg Australian Navy Fleet base in Sydney Harbour, or port
operations. When a ‘public exclusion area’ is declared over certain coastal waters, to enable
private use, the public right of navigation is not extinguished, but suspended in a defined area
for a period, and on the expiry of the Notice of closure, it revives.1420 When public navigation is
excluded in this way, it is the statutory framework which overrides it, not private property
1411

See s 164 (3) FMA 1994 (NSW).
See s 162 FMA 1994 (NSW). See also the Fisheries Management (General) Regulation 2019 (NSW).
1413
See s CLMA 2016 (NSW). See also s 164 (3) FMA 1994 (NSW).
1414
A licence or lease over a structure attached to a privately owned real property may be transferred to
the purchaser of the real property, if due notice is given to RMS and their approval is obtained.
Otherwise a new lease or licence may be required. See RMS Information Guide – Maritime Property –
Managing Domestic Waterfront Leases & Licences 2017.
1415
See s 164(3) FMA 1994 (NSW).
1416
The terms of the licence or lease usually specify the use as domestic use by the lessee, and exclude all
public and commercial use. See Clause 4.1 in standard Lease ‘Permitted Use’.
1417
See s 120 POA 1982 (NSW).
1418
See the procedure for issuing an Aquatic Licence under s MSA 1998, for activities which have the
potential to affect public use of navigable waters. See << https://www.rms.nsw.gov.au/maritime/usingwaterways/aquatic-events/licences.html >.
1419
For eg aquaculture leases for oyster production do not prohibit public navigation.
1420
See s 18 MSA 1998 (NSW).
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‘rights’. Further, where private uses of the seabed and coastal waters are permitted, these
permits are not perpetual.1421

Hence the legislature has accommodated diverse private interests in the seabed and coastal
waters through these statutes, but the ‘property rights’ available are narrow, limited, and usually
temporary use rights under the relevant lease or licence, not common law private property
rights.

While these statutes indicate that private uses of the seabed and coastal waters have been given
weight by the legislature, their operation may or may not affect the public right of navigation.
Where possible, private uses co-exist with public navigation, but if exclusive use is justified, the
area affected is defined by the Notice.1422 Hence private use may take priority over public
navigation in certain waters, under some circumstances, where the statutory authority permits
this, not under any private property ‘right’, and when the private use expires, the public right of
navigation revives. Relevantly, an aquaculture lease for private use of the seabed under the FMA
1994, requires the consent of the minister administering the MSA 1998, to ensure the leased area
is not required for public navigation and its structures are not a danger to public navigation.1423

Thus these statutes do not provide evidence of either private property rights operating as
‘trumps’ over the public navigation, or the public right of navigation preventing limited,
temporary private uses of small areas of seabed and coastal waters. They indicate that while
concurrent private and public uses of coastal waters are possible, concerns about risks to ‘public
safety’ from conflicting uses is the key factor in decisions to temporarily close coastal waters to
public navigation to permit their private use.1424 Hence in this field of law ‘public safety’
prevails over the public right of navigation, and the limited private use ‘rights’ permitted over
the seabed and coastal waters.1425

This concludes my review of the relevant provisions of statutes in five relevant fields of law. In
the next Part I discuss these statutory provisions and their relevance to my research question.

Section 5.2 (4)(e) CLMA 2016 (NSW) requires a ‘maximum term’ for holdings over Crown land.
The Marine Notice declaring an ‘exclusion area’ for a ‘special event’ under s 12 MSA 1998 (NSW)
typically defines the area affected, the means of identifying it, and the time and date of its expiry. See <
https://www.rms.nsw.gov.au/maritime/using-waterways/restrictions-closures/marine-notices/index.html >.
1423
See s 17 MSA 1998 (NSW).
1424
See ‘How aquatic licence applications are determined’ at < https://www.rms.nsw.gov.au/maritime/usingwaterways/aquatic-events/licences.html >.
1425
See ss 11(2)(a), s13, 13A, 14, 15A MSA 1998 (NSW).
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Part C. Discussion
In this Part I make observations on the weight the legislature places on competing private and
public rights in the statutes considered, answer my secondary research questions and report my
conclusions on the current relationship between competing these rights.

8. Observations
The Crown policy to reserve coastal land from sale to provide for future public purposes, before
grants of private ownership were made, established a clear priority for public uses of coastal
land in New South Wales from the time of early settlement, which continues today. The
historical link between this Crown policy, subsequent legislation by the colonial government,
and later New South Wales statutes, indicates the legislature’s sustained intention to award
public purposes priority in the statutory framework. Private uses of Crown land are recognised
in these statutes, but the rights exercisable are statutory rights, not common law private property
rights. While the legislature recently adjusted the weight attributed to private interests in Crown
land, by permitting previously prohibited exclusive commercial uses, this did not elevate private
interests to a position of ‘trumps’. Rather they were accommodated in the statutory framework,
to co-exist with public rights to access and use Crown lands, where possible, and generate
revenue to the State, in the public interest.
The legislature’s intention to attribute greater weight to public rights of access, and to public
interests generally, over private property rights is evident in statutes governing coastal lands
protection and management. Prohibiting consent for protection works on coastal lands,1426 and
modification of a private property right, in order to protect public access along the foreshore,1427
provide unmistakable indications that this public right is dominant. Diverse public interests also
warrant protection,1428 whereas private land’s protection has only secondary status.1429
Moreover, the claimed private property right to protect against the sea1430 is plainly
incompatible with current law.

The law governing environmental planning and development control, the EPAA 1979 (NSW),
demonstrates the legislature’s awareness that owners’ use or development of their private land
could adversely affect the public, public rights, or the public interest in that land, or nearby land.
1426

See s 55M CPA 1979 (NSW) and s 27 CMA 2016 (NSW).
See s 55N CPA 1979 (NSW) and s 28 CMA 2016 (NSW) discussed above.
1428
See ss 3, 5.6, 7, 8 and 9 CMA 2016 (NSW).
1429
via an ‘emergency action sub-plan’, prepared under s 15(1) CMA 2016 (NSW).
1430
See Coleman, above n 13.
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The Act’s processes aim to identify and assess the competing private and public interests in
private land, and to permit private uses or development only if public safety, public rights, and
other public interests in that private land, are effectively protected. Hence the legislature
intended that private and public interests in private land co-exist, wherever this is feasible, not
operate as ‘trumps’. However, protecting public safety, public access and public interests, may,
in some situations, require private use of private land to be refused consent. Thus, in rare
instances public rights and interests can ‘trump’ private interests in coastal land. Significantly
private property rights are not recognised, and instruments made under the Act explicitly
regulate the ‘right to use’ private land.

Statutes authorizing acquisition, compensation and easements also clearly attribute greater
weight to public rights and interests. By authorizing private land’s acquisition, and its use for
public purposes without acquisition, via easements or covenants, these statutes demonstrate the
legislature’s intention that public interests in private land prevail over private property rights.
While private interests are recognized through compensation, landowners’ property rights
cannot prevent the State acquiring their private land, or the Court to creating an easement,
without their consent.1431 Hence these statutes offer no evidence of private property rights acting
as ‘trumps’ over public rights and interests, but abundant evidence of the converse. I conclude
that in practice, private property rights over coastal lands in New South Wales are weak, limited
by definition, and restricted by modern laws.

From the statutes governing use of coastal waters it is apparent that public right of navigation
though regulated, is extensive and enduring, but a range of private interests in the seabed and
coastal waters, of a limited and often temporary nature, are also recognised. Typically, private
rights to use the seabed or coastal waters, created by leases or licences issued under relevant
statutes, co-exist with public navigation, unless they restrict normal public use of coastal waters.
If exclusive use is required approval may be granted, but public navigation is restored when the
private use expires. Thus these statutes show private interests in coastal waters gain temporary
priority and affect public navigation in some areas, but do not ‘trump’ public rights entirely.
Further, it is clear that another element of the public interest, public safety, which is dominant.

A common feature of these statutes are processes which recognize the potential for conflict
between competing rights, and which aim to identify and protect elements of the public interest
in land of all tenures when decisions are made about their future use. Also common are
legislatures’ intentions that public rights and interests in coastal lands co-exist with private
1431

See s 11 Land Acquisition (Just Terms) Compensation Act 1991 (NSW), and s 88K Conveyancing Act
1919 (NSW).
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interests where possible, and that public rights prevail over private property rights if they
conflict. However public rights have been narrowly defined, and public uses affect private land
only to the extent necessary for the public purpose. Other private property rights are unaffected.
Legislatures have consistently recognized landowners’ private interests by authorizing
compensation if a public authority compulsorily acquires private land for a public purpose but
have not permitted private property rights to prevent the land’s acquisition. Further, any
compensation is payable under the relevant statute, not as of ‘right’. Thus, statutes authorizing
compulsory acquisitions and easements over private land for public purposes, clearly
demonstrate that private property rights may be overridden if the public interest justifies this.
Further, these statutes indicate the legislatures’ intention that, under stated circumstances, these
public rights, uses and purposes continue to override private interests in land into the future.

9. Conclusions on claimed private property rights
With the benefit of these reviews of relevant common law rules and current statutes it possible
to now state my conclusions on the existence of the four private property rights claimed by
some landowners, noted in Chapter II, that
a) allows them to build seawalls or other structures to defend against the sea;
b) creates a ‘duty’ on the State to ‘protect’ them from the sea with defensive structures;
c) entitles them to be paid compensation for land lost to the sea;
d) are dominant, and paramount considerations “which the legislature cannot ignore”.

In the next sections I draw on these primary sources of law to explain the basis for concluding
that these claimed rights do not exist under current law in the jurisdiction of New South Wales.
a] Is there a ‘right to protect’ or defend?
The claim of a ‘right to protect’ or defend against the sea is based on an outdated view of the sea
as an enemy which obliged the King to defend the realm against the invader. 1432The claim is not
well founded since it overlooks relevant court rulings,1433the powers of State legislatures,1434 and
the modern laws of this jurisdiction.1435 Under current law, construction of sea defences can

1432

This view was ascribed to Lord Coke in Isle of Ely (1609) 10 Rep. 141 a, in Attorney General (UK) v
Tomline (1880) 14 Ch 58, 66 (Brett LJ).
1433
Hudson v Tabor [1877] 2 QBD 290, and Attorney General v Tomline (1880) 14 Ch 58.
1434
The power of the NSW Legislature was reported as having “the widest possible operation” by Kirby J
in Durham Holdings PL v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399, at [56].
1435
Eg the Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW); the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW).
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only proceed lawfully with development consent, not as a private property right.1436
b] A Crown ‘duty’ to defend?

The claimed duty of the Crown, or State government, to construct defences against the sea, to
protect private land has also been overtaken by modern legislation.1437 While the Crown, as the
State government has a power to construct defences, it has no duty or obligation to do so.1438
c] A ‘private property right’ to compensation?
The claimed private property ‘right’ to compensation for land lost to the sea is also rejected.1439
In the United States of America, a citizen has a constitutional right to compensation1440 if their
property is acquired by government, which includes lands lost below tidal waters.1441 However
this constitutionally guaranteed ‘right’ attached to real property in the US, and related doctrine
on “takings”, do not apply in the jurisdiction of New South Wales.1442 Further, section 51(xxxi)
of Australian Constitution 1901 (Cth) does not replicate this right in Australian law.1443 Section
51 states the Commonwealth’s heads of power, not citizens’ rights. Sub-section (xxxi) confers
power to acquire private property on the Commonwealth government, but imposes a duty to pay
‘just terms’ compensation when it acquires private property from a citizen, or a State.1444 In
contrast, where private property is compulsorily acquired by a State government, s 51(xxxi)
does not apply, and compensation, if payable, is determined by the authorizing State legislation,
not as of ‘right’.1445 The claim that a private property right to compensation exists in common

Corkill, ‘Claimed’, above n 347, 53-54.
Construction of seawalls require development consent under s 4.2 EPAA 1979 and must satisfy the
requirements of section 27 Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW).
1438
See Corkill, ‘Claimed’, above n 347, 52. This issue is considered more closely in Chapter III.
1439
Ibid 55. For a fuller discussion see Corkill, ‘Ambulatory’, above n 63, 79-82
1440
In the US, the right of all citizens to hold property was guaranteed by part of the Fifth Amendment of
the US Constitution, made in 1791, which inserted a prohibition on the compulsory acquisition of
private property by the State unless ‘just terms compensation’ is paid at full market value.
1441
Under the ‘takings clause’ of the Fifth Amendment. See Joseph L Sax, ‘Takings, private property and
public rights’ (1971) 81 Yale Law Journal 149.
1442
The High Court has ruled that whether compensation is paid for the acquisition of private property by
a State, and its quantum, are determined by the statute law, not as of ‘right’. See Durham Holdings PL v
State of New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399; 177 ALR 436, [31] (Kirby J).
1443
Section 51 (xxxi) does not create a constitutional obligation which extends from the Commonwealth
Constitution to the constitutions of the States or to State government s. See Durham Holdings PL v New
South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399; 177 ALR 436, [56], [63] – [64] (Kirby J).
1444
Durham Holdings PL v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399; 177 ALR 436, [56], (Kirby J).
1445
See Durham Holdings PL v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399; 177 ALR 436, [29] – [31] (Kirby
J). See also Andrew Macintosh and Jancis Cunliffe, ‘The significance of ICM in the evolution of s
51(xxxi) (2012) 29 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 297-315.
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law despite enactment of modern statutes was rejected by the High Court of Australia. 1446

Though there may be an expectation or a cultural norm that compensation be paid when a State
compulsorily acquires property, it is the statute law which governs payment of compensation,
“if any”.1447 Indeed as the High Court declared in Durham, the applicant had failed to show a
single authoritative precedent in English common law for the claimed private property ‘right to
compensation’.1448 Hence it is clear that this ‘right’ does not exist in New South Wales.

d] Are private property rights dominant?
The claims that ‘private property rights’ are dominant, and ‘fundamental’ considerations which
legislatures “cannot ignore”,1449 are also rejected. As the statutes above show, there are many
instances where the legislature has given public rights enduring precedence: eg by modifying
the property rights available to a littoral landowner under the doctrine of accretion, by s 28
Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW) to ensure that the public right of access to and along the
foreshore is not limited.

Further, as noted above, the decision in Durham makes it clear that the power of State
legislatures is effectively unlimited. So, rather than claimed rights constituting insuperable
limits which Parliament “cannot ignore”, what can be seen from the literature, case law and
statutes considered above, is that the NSW legislature may ‘ignore’ such claims and modify or
repeal private property rights by statute, if a public interest rationale justifies doing so.

Hence the evidence reviewed shows that these four claimed landowner rights do not exist, and
private property rights are not dominant or immutable in New South Wales as claimed.1450

10. Answers to secondary research questions
Based on the foregoing analysis of the common law and applicable statute law it is also possible
to now answer the secondary research questions identified in Chapter I, as a key step towards
answering my primary research question. In this section I restate the questions and furnish
concise answers on the operation of current law.
1446

Durham Holdings PL v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399; 177 ALR 436, [14] (Gaudron,
McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), [57] Kirby J). Kirby cited the Mabo decision, Mabo v Queensland
(1988) 166 CLR 186, as a relevant prior decision which had determined the question authoritatively.
1447
Durham Holdings PL v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399; 177 ALR 436, [33] – [35] (Kirby J).
1448
See Durham Holdings PL v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399; 177 ALR 436, [12] (Gaudron,
McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), [52] (Kirby J).
1449
These claims were made in Karen Coleman, above n 13, 422.
1450
See the discussion of this in Corkill, ‘Claimed’, above n 347, 54-55.
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Q1. Where will the boundary of private land, affected by coastal hazards, be located?
A. As sea-levels rise, the property boundary moves landward, and is located wherever the
natural boundary formed by of the line of MHWM is located from time to time, irrespective
of any prior boundaries defined by survey.1451

Q2. Who owns land when it becomes covered by tidal waters ie comes to lie < MHWM??
A. Title to land below tidal waters reverts to the Crown, as the State of New South Wales, under
the common law. A land title, or a plan attached to it, requires amendment if it becomes
erroneous after its issue due to effect of the doctrine of accretion to add or subtract land.1452
Q3. Do landowners have a private property ‘right’ to build seawalls to defend against the sea?
A. No. There is no common law right to defend against the sea.1453 In New South Wales statute
law applies and works require development consent within the statutory framework created
by the EPAA 1979, LGA 1993 and CMA 2016.1454

Q4. Are governments duty bound to construct defences against the sea?
A. No. State and local government authorities have powers to build defensive structures,
following environmental impact assessment and development approval processes,1455 but
there is no common law duty1456 which requires the State, or a local council to do so.
Q5. Are governments liable to pay compensation for private land ‘lost’ to the sea?
A. No. Compensation is not payable because the land is ‘taken’ by the sea not by action of the
State and the relevant legislation is not triggered.1457 The only compensation available under
the common law is the gradual natural gain of land under the doctrine of accretion.1458 There
is no common law right to compensation: statute law provides compensation, if any.1459

These answers constitute a substantial basis for concluding that at present, in practice in New
South Wales, private property rights are not as extensive or dominant, as has been claimed.

1451

See EPA v Saunders (1994) 13,660 discussed in s 8 Chapter III above.
See EPA v Saunders (1994) 659 (Bannon J) discussed in section 8 of Chapter III above.
1453
See Hudson v Tabor (1876) (1877) AG v Tomline (1889) discussed in ss 4 and 5 of Chapter III above.
1454
See ss 27 and 28 CMA 2016 (NSW) discussed in section 4 of Chapter IV above.
1455
See the discussion of statutory controls on coastal protection works in sections 4 and 5 of Chapter IV.
1456
See AG v Tomline (1889) discussed in s 5 Chapter III.
1457
See the discussion of the operation of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991
(NSW) in section 6 of Chapter IV above.
1458
See Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy [1911] 295-6, discussed in section 6 of Chapter III above.
1459
See the discussion of Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v NSW (2001) in section 10 of Chapter III above.
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11. Conclusions on current relationship between competing rights
In this section, using relevant case law and current statutes, I draw conclusions about the current
relationship between competing private property rights and public rights to use coastal lands.

Current statutes are explicit that many, if not most, uses of land cannot proceed under a landowner’s private property right, and need approval from a relevant authority, or are prohibited.
Where public access or another public interest exists in private land, use or development of the
private land may be permissible if the public access or public interest can be adequately
protected. In this way the legislature intended that private and public interests in land coexist
where-ever feasible. However, where the public interest in private land is significant and cannot
be adequately protected through mandatory conditions, consent for private use or development
of the land may be refused. I conclude that, though theoretically extensive, in practice in this
jurisdiction, private property rights over coastal land are weak, narrow by definition, and
constrained, or inoperable, under current law.

The case law and early statute law point to public rights of access having been dominant over
private property rights in coastal lands for centuries. Both recent decisions of the court and
current statutes include unmistakable indications that private property rights do not trump public
rights in coastal lands. Moreover, current primary sources indicate that, under certain circumstances, public rights of access, or other elements of public interest, may override private property
rights and private interests in coastal land. I conclude that at present public rights and interests
are dominant and may ‘trump’ some private property rights in coastal lands. Lastly, from the
provisions of current statutes I conclude that successive legislatures intended this dominance of
public rights, and public interests in coastal lands, to continue indefinitely into the future.

These conclusions are useful in assisting me to address the primary research question about
their likely future relationship. Having identified the status quo, it is reasonable to theorize that
in the jurisdiction of New South Wales, private property rights will remain weak and public
rights’ dominance will continue in the future, unless action is taken to change this relationship.
Hence answering the primary research question in the negative would be justified based on the
analysis thus far. However, since its important qualification acknowledges the theoretically
available option foreshadowed - unless the Legislature enacted laws to change the ongoing
dominance of public rights - this theoretical answer of ‘No but maybe’ is inconclusive.
Consequently, anticipating a future government’s policy on whose rights should prevail in the
future, and the legislature’s support for that policy, and making an analysis of the likeliness of
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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this theoretical possibility of reversing this stautus quo being adopted and enacted would be
crucial to furnishing an answer to the primary research question which makes sense in practice.

Reversing the status quo, however, would not be the only response available to the government
and legislature, likely to generate a definitive answer to the primary research question. I explore
a range of potential responses by a future State government in Chapter VI.

In this chapter I reported legislative responses to conflicts between private property rights and
public rights, and noted the relative weight attributed to them. Drawing on recent cases and
current statutes I concluded that at present private property rights do not trump public rights
over coastal lands, and under some circumstances the converse is possible. I also concluded that
key factors affecting the future relationship of competing rights would be a future government’s
policy on whose rights should be dominant, and the legislature’s support for that policy.

In the next chapter I consider other philosophical sources which could influence a future
government’s position on whose rights should prevail to avoid or resolve future conflicts
between competing rights, and future legislators’ attitude towards that policy. Further I identify
writers and concepts which will assist me in evaluating the merits of potential statutory
responses by a future government to such conflicts.
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“The tide rises, the tide falls,
The twilight darkens, the curlew calls …
Along the sea sands damp and brown,
The traveller hastens towards the town,
And the tide rises, the tide falls.
Darkness settles on roofs and walls,
But the sea, the sea in darkness calls,
The little waves, with their soft, white hands,
Efface the footprints in the sands,
And the tide rises, the tide falls.”
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow
The Tide Rises, the Tide Falls (1879)

Chapter V – Selected secondary sources
Introduction to Chapter V
Given the future orientation of my primary research question ‘will private property rights
‘trump’ public rights to use coastal lands, under climate change conditions?’, a shift in
perspective is needed to foresee their likely future relationship and frame a coherent answer.
Hence in this chapter I pivot from my analysis of the law regarding private property rights and
public rights in the past and at present, to re-focus on the future.
To effect this re-orientation, I do four things in this chapter. First in Part A, I explain this pivot,
and how I plan to re-focus forward. As the starting point, I recap my conclusions in the last
chapter on the current relationship between competing rights, and that this could change in the
future. Second, I map out the path ahead, describing the steps needed to move past my present
analysis, and develop a credible forecast of their likely future relationship. This includes
anticipating relevant issues and likely developments, and identifying the preparations needed to
complete my research analysis. Third, given future State government policy and the legislature’s
support for it could determine whose rights would prevail in the future, in Part B I explain my
selection of secondary sources which could shape the direction of future government policy on
whose rights should prevail, or influence the legislature’s support for it. I outline a range of
perspectives: some emphasize public rights, while others advocate for private property rights.
Fourth, having foreshadowed the suite of potential responses by a future government, to be
explored in Chapter VI, in Part C of this chapter I derive criteria from these selected sources, the
literature, case law and statutes considered above, to evaluate these potential responses’ merits
in Chapter VII, and additional criteria to estimate which response would be ‘most likely’ to be
adopted by a future government, and supported by a future legislature, for use in Chapter VIII.

At the end of this chapter the reader will have a clear plan of the steps to be taken in the next
chapters to prepare to answer the primary research question at the end of Chapter VIII.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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Part A. Pivot, present, prepare
1. Pivoting to re-focus forward
Though my primary research question is future oriented, in the preceding chapters I have
focused on past and current law, in order to develop conclusions about the recent and current
relationship between competing rights. From my analysis of these primary sources, I have
concluded that at present public rights and the public interest generally prevail over private
property rights. Moreover, from the provisions of the statutes reviewed, it is apparent that
successive legislatures have clearly intended that this dominance of public rights continue
indefinitely into the future. Hence based on this analysis it is possible to also forecast their
likely future relationship and frame an answer to the primary research question in the negative.

However, these conclusions do not, by themselves, constitute an adequate basis for answering
the question: whose rights will prevail in the future? because, in theory at least, it is possible
that a future Government could adopt a policy and win the support of the legislature to reverse
this status quo by enacting relevant legislation. Thus, to answer, “the public rights, unless a
future government and legislature decide that private rights should prevail,” is hardly adequate.
Consequently, to do more than propose an ambivalent theoretical answer, and furnish a more
realistic answer it is necessary to investigate this caveat and ascertain both the likeliness of a
future government adopting such a policy and the possibility of implementing it in practice.

This requires more than the foregoing positivist analysis of current law and necessarily involves
a pivot and re-focusing of my analysis into the future. However, rather than a narrow focus on
the feasibility of reversing the status quo, it is appropriate to explore a range of potential
responses available to a hypothetical future government to address increased conflicts between
private property rights and public rights over future use of coastal lands. Broadly these options
are to: do nothing, protect public rights, privilege private rights, or attempt to do both. (These
potential responses are described in the next chapter, VI, and evaluated in Chapter VII.)
This exploration will involve anticipating future events, estimating key policies’ likely success
in attracting the support of the legislature and electors, and foreseeing the likely practical
implications of their implementation. Hence to make sense of this exploration, in the next
section I sketch a map of the steps needed to forecast future circumstances and undertake the
analysis necessary to enable the articulation of a more coherent, practical answer. This includes
an explanation of the preparations necessary to make in this chapter, for taking these steps, in
the thesis’ concluding chapters.
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Since no NSW government has had a majority in the upper house since 1988,1460 I assume for
the purposes of this discussion that the status quo of diverse minor party representation in the
NSW Legislative Council would continue in the future and a future NSW government would
still require the support of cross-bench MLCs to enact new legislation.1461 Thus I anticipate
continued opportunities for the legislature to review, amend, support or reject government Bills.
If this assumption did not to apply, and the government held a majority in both chambers, the
importance of persuading cross-bench MLCs to support government Bills would be diminished,
and the legislature’s role would narrow to implementing the Executive government’s decisions.
Hence part of the re-focus required, to forecast likely future circumstances, will be analysis of
the potential for policies adopted by a future government, to be supported by the legislature.

Further, the re-focus towards the future requires that considerations of future circumstances and
events in New South Wales reflect the likely risks that global climate change poses for coastal
land management,1462 and recognizes the realities of profound local impacts of rising seas,1463
and more frequent extreme events, resulting in greater coastal erosion, and more extensive
coastal flooding,1464 and the possibility that these impacts may affect how electors vote.

Having identified these points of focus in the future, I next sketch a road map of how I plan to
address them in the remaining chapters of the thesis.

2. A map to the desired destination
I begin my outline of the path ahead with a recap of the progress made in my enquiry so far. At
the end of the last chapter, based on the evidence of Chapters III and IV, I found that at present
private property rights do not ‘trump’ public rights to use coastal lands in New South Wales.

I also found that, over many years, legislatures have unmistakably afforded public rights of

1460

The last to do so was the Wran / Unsworth Labor government during the 48 th Parliament, 1984-1988.
See Parliament of New South Wales, ‘Political party composition of the Legislative Council since
1978.pdf’, information paper, Statistics of the Council, Historical Trends <
https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lc/pages/statistics-of-the-legislative-council.aspx >.
1461
Elected MLCs for minor parties, or Independents, are not part of the Opposition, or Government, and
hence are seated on the cross benches in the Legislative Council.
1462
Particularly higher sea levels, greater tidal inundation and more intense and more frequent extreme
events. See IPCC, Climate Change 2014, Summary for Policymakers, Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)
(IPCC, 2014) SPM 2.2, 10.
1463
IPCC, Climate Change 2014, above n 1420, 13. ‘Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at risk from
sea level rise, which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilized (high
confidence).’
1464
See IPCC, Climate Change 2014, above n 1420, 14, ‘Regional risks and potential for risk reduction’,
and see especially ‘risks in urban areas’, 15.
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access, and other public interests, dominance over landowners’ private property rights, without
negating them entirely; and intended this dominance to continue indefinitely into the future.
However, I also concluded this relationship between competing rights could, in theory, change
if a future legislature changed the necessary laws and institutional arrangements to achieve a
future NSW government’s policy objective on whose rights should prevail, when they conflict.

Exploring the possibility of reversing the status quo, among a suite of potential future
government responses, is part of the enquiry that lies ahead in Chapters VI and VII. However in
this chapter, explanations of and preparations for this exploration and later analyses are needed.
Thus the immediate next steps are outlining the key tasks which are required, and making the
preparations necessary to undertake them.

One key task is to consider a range of perspectives on property in land and property rights,
which could shape the direction of future government policy on whose rights should prevail in
future conflicts, or influence non-government MLCs’ support for that policy. This relevant
because as noted above, the direction and scope of future public policy will depend on both a
future government’s policy, and the legislature’s co-operation in enacting it. The content of that
policy, and the level of support it attracts, will however, be influenced by prominent voices and
views about property and land ownership, within the then contemporary society.

I outline my approach to selecting relevant sources in section A.3 below and define the criteria
required for assessing the merits of the potential responses in section A.4 In Part B I consider
perspectives which support public rights’ continued primacy and other views which favour
private property rights over the public interest generally. These secondary sources were
introduced and located within current discourses in the literature on property theory and land
management, in Chapter II.

In Part C I draw on the property theory, case law and statutes reviewed above, and these
selected sources, to identify relevant criteria for evaluating the merits of the suite of potential
responses, and ascertaining which would be most likely to be adopted by a future government.

Thus Chapter V has four purposes: i) pivot from the focus on past and current law, to re-focus
on future circumstances; ii) sketch the planned next steps to move from analysis of their current
relationship, to a position where I can draw credible conclusions on their likely future status;
iii) outline a selection of views which could inform or shape the direction and substance of a
future government policy, and or influence the legislature’s support for it; and iv) identify
criteria for undertaking analyses of the suite of potential responses in later chapters.
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In the next chapter, VI, as foreshadowed, I describe in more detail the potential responses
available to a future government to address future conflicts between competing private and
public rights. As well as four basic options (where a future government could: do nothing;
protect public rights’ dominance; privilege private property rights; or seek to do both) I apply
two levels of intensity of implementation. Hence, I consider weak and robust responses
privileging private property rights, strong and stronger approaches to protecting public rights,
and two different approaches to seeking to do both.

In Chapter VII, I evaluate the merits of these potential responses using the criteria adopted in
Part C of this chapter.

In Chapter VIII, I apply insights from my assessments of the responses using these criteria, to
ascertain the response considered ‘most likely’ to be adopted by a future government and
supported by a future legislature. With the benefit of these analyses I then draw conclusions
about the likely relationship between competing private property rights and public rights to use
coastal lands in the future, and frame an answer to the primary research question.
Thus this ‘map’ shows there are several stages of enquiry and analysis still be conducted. By
chapter’s end, with relevant perspectives outlined, and criteria adopted for later analyses, the
necessary preparations will have been made for key steps in subsequent chapters, so that, in the
final chapter, a credible, practical answer may be stated.

3. Exploring relevant secondary sources
In Chapters III and IV, I considered the guidance from the main social arbiters, the court and
Parliament, in developing an answer to the primary research question: ‘Will private property
right ‘trump’ public rights and interests on coastal lands, under climate change conditions?’
In Part B of this chapter I explore a range of views in secondary sources identified in the
literature overview, including pro-public rights and pro-private property rights perspectives,
which are relevant to this topic, because they address future government policy options for
managing coastal lands affected by climate change impacts; and could shape the direction of
future NSW government policy on ‘whose rights should prevail’; or may influence legislators’
support for that policy.

Four works were selected to consider more closely: two views focused on public property and
public rights and two views focused on private property and private property rights. First I
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consider the public trust doctrine, and its possible application in New South Wales. Second I
examine the ethical framework for decision making about use of land posited by Freyfogle and
its correspondences with the principles of ecologically sustainable development. The third
source is an adamant pro-private property rights position espousing a ‘right to defend’ against
the sea. Fourth, I consider a review of private landowners’ calls for ‘social justice’ in coastal
management decision making in the UK.
These selected sources discuss useful concepts relating to ‘property’, ‘real property’ and coastal
land not articulated by the courts or legislature, and reflect debates in liberal property ‘theory’,
critiques of current approaches, and emerging perspectives on ‘real property’. They contribute
important insights into current property theory’s limits and suggest how these competing rights
may interact in the future, under anticipated climate change conditions.

As well as possibly influencing a future government, or legislature, these views were selected to
illustrate policy responses available to a future government explored in Chapter VI and because
they indicate factors which may be key to future decisions about use and management of coastal
land. They also raise relevant concerns, suggest qualities to be emulated and highlight pitfalls to
be avoided in such decisions. Hence, in Part C below, I draw on these perspectives, and the
primary sources considered above, to derive criteria for use in later chapters to assess the merits
of the potential responses identified.

4. Deriving criteria for use in later chapters
Initially, it is important to note that what is under consideration in the next chapters is more than
decision-making about the future ownership, use and management of coastal land, at the level of
an individual landowner. Also explored in Chapter VI are a range of decisions of a future
government and legislature, at an institutional level, described as ‘potential responses’, which
could affect many land titles, through legislation and statutory instruments. Such decisions are
the substance of public policy,1465 and warrant assessment as institutional responses.

Hence, two sets of criteria are required. One, to evaluate the merits of these potential responses
as approaches to coastal lands management, and another to estimate their likely success as
public policy.

1465

Decisions of government which create, amend or repeal legislation, revoke and update regulations and
instruments, initiate new statutory processes, change extant institutional arrangements, allocate staff
time and commit public funds’ expenditure are ‘public policy’. See definitions discussed in Althaus et
al, above n 163, 5-11.
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I identify these sets of criteria, explain their application and cite authorities in the property
theory, case law and statutes, which corroborate their selection in Part C of this chapter below,
and use them to evaluate these potential responses in Chapter VII. Using scores assigned for
each response’s satisfaction of the criteria, I will be able to compare results and state which
potential responses have greatest merit.

However, relative merit may not determine whether a future policy response is adopted by
Government. Because future government policy and legislation are political decisions,1466 other
factors that may affect which response would be ‘most likely’ to be adopted by a future
government, and supported by the legislature, would also need to be considered. Hence at the
end of Part C of this chapter, I identify three criteria with which to ascertain in Chapter VIII,
which response a future government would be ‘most likely’ to adopt politically, in the future.
Using this analysis I then frame a coherent answer to the primary research question.

Having outlined the pivot required to re-focus on future conditions, sketched a map of the path
ahead, and outlined the preparations needed for analyses in later chapters, in the next part I
canvass selected views on coastal landuse which, as well as suggesting relevant criteria for the
foreshadowed evaluations, could shape the direction and scope of future Government’s policy
on ‘whose rights should prevail, if they conflict’, or influence the legislature’s support for it.

Part B. Relevant perspectives on real property
An overview of the vast literature on property theory, and real property, was sketched in
Chapter II. In this Part I consider sources whose approaches to applying property theory to land
were selected for closer review due to their direct relevance to one or more elements of the
primary research question: private property rights and public rights to use coastal land and or
the management of coastal erosion impacts on coastal land.

I first consider several perspectives on public interest uses of coastal lands. I briefly review the
US public trust doctrine described by Sax,1467 and Slade,1468 consider its application in New
South Wales and describe extant legal rules which could constitute a parallel doctrine in this
jurisdiction. Then I outline the ethical and ecological responsibilities of landowners, to make
decisions about land’s use in their physical, social, ecological and temporal contexts, as

1466

Althaus et al, above n 163, 145, 215; Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 304.
Sax, above n 189. Other published works by Sax are also considered.
1468
Slade, above n 336.
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advocated by Freyfogle,1469 and contrast his ethical framework for decision-making with the
principles of ecologically sustainable development.1470
In section 6 private property perspectives on coastal land are considered, including Coleman’s
claims that landowner’s have a ‘right to protect from the sea’, that private property rights prevail
over public rights, and remain unaffected by modern law.1471 I then outline Cooper and
McKenna’s critical review1472 of calls by private landowners in the UK for ‘social justice’ in
decisions on coastal lands management and for public intervention to protect their private land,
and consider the relevance of this perspective to similar circumstances in New South Wales.

These sources provide ideas and perspectives for elaborating potential responses by a future
State government, in Chapter VI, and suggest relevant criteria which may be employed in later
chapters. I identify relevant assessment criteria from these and other sources in Part C.

I next look at views on decision-making about coastal land. First I consider public interest
points of view, then landowners’ perspectives on their ‘private property rights’.

5. Public interest perspectives
In this section I present several views on ‘public property’ and ‘public interests’ in land. In the
first sub-section I consider the public trust doctrine and explore its application in New South
Wales. In the second and third sub-sections, ethical and ecological perspectives are considered.
5.1 ‘Public trust’ doctrine
As a long-standing legal principle, the ‘public trust doctrine’ is, one perspective on ‘real
property’ highly pertinent to answering the primary research question, which could influence
future government policy on whose rights to use coastal land should prevail. As outlined in
Chapter Two, the seashore and other resources were designated ‘common’ to all in the civil law
texts Institutes of Gaius (c. 180 AD),1473 and Institutes of Justinian (c. 533 AD),1474 and this
idea, as modified by long customary use in England, provided a legal basis for public rights to

Freyfogle, ‘Ownership’, above n 193. Other commentary by Freyfogle are also considered.
As defined by s 6(2) of the Protection of the Environment (Administration) Act 1991 (NSW).
[POEAA 1991]
1471
See Coleman, above n 13, 421.
1472
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123. This review is considered in detail in s 7, below.
1473
See The Institutes of Gaius translated by Francis de Zulueta, (Clarenden Press 1946) quoted in
Southern Centre of Theosophy Incorporated v South Australia (1978) 19 SA SR 389, 393 (Walters J).
1474
The relevant Latin passage from the Institutes of Justinian (bk ii, tit i, s 20) was quoted in Attorney
General of South Nigeria v John Holt & Company (1915) AC 599, 613 (Lord Shaw).
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access the foreshore to fish, and navigate on tidal waters,1475 which were recognized by English
common law courts,1476 and protected by the Crown.1477 Through ‘constitutional principles’
these common law public rights applied in Britain’s colonies,1478 where they were later
recognized,1479 or modified, by the new nation’s property laws.1480

Hence, despite their common origin, in modern English-speaking nations the property laws of
each jurisdiction governing the ownership and use of coastal land and waters, and their use by
the public, have developed separately, and to some extent, in parallel, over centuries. 1481

(a) The public trust doctrine in the United States of America

In the US after their independence from Britain, the Crown’s role as trustee of coastal land
required for public use, passed to the citizens of each new State,1482 as authorized by their State
Constitutions.1483 Since property law remained the province of the States in the US, two modes
of ownership of coastal land and its use by ‘the public’, emerged,1484 as is shown below.

Some US States defined the boundary between land and tidal waters as the mean high water
mark (MHWM),1485 and hold title to the land below tidal waters (tidelands) ‘in trust’ for ‘the
people’, under the ‘public trust doctrine’ (PTD), to protect public rights to fish and navigate.1486
(See Figure 13.1 below).

1475

Moore, above n 37.
See the discussion of the modification of civil law rules by English common law courts in Attorney
General v McCarthy [1911] 2 IR 260, 276-7, (Palles CB).
1477
Sax, above n 189, 368-9.
1478
Including colonies in North America, which later formed the United States of America. See the
discussion of the operation of these constitutional principles in British colonies, in Chapter II above.
1479
See the discussion of US courts’ recognition of public rights in Sax, above n 189, 476-477. In New
South Wales, see the recognition of the public right of navigation in York Bros (Trading) PL v
Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391, 393-4 (Powell J).
1480
Including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States of America. See the discussion of
the impact of British concepts of property on its colonies in John C Weaver, ‘Economic Improvement
and the Social Construction of Property Rights’, in John McLaren, Andrew Richard Buck and Nancy E
Wright (eds) Despotic dominion: property rights in British settler societies (UBC Press, 2005) 79-102.
1481
See Michael C Blumm and Mary Christina Wood, The Public Trust Doctrine in Environmental and
Natural Resources Law (Carolina Academic Press, 2013), 305-332, for discussion of cases involving
the public trust doctrine in India, Philippines, Uganda, Kenya and Canada.
1482
This history is recounted in Sax, above n 312.
1483
Several State constitutions pre-date the Constitution of the United States of America, adopted in 1788.
See Sax, above n 189, 772; Rose, ‘Comedy’, above n 235, 115.
1484
See Slade, above n 336.
1485
Some States have a mean high tide line (MHTL) as the boundary, defined as the ‘average of ordinary
high tides over the lunar cycle of 18.6 years.’ See Joseph L Sax, ‘The Accretion / Avulsion Puzzle: Its
Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed’ (2009) 23 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 305, 347, fn 234.
1486
Slade, above n 336, 7.
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Figure 13.1 Land title and public use rights in a ‘High Water State’ from Slade et al

Other US States with low water mark (LWM) as the boundary, allow private ownership of the
beach,1487 but public use rights, the jus publicum, apply over the foreshore.1488 (See Figure 13.2.)

Figure 13.2 Land title and public use rights in a ‘Low Water State’ from Slade et al
Thus in the US ‘the PTD’ has a number of elements: relevant State and federal constitutional
provisions, provisions in State legal codes, surviving common law rules and relevant US court
rulings affecting two core issues: public ownership and public use of coastal land. Some States’
constitutions prohibit the sale of ‘public trust lands’ to ensure public use continues,1489 while
other States permit this if public use is protected by an easement over land title.1490

1487

Slade, above n 336, 7-8. Slade uses the Latin designation of private property as the jus privatum, and
refers to adjoining landowners as having ‘riparian’ rights.
1488
For eg California, New York, South Carolina, and Michigan: See Blumm, ‘Accommodation’, above n
311, 659. See also Slade, above n 336, 8. See also Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v Atlantis Beach Club
879 A2d 112, 124 (NJ 2005) cited in Blumm, ‘Accommodation’, above n 311, 664.
1489
Such as Hawaii. See Blumm and Wood, above n 1493, 7.
1490
Such as New Jersey and Oregon. See Blumm, ‘Accommodation’, above n 311, 663-5. See also
Richard M Frank, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its Future’ (2012)
45 University of California, Davis Law Review 665-691.
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Further, court rulings on the effect of State-based public trust doctrines on claims of ‘takings’ of
private property by landowners, is a third significant issue in this US PTD jurisprudence, but of
limited relevance to this jurisdiction. These primary sources - US federal and state constitutions,
state statutory codes and court rulings - are supplemented by legal academic commentary and
teaching materials, forming a complex but inherently narrow set of state-based jurisprudences.

Hence, due to their unique constitutional and statutory provisions, and narrow legal precedents,
it appears that each coastal State in the US has an endemic ‘public trust doctrine’,1491 relating to
tidelands.1492 Despite this diversity, the common feature of these doctrine is to limit or prohibit
State government ‘trustees’ from dealing with ‘public trust’ lands and resources in ways which
prevent their continued public use.1493

Though relevant to coastal lands and tidal waters, in the civil law the public trust doctrine also
applied to air and running water,1494 and its application to these natural resources, and to other
publicly-owned natural resources have been recognized by US courts,1495 while new
applications of the trust doctrine, have been posited, 1496 including extending it to the planetary
environment, atmosphere and global oceans.1497 However, it is the doctrine’s traditional
application, the reservation of coastal lands and waters for public use, which is most relevant to
the discussion which follows. Indeed this concept could shape a future State Government’s
policy on coastal lands management, and influence the legislature’s support for it, particularly if
a local public trust was formally recognized in New South Wales.

In the next section I explore the possibility of that idea being realized.

Wilkinson described the PTD as complicated and referred to “fifty-one public trust doctrines in this
country alone”. Charles Wilkinson, ‘The Headwater of the Public Trust: Some thoughts on the Source
and Scope of Traditional Doctrine’ (1989) in Blumm and Wood, above n 1493, 41. Sax described an
‘almost anarchic doctrinal diversity from jurisdiction to jurisdiction’ in Sax, above n 189, 774.
1492
See Blumm and Wood, above n 1493, 247.
1493
See Sax, above n 189, 477; David C Slade, in Blumm and Wood, above n 1493, 11, Blumm,
‘Accommodation’, above n 311, 661.
1494
See the Institutes of Gaius excerpt cited in Chapter II, quoted in Sax, ‘above n 189, 763-4.
1495
See Blumm and Wood, above n 1493, wetlands, 127, wildlife 195, State parks and public lands 233,
and to federal lands 247. See also Blumm, ‘Accommodation’, above n 311, 657.
1496
See Sax, ‘Liberating’, above n 312; Richard J Laxarus 'Changing Conceptions of Property and
Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine' (1985) 71 Iowa Law Review
631-716; Tim Eichenberg, et al, ‘Climate Change and the Public Trust Doctrine: Using an ancient
doctrine to adapt to rising sea levels in San Francisco Bay’ (2010) 3(2) Golden Gate University
Environmental Law Journal 243-281.
1497
Blumm and Wood, above n 1493, 341 – 371.
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(b) The PTD’s application in New South Wales?

That an enduring tradition of Crown ownership and public use of the foreshore and tidal
waters,1498 and a continuous government policy of reserving coastal Crown lands from sale, and
dedicating them for public purposes,1499 exists in this jurisdiction is evident from the material
considered in Chapters III and IV. Further, since the time of self-government,1500 where deemed
in the public interest, NSW governments have resumed privately-owned coastal lands to allow
their public use.1501 However, despite discussion of the doctrine’s potential application in New
South Wales by Bonyhady,1502 Stein,1503 Gordon,1504 and Thom,1505 the ‘public trust doctrine’
has had very limited judicial recognition in this jurisdiction.

This limited judicial recognition is likely due to several factors. It seems from my review of
recent cases,1506 that counsel in these cases have not cited the US PTD or the prospect of a local
‘public trust’ in their submissions to the court, preferring other more viable legal arguments.
This failure to cite the doctrine is likely because the US jurisprudence on the PTD is so diverse,
and different constitutional provisions defining States’ powers,1507 and the acquisition of
privately property apply in each of the coastal States in the US.1508 Further, the US States’ legal
codes on land titles and coastal management do not apply here; and US court rulings on them,
which constitute core elements of each state’s public trust doctrine, are not authoritative binding
precedents in the courts of New South Wales.

1498

See Ford, above n 325, 25; Huntsman, above n 325, 19; Hoskins, above n 558, 183- 211.
Ford noted one of the earliest attempts to dedicate coastal lands in Sydney for recreation was at
Nelson Bay in 1864. See Ford, above n 325, 29-31. See also Cabena, above n 960, 16.
1500
The institution of ‘responsible government’ in the colony of New South Wales began in 1856 with the
formation of the first bi-cameral parliament. See < https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/about/Pages/1856-to1499

1889-Responsible-Government-and-Colonial-.aspx >.
1501

Ford, Sydney, above n 325, 32-3, reported the forced resumption of Bondi Park in 1881.
See Tim Bonyhady, ‘A Usable Past: The Public Trust in Australia’ (1995) 13 Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 329-338; and Bonyhady, ‘An Australian Public Trust’ in S Dover (ed),
Environmental History and Policy: Still Settling Australia (Oxford University Press, 2000) 258 – 272.
1503
Paul Stein, ‘Ethical Issues in Land-Use Planning and the Public Trust’ (1996) 13 Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 493-501.
1504
Angus D Gordon, ‘Highwater Mark - The Boundary of Ignorance’ (2001) (Paper presented at 11th
NSW Coastal Conference, Newcastle, 13-16 November 2001), 2-3.
1505
Thom, above n 316, 36-9.
1506
Eg Positive Change for Marine Life Inc v Byron Shire Council (No. 2) [2015] NSWLEC 157, and
Ralph Lauren Pty Ltd v New South Wales Transitional Coastal Panel [2018] NSWLEC 207.
1507
The powers of States in the US to deal with ‘trust land’ is summarized in Blumm, ‘Accommodation’,
above n 311, 657 – 663.
1508
The part of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, which created a
citizen’s right to compensation if the State acquires their private property, is known as the ‘takings’
clause. Neither s 51 (xxxi) Australian Constitution or the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) creates an
equivalent right in Australia.
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Hence, because much of the detail of US ‘public trust doctrine(s)’, ie what is teachable,1509 is
inapplicable to New South Wales, mounting a ‘public trust’ argument in this jurisdiction based
on a US ‘public trust doctrine’ would be very difficult.
Nonetheless at a higher conceptual level, the PTD’s core concepts of enduring public ownership
of the foreshore, seabed, and tidal waters as ‘trust lands’, and protecting their public use in
perpetuity, resonate in New South Wales. This resonance has been noticed by Bonyhady, who
cited relevant landmark cases,1510 by Gordon,1511 Thom1512 and others1513 who posit that an
endemic parallel doctrine exists in this jurisdiction, encompassing both public ownership of
coastal lands and waters, and a government duty to protect their use by the public, which awaits
formal judicial recognition.1514
(c) A local ‘public use’ doctrine?

I explore this idea next by identifying existing legal rules in this jurisdiction regarding public
ownership, public access, public uses, and other public interests in coastal lands and waters.
However first I wish to highlight two factors which distinguish New South Wales from US
jurisdictions - the geographic extent of public ownership, and the wider footprint of public uses,
of coastal land. To further distinguish this posited endemic doctrine from the US PTD, the
phrase ‘public use doctrine’ is used hereafter to denote the body of statute and case law on
public ownership and public use of coastal lands and waters, in New South Wales.1515

(i) Public ownership of coastal lands and waters

Due to government policies discussed in Chapter III, summarised below, a larger geographic
extent of coastal land remains in public ownership in New South Wales, than in many States in
the US. See Figure 14.1 below.
See Delbridge et al (eds), above n 4, 517. ‘doctrine’ noun 1. a particular principle taught or advocated.
2. that which is taught; teachings collectively. 3. A body or system of teachings relating to a particular
subject. See also DM Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law, (Clarenden, 1980) 371, ‘doctrines of law:
systematic formulations of legal principles, rules, conceptions and standards with respect to particular
situations, or types of cases, or fields of the legal order, in logically interdependent schemes, whereby
reasoning may proceed on the basis of the scheme and its logical implications.’
1510
Bonyhady, Usable’, above n 316, 329.
1511
Angus D Gordon, ‘Highwater Mark - The Boundary of Ignorance’ (2001) (Paper presented at 11th
NSW Coastal Conference, Newcastle, 13-16 November 2001), 2-3.
1512
Thom, above n 316.
1513
Sack, Allen and Thom, above n 357, 129-130.
1514
Ibid. Sack et al observe a recent case’s concordance with the principles of the ‘public trust doctrine’
but the PTD was not cited in the case report of arguments presented to, or adopted by, the court in
Ralph Lauren PL v NSW TCP [2018] NSWLEC 207.
1515
See Willoughby City Council v Minister Administering the National Parks & Wildlife Act (1992) 78
LGERA 19, discussed below [hereafter Willoughby (1992)].
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Figure 14.1 Title to coastal lands and waters in New South Wales (1777 – to date)

Prior to colonization, the coastal lands and waters of New South Wales were the sovereign
territory of indigenous nations, but these interests were ignored, and the title to all the colony’s
lands and waters were claimed by the English Crown, an action later justified under the doctrine
of terra nullius.1516 English courts recognized the Crown’s prima facie ownership of the
foreshore and seabed,1517 and the operation of this and other common law rules in the New
South Wales colony was confirmed by British statute.1518

The reservation from sale of coastal lands above MHWM, when adjoining lands were granted or
sold, was required under Crown policy from 1825 - 1840,1519 but later it became a discretionary
policy, where private ownership of coastal land to MHWM was deemed appropriate.1520 Later,
in certain locations, coastal Crown lands above MHWM were reserved from sale under colonial
statutes,1521 and post-Federation their reservation from sale was authorized by statutes of the
State of New South Wales.1522

1516

Stuart Banner, Possessing the Pacific: land, settlers, and indigenous people from Australia to Alaska.
(Harvard University Press, 2009) 24-5. See Arrow A in Figure 13.1.
1517
See Kirby v Gibbs (1667) 2 Keble 294, p 414, and other cases cited in Moore, above n 37, 651.
1518
Australian Courts Act 1828 (Imperial British Parliament). See Cook et al, above n 18, 35.
1519
Under Royal Instructions first issued in 1825 to Governor Brisbane, according to Cabena, above n
960, 16. See Arrow B in Figure 14.1, circa 1825 - 1840.
1520
Under Royal Instructions issued in 1841, reserving coastal lands from sale became discretionary, and
the Governor could grant new land titles bounded by MHWM. See Cabena, above n 960, 18. See Arrow
C in Figure 14.1, circa 1840 – 1861.
1521
The Crown Lands Alienation (Public Purposes) Act 1861 (NSW), See Arrow D in Figure 14.1.
1522
Eg s 24 Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1931 (NSW) [repealed].
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Lands below MHWM were originally vested in the Crown under the common law, and their
sale or grant was prohibited by colonial legislation.1523

However, title to coastal lands and waters underwent dramatic change in the 1970s. The federal
Labor government made use of developments in international law1524 and introduced legislation
extending Commonwealth title and powers over the submerged lands and territorial seas around
Australia, thus securing federal government control over and revenue from fisheries and offshore oil and gas resources.1525 New South Wales and other States objected to the legislation and
the then federal Liberal Opposition unsuccessfully opposed it, but the Bill was enacted. The
Act’s validity was then legally challenged and was publicly disputed by the Opposition in the
intervening federal election. However, soon after the election the High Court of Australia found
the Act valid and affirmed the Commonwealth government’s powers, 1526 creating a quandary
for the newly elected Liberal Government who had campaigned for ‘States’ rights’ and publicly
remonstrated against federal government over-reach.1527 The dilemma was finally resolved by a
political agreement, the Offshore Constitutional Settlement (OCS),1528 under which the States
agreed to enact legislation ceding to the Commonwealth their ownership and powers over lands
below the territorial seas,1529 and the Commonwealth agreed to confer title and power back to
the States,1530 reserving its exercise of relevant Commonwealth powers.1531
Hence since 1979, lands below the low water mark (LWM) are held by the State of New South
Wales under Commonwealth law, while it holds title to the foreshore, between MHWM and
LWM, under common law,1532 and to lands above MHWM under relevant State laws.

A further development in 1983 was the enactment of legislation in NSW allowing Aboriginal
Land Councils to claim ownership of Crown lands not required for essential public purposes.1533
Subsequently the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) created a process for traditional owners’ native
title in unalienated lands to be formally recognized. However, since both Acts exclude claims
over private freehold land, they do not apply to the land titles at the focus of this thesis.
1523

See s 12 Crown Lands Alienation (Public Purposes) Act 1861 (NSW). See Arrow A in Figure 14.1.
The entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in
1964 authorised the demarcation of a nation state’s territorial waters and its control over natural
resources within a 200km economic exclusion zone (EEZ).
1525
Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth)
1526
New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 486-7, [35] (Jacobs J).
1527
see Haward, above n 328, 336.
1528
For detailed discussion of the OCS see Haward, above n 328, and Brazil, above n 328.
1529
See Constitutional Powers (Coastal Waters) Act 1979 (NSW).
1530
See Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) and Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980 (Cth).
1531
over marine parks, off-shore resource development, off-shore fisheries, shipping and navigation, ship
sourced pollution, and crimes at sea. See Haward, above n 328, 337-8.
1532
New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 486-7, [35] (Jacobs J). See Arrow E in
Figure 14.1.
1533
Under s 36(3) Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW). See Arrow F in Figure 14.1.
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As the result of applying common law rules, these policies and statutes, in New South Wales all
submerged lands, and large areas of coastal land above MHWM, remain publicly owned.1534

(ii) Public use of coastal lands and waters

Like title to land, the means of legally protecting public rights to access and use coastal lands in
New South Wales has also changed since colonization. (See Figure 14.2 below.)

Initially, the coastal lands and waters of New South Wales were used by indigenous people, but
their customary uses were usurped by the establishment of a British penal colony.1535 Military
and convict use of the foreshore and tidal waters for fishing and transport was recorded,1536 but
it is likely use of the colony’s coastal lands and waters by ‘the public’, mandated by English
common law,1537 began when free settlers started to arrive in 1793.1538 Later, the public use of
coastal lands above MHWM became permissible under the Crown policy which reserved many
areas of coastal lands from sale for public purposes.1539 However from 1841 some privately
owned coastal land extended to MHWM, which limited public use to the foreshore.1540

Under responsible government many areas of coastal land above MHWM previously reserved
from sale, were dedicated for public purposes under colonial Crown Land Acts, and some
recently alienated lands were re-acquired by the government and dedicated to public use.1541
Post-federation, other reserved coastal lands were dedicated for public use as ‘recreational
reserves’ under a Crown Lands Act, or as nature reserves or national parks.1542

Other vacant, undedicated Crown lands were subject to ad hoc public use for many years.
Though tidal waters remained available for public use, ‘marine parks’ were later dedicated over
some lands below MHWM,1543 and their public use was regulated through zoning plans.
1534

The exception being Commonwealth land, in Jervis Bay. In relation to the public ownership of the
bed of Sydney Harbour, see Verrall v Nott (1939) 39 SR (NSW) 89; 56 WN 55; 14 LGR 66.
1535
See Hoskins, above n 558, 51 – 71. See Arrow A in Figure 14.2.
1536
See historical accounts of fishing cited in Tim Bonyhady, The Colonial Earth (MUP 2000) 17, fn 9.
1537
Public rights to navigate and fish in tidal waters were known as the jus publicum in English common
law. See Hale, above n 704, Cap VI, quoted in Blundell v Catterall (1821) 106 ER 1190, 1193 (Best J).
1538
See < https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/about/Pages/1788-to-1810-Early-European-Settlement.aspx >
1539
See the Royal Instructions first issued in 1825 to Governor Brisbane, cited in Cabena, above n 960,
16. See Arrow B in Figure 14.2. 1825 – 1840.
1540
Cabena, above n 960, 18. See Arrow C in Figure 14.2.
1541
The purchase of Bondi Park in 1881 under the Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1880, was
reported by Ford, Sydney, above n 325, 31-33. See also Ford, ‘The Battle’ above n 325, 258-9.
1542
Under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW). Most coastal national parks’ boundaries
were MHWM. See Arrow D in Figure 14.2, 1979 - 2014.
1543
Eg Cape Byron Marine Park, under the Marine Parks Act 1997 (NSW) [repealed].
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Figure 14.2 Public use of coastal lands and waters in New South Wales (1777 – to date)
More recently the landward boundary of the ‘marine estate’ has been defined as HAT,1544 and
protected submerged lands may be designated as ‘marine parks’ or ‘aquatic reserves’.1545

Further, operation of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) has led to the use of another
means of legally protecting public use of the beach and coastal waters: the creation of easements
over vacant Crown land under claim. Though narrow static easements for access are often used,
an important further development was the court’s creation of an ambulatory easement,1546 of 30
metres width measured from the MHWM, over vacant coastal Crown land, to protect public use
of the beach before it awarded the land to the claimant aboriginal land council.1547 Through this
mechanism, also known as a ‘rolling’ easement,1548 public use of beach was guaranteed in
perpetuity, even though the land above MHWM ceased to be publicly owned.1549 Hence it is

It includes submerged lands in estuaries up to the ‘highest astronomical tide’. See s 6 (b) Marine
Estate Management Act 2014 (NSW). See Arrow E in Figure 14.2, 2014 – present.
1545
‘Marine parks’ may be declared under s 23, and aquatic reserves declared under s 34 of the Marine
Estate Management Act 2014 (NSW).
1546
Ambulatory: capable of walking. See Delbridge et al (eds) above n 4, 53. An ambulatory easement is
of a prescribed width from the line of MHWM, and the easement’s location moves with the gradual
movement of the seaward boundary of MHWM, to maintain the prescribed width.
1547
See Coffs Harbour and District Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister administering the Crown
Lands Act [2013] NSW LEC 216. See Arrow F in Figure 14.2.
1548
See James G Titus, Rolling Easements (US Environment Protection Agency, 2010), available at <
http://papers.risingsea.net/rolling-easements.html >.
1549
See discussion of this in John R Corkill, ‘Coffs Harbour and District LALC v Minister administering
the Crown Lands Act (2013) NSWLEC 216 (Red Rock) and Crown Lands Amendment (Public
Ownership of Beaches and Coastal Lands) Bill 2014 (NSW)’ (2014) 11 (6) Native Title News 147- 151.
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clear that in some locations in New South Wales public use of coastal lands above MHWM may
extend to lands not held in public ownership.

The early means of protecting public use of coastal lands and waters have been overtaken by a
series of later protection measures, in some locations. In other places dedications of land to
protect public use pre-date urban development, while elsewhere the onset of urban development
has prompted action to protect public use of coastal lands from private encroachments. Hence,
unlike US States, in New South Wales the extent of coastal land above MHWM available for
public use is not uniform, or limited to publicly-owned land, but varies from place to place (see
Figure 14.2 above).

Due to the historical series of policies and actions of government, extensive areas of coastal land
and waters in New South Wales are dedicated to public use, or another public purpose, and their
public ownership is secured by legislation.1550 Consequently legal cases in New South Wales
have not focused on preserving public ownership of coastal lands, or public access to the
foreshore, as in the US.1551 However, that does not mean that cases relevant to protecting the
public use of coastal lands have not been brought in this jurisdiction.
(iii) Existing local legal ‘doctrine’ re public use of coastal lands and waters

Bonyhady argued that an early case, which thwarted the development of a coal loader on the
foreshore of Sydney Harbour,1552 was an important first step in recognizing the public trust,1553
and he described a related second case in which the court recognized the Crown’s role as trustee
of public interests.1554 Importantly Bonyhady also cited a later case where the court found that
National Parks were “held by the State in trust for the enjoyment and benefits of its citizens,
including future generations”,1555 and held that “public officers have a duty to protect and
preserve national parks”,1556 and should guard against commercial uses which could diminish
public access, use and enjoyment.1557 Hence, to date only rarely has a New South Wales court
referred to the ‘public trust’.

1550

See s 5.3 CLMA 2016 (NSW); s 40, 47I, 47Z, 53, 58N, 149(2) NPWA 1974 (NSW).
See for eg Raleigh Avenue Beach Assn v Atlantis Beach Club (2005) A.2d 112, discussed in Blumm
and Wood, above n 1493, 265 -268.
1552
Attorney General (NSW) v Milson (1891) 12 NSWLR 121, 16 NSWLR 145.
1553
Bonyhady, above n 316, 334. See also Bonyhady, ‘Australian’, above n 316, 263-5.
1554
Re Sydney Harbour Collieries Co (1895) 5 Land Appeal Court Reports 243, in Bonyhady, above n
316, 335-6.
1555
Willoughby City Council v Minister Administering the National Parks & Wildlife Act (1992) 78
LGERA 19, (Stein J, hereafter Willoughby v Minister (1992).
1556
Willoughby v Minister (1992) 34, cited in Bonyhady, above n 316, 330-1.
1557
Willoughby v Minister (1992) 26-7.
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Nonetheless the State’s courts have made some important decisions regarding public trust rights
and these court rulings form an extensive local jurisprudence on public access to, and public use
of, coastal land dedicated for public purposes.1558 I sketch the ambit of this jurisprudence next.
Cases concerning Crown lands have resulted in court rulings on what constitutes a ‘reserve’ or
park ‘for public recreation or enjoyment’;1559 and the permissible ‘uses’ of land dedicated for
‘public recreation’,1560 the operation of a statutory provision,1561 satisfaction of processes for
dedicating land’s use,1562 the validity of a Plan of Management,1563 and denied consent for
private use of land dedicated for ‘public recreation’ which excludes the public.1564 Other cases
have limited the use of ministerial powers,1565 and overturned the issuing of a licence for an
unauthorized use of a national park.1566
Other common law rules in this jurisdiction which might form part of a ‘public use doctrine’,
are well defined. The courts recognize the Crown’s ownership of the foreshore,1567 the public
rights to access the foreshore, and navigate on coastal waters,1568 and the latter’s seniority over
the right to fish.1569 Statutes which deny development consent to protect public access,1570 and
court rulings that recognize public access to the beach as an ‘essential public purpose’,1571 and
create easements to allow public access,1572 also provide important doctrinal elements. Indeed

1558

Many relevant matters were considered in Friends of King Edward Park Inc v Newcastle City Council
(No 2) [2015] NSWLEC 76, (hereafter FOKEPI [2015]).
1559
The principal case, re Randwick racecourse, defined uses of ‘public reserve’ and ‘for the purposes of
public recreation’, was Council of Municipality of Randwick v Rutledge [1959] HCA 63; 102 CLR 54,
88, and 92-93, (Windeyer J), hereafter Rutledge [1959] quoted in FOKEPI [2015], [223], [224].
1560
Coffs Harbour Environment Centre Inc v Coffs Harbour City Council (1991) 74 LGRA 185, 189-90.
1561
Section 114 (1C) CLA 1989 (NSW) was closely considered in FOKEPI (2015) [244] – [269].
1562
This was considered by the court in FOKEPI [2015] [244] – [280].
1563
The management plan part permitting private use was ruled invalid. See FOKEPI [2015] [270]-[280].
1564
See for eg FOKEPI [2015]. Newcastle City Council’s decisions to adopt a Plan of Management and
grant a company a lease to develop a private function centre in the King Edward Headland Reserve,
which excluded the public, were ruled invalid as the area had been dedicated for ‘public recreation’.
1565
See Willoughby v Minister (1992) discussed by Sheahan J in FOKEPI [2015].
1566
See Woollahra Municipal Council v Minister for the Environment (1991) 23 NSWLR 710; 73 LGRA
379, cited as the ‘Simon University case’ in FOKEPI [2015] [225] – [233]. The licence for use of part
of Sydney Harbour National Park as a university campus, was issued under the National Parks and
Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW).
1567
See New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 407 [44], [45] (Gibbs J). See also
Gullett, above n 32, 1-11.
1568
See York Bros (Trading) PL v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391, 402.
1569
See Gann v Free Fishers of Whitstable (1865) 11 ER 1305, cited in Walrut, above n 26, 427.
1570
See s 55M CPA 1979 (NSW) [repealed] and s 27 CMA 2016 (NSW).
1571
Coffs Harbour LALC v Minister [2013] NSW LEC 216, [161] (Craig J). See also Ralph Lauren PL v
NSW TCP [2018] NSWLEC 207 (Preston CJ).
1572
Coffs Harbour LALC v Minister [2013] NSW LEC 216, [163] (Craig J).
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the use of easements in New South Wales to allow public access,1573 parallels their use in the
public trust doctrines of the US.1574
However, prior court rulings declaring fees to use public lands dedicated for ‘public recreation’
may only be levied, if ‘those profits are devoted to the public purpose’,1575 or maintain or
manage the public asset;1576 and stipulating that exclusive use of land dedicated for ‘public
recreation’ to generate private profits cannot be permitted,1577 appear redundant, since the
Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW) authorizes appointment of corporations as Crown
land managers,1578 and the charging of fees.1579
A ‘public use doctrine’ in New South Wales would include the courts’ recognition of the legal
priority of public use of the foreshore,1580 and the ambulatory MHWM boundary’s dominance
over real property boundaries defined by survey,1581 and acknowledge that ownership of land
which falls below MHWM reverts to the State, as the owner of the foreshore.1582 Further, an
endemic ‘public use doctrine’ could recognize public ‘rights’ to sit on community advisory
committees,1583 access relevant information, and participate in decisions which adopt plans of
management1584 determine priorities,1585 and allocate public funds for managing publicly owned
lands, dedicated for public purposes.1586

Several important rulings have also been made in decisions on land claims over coastal Crown
lands made by Aboriginal land councils under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW). 1587

1573

The court created both a static east-west easement for public access to the beach along an existing
track, and ‘an ambulatory easement for public access landward of the mean high water mark’ along the
beach, 30 metres wide, running north-south. See Corkill, ‘Coffs’, above n 1559, 147 – 151.
1574
See Blumm, ‘Accommodation’, above n 311. See also Titus, above n 1558.
1575
Rutledge [1959] 92-93 (Windeyer J) 88 – 89, cited in FOKEPI [2015], [224].
1576
Rutledge [1959] 92-93 (Windeyer J) 88 – 89, cited in FOKEPI [2015], [224].
1577
FOKEPI [2015], [240].
1578
See s 3.3 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1579
Regulation 7 of the Crown Land Management Regulation 2018 (NSW), made under s 9.25 CLMA
2016, authorizes Crown land managers to charge members of the public fees for entry into Crown lands.
1580
created by s 55M CPA 1979 (NSW) [repealed] and s 27 CMA 2016 (NSW).
1581
Environment Protection Authority v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655, 13,659-60 (Bannon J).
1582
See Environment Protection Authority v Leaghur Holdings PL [1995] 87 LGERA 282, 287 (Allen J).
1583
See s 3.29 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1584
See s 3.33 – 3.36, s 3.40 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1585
Community engagement strategies are required under s 5.4- s 5.8 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1586
Community engagement is required for a State Strategic Plan, under s 12.17 – 12.25 CLMA 2016
(NSW). See also requirements for public consultation under s. 73A, 69H, 151 F, 188F, 188G NPWA
1974 (NSW).
1587
Only areas of ‘vacant’ Crown lands, not required for any public purpose are claimable by local
Aboriginal land councils under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW). See the Red Rock land
claim granted in Coffs Harbour and District Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister administering
the Crown Lands Act [2013] NSW LEC 216 (Craig J), discussed below.
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In a key decision, Worimi, the court ruled that lands below MHWM were not ‘claimable Crown
land’.1588 Subsequently many Aboriginal land councils have claimed ownership of ‘vacant’
coastal Crown land above MHWM, but not the foreshore or submerged land. 1589 In other cases
the court has defined what constitutes an ‘essential public purpose’,1590 and protected public
rights of access to the beach.1591

Conclusions

Thus in New South Wales, many legal rules regarding the public use of publicly-owned coastal
lands have developed from cases brought under NSW statutes,1592 decided by NSW and
Australian federal courts. Collectively, these statutory provisions and court rulings constitute the
core ‘teachable’ elements of our endemic ‘public use’ doctrine.
The strength of the US ‘public trust’ doctrine is its guarantee that public access to and use of the
foreshore can continue, when title to land down to LWM is transferred into private hands.1593
However, the beauty of the ‘public use’ doctrine in New South Wales is that the foreshore and
large areas of coastal land above MHWM remain publicly owned, and due to their dedication
for public purposes, their status as ‘inherently public property’ is not in doubt.1594 Hence, in
NSW disputes over coastal lands have mainly focused on private use, not private ownership.
I conclude that both the US PTD and our endemic ‘doctrine’ point to the dominant status of
public rights in coastal lands, historically and currently. They have potential application for
resolving future conflicts, and will inform my framing of potential responses in Chapter VI.

because they are required for “essential public purposes of recreation and access.” See Worimi LALC
v Minister administering the Crown Lands Act (1991) 72 LGRA 149, 161-3 (Stein J).
1589
Many proceedings have been brought regarding claims over vacant Crown land under the Aboriginal
Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) See for eg Coffs Harbour and District Local Aboriginal Land Council v
Minister administering the Crown Lands Act [2013] NSW LEC 216 (Craig J) discussed below.
1590
See Worimi Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister administering Crown Lands Act (1991) 72
LGRA 149, 162-3 (Stein J). See also Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v NSW Aboriginal
Land Council (Goomallee Claim) [2012] NSWCA 358; 84 NSW LR 219, [37] (Basten JA).
1591
Coffs Harbour and District Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister administering the Crown
Lands Act (Red Rock) [2013] NSW LEC 216 (Craig J).
1592
Eg Crown Lands Act 1989, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983, National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974.
1593
Blumm, ‘Accommodation, above n 311, 666-7.
1594
Under s 5.3(5) CLMA 2016 (NSW) the Minister is not authorized to sell Crown lands dedicated or
reserved for a public purposes. However, under s 2.7 and s 2.11 CLMA 2016 the Minister has powers to
revoke dedications or reservations over Crown land, which would allow it to be sold. Sale of national
parks estate land would require legislation revoking its dedication under the NPWA 1974 (NSW).
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5.2 Ethical decision making about land
(a) Ethical, ecological perspectives on ‘real property’

Another relevant critical perspective on property theory applied to land, insists that landowners
should take non-economic considerations into account when making decisions about acquiring
and managing ‘real property’, to address embedded ethical and ecological imperatives.1595 One
prominent advocate of this ethical approach is Eric T Freyfogle.1596 Though much of his writing
relates to the institutions and jurisprudence of the USA,1597 his ethical critique of the moral
justification of private property rights has wider relevance and application.1598

Seeing ‘real property’ as land, in its unique contexts
A key characteristic of this ethical critique is its grounding of the abstract concept of ‘property’
in the physical, material plane, through repeated references to ‘land’,1599 where all land is
recognized as inherently situated in its unique contexts: its physical properties, adjoining
neighbours and nearby residents, and its biological attributes including other species which
inhabit that place.1600 This ethical approach demands more than a ‘snapshot’ of the land and
incorporates a temporal context,1601 which recognizes the needs of later generations of
landowners, non-owners, and ecological communities, the potential long-term impacts, costs or
benefits, and future cumulative ramifications of decisions and actions taken now, to use land
and natural resources in certain ways.1602 These physical, social, ecological and temporal
contexts also inform the ethical landowner or manager of the duties and responsibilities, and the
concomitant opportunities and limitations, inherent in owning that land.1603

These four contexts have highly relevant application to coastal lands affected by coastal
hazards, and the need for landowners to consider them in decisions about future use, suggest
1595

An early advocate of this view, often cited as a forerunner in ethical thinking about land ownership
and management, was Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (1st pub 1949, Oxford UP, 1966).
1596
Freyfogle’s early work was writing about water law in the US in the 1980s. See Eric T Freyfogle,
‘Water Justice’ (1986) University of Illinois Law Review 481.
1597
Many articles discuss the ‘takings’ clause of the US Constitution, and decisions in the United States
Supreme Court, which are inapplicable in New South Wales. See Eric T Freyfogle, On Private
Property: Finding Common Ground on the Ownership of Land (Beacon Press, 2007) 64.
1598
Freyfogle, ‘Ownership’, above n 193.
1599
See Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 183; Freyfogle, ‘Owning’, above n 310.
1600
Freyfogle uses the ideas of a ‘social community’ comprised of neighbours, non-owners and future
generations, and an ‘ecological community’ constituted by ‘the living things in the non-human world’.
See Freyfogle, ‘Eight’, above n 202, 790; Freyfogle, ‘Particulars’, above 360, 579-581.
1601
Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 653.
1602
Freyfogle, ‘Ownership’, above n 193, 1292.
1603
Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 652; Freyfogle, ‘Eight’, above n 202, 799.
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that they could form useful criteria with which to assess the merits of options for public policy
responses affecting coastal land use.

Ethic landownership involves moral choices
Freyfogle’s ethical critique of property law provides a moral framework for landowners and
managers, where there are right and wrong approaches to making decisions about land use.1604
In Freyfogle’s view, the correct, ethical approach, is to recognize that the special attributes, or
features of the land,1605 provide natural limits to the land’s use which should not be exceeded, to
prevent potential adverse impacts on its social and ecological communities, and to protect
‘sensitive land uses’ like threatened species habitat, now and in the future.1606 Thus he proposes
‘tailoring’ property rights to fit the attributes of a specific area of land.1607 An all too common
wrong approach, according to Freyfogle, is to overlook the land’s particulars, damage or remove
sensitive land uses, impose unrealistic expectations about economic yield, overlook adverse
impacts on social and ecological communities, or long-term effects and, as a result, degrade
land.1608 This approach, says Freyfogle, is ‘morally illegitimate and socially unwise’.1609

Freyfogle makes it explicit that in the ethical approach to land management, property regimes
and property rights express the moral choices made by people in society, between conflicting
rights or interests of members of society.1610 Using this approach, property norms are developed
to avoid harm and to achieve wider social goals.1611 Since one property norm, the ‘do no harm
rule’ is posited as a key principle for ethical landownership,1612 how ‘harm’ is defined is key.1613
Ethical landowners who observe this rule would also satisfy the norm that one may not use
one’s property to harm another’s.1614 As Freyfogle noted, it is in landowners’ interests to comply
with this norm.1615

Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 639; Freyfogle ‘Property’, above n 201, 84.
Such as its area, aspect, topography, drainage, climate, soil characteristics and vegetation types.
1606
See the discussion of this in Freyfogle, ‘Owning’, above n 310, 302-3.
1607
Freyfogle, ‘Particulars’, above n 360, 585; Freyfogle, ‘Eight’, above n 202, 792; Freyfogle, ‘Private
Rights’, above n 356, 276.
1608
Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 645-6; Freyfogle, ‘Private Rights’, above n 356, 272.
1609
Freyfogle, On Private, above n 1607, 124; Freyfogle ‘Property’, above n 201, 116.
1610
Freyfogle, 'Property’, above n 201, 84.
1611
Re-defining and or regulating rights and expectations, rather abandoning them, are two ways society
makes changes to its choices between various rights and interests. See Eric T Freyfogle, ‘Context and
Accommodation in Modern Property Law’ (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 1529, 1538.
1612
Ibid 1539; Freyfogle, 'Property’, above n 201, 87; Freyfogle, ‘Owning Nature’, above n 1480, 164;
Freyfogle, ‘Private Rights’, above n 356, 275.
1613
Freyfogle, ‘Eight’, above n 202, 791-2; Freyfogle, On Private Property’, above n 1607, 111.
1614
Ibid 110.
1615
Freyfogle, 'Property’, above n 201, 87. Freyfogle quoted the statement of gospel morality used by
William Blackstone 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England (1st pub 1765) *217-218.
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This norm also has a highly relevant application to coastal land. A landowner should not
construct defensive structures to protect their land, because the structure will harm their
neighbour’s land, by increasing the erosive forces affecting it.

The ultimate goal of ethical land ownership and management proposed by Freyfogle, the higher
purpose of real property, is to recover and sustain land health.1616 To do this he said landowners
should, ie are morally obliged to, integrate into their decisions to acquire or manage land, the
conservation of the natural environment in which the site is located, to sustain vital eco-system
functions and the survival, or flourishing, of endemic non-human species in the long term.1617
Freyfogle rejected the argument1618 that private property was all about liberty1619 and
landowners’ claimed rights of autonomous action on their private land, and concluded that
property is justified by its social utility,1620 which he said proved its origins in civil society, not
as pre-social, individual rights.1621 He also concluded that since no satisfactory rationale
explains why it is morally justifiable for an individual to take a thing everyone could use, keep
it as their own, and deny its use to others, the idea of private property is morally problematic.1622
The ‘social utility’ of private ownership of land and property rights, as distinct from their
benefits to the owner, were discussed by Freyfogle,1623 who found that how social purposes and
benefits of private land are framed and pursued is rooted in the social utility needs of societies,
and the ambitions of their time.1624 He posited that as well as benefitting landowners,1625 an
ethical property regime ought to benefit society by helping achieve wider social goals.1626

See Freyfogle ‘Ownership’, above n 183, 1289, ‘land health, in perpetuity’, 1292;
Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 654; Freyfogle, ‘Private Rights’, above n 356, 275-7.
1618
The libertarian argument, of Richard Epstein in Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain (1985) was considered in several articles.
1619
See Freyfogle, ‘Owning’, above n 310, 286-292; Freyfogle, ‘Particulars’, above n 360, 576;
Freyfogle, 'Property', above n 201, 99-102.
1620
Freyfogle, 'Property’, above n 201, 108. See also Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 637; Freyfogle,
‘Particulars’, above n 360, 576.
1621
The idea of property and property rights arising from ‘a pre-social world of nature’ was described as
‘simply nonsense’ in Freyfogle, 'Property’, above n 201, 86, who doubted whether humans were ever
pre-social and operated only as autonomous individuals. See also Freyfogle, ‘Owning the land’, above n
310, 301.
1622
Freyfogle, ‘Property’, above n 201, 105, 109, 116; Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 637; ‘Private
Rights’, above n 356, 273.
1623
Property functions at economic, civic and personal levels. See Freyfogle, ‘Owning the land’, above n
310, 296.
1624
Freyfogle, ‘Particulars’, above n 360, 169. See also ‘Private Rights’, above n 356, 273.
1625
Private property and the ownership of land stimulates individual enterprise and economic growth,
encourages investment; provides privacy; divides power within society; and promotes civic engagement
by citizens. See Freyfogle, ‘Particulars’, above n 360, 583. Other individual benefits included
‘promoting freedom’ and ‘access to key resources’. See Freyfogle, 'Property’, above n 201, 115.
1626
Freyfogle, ‘Private Rights’, above n 356, 277-8.
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The ethical basis for a claimed landowner ‘right’ to develop land to intensify land use and
maximize its commercial production was also scrutinized by Freyfogle.1627 He found that
development value of land is conferred by the community, not the owner, and hence
development should only proceed with community consent, not as an ‘inherent right’.1628 Since
intensive uses often affect land’s social and ecological communities by damaging non-economic
uses1629 and creating off-site impacts,1630 he argued that ethical decisions about intensifying land
use should only be made by the community, having regard to all relevant interests, and the
common good.1631 Given that, the interests of others in the land’s social and ecological
communities also deserve consideration, Freyfogle reasoned that assertions of autonomous
individual landowner rights to use land could not be morally sustained.1632 He concluded that
the moral arguments relied on to justify private property in land were not compelling, and
unless the institution, and uses of private real property created social benefits, as well as benefits
to the landowner, they were ‘illegitimate’.1633 This is a view shared by other ethical theorists.1634

Freyfogle also challenged key ideas about private ownership of land underpinning economic
theory: the myth of self-interested, economic rationalist, land-owners, who use land to
maximize the satisfaction of their individual personal preferences, finding them inadequate.1635
He extended the purposes for acquiring and managing land beyond those usually recognized,
residence, agriculture and commerce, to include partnering with nature to restore land health.1636
Thus Freyfogle posited that other ethical motives in decision-making about land were also valid.

Relevance
Freyfogle’s ethical framework for decision-making about land is relevant because it affirms
property’s social origins, recaps the history of property as a creature of the law,1637 rebuts
libertarian and natural rights arguments on property’s origins, and discounts their usefulness.1638

Freyfogle, ‘Owning Nature’, above n 1480, 173-4; Freyfogle, ‘Eight’, above n 202, 795.
Ibid. See also Freyfogle, ‘Owning Nature’, above n 1480, 174.
1629
such as the protection of soils, wildlife habitat, wetlands and natural drainage lines. See Freyfogle,
‘Property’, above n 201, 84.
1630
such as noise, dust, smoke, odours, water pollution, increased rainfall run-off and soil erosion,
wildfire, damage by escaped livestock, and or feral animals.
1631
Freyfogle, 'Property’, above n 201, 84.
1632
Ibid 111, 116; Freyfogle, ‘Ownership’, above n 193, 1287.
1633
Freyfogle, 'Property', above n 201, 115-6; ‘Private Rights’, above n 356, 277-8.
1634
See Babie, above n 323, 18-21; Rose, above n 237.
1635
Freyfogle, ‘Owning’, above n 310, 297, 303-7.
1636
Freyfogle, ‘Ownership’, above n 193, 1289-90.
1637
The history of the description of property as a “creature of the law” was outlined in Freyfogle, On
Private Property’, above n 1607, 78. This discourse has included Jeremy Bentham, Benjamin Franklin
and others, as Freyfogle acknowledged in ‘Property’, above n 201, 84-5.
1638
Freyfogle, On Private Property’, above n 1607, 86.
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Further his analysis of property accords with other scholars’ view that private property and
property rights generally, and property norms regarding land in particular, have changed in the
past, and will – indeed, should - change in the future, to meet society’s changing needs.1639
Importantly, Freyfogle’s approach places decision-making about future land use in a moral
framework, by identifying what constitutes proper and improper uses of land, arguing that
private property should serve society’s goals, as well as the owners’, and contribute to the
‘greater good’, if it is to be morally justified.1640

These conclusions are highly relevant to the coastal lands under scrutiny, and clearly indicate
that decisions on future private uses of coastal lands which undermine wider public goals – ie
continued public access to and along the foreshore - are not morally justifiable.
Usefully, this approach overcomes the unreality of hyper-abstraction and ‘placelessness’ of
property theory by repeated grounding references to land, emphasizing the crucial physical,
social, ecological and temporal contexts in which all land is located.1641 Further, it undermines
the commodification of land by rejecting fixed property rights, asserting that they should be
tailored to suit the land, and natural limits should govern future uses of land.1642 These four
contexts are most relevant since they are the domains in which landowners’ claims of property
rights are situated, where they seek to be exercised, and where adjudications of their ethical
merit must be made. Thus owners who ignore these contexts, exercise property rights and landuses which degrade their land and impact on neighbours and nearby lands, are not acting
ethically and their actions and may be seen as ‘morally illegitimate’.1643
Freyfogle’s proposition that to act ethically, those who own and manage land must look beyond
private property rights, and allow for the needs of others in current and future social and
ecological communities of that land, is a significant point of reference for my discussion of how
future conflicts over competing rights to use coastal land might play out. The extension of this
ethical framework to law makers, who “are morally obligated to revise property laws over time
so that the law enforces only property rights that foster the common good”,1644 is also relevant.
Usefully, Freyfogle’s critiques of landowners’ claims of unilateral natural property rights
indicate that such misinformed ‘rights talk’ is unlikely to lead to the ethical management of
Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 638; Freyfogle, ‘Particulars’, above n 360, 577.
Freyfogle, ‘Eight’, above n 202, 787; Freyfogle, ‘Private Rights, above n 356, 277-8.
1641
Freyfogle, ‘Particulars’, above n 360, 580; Freyfogle, ‘Eight’, above n 202, 790; Freyfogle, ‘Private
Rights’, above n 356, 274.
1642
See Freyfogle, ‘Owning’, above n 310, 302-3; Freyfogle, ‘Particulars’, above n 360, 585; Freyfogle,
‘Eight’, above n 202, 792; ‘Private Rights’, above n 356, 276.
1643
Freyfogle, On Private Property’, above n 1607, 124.
1644
Freyfogle, ‘Property’, above n 201, cited in Blumm, Accommodation, above n 311, 655, fn 21.
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coastal land in the future. Moreover, his recognition of the social origin and dynamic nature of
property and private property rights are key starting points for the discussion that follows.

I draw on this ethical perspective when I identify relevant criteria, in Part C below, and assess
the merits of potential responses, in Chapter VII.

(b) Principles of ecologically sustainable development (ESD)

Last in my review of public interest perspectives I briefly consider the principles of ecologically
sustainable development (ESD), for several reasons. First, like other perspectives considered,
jurisprudence on ESD could influence the development of future government policy. Second, I
wish to highlight the relevance of the principle of ‘use of economic instruments’ as a key means
of implementing government policy, to effect change in land use. Third, the integrative principle
is highly relevant to the estimations I propose to make of future circumstances, impacts and
success of potential public policy responses by a future government, in Chapters VII and VIII.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s ecologically sustainable development (ESD) emerged as a key
concept in public policy in New South Wales, and as a core goal shared by diverse sectors of
contemporary society. Though its antecedents lie in international law1645 and national policy
development in the early 1990s,1646 the key milestone in New South Wales was the statement of
the principles of ESD in the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW).1647

Though there is some debate around the number, I posit that there are five principles of ESD:
i] the precautionary principle; (see section 6 (2)(a) )
ii] the principle of inter-generational equity; (section 6 (2)(b) )
iii] the biodiversity conservation principle; (section 6 (2)(c) )
iv] the principle of using economic instruments to achieve environmental protection; (s 6
(2)(d) )
v] the integrative principle (section 6 (2).

1645

See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, (Oxford UP, 1987)
[the Brundtland Report], and UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), The Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 14 June 1992. See also Herman
E Daly, ‘Towards some operational principles of sustainable development’ (1990) 2 Ecological
Economics 1-6.
1646
See Commonwealth of Australia, Ecologically Sustainable Development: A Discussion Paper
(AGPS, June 1990), Draft National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development – A Discussion
Paper (AGPS June 1992) and National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (AGPS,
December 1992).
1647
See s 6 (2) POEA Act 1991 (NSW) < http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/poteaa1991485/s6.html >.
[Hereafter POEAA 1991 (NSW).]
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Some authors have noted four principles, or have included ‘the polluter pays’ concept as a
principle. However I regard this as one example of the principle of using economic instruments
to protect the environment. I posit that the ‘integrative principle’ is explicit because the Act
“requires the effective integration of economic and environmental considerations in decisionmaking processes”.1648 However it is not relevant or necessary to elaborate these arguments
here. What is important to emphasize is that the principles of ESD are part of the status quo, and
they frame the ‘ecologically sustainable use’ of land and resources as a core social goal. They
indicate how public authorities should consider and take into account all relevant matters when
making decisions about publicly owned natural resources, to ensure they are ecologically
sustainable. Applying these principles allows, in theory, decision-makers to test whether
development proposals are ecologically sustainable, or can be made so with appropriate
conditions. Hence the theoretical model of ESD requires the integration of considerations from
economic, social, ecological and temporal domains.1649
These key principles have been incorporated into other New South Wales legislation, 1650 and
embellished by legal authorities. Court decisions on questions of fact, interpretation and operation of statute law,1651 extra curial writing by leading jurists,1652 and explorations of ESD themes
in academic research and publications1653 have created a substantial jurisprudence on ESD in
New South Wales. Developments in other jurisdictions, have widened the principles’ scope of
1648

See s 6 (2) POEAA 1991 (NSW).
The reference to ‘intergenerational equity’ indicates considerations which take into account factors
which could arise, or circumstances which could play out, over periods of multiple decades to centuries.
1650
New South Wales legislation has directed that the management of many public resources be
consistent with the ‘principles of ecologically sustainable development’ set out in s 6(2) of the POE Act
1991 (NSW). See for example: s 89 Local government Act 1993 (NSW), ss 37A, 38, 54A Coastal
Protection Act 1979, (NSW), s 3 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 15 Sydney Harbour Foreshore
Authority Act 1998 (NSW), ss 5, 115H Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), ss 3
(2) (c) Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW), ss 198, 220A Natural Resources Commission Act 2003
(NSW), s 10 (1) (c) Forestry Act 2012 (NSW). See also s 22 Marine Estate Management Act 2014
(NSW), s 3 Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW), but contra ss 1.3(f) and 1.4 Crown Land
Management Act 2016 (NSW).
1651
See the cases cited in Bentley v BGP Properties Pty Ltd (2006) 145 LGERA 234, 246 (Preston CJ).
1652
See for eg Paul Stein, and Susan Mahony, ‘Incorporating Sustainability Principles in Legislation’ in
Leadbeter, P, N Gunningham and Ben Boer (eds), Environmental Outlook No. 3. Law and Policy (1999)
57-75; Brian J Preston, 'Jurisprudence on ecologically sustainable development: Paul Stein’s
contribution’ (2012) 29 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 3-15; BJ Preston, ‘Water and
ecologically sustainable develop-ment in the courts’ (2009) 6 Macquarie Journal of International
Comparative Environmental Law 129; BJ Preston, ‘The Role of the Judiciary in Promoting Sustainable
Development: The Experience of Asia and the Pacific’ (2005) 9 Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental
Law, 109; Stephen Estcourt, ‘The precautionary principle, the coast and Temwood Holdings’ (2014) 31
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 288 – 299.
1653
See Ben Boer, ‘Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development: the Roles of National, State
and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy into Action’ (1995) 31 Williamette Law Review
307; Jacqueline Peel, ‘Ecologically sustainable development: more than mere lip service?’ (2008) 12 (1)
Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 1-34; Guy J Dwyer and Mark P Taylor
‘Moving from consideration to application: The uptake of principles of ecologically sustainable
development in environ-mental decision making in New South Wales’ (2013) 30 Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 185 - 219.
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operation in Australia.1654 Comprehensive review of the extent of this jurisprudence is beyond
the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless the future application of these principles is highly relevant.
In the following sections I sketch their relevant application to decision-making about the future
use of coastal lands.

(c) ESD principles application to coastal lands

The principles of ESD and the concept of ‘ecologically sustainable’ use of land and resources,
are pertinent since under current law they apply to decision-making about lands in the coastal
zone, including public policy responses to adverse climate change impacts. 1655

Applied at a general level, the precautionary principle should inform policy-advisers and
decision-makers that appropriate actions by Governments to reduce global warming and to
address forecast climate change impacts should not await full scientific certainty, about the risks
of irreversible harm to the environment.1656 The principle of intergenerational equity, with its
future orientation, would require decision-makers to consider the likely impacts of global
climate change on the availability of key natural resources to future generations, over decades,
or centuries.1657 Similarly the ‘biodiversity conservation principle’ would oblige decisionmakers to understand likely impacts on coastal species and how eco-systems might be assisted
to survive, as climate change becomes acute.1658
The fourth principle – use of economic instruments to achieve environmental outcomes – is
qualitatively different and especially relevant, since it could be employed by a future
government to implement its policy response to climate change impacts. Using economic
instruments inappropriate uses of coastal land could be regulated or prohibited, and appropriate
uses encouraged through incentives to change behavior, to achieve the preferred policy
outcome. The use of economic instruments will be explored in the next chapter.

As well as its use in comprehensive assessments of impacts, costs and overall merits of
development proposals, and formulating appropriate consent conditions, the integrative
principle also applies to strategic planning decisions to re-zone land to enable its more intensive
future use. New planning instruments for coastal management, developed through open
1654

See the list of legislation incorporating ESD by jurisdiction complied in Peel, above n 1670,
Appendix 1.
1655
See s 3 Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW).
1656
The IPCC reports high degrees of confidence in many analyses, and lower levels of confidence in
some aspects of its climate change modelling. See IPCC, Climate Change 2013, above n 7, 23-4.
1657
See the discussion of climate change impacts in Pittock, above n 8, 107 – 128.
1658
See Will Steffen, et al, Australia’s Biodiversity and Climate Change (CSIRO Publishing, 2009).
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consultative processes, informed by relevant social, ecological and economic studies, which
forge community consensus on the goals of future coastal management, identify the actions and
funding needed to achieve them, to respond to current and likely future climate change impacts,
would reflect the integrative principle in action.

However use of this principle would also be vital in accurately assessing the social, ecological
and economic impacts of climate change on current uses of vulnerable land, and in developing a
timely, comprehensive, integrated public policy response which cost-effectively addresses those
impacts.1659 Hence this integrative principle guides my estimations, in later chapters, of future
circumstances and impacts and informs my assessments of the likelihood of potential responses
being adopted by a future government, and attracting adequate support in the legislature.

The principles of ESD currently require decisions about future use of land to consider and
protect elements of the public interest, and ensure public resources are used sustainably. They
would need to be repealed if the status quo were to be reversed to privilege private property
rights. However these principles could provide a basis for the government and legislature to
adopt a policy to enhance public rights to use coastal land. This is explored in Chapter VI.

Interestingly, the principles of ESD strongly correlate with the elements of ethical decisionmaking about land identified by Freyfogle. Though he does not embrace economic instruments,
Freyfogle’s framework aims at environmental protection, and restoration, urges caution,
avoiding or minimizing social and ecological impacts and consideration of implications for
future generations. Moreover the ‘mature reflection’ he proposes, would allow all relevant
matters to be integrated into any decision.
These modern ideas about ‘public property’, the purpose of ‘property’ and property law are very
relevant to my discussion of the future use of coastal land in New South Wales, in Chapter VI.

6. Private interest perspectives
In the next sections I consider two articles which could shape future Government’s policy on
whose rights should prevail, to privilege private property and private property rights. The first
claims, on behalf of coastal landowners in New South Wales, a private property ‘right to protect
their land from the sea’. The second reviews calls by landowners affected by coastal erosion, for
‘social justice’ in coastal management decisions by public authorities in England and Wales.
IPCC, Climate Change 2014, above n 1420, SPM4.1 26. See the European Union’s integrated
approach in Kenchington et al (eds), above n 137, 60-62.
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6.1 Robust private property ‘rights’
It is possible that a future New South Wales government could decide that private property
rights should prevail over public rights to use coastal land, as climate change impacts become
apparent. Such a policy was advocated by Karen Coleman in an article,1660 with which I
disagreed in my own article in the same journal in 2013.1661 I present here a brief exposition of
Coleman’s arguments as an exemplar of a forceful pro-private property rights point of view.

(a) Claimed private property right

Coleman’s key claim was that landowners had a ‘right to protect their land from the sea’ which
‘must be seen as one of the rights in the “bundle” of rights that comprise modern ownership of
land.’1662 It was claimed this was ‘an ancient common law right’ recognised in the English cases
cited, but later decisions which found the claimed ‘right’ imperfect and its application highly
limited,1663 were not considered. Coleman acknowledged that in England the Crown’s defense
of land from the sea had been governed by statute since 1427,1664 but did not explain how the
claimed right had survived the enactment of modern statutes enacted by the NSW legislature.1665
Though Coleman correctly identified the Crown power to erect defences against the sea, no
argument was mounted to show how this power created a current legal duty on the State of New
South Wales, or justified the claimed private property right to ‘protect against the sea’.
It appears that in asserting that this right ‘must be seen as one of the rights in the “bundle” of
rights´, Coleman made a statement of advocacy, since this claim conflicts with modern property
theory which limits the number of sticks in the bundle,1666 and contrary to modern statutes.1667
(b) Private property rights as ‘fundamental’ rights

Arguably Coleman’s most doubtful claim was that the ‘right to protect’ land from the sea was a
fundamental right which ‘[g]overnments and legislatures cannot ignore.’1668 This claim
1660

Coleman, above n 13, 422.
Corkill, ‘Claimed’, above n 347-58.
1662
Coleman, above n 13, 422.
1663
See the discussion of the decisions Hudson v Tabor (1877) 2 QBD 290, 294, and Attorney General
(UK) v Tomline (1880) 14 Ch 58, in Corkill, ‘Claimed’, above n 347, 50-51.
1664
Corkill, above n 347, 51.
1665
Ibid 52.
1666
This claimed right was identified by Honore, above n 216, discussed in Chapter II.
1667
See consideration of relevant provisions of the Coastal Management Act 2016, Crown Land Management Act 2014, and the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), in Chapter IV.
1668
Coleman, above n 13, 422.
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misunderstood the NSW legislature’s pre-eminence as the supreme law-making body, its
extensive powers to modify or extinguish common law by enacting modern statutes,1669 and
overlooked the provisions of then current legislation,1670 and an authoritative court decision.1671
Hence the claim that there are ‘fundamental rights’ over land, which remain beyond the power
of the State’s Legislature, was repudiated in my analysis of claimed rights in section 9, Chapter
IV, and disputed in my published critique, as contrary to legal norms.1672
Coleman’s claims demonstrate the erroneous belief of some landowners that their private
property rights already are, and in the future should, be dominant in the statutory framework.1673
These propositions inform my description of potential responses by a future government which
might privilege private property rights over public rights to use coastal lands, in Chapter VI.
6.2 Social justice argument
Calls for ‘social justice’ in publicly funded programs for coastal management and associated
‘defensive works’, to ‘protect’ private property from further coastal erosion, are rarely heard in
New South Wales, but are not unknown in the United Kingdom. In a highly relevant article,
Cooper and McKenna1674 explored “the potential relevance and application of social justice
arguments” raised by affected landowners after public authorities discontinued public funding
for coastal protection works along the coast of England and Wales, because they were
ineffective in preventing further erosion or interrupting the shoreline’s recession.1675

This review is particularly pertinent because it relates to circumstances in the UK which are
analogous to conflicts over coastal land use in New South Wales, which could occur in the
future, and describes the same challenges in coastal management under consideration in this
thesis: the response of government and landowners to the impact of rising seas, and increased
erosion, on privately owned coastal land. Hence it offers views of possible conflicts between
private landowners and public rights and interests, arguments which might support preferred
outcomes, and how decision-makers might adjudicate competing claims, to resolve conflicts.
Corkill, ‘Claimed’, above n 347, 52-54.
Section 55M of the Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW) prohibited coastal protection works on
coastal land if it would ‘unreasonably limit public access to or use of a beach or headland’ or ‘pose a
threat to public safety’; and s55N CPA 1979 denied landowners the right to claim ownership of land
formed by accretion if it impeded public access or affected public safety. See discussion of this
provision in Section 4 of Chapter IV below.
1671
Durham Holdings PL v State of New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399; 177 ALR 436. See the
discussion of this case in section 10 of Chapter III.
1672
Corkill, above n 347, 55.
1673
Coleman, above n 13, 422.
1674
JAG Cooper, and J McKenna, ‘Social justice in coastal erosion management: The temporal and
spatial dimensions’ (2008) 39 Geoforum 294-306.
1675
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 297.
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(a) Defining ‘social justice’

Cooper and McKenna reviewed the literature on ‘social justice’, and discovered it was a
‘contested concept’, with two approaches extant: one focused on equitable ‘procedures’,1676 and
a second centred on equitable distribution of both costs and benefits of economic
development.1677 Though they noted the related concept of ‘environmental justice’, it was not
further considered.1678 The authors established that the calls for ‘social justice’ were based on
landowners’ perception of the ‘fairness of the outcomes”,1679 as distinct from ‘fairness’ of the
decision-making process,1680 and they posited that ‘social justice’ could be considered “at
different scales”, from small group to whole society.1681

Before considering the potential application of social justice arguments to coastal erosion,
Cooper and McKenna summarized the state of knowledge and experience in managing the
coasts of England and Wales, outlined the limited policy options then available ie: (a) intervene
to resist coastal erosion; or (b) accept it and adapt; and noted the four options being applied in
‘shoreline management plans’ (SMPs) in the UK: ie hold the line; retreat the line; advance the
line; and do nothing.1682
They observed that the social justice argument is advocated “mainly in cases where private
property is threatened by coastal erosion” and reported that it “maintains that society should
intervene in some way when the property of individuals or groups is threatened by erosion”.1683
They noted that the rationale advanced for this argument was the precedent of earlier publiclyfunded works, but they did not accept this argument. They found that building coastal defensive
structures was a discretionary power available to public authorities, and apart from ‘a few
specific instances’, there was no binding legal obligation on public authorities in the UK to
defend all lands affected by erosion.1684 They noted that ‘social justice’ considerations did not
form part of the then current decision-making processes for coastal management in the UK,
1676

Ibid 295. Cooper and McKenna cited A. Dobson, Justice and the Environment (Oxford UP 1998)
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 295. Cooper and McKenna cited the work of Miller (1999),
Dobson (1999) and Hardin (1987).
1678
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 295. This idea was not raised by adversely affected residents.
1679
Ibid. This view was expressed in submissions to a government policy paper Making Space for Water.
1680
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 297. These calls cited articles in the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the protection of private property and private property
rights. However the authors noted the Convention permitted private property to be alienated where this
was in the public interest, had been lawfully authorized and achieved ‘a fair balance between public
interests and private rights.’
1681
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 295.
1682
Ibid 295.
1683
Ibid 296. They report that “the nature of the intervention, is immaterial to the general argument”.
1684
Ibid 296. Cooper and McKenna cited Pettit 1999, Defra 2003).
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which were “overwhelmingly economic in scope”, and observed that they were, potentially,
much wider than benefits to coastal landowners.1685
In their analysis Cooper and McKenna considered different forms of ‘public intervention’ in
these analyses: building (and maintaining) hard defensive structures, or soft engineering
options; and compensating private landowners adversely affected by coastal erosion,1686 but
recognized that all these options required public funds.1687 They contrasted these ‘public
funding’ options with landowners having to “bear the costs of their own misfortune”.1688

(b) Local level, short-term perspective

In their review of a local level, short-term perspective, Cooper and McKenna rejected the ‘crude
equality argument’, of “if done for one, then done for all”, observing that public authorities
needed to be able to reconsider public policy, and re-allocate funds to address new
circumstances, and would be justified in doing so where there was a ‘general good or public
interest’ rationale for the policy.1689
In noting landowners’ personal responsibility “to plan for the inevitable”, since many areas have
been known to be susceptible to coastal erosion for centuries,1690 Cooper and McKenna rebutted
the primary narrative in the ‘social justice’ argument: that the landowner is an innocent
bystander, suffering ‘misfortune’ due to unforeseen acts of nature, and seemingly illogical
changes in public policy made by remote, uncaring public authorities. In contrast, the authors
asserted that owners should be aware of the hazards of their land, and have a personal
responsibility to avoid risks, not perpetuate them, by remaining in harm’s way. They observed
that “typically privileged coastal dwellers” enjoy considerable benefits from their coastal real
estate, and reside there by their own choice. 1691
Cooper and McKenna acknowledged major adverse impacts of hard structures,1692 and soft
defences,1693 on public interest values of the coast, but found assessments of impacts from a
1685

Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 296. As well as higher property values accruing to coastal
residents, Cooper and McKenna noted that many visitors to the coast come to ‘enjoy coastal resources’.
1686
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 297 – 302.
1687
Ibid 298. Such as the construction of ‘hard’ works such as seawalls, groynes and revetments, and
‘soft’ options such as beach nourishment, or acquisition of affected lands by the government.
1688
Ibid 297.
1689
Ibid 298.
1690
Ibid.
1691
Ibid. The major benefit to the land owner is ‘a substantial capital gain … with the value of the
property being enhanced due to its protection”.
1692
Ibid. Immediate adverse impacts of hard structures were said to be ‘essentially’ fiscal since such
structures are expensive to construct and require on-going maintenance. Short-term adverse
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local, short-term perspective made cursory appraisals of only ‘immediate’ or short-term costs or
adverse effects.1694 They also explored the ‘social justice’ argument for landowners to be compensated with public funds, if changes to public policy ‘damage’ their expectations of public
intervention, but they found these calls had no basis in law, since ‘the public good prevails’.1695
They noted potential costs and benefits from any public intervention, and were frank that
benefits would mostly accrue to private landowners, while costs, and adverse impacts on ‘public
interests’, would be mainly borne by the public, into the future.1696 They concluded that
landowners who had already benefited from public funding, did not have a ‘social justice’
argument for more public spending for their private benefit.1697
Cooper and McKenna summarized the costs and benefits where ‘the principle of public intervention was rejected’ and found that if ‘the natural sedimentary system is free to adjust to
changing energy levels, sediment supply and sea level change with no loss to society as a
whole’. But they noted that owners of affected private land would face a short-term, perhaps
substantial, financial set-back, ‘if they have not made provision for the impending loss’.1698

(c) Regional level, long-term perspective

In their review of a regional level, long-term perspective, Cooper and McKenna expanded their
consideration of ‘social justice’ arguments to “broader spatial and temporal scales”1699 and
identified other current and future coastal users whose interests also needed to be considered.1700

They also found a range of long-term adverse environmental impacts of hard defensive
structures,1701 and soft defence options,1702 whose costs to the public were often overlooked or

environmental impacts of loss of scenic quality, loss / difficulty of access (Clayton, 1993) loss of
resilience to storm attack and reduction in sediment supply (Pontee et al, 2004) were also reported.
1693
Soft defences include beach nourishment, but these activities are not free from adverse environmental
impacts. Cooper and McKenna reported “impoverished fauna and flora compared to natural beaches
(Speybroek et al 2006)”, but did not discuss the adverse impacts of the recovery of the sand used for
nourishment, or the short life of most nourishment activities, necessitating repeated episodes of
nourishment.
1694
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 298. Medium term impacts of “beach narrowing, loss of
sediment elsewhere, loss of amenity, loss of natural habitat” … “do not feature in short-term social
justice arguments”.
1695
Ibid 300. This conclusion referred to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.
1696
Ibid. Costs would include the costs of construction and ongoing maintenance, which effectively ‘lock
in’ the public purse to pay the costs of unlimited future upgrades.
1697
Ibid.
1698
Ibid. Further, they recognised ‘additional impacts’ of an intangible nature such as uncertainty, stress,
loss of community spirit, and mistrust of authorities, and saw the benefits of this approach as preserving
beaches, natural coastal landscapes, functioning coastal ecosystems and amenity of the coast.
1699
Ibid.
1700
Ibid. These included non-resident coastal users, property owners on adjacent coasts, and future
generations of users and residents.
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discounted.1703 Further, they reported that costs of building, maintaining and upgrading coastal
defensive structures, could ‘lock in’ long-term future public funding for works of largely private
benefit, limiting the options available for future management of coastal hazards.1704 The authors
acknowledged the ‘finite lifespan’ of seawalls, that their design limits would likely be exceeded
under climate change conditions, and were frank about likely future costs1705 and environmental
impacts,1706 warning of a ‘false sense of security’ when developing coastal lands assumed to be
‘protected’ by a sea-wall.1707 When they considered the likely consequences ‘if the coast is
allowed to fluctuate freely’ they found ‘no long-term adverse impact’ on the coastal
environment, but ‘a direct cost’ to landowners affected by erosion.1708 They found a one-off
compensation payment to landowners would not ‘solve the problem’, and compensation could
continue indefinitely, as the shoreline continued to retreat.1709 The authors concluded that
‘defending the coast’ was undesirable from financial, recreational amenity and environmental
perspectives, and inappropriately encouraged development in unsuitable places,1710 and posited
that at the regional level ‘there is a stronger argument for non-intervention’.1711

(d) Scale considerations in social justice

Cooper and McKenna found that scale affected social justice, declaring there were ‘clearly
different perspectives depending on the spatial and temporal scales considered’, which had
‘implications for sustainability’.1712 They highlighted the discounting of adverse impacts and
costs to the public under a local level short-term perspective,1713 and emphasized the ethical
imperative for including inter-generational considerations, including future costs, in any longerterm perspective of social justice.1714 Further, they noted that the extent and cost of adverse
environmental impacts increased substantially, at larger temporal and spatial scales, and the
Ibid 301. The adverse impacts of these ‘hard’ sea defences include narrowing and loss of beaches, the
segmentation of the beach into short compartments, ‘coastal squeeze’, changes in wave patterns and
interruptions to natural sediment flows, with ‘knock-on effects for areas of human activity’.
1702
Ibid. ‘Soft’ defence options of “beach recharge / nourishment” needed to be ‘ongoing’ and continue
indefinitely to maintain an eroding beach, and could generate adverse impacts: reduced ecological value
of nourished beaches, unsustainable sources of sand supply; and extraction impacts on source areas.
1703
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 302.
1704
Ibid 300. They posited that ‘the present generation continues to bear the financial (and environmental)
cost of the widespread coastal engineering of the Victorian era.’
1705
Ibid. ‘… the cost associated with the maintenance of coastal defences will certainly increase.”
1706
Ibid 301. These include: narrowing and loss of beaches, exacerbated sediment loss (erosion), coastal
squeeze, interruptions to coastal sediment supply, with a host of ‘knock-on effects’.
1707
Ibid 300-301.
1708
Ibid 301-2.
1709
Ibid 301. See estimates of value of lands at risk from climate change in Australian Government,
Climate, above 44, 71-134.
1710
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 302.
1711
Ibid. …based on the ‘scale of the costs to contemporary society and future generations’.
1712
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 302.
1713
Ibid.
1714
Ibid 304.
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number of adversely affected non-resident beach users outnumbered the landowners in any
‘local level perspective’, concluding that at these larger scales, the moral force of social justice
arguments was greatly reduced.1715

(e) Social justice and sustainability

Relevantly, Cooper and McKenna discussed the relationship between ‘social justice’ and
‘sustainability’, observing that initally they thought that ‘the two concepts would always be
compatible’, but that tensions ‘have since arisen’, due to differences in the temporal and spatial
scales used. They asserted that in coastal erosion management ‘the two converge at large
temporal and spatial scales’, where ‘social justice arguments lend support to the goal of
environmental sustainability’.1716

However, they concluded that when framed using small temporal and spatial scales, social
justice arguments “oppose” sustainability.1717 They found the ‘social justice’ argument strongest
at a local level, but it was weakened by ‘personal responsibility’ factors,1718 its failure to
consider long-term impacts, and substantial environmental and financial costs to the public, and
future generations.1719 The authors also found that ‘social justice’ considerations could
contribute to sustainability, if viewed at longer term and greater spatial scales,1720 and
highlighted the willingness of decision-makers ‘not to foreclose options for future generations’
as a ‘central tenet of sustainability’.1721 Significantly, they endorsed ‘social justice’ as a
potentially useful concept because it would extend considerations beyond ‘the traditional
economic and emerging environmental arguments’, highlight ‘an additional range of
considerations’, and improve decision-making about coastal management in the UK.1722
Cooper and McKenna concluded with an appeal for a ‘major change in public attitudes’ toward
publicly funded sea defences, and an end to the nourishment ‘addiction’, and called for ‘an open
and informed discussion’ of social justice perspectives, as an aid to ‘breaking the cycle of construction and defence followed by yet more construction into which society is often locked.’1723

Ibid 303. “…to the realm of ‘ideological intimidation’ (Novak, 2000) at worst and wishful thinking at
best.”
1716
Ibid 305.
1717
Ibid.
1718
Ibid 303.
1719
Ibid 302.
1720
Ibid 305.
1721
Ibid 304.
1722
Ibid 305.
1723
Ibid.
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Cooper and McKenna’s identification of future generations as interested parties who deserve
consideration, is relevant, as is their warning of the substantial economic burden on future
taxpayers from decisions made to ‘lock in’ public funding for ineffective structures, into the
future. Their conclusion that at large spatial and temporal scales ‘social justice’ considerations
can contribute to the sustainability of decision-making about coastal lands, is also relevant.
Most useful is their finding that at micro scales, social justice arguments are inconsistent with
sustainability. Their review suggests several criteria suitable for use in assessing the merits of
the potential responses by government in Chapter VII, and their likelihood in Chapter VIII.
Having outlined philosophical approaches which could influence future government policy, or
legislative support for it, I next identify, in Part C, appropriate criteria for use in later chapters.

Part C. Criteria derived from the literature
In this last Part I derive the three sets of criteria identified in Part A, required for the further
analyses needed to evaluate the merits of potential responses as decisions about future use of
land, and as public policy in Chapter VII, and to ascertain their likelihood, in Chapter VIII.

7. Decision-making about future use of land
From my review of the literature regarding land management, it became clear that the work of
Eric T Freyfogle was extensive, authoritative, and highly relevant to my research area. His
ethical approach to decision making about future land use, which emphasizes consideration of
the particulars of place, addresses a primary criticism of property theory applied to land: its
conceptual ‘dephysicalization’ of real property, creating a ‘placelessness’ which enables the
commodification, and sadly often the degradation of land.
Further, his many articles reflect a mature analysis, which has investigated and rejected
unhelpful claims about property and private property rights and identified and integrated
multiple relevant considerations into a coherent ethical framework for making decisions about
the future use of land, which recognises the diverse personal and social purposes of owning
land, but aims to avoid its degradation.
Using Freyfogle’s ethical approach, those making decisions about the future use of private or
public land, ought to consider potential impacts and benefits on five matters: the land’s physical
characteristics and condition; the social community in which it is situated; the ecological
community which inhabits it; possible effects over time; and its contribution to key social goals.
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Because they comprise an integrated ethical framework for decision making about future land
use, I adopt these five considerations as criteria to evaluate the merits of potential responses by
a future government to increasing conflicts between competing rights in Chapter VII. In these
assessments potential responses will be evaluated by testing whether they are compatible with,
and or have adequately considered the land’s: i] physical character; ii] social impacts; iii]
ecological impacts; iv] effects over time; and v] social value.
Each of these matters is justified by Freyfogle as part of this coherent ethical framework, but
importantly they have corresponding justifications as highly relevant considerations, in the
property theory, common law rules, case law, statutes and literature considered above.
In the next sections I explain the relevance of each criterion, refer to relevant justifications in
these primary and secondary sources which support their selection, and frame focus questions
for their use in assessing the merits of the seven potential responses of a future government.

I] physical characteristics. This criterion has been adopted as an essential consideration to
ground the discussion in land, overcome the pitfall of ‘dephysicalizing’ real property, avoid the
‘placelessness’ of property in land in theoretical discussions, and prevent decisions which will
lead to land degradation if they are ignored.1724 The physical attributes of coastal land are
extensive and include its location, size, shape, aspect, substrate, topography, hydrology,
boundaries and condition, and especially its vulnerability to physical impacts such as coastal
erosion. These attributes, and their significance for future land use, vary from site to site, but all
these characteristics are highly relevant facts, which should be taken into consideration in
decision about the land’s suitability for the proposed future use.1725
The adoption of ‘physical characteristics’ as a relevant criterion which should be considered in
decisions about the future use of coastal land is supported by existing common law rules,1726
case law,1727 and current statutes,1728 and commentary in the published literature.1729

Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 649; Graham, above n 235, 44 191-2.
Freyfogle, ‘Particulars’, above n 360, 585, Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 645-6.
1726
See the outline of the ‘doctrine of accretion’ in Chapter II.
1727
the physical effects of the doctrine of accretion on coastal land were core to the decision in EPA v
Leaghur Pty Ltd (1995) discussed in Chapter III.
1728
see for eg the duty to consider environmental impacts under s 5.5, the obligation to require and
consider an environmental impacts statement (EIS) under s 5.7; the need to declare the presence of
‘coastal hazards’ in planning certificates under s10.7 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1729
Alexander et al, ‘A Statement of progressive Property’ (2008) 94 Cornell Law Review, 743, 744;
Graham, above n 235, 190-3.
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Relevant considerations for this criterion would include answers to these focus questions:
Have the land’s characteristics (including its soil properties, seasonal temperature and humidity
ranges, rainfall, wind exposure, aspect, position in catchment; fire history) its carrying capacity
and natural limitations, been properly considered?

II] social community. In this ethical framework the impacts of decisions about future land use
ought to consider – and where possible avoid - any adverse impacts on the social community.1730
However, who is part of this social community may be defined narrowly, or inclusively.
Freyfogle nominates the typical social community within which most rural landowners are
situated as including adjoining neighbours, others downhill, downstream, or downwind, nonowner residents nearby, members of the public, and future generations.1731
But for many privately owned coastal lands the social community is more complex and
dynamic. As well as neighbours, it includes the managers of adjacent public lands, members of
the public, domestic visitors, and often international tourists. Further, since economy activity is
a social function, the social community of many coastal lands includes the customers and
proprietors of coastal businesses and industries which depend to some extent on public access to
and use of coastal lands and waters.

Support for using the consideration of impacts or benefits on the social community as a relevant
criterion is found in property theory,1732 case law,1733 in current statutes,1734 and the literature.1735
Focus questions for this criterion are: Could there be adverse impacts on neighbours, residents
nearby, members of the public, or future generations? What could be done to prevent this?
III] ecological community. In Freyfogle’s framework, recognising and minimising any
possible adverse impacts on the ecological community using or inhabiting a particular allotment
of land is an important ethical duty of landowners. Identifying the ecological community on
their lands may be relatively easy for rural residents but more difficult for coastal landowners
where, as well as obvious native flora and fauna, the ecological community potentially affected
Freyfogle, ‘Particulars’, above n 360, 579-81.
Freyfogle, ‘Property’, above n 201, 84-7.
1732
See Hohfeld, above n 406, 718-9, discussed above.
1733
The impacts on others in the social community were recognised by the courts in Blundell v Catterall
(1821), Hudson v Tabor (1877), AG v Tomline (1880), discussed in Chapter III. See also Ralph Lauren
v TCPNSW [2018] NSW LEC 207.
1734
See s 6(2) POEAA 1991, which requires ‘the integration of social, economic and environmental
considerations in decision-making processes’, and principle of ‘intergenerational equity’ defined under
s 6(2)(b) POEAA 1991 as part of the principles of ecologically sustainable development (ESD).
1735
See Freyfogle, ‘Property, above n 84, Rose, ‘Comedy’, above n 235, Babie above n 18-21.
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by their decisions about future land use may include cryptic intertidal invertebrates or
seasonally migratory species dependent on the beach or dunes for feeding roosting and nesting
sites. For some lands and land uses, the ecological community potentially affected would
include species inhabiting adjacent estuarine waters.
Inclusion of this criterion is also justified by other ethical property theorists who recognise the
moral responsibility of landowners to respect the ‘non-human world’.1736 Consideration of
potential ecological impacts is also supported by the mandatory requirements of current statute
law regarding application of the principles of ecologically sustainable development,1737 also the
requirement to consider impacts on threatened species,1738 the ‘duty’ of public authorities1739 and
consent authorities to consider potential environmental impacts in their decisions.1740

Focus questions for this criterion are: How will the land use approved by this potential response
affect those diverse forms of non-human life in coastal land and environs, including native
plants and animals, and introduced species? Will it increase or decrease the area of habitat?

IV] temporal factors. Freyfogle identified several ways in which the effects of time might be
considered in decision making about future land use. While short-term impacts may be easily
recognised, he urged landowners to also consider long term effects, including natural processes
and the cumulative impacts of intensive use on land condition and suitability for future use.1741
This factor is highly relevant to the lands in focus in this thesis, since the long term effects of
natural processes, exacerbated by climate change, will create major impacts on coastal lands
affected by coastal hazards, potentially rendering them unsafe for continued residential use.

Adopting the consideration of temporal effects as a relevant criterion which to assess the merits
of potential government policies on the future use of coastal land is corroborated by the
common law rules governing the movement of property boundaries,1742 recognised in relevant
case law,1743 and by the provisions of numerous current statutes which require it.1744

1736

Alexander et al, above n 1729, 744, Babie, above n 323, 15-24, Graham, above n 235, 183-202.
See the principles of ESD defined under s6(2) POEAA 1991, and especially s6(2)(c) which requires
the ‘conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity’. See also s 3 CMA 2016 which
requires coastal management to be consistent with the principles of ecological sustainable development;
and Object (a) which requires land managers to protect ‘…biological diversity and ecosystem integrity
and resilience’.
1738
Under s 3.25 EPAA 1979.
1739
Under s 5.5 EPAA 1979.
1740
Under s 5.7 EPAA 1979.
1741
See Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 645-6, 653.
1742
See the outline of the doctrine of accretion in Chapter II.
1743
The movement of the high water mark over time was a key issue in EPA v Leaghur Pty Ltd (1995).
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Useful focus questions for the use of this criterion are: What are the possible long term effects
of the potential response? Could any long-term opportunities, adverse impacts or ongoing costs
be generated or accumulated over decades or generations?

V] social value. The use of private land so that it does more than satisfy the personal interests of
the landowner and contributes to the achievement of wider social goals is essential in the view
of Freyfogle,1745 if private property is to be seen as morally legitimate.1746 He nominated ‘the
recovery of land health’ as a key social goal which landowners ought to work to achieve
through their land use.1747 Other theorists concur with the general point and suggest worthy
alternative social purposes for the private ownership of land which might be pursued.1748
Adopting consideration of the responses’ social value, in furthering social goals or achieving
social purposes through the use of land, as a relevant criterion has support in the case law,
where the achievement of social goals was found relevant and binding.1749 Considering ‘social
purpose’ is also supported by provisions which state the overall social purpose of coastal land
management, and a range of important social objectives which land managers should pursue.1750
More generally, use of this criterion is supported by provisions in current statutes which require
public authorities to state the ‘public purpose’ being achieved when they take action.1751
Focus questions for this criterion are: Does the potential response contribute to achieving wider
social goals? What is the extent, or value, of this contribution?

I employ these criteria for ethical land management in Chapter VII when I assess the merits of
the potential responses to conflicts between competing rights, which could be adopted by a
future State government.

For eg see the ‘precautionary principle’ under s 6(2)(a) POEAA 1991, which requires timely action to
prevent foreseeable ‘environmental degradation’, and the ‘principle of intergenerational equity’ under s
6(2)(b) POEAA 1991, which requires consideration of potential impacts on ‘future generations’; see
also the need to consider likely future impacts on the environment under ss 5.5, 5.7 EPAA 1979.
1745
Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 652.
1746
Freyfogle, ‘Private Rights’, above n 356, 277-8.
1747
Freyfogle, ‘Ownership’, above n 193, 1289-92.
1748
Alexander et al, above n 1729,744 propose the overall social goal of ‘full social and political
participation’ within ‘a free and democratic society’.
1749
see Falkner v Gisborne DC [1995], Durham Holdings (2001), Worimi LALC v Minister administering
Crown Lands Act (1991), Minister v NSW Aboriginal Land Council (Goomallee Claim) [2012].
1750
See s 3 Objects of the CMA 2016, and the purposes of Crown land management in s 1.3 CLMA 2016.
1751
To dedicate or reserve Crown land, see ss 2.3, 2.8 CLMA 2016; to refuse an Aboriginal land claim,
see ss 36(1)(c), 36(5)(b) ALRA 1983; to acquire private land, see ss 5, 11-12 LAJTCA 1991; and create
easements over private land, see ss 88A, 88B CA 1919.
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However, a second set of criteria are required to assess their merits as ‘public policy’. I discuss
the identification of suitable criteria for this task next.
8. Successful ‘public policy’
Though a ready-made set of criteria suitable for assessing the merits of policy options as
‘successful public policy’ were not identified in the literature reviewed, approaches to and
factors involved in developing public policy are cited in the Australian Policy Handbook.1752
This text, and the literature it canvasses, suggest several key considerations which would be
appropriate to adopt as criteria with which to assess the potential responses’ merits as
‘successful public policy’.

To supplement this source, and to ground its generic, in principle advice on public policy
development in assessing the merits of policy options for future coastal management, I intend to
also refer closely to the review by Cooper and McKenna,1753 discussed above.

Since Cooper and McKenna described the decisions of public authorities in the UK which
constitute public policy, discussed the history of the public policy on coastal management in the
United Kingdom since the 19th century, 1754 and made some observations on the substance of the
decision making processes on coastal management in the UK,1755 their review also suggests
criteria suitable for assessing the potential responses’ merits as ‘successful public policy’.

Drawing on their review, the norms of public policy development outlined by Althaus et al, the
property theory, case law, statutes and literature canvassed above and my personal observations
of government policy initiatives over many years, I was able to identify, pragmatically, a set of
criteria relevant to the merits of public policy, which suit my purposes. It is apparent that public
policy is successful when it is clearly justified, timely, cost-effective, least disruptive, and
credible. Hence, I have adopted these five qualities as appropriate criteria for evaluating the
merits of the suite of potential policy responses as public policy.

In the following sections I describe the criteria selected, refer to corroboration for its selection
as an assessment criterion in the literature, case law and statutes considered, and outline how a
potential response might rate well or poorly against the criterion. Relevant focus questions to

1752

Althaus et al, above n 163.
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123.
1754
Ibid 296, discuss the history of the public policy on coastal management in England and Wales since
the 19th century.
1755
That decisions primarily used economic considerations. See Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 304.
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address when I assess the potential responses satisfaction of each criterion are stated.
I] Public interest justification. This criterion focuses on the reasons given for the public policy.
Typically, it involves a public statement by the responsible government minister, of the problem
or issue of public concern that the new policy is intended to address. This statement usually
refers to the public interest benefits which the policy aims to achieve and may acknowledge and
explain any ‘trade-off’ involved, where a diminution in other public interests is necessary to
achieve the intended ‘greater good’. Further, the rationale for a new policy may be as part of a
government response to events which were beyond government control. In any case it is the
strength of the logic and the coherency of the justification for the new policy as in the public
interest which is important. A rationale for a new policy framed with a claim it will achieve a
remote or indirect public benefit, when the policy undermines other public interests or confers
major private benefits, would be seen as an inadequate, implausible or misleading justification.
Explaining a public policy’s benefits to the public interest is crucial because it provides the
moral justification necessary to authorize spending of public funds and allocate agency staff.
Further, the statement of outcomes the policy aims to achieve should be an essential element of
the plan to implement the policy and inform the actions of the responsible agency’s staff.
A response with a coherent public interest justification which explains the policy’s origin,
development and refinement, its alignment with best practice and expert opinion would rate
highly against this criterion. A response which has a weak or implausible justification, or which
is incompatible with the ‘public interest’ would rate poorly against this criterion. 1756

That a coherent statement of its public interest justification is an essential part of a public policy
is corroborated by its recognition as a central element in public administration in the
literature,1757 property law theory,1758 case law1759 and statutes1760 considered above.
Focus questions for this criterion may include: What is the policy’s public interest rationale?

Such policies would risk being seen as ‘morally illegitimate and socially unwise’. See Freyfogle, ‘On
Private Property, above n 1607, 124; Freyfogle, ‘Private Rights’, above n 356, 277-8.
1757
See Freyfogle, ‘Eight’, above n 202, 788; Althaus et al, above n 163, 62, 82-3.
1758
Blackstone’s Commentaries, above n 580, stresses the importance of the public purpose in overriding
private property rights to acquire private land (see vol 2, 2-11).
1759
For eg see Falkner v Gisborne DC [1995] in which the court found that the public interest purposes of
the Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ) were relevant considerations, which authorised the Council’s
decisions and justified overriding the landowners’ claimed property right to defend against the sea. See
also the importance of the public purpose of creating a new national park, underpinning the decision to
terminate coal leases, in Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v NSW [2001] also discussed in Chapter III.
1760
See the Objects of the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW) and the need to state the relevant
‘public purpose’ under statutes to acquire private land and create easements discussed in Chapter IV.
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How well has this been explained? Is it evidence-based? How will it achieve a ‘greater good’?

II] Timeliness. This criterion relates to the perceived responsiveness of government to an
identified public policy issue. It involves the early identification of emerging issues of public
interest or concern, anticipating their possible social, economic and ecological implications,
research into and development of a range of possible public policy responses to address and, if
possible, ameliorate likely impacts, the selection the policy response deemed most appropriate,
and its implementation, before, or as, the issue become acute, or a key deadline is reached.1761

Often timeliness is part of the crisis management of unforeseen issues by governments in which
being seen to respond promptly to a public concern is the main goal. Regrettably, rapid
reactions to unforeseen problems or acute episodes of wicked problems can produce decisions
which, though timely, may be ineffective, harm other interests, or prove counterproductive.1762

Hence this criterion is not about minimizing the time required by government to make and
implement a policy decision, so much as about taking the right amount of time to identify,
develop, consult, refine, and plan for the implementation of new public policy, so that it is ready
to address the perceived public concern, when assistance is needed, without undue delay.1763
This criterion has implications for the public’s perception of the competence of the relevant
agency and minister. Hence, if issues of public concern are not recognised promptly, or policy
responses are too slow being developed, adopted or implemented to be ready when needed, the
lack of ‘timeliness’ may damage the government’s electoral support.

Timeliness also has implications which extend beyond decision making to the implementation
of public policy responses by government agencies through programs of action. Though the
announcement of the policy may be timely, the real proof of the timeliness of policies, is the
time required to deliver the policy on the ground. Often this implementation involves the
allocation of committed funds, integration and co-ordination of actions by several state
government agencies, in co-operation with local councils and other public authorities, nongovernment organisations, institutions, business entities, to achieve the desired policy goal.1764

Public policies would be seen as timely if they quickly identify issues of public interest concern,

1761

The IPCC stresses the need for timely action by governments to reduce C0 2 emissions, to keep global
warming below 1.50C by 2100, see IPCC, Special Report on Oceans &the Cryosphere, above n 45.
1762
Althaus et al, above n 163, 54. See also Australian Public Service Commission, Tackling Wicked
Problems: A Public Policy Perspective (Australian Government, 2007).
1763
Althaus et al, above n 163, 159.
1764
Ibid 125-141, 159-160.
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have taken appropriate steps inside government to consult, develop, cost, refine, and adopt the
policy and realistic plans have been prepared for its implementation.

A lack of timeliness would be evident in a slowness or refusal by government to recognise that a
public concern requires a public policy response, an ignorance of or lack of planning to meet a
looming deadline, poor or mal-alignment of agency roles, use of simplistic assumptions about
what is needed, or unrealistic demands of timelines, which produce unanticipated delays in
preparing, selecting, adopting and implementing the policy. Hence though the announcement
may be ‘timely’, a rushed decision on an ill-considered policy, whose implementation then stalls
because it has not been thought through or effectively organised, would not been seen as timely.
A government policy response that recognizes an issue as a public policy concern only after
escalating acute episodes, or growing social and political protests, would not be seen as timely.
Even a well-developed, highly rational, scientifically credible policy response whose adoption
or implementation was seen to be unduly delayed (for whatever reason) and came well after it
was needed, would not be perceived as ‘timely’ and would rate poorly under this criterion.
The notion of public policy needing to be ‘timely’ if it is to be successful, is well recognised in
the literature,1765 in the cases1766 considered, and in the statutes1767 discussed in Chapter IV.

The focus questions for this criterion include: Is the response unduly delayed? Or rushed and ill
considered? Has time for consultation and legislative authorization been factored in? Could poor
process in developing, testing and modifying policy proposals cause problems or delays?

III] Cost-effectiveness. This criterion relates to the ratio of public benefit, or positive effect on
the common good, of a policy option, against its imposts on the public’s interests and costs to
the public purse.1768 It is a private sector concept, focused on the effectiveness of spending,
which now drives scrutiny of the funding, staffing and programs of many public authorities. It
involves estimates of the likely value of foreseen future ‘positives’ and ‘negatives’, but as well
as their quantum, the scope of factors considered can dramatically affect the outcome of the
analysis. The tangible benefits from and direct costs of a policy option may be easy to identify
and take into account, but claimed future benefits may be unrealized or overstated and timeframes and projections of future cost may prove to be drastic under-estimations. Intangible
See the view of Michael Keating, that policy advice should be ‘timely, forward looking’, cited in
Althaus et al, above n 163, 64.
1766
The need for timely action to implement a decision to build a bridge was argued, unsuccessfully, as a
defence in York Bros (Trading) v Commissioner of Main Roads (1983) discussed in Chapter II.
1767
See the need for timely action to prevent irreversible harm to the environment mandated by the
precautionary principle, in s 6 (2)(a) POEAA 1991 (NSW).
1768
See Althaus et al, above n 163, 72-4.
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benefits and especially intangible ‘costs’ may by noted, but not integrated into the value of
public interests likely to be affected, or overlooked entirely, in a dry narrowly-focused
economic analysis.
Cost-effectiveness can also vary over time, but it is often calculated using electoral cycles.
This criterion is not the same as ‘cost’, since it is a ratio of ‘benefits’ against ‘costs’. Once-only
low cost policies could rate highly for their cost-effectiveness if the benefits of the initial public
spending are immediate and seen to be enduring.1769 Higher cost policies could also achieve a
high cost-effectiveness ratio over time if carefully planned, all relevant public benefits and
potential costs were identified and credible estimates of their ‘value’ were considered, as long
term public benefits were realised and foreseen costs were minimised or avoided. Higher cost
policies would have a mid to low cost-effectiveness rating if the intended public benefits were
narrowly focused, in fact minor, limited or temporary.

This concept reflects the moral obligation impliedly placed on governments by their taxpaying
citizens, that public funds be efficiently spent to achieve public benefits. 1770 It recognises that
there are many competing public interests seeking public funding, and that to make decisions to
allocate scarce resources, as well as a coherent public interest rationale, decision makers in
government need a method of comparing competing proposals for public funds expenditure. 1771

The use of this concept as a criterion with which to assess the merits of potential responses by
government is supported by references to it in the literature,1772 case law1773and statutes.1774
Focus questions for this criterion would be: Do the public funds, and public officials’ time to
implement the response, represent value for public money? Do the public funds achieve socially
useful outcomes? Are public funds locked in, or available for reallocation if needed?1775

IV] Minimal disruption. This criterion focuses on the possible adverse impacts of introducing
new public policy on existing policy by creating delays, new procedures, extra costs, greater
limits or prohibitions on prior practice, but it would also include the impacts of confusion and

1769

See Cooper and McKenna, above n 163, 304.
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 300, 304, discuss defensive structures’ cost-effectiveness.
1771
See Althaus et al, above n 163, 73. The IPCC’s AR5 compares the cost-effectiveness of options for
climate change mitigation. See IPCC, Climate Change 2014, above n 1420, SPM 4.3, 27-28.
1772
Althaus et al, above n 163, 37-42.
1773
The ‘cost-effectiveness’ of the government’s compensation arrangements under the authorising Act,
for loss of access to coal leases, was discussed in Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001).
1774
See the ESD principle of using economic instruments to achieve environmental protection, in s
6(2)(c) POEAA 1991 (NSW) discussed above.
1775
See Cooper and Mc Kenna, above n 123, 298, 302, 305.
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uncertainty while the new policy is implemented. 1776 It includes the disruption of elements of
law, procedures of public administration and the operation of related social and economic
enterprises, including the expectations of stakeholders with social or economic interests.1777 At
another level it also relates to disruptive impacts on healthy, functioning ecosystems.1778

This criterion does not equate with minimalist change: in theory, even a major change in public
policy is possible with minimal disruption,1779 if it is well designed, well explained and plans are
prepared to enable its proper implementation.1780

An important distinction is recognised however, between planned and unplanned disruptions. In
a rational policy development process an early step would be identifying the elements of law,
procedures, and operations potentially affected by the policy, adversely or beneficially, either
intentionally or coincidentally, so that the policy can be developed to target intended effects and
designed to avoid or minimise other possible coincidental disruptions.1781 A government’s
capacity to minimize the new public policy’s anticipated disruption ie the impacts of its
intended changes, would be assisted by clearly stating the public goals it is pursuing, explaining
its effects on prior policies, laws, procedures and operations, retraining agency staff, creating
transition measures to allow time for adjustment; and setting a date for the policy to commence.

However, it is possible that unplanned disruption could also occur, especially if the process of
policy development has been telescoped into a very short period or overlooked entirely. Where
unforeseen applications of the policy become apparent, unintended consequences affect otherwise unaffected parties, new procedures prove complicated or costly, and create unanticipated
delays and extra costs, the level of disruption would increase. If many unplanned disruptions
arose from a new public policy, it could create confusion, heighten uncertainty, undermine
business confidence, and erode public support for the government.
The adoption of ‘minimise disruption’ as a suitable criterion with which to assess the merits of
public policy is corroborated by its recognition in the literature,1782 case law,1783 and statutes.1784

Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 300 discussed the disruption of landowners’ expectations of
continued public funding of defensive structures.
1777
It is due to the potential for disruption that many public policy changes proceed by small incremental
steps. See Althaus et al, above n 163, 83.
1778
See the duty to consider adverse impacts on the environment, including disruptions of ecosystems,
under s 5.5 EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1779
For eg the introduction of decimal currency in 1966, recognition of Native Title in 1993.
1780
An implementation plan should be developed with the policy. See Althaus et al, above n 163, 159.
1781
Althaus et al, above n 163, 77.
1782
Freyfogle, ‘Owning the land’, above n 310, 306 noted the need to minimize disruption when property
laws change.
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Relevant focus questions would be: How much disruption might adopting the policy response
cause? Could unforeseen effects, outcomes or unproductive transitional costs be incurred? What
would it take to change existing laws, regulations or other texts to reflect the ‘new’ policy?

V] Credibility. This criterion refers to how the potential responses under review would be likely
to be regarded by the public, the media, local councils, coastal land managers and experts in
related fields. 1785 It relates to the intellectual substance of the public policy: the basis for it in
the evidence of recent research, its integration of the latest information and analysis, alignment
with best professional practice and consistency with expert opinion in the literature.1786

Beyond these assessments of scientific and technical credibility, this criterion also relates to the
responses’ consistency with existing social and cultural norms: public policy positions which
are largely consistent with existing norms1787 would be seen as credible, and vice versa.1788
Further, ‘credibility’ has a prosaic use assessing the ‘practical achievability’ of potential
responses. Though meritorious in theory, a public policy without funding and a plan for its
practical implementation may not be seen as credible. Supported by a strategic plan that shows
how the policy will be funded, can be feasibly introduced and implemented, monitored and if
necessary adjusted, would maximize a response’s credibility.1789
Corroboration of the significance of ‘credibility’ for successful public policy and its suitability
as a criterion for assessing the merits of potential responses as successful public policy is
provided by its recognition and use in the literature,1790 and case law1791 considered above.

1783

The disruption of a shipbuilding business and the creation of a public nuisance to public navigation
along a tidal river, caused by the policy of constructing bridges to replace ferry services, was the source
of the legal action in York Brothers v Commissioner of Main Roads [1983] 1 NSWLR 391. See Chapter
II. See also Ralph Lauren PL v TCP NSW [2018] NSW LEC 207 in which the court refused consent for
a seawall because of its unreasonable limitation (ie disruption) on public access to and along the beach.
1784
See the prohibition on unreasonable limiting (ie disruption) of public access to and along the
foreshore under s 55M(10)(a) CPA 1979 and s 27(1) CMA 2016 discussed in Chapter IV.
1785
As noted in Chapter I, affected stakeholders would include the beach-using non-residents, beachfront
landowners, researchers and academics and proprietors of coast based businesses.
1786
See the discussion of evidence based policy in Althaus et al, above n 163, 67-71.
1787
These norms include the recognised elements of property theory, property law rules, common law
decisions and the explicit provisions of current statutes, which were examined in Chapters II, III and IV.
1788
In Durham (2001) [14], [57], the court evaluated the credibility of the claim that a common law right
to compensation existed, and concluded that not one example had been cited to support the argument.
1789
See the observation of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) “there’s no point in having good ideas if they
cannot be carried out”, quoted in Althaus et al, above n 163, 167.
1790
Althaus et al, above n 163, 67-71. Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 303 quote Novak’s analysis of
the credibility of UK landowners’ calls for social justice in coastal management as ‘ideological
intimidation’ at worst, and wishful thinking at best’.
1791
In Falkner v Gisborne DC [1995], 632, the court assessed the credibility of landowners’ claims of
dominant property rights against the aims and provisions of the relevant legislation.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Page 241

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Laws)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

Chapter V – Selected secondary sources

© John R Corkill
Student No. 2376398

Focus questions for this criterion are: How would this response be received by stakeholders? Is
it evidence-based reflecting the latest research? Does it accord with expert opinion? Would it
foster or frustrate best practice in coastal management?
Thus far I have identified and described criteria and focus questions for assessing the merits of
potential government responses in Chapter VII, as decisions about future coastal land use, and
as public policy. However criteria are also required to ascertain which potential response is
‘most likely’ to be adopted by a future government, and supported by the legislature.
9. From greatest merit to ‘most likely’
Criteria which enable an assessment of the ‘most likely’ response are necessary because the
public policy process is political,1792 and political factors would affect which response is
adopted by Government, and the legislative support it attracts. However, unlike decisionmaking about land use, or the merits of public policy, writers of contemporary texts and
discourse rarely suggest criteria for, or attempt to estimate, the likelihood of a public policy
succeeding politically. Hence in this final section it is necessary to nominate relevant factors
and frame appropriate criteria for making political assessments of the ‘likeliness’ of potential
responses being adopted by a future government.

Though merits would be considered, three factors which frame most government decisions to
adopt policy were identified. These are political calculations, by key government ministers, of:
i) its difficulty: in justifying it, enacting and implementing the necessary legislation;
ii) the overall cost of implementing the policy; and
iii) its kudos1793 or electoral appeal: ie its potential political value to the Government.1794
It is highly likely that decisions of a future government on ‘whose rights should prevail?’ and
hence which potential response to adopt, would use these same factors and calculations.
Thus I adopt these factors as relevant criteria for estimating the responses’ political likeliness.
These criteria are explained next and are applied in Chapter VIII to identify the potential
response ‘most likely’ to be adopted by a future government.

1792

See Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 303; Althaus et al, above n 163, 44-50, 209, 215.
Delbridge, et al (eds) above n 4, 984. ‘kudos’: n. glory, renown [Gk kydos].
1794
Althaus et al, above n 163, 145, acknowledge the role that ministers’ assessments of “political risks
and benefits” play in decisions to adopt, or not adopt, policy options.
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i) Difficulty. This criterion is concerned with how hard it would be to achieve the policy
response and involves calculations of difficulty on several levels. It would employ estimations
of the conceptual difficulty of articulating a coherent public interest rationale to justify the
policy; and defend it against criticism; the complexity of the policy and the technical difficulty
in drafting appropriate legislation to implement it; the ease or difficulty politically, in attracting
crucial non-government support in the legislature and the procedural difficulties of enacting key
parts of the policy; and an appraisal of the practical difficulties involved and the time likely to
be needed to implement the policy.

Political calculations of difficulty would draw on the results of the merits assessments and
integrate evaluations of potential responses against the criteria for ethical decision making,
public interest rationale and minimal disruption.

ii) Overall cost: This criterion encompasses consideration of all the costs associated with a
public policy proposal: for preparatory research, initial scoping and planning of the policy’s
development, internal and external stakeholder consultations, implementation costs including
public information, communications, capital works, ongoing maintenance, or other recurrent
costs such as agency staff.

Typically, political assessments using this criterion would draw on the information on costs and
benefits assembled by the responsible agency developing the public policy, in association with
Treasury, in order to assign a cost-effectiveness rating against the policy. However, in this
assessment the total cost is the crucial factor, because of the intense competition between policy
proposals for limited public funds. Lower cost policies would allow spending on other public
interest priorities; higher cost policies would constrain the public funds available for other
government initiatives. Thus, of two policy proposals with similar cost-effectiveness ratings, it
is likely that the policy with a lower overall cost, would rate more highly under this criterion.
Hence, scoring of responses against the criterion of ‘overall cost’ is inversely proportional.

iii) Kudos for government: This criterion relates to estimations of the positive value of the
public policy to the government, the level and extent of the community goodwill it creates, the
warmth of its reception by the media and stakeholders and how well the positive reaction to it
translates into electoral support for the government at the next election.1795

Political calculations using this criterion would draw on the merits assessments using the criteria

1795

See Althaus et al, above n 163, 72.
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of timeliness, achievement of social goals, and credibility, but would also factor in calculations
of political risk arising from assessments of responses’ potential to minimize disruption.
The integration of considerations from the merits assessments into assessments of a response’s
likeliness to be adopted, using political criteria, is shown in Table 5 below.

Merits assessment criteria
Ethical contexts
Public interest rationale
Minimal Disruption

Political assessment criteria

Cost-effectiveness

Overall cost

Achieve social goals
Timeliness
Credibility

Kudos for government

Difficulty

Table 5 – Integration of merits assessments into political assessments

10. Conclusion
From the foregoing description of the adopted criteria and their correlation with property theory,
property law rules, common law decisions and current statutes, it is clear that as existing
continuing elements of law they are highly relevant to several criteria. Hence, estimates of
potential responses’ consistency with these underpinning elements of law inform my assessments of their satisfaction of the ethical criteria of physical characteristics, and contribution to
social goals, and the public policy criteria of public interest rationale, minimal disruption and
hence cost-effectiveness, and credibility. Further, because these merits assessments are drawn
on the subsequent assessment these existing elements of property law inform, albeit indirectly,
political assessments of responses’ difficulty and likely kudos for government.

In this chapter I have pivoted from my analyses of competing rights under current law, to
refocus forward. I have described the next stages of my analysis in ascertaining their likely
future relationship, canvassed perspectives on coastal lands’ management which could shape
future government policy, and identified and justified criteria for use in the planned next steps.

In the next chapter I describe the responses to conflicting rights, potentially available to
government. In later chapters the criteria above are used to evaluate these responses and identify
which would be ‘most likely’ to be adopted by a future government, and supported by the
legislature.
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"I tell you naught for your comfort,
Yea, naught for your desire,
Save that the sky grows darker yet
And the sea rises higher."
GK Chesterton,
The Ballad of the White Horse (1911)

Chapter VI - Potential responses by a future State government.
Introduction to Chapter VI
This chapter continues the focus on the future and its core task is outlining possible courses of
action available to a future State government, in responding to climate change impacts and
conflicts between competing private and public rights to use coastal lands. To scope the range
of options potentially available in the future I apply the IPCC’s scenario setting approach,1796
and identify a diverse suite of potential responses. The objectives and public policy actions that
each response would involve, and their advantages and disadvantages, are then explored.

Defining a diverse suite of potential responses is a key, but only preliminary, step towards
anticipating the public policy environment of the future. These responses are evaluated in the
next chapter, and an estimate of the response ‘most likely’ to be adopted by a future government
is made in the last chapter. With the results of this analysis I then answer my primary research
question - Will private property rights ‘trump’ public rights and interests in coastal lands, under
climate change conditions?

Before I begin my exposition of these responses several points about my approach ought to be
made clear.

First, in the discussion which follows I deal with real property and rights within the social
institution of law. An exploration of these matters within a wider domain, where property
operates as a cultural ideal, subject to cultural myths,1797 is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Second, as stated in Chapter I, rather than pursue an abstract theoretical enquiry, I ground my
discussion of property and rights in ‘place’, in an actual functioning property regime – the State
of New South Wales - where ‘real property’ and other elements of property theory are defined

1796

See the explanation of the factors defining likely future scenarios for emissions reduction in IPCC
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, above n 176, 3 -5.
1797
‘Cultural myths’ influencing ideas of ‘property’ in the US and other liberal societies are cited and
debunked by Freyfogle in several articles. See Freyfogle, ‘Context’, above n 1621, 1555-6; Freyfogle,
On Private Property, above n 1607, 61, 72.
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and ‘property rights’ over land are affected by other elements of law, in practice. This is
preferred to a placeless, ‘in principle’ approach, which seeks universally applicable answers.

Third, though there are inherent complexities involved, and many factors could influence future
circumstances, I have concluded the most crucial factor which could change the status quo,
would be the ‘policy position’ of a future State government. By ‘policy position’ I mean a future
State government’s attitude to, engagement with, decisions about and actions on the policy
issues driven by anthropogenic global warming and climate change impacts, especially sea level
rise and coastal hazards’ impacts on both publicly- and privately-owned land.1798 Regardless of
their substantive content, all the public policy response options canvassed below would involve
advocacy, enacting relevant legislation and regulations, allocating public funds, issuing public
and stakeholder information and explanatory materials, and deploying staff resources.1799 Hence
the government’s choice of public policy response to emerging conflicts between private
property rights and public rights and interests in coastal land in New South Wales will be key.
Were a future government to decide ‘private property rights’ should be ‘trumps’, then
legislation, not decree of policy, would be required to implement this policy, and an assessment
of the implementation costs and an authorization to allocate public funds would be required.
Conversely, if government policy were to enhance public rights and interests, legislation,
funding, public explanation and information, and staff necessary to implement the policy would
also need to be estimated and authorized, but their nature and scope would qualitatively differ.
Logically if a ‘do nothing’ response was adopted there would be no need for legislation to
authorize public funding for public policy action. However it is conceivable that a future
government could adopt a policy position, prepare the necessary legislation but find it can ‘do
nothing’ because it lacks the support of a majority of the legislature.1800

Thus as a starting point, I observe that a future government may adopt a policy which explicitly
answers my research question, and implements it through legislation, allocation of public funds
and government agency ‘action’, or it may not. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the
public policy actions of a diverse range of potential policy responses by a future government.

1798

See the discussion of policy issues in Althaus et al, above n 163, 43-56.
Ibid 86-95. The authors note ‘[n]o typology captures fully the complexity of policy instrument
choice…’ and describes five categories of ‘policy instruments’: advocacy, network, money, government
action, and law, but notes a trend to outsourcing to the private sector as ‘virtual government’,
1800
See discussion of this possibility in s 14 Chapter I, s 1 Chapter IV. This was the fate of the O’Farrell
government’s Planning Reform Bill rejected by the NSW Legislative Council in November 2013. See
< https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/overhaul-of-nsw-planning-laws-shot-down-in-upper-house-201311272y96t.html >.
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Fourth, each response canvassed below would incur a characteristic suite of costs to the public
purse for the actions it entails. Ideally in a rational comprehensive approach to decision-making
about policy responses,1801 the economic costs of all the actions proposed by government in
these responses would be estimated and considered in an economic study which compares the
likely costs of the response options under consideration.1802 However, preparing such a study,
using credible estimates of the costs of the suite of future actions by government in each
response, is beyond the scope of this thesis.1803 Hence only broad indications of the scale of
likely future costs are included in the discussion of responses’ advantages and disadvantages.1804
I adopt for these purposes five terms: 1) very low or no cost, 2) low cost, 3) moderate cost, 4)
high cost and 5) very high cost and indicate whether the public funding required is ‘once-only’
or ongoing and whether it is likely to increase, plateau or decrease. These indications of the
scale of costs are nonetheless useful for assessing the merits of each response and for comparing
their likely cost of implementation, at a high level of generality, in later stages of analysis.
Last, as outlined in Chapter I, four pathways for a future State government’s response to
conflicts between competing rights to use coastal land were identified: i] do nothing, ii]
privilege private property rights, iii] protect public rights, and iv] attempt to do both. However,
to develop a more diverse suite of responses, two versions of three of these macro-policy
options are considered. Consequently seven potential responses have been identified:

i)

do nothing / status quo

ii)

a weak approach to privileging private property rights

iii)

a robust approach to privileging private property rights

iv)

a strong approach to protecting public rights of access

v)

a stronger approach protecting and enhancing public rights

vi)

a balancing response, where criteria other than ‘rights’ are determinative

vii)

accept public rights dominance and accommodate private interests where feasible.

These potential responses feature different policies on the core concerns, identified in Chapter I:
a] the nature and location of the real property boundary, b] ownership of land below MHWM,
c] the ‘right to defend’, d] the government ‘duty to protect’, e] any right to compensation, and
f] level of public funding available.

1801

Althaus et al, above n 163, 59-60.
Ibid 59-60. See the suite of analytic tools which might be employed in such an economic study, at 73.
1803
The thesis is focused on addressing questions of law not economics. Credible estimates of likely
future costs to implement these responses would require the detailed economic study flagged above.
1804
Estimates of the likely costs to implement each potential response would be one of several key
considerations for a State government when it adopts public policy on future use of coastal lands.
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Hence in Part A, I explore a potential nil response by a State government which does nothing,
leaving questions of ‘whose rights should prevail?’ to the courts to determine. In Part B I outline
two potential responses where a future government adopts a ‘weak’ or a ‘robust’ policy of
privileging ‘private property rights’ over public rights and interests in coastal land.
In Part C two potential responses where a future State government adopts a ‘strong’ policy of
protecting public rights and interests or a ‘stronger’ policy of enhancing public rights to use
coastal lands and waters are considered. In Part D, two different responses where a future State
government attempts to ‘do both’ are outlined. In one response the State government would
attempt to ‘balance’ private and public rights and interests, and in another, would protect public
rights but accommodate private interests to some degree, where this was feasible.
In Section E, I collate these responses’ policies on key issues in Table 3, make some
preliminary observations on them and cue their evaluation in the next chapter.

Part A. If government does nothing to address conflicting ‘rights’
I begin my discussion of potential responses to conflicts between private and public rights by a
future NSW government by considering an exceptionable but possible situation in which the
government does not take legislative action to determine which rights should prevail when they
conflict. This situation could arise under a number of scenarios.

A future government may not accept that global climate change is real, adopt no policy and
introduce no legislation to address conflicts between private and public rights or interests.1805 Or
it may arise in a political deadlock where a future government adopts a policy, but cannot
implement it, due to the Legislative Council’s rejection of enabling legislation.1806 Under either
of these scenarios, the status quo would be unaffected. Consequently it would likely that the
resolution of conflicts between competing private and public rights to use coastal lands would
be pursued in the State’s courts.

1805

This was the position of the Liberal National Party Coalition government in New South Wales,
elected in March 2011, under Premier Barry O’Farrell.
1806
The government of New South Wales has lacked a majority in the Legislative Council on several
occasions (1976-77-78, 1988 and 1988-89) according to Barbara Page ‘The Legislative Council of New
South Wales: Past, Present and Future’ (Parliament of New South Wales Briefing Paper 01/1990). Since
1991, no government has held a majority in the upper house. Consequently, many government Bills
have failed due to opposition in the Legislative Council. See ‘Party Composition of the Legislative
Council since 1978’ at < https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/lc/pages/statistics-of-the-legislativecouncil.aspx >
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Philosophically this response would, by default, align with the ‘modern’ approach to the
common law tradition.1807 The court’s decisions would likely be doctrinally conservative but the
law would not be static.
1. A ‘storm of litigation’? – leaving it to the courts
Framing a discussion of future possibilities under this potential nil-response by government is
possible because current law on private and public rights would continue to apply, and its
operation, and the outcomes of future proceedings can be relatively confidently anticipated.
Under the principle of stare decisis, the court would be bound to apply earlier precedents where
the facts of the matter corresponded well with precedent decisions.1808 However, if the case
warranted it, or the court wished to avoid unhelpful precedents, it could distinguish the case on
its facts,1809 then adapt and apply existing principles of law to the novel circumstances or
conditions of the case.1810 Thus the court’s approach would be cautious. Incremental change to
develop existing law would be possible, but the repudiation of earlier decisions and the reversal
of longstanding rules of law would be unlikely.

No full assay of potential legal actions to protect access to and use of coastal land, is possible
here due to limited space, but the following examples indicate diverse ways future conflicts
between public rights and private property rights, or claims, might play out in the courts.

2. Private landowner initiated actions
Without intervention by the State government it would be likely that landowners would bring
legal actions to protect their private land, asserting that their private property rights prevailed
over public rights to use coastal lands, and seeking the courts concurrence with this view.
Commencing proceedings would be procedurally simple for private landowners since their
vested interests in their real property would qualify them for standing before the court. For
example in bringing an action against a member of the public for trespass on coastal land, said
to be privately owned.1811 However, in such a case evidence of where the property boundary
was actually located would be decisive.

1807

See Davies, above n 593, 69-72. See also Cook et al, above n 18, 73-88.
See Cook, et al, above n 18, 74-76.
1809
Ibid 150.
1810
This was the approach adopted in Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia [1978] 19
SASR 389, 394 (Walters J).
1811
Repeated actions for trespass by the landowner McCarthy, were the cause of the government’s
intervention in Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy (1911) 2 IR 260, discussed in Chapter III.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
1808

Page 249

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Laws)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

Chapter VI – Potential responses

© John R Corkill
Student No. 2376398

Other landowner initiated proceedings in which a council or public authority would be the
respondent, include an appeal of a decision to refuse their application to construct a seawall,1812
to challenge an authority’s decision to remove ineffective structures,1813 or to discontinue
nourishment of a beach. In such proceedings a plaintiff might seek compensation for lands lost
to the sea, at full market value.1814
Proceedings with other respondents could challenge a Minister’s decision to approve or certify a
coastal zone management plan,1815 or a coastal management program, that does not include the
coastal defenses sought by the landowner.1816 Alternatively, a landowner may bring a suit to
contest a decision of the Registrar General of land titles on the location of a property boundary
formed by water, or details recorded on a land title.1817

Landowners could also bring proceedings against a neighbor, the local council or a State
government agency, alleging the works approved and built to reduce erosion on one allotment,
has caused, or increased, coastal erosion of their private land.1818

Though a theory of dominant private property rights might be argued in a hearing, the court
would likely place more weight on the specific facts of the conflict, and the nature of the land in
dispute than theoretical arguments, and would determine the plaintiff’s application on the basis
of the evidence, the character and extent of any ‘rights’ in dispute, and then current applicable
law. In doing so the court would necessarily focus on the allegations, specific declarations and
orders sought as remedy by the plaintiff landowner, and the arguments of the parties’ counsel,
but it is highly likely the courts would consider and apply more elements of law than the
plaintiff’s claims of a private property right or a defendant’s claim of a public right. This would
include considering relevant provisions of current statute law, described above, applicable
principles of property law1819 , and common law.1820 Thus the court would likely consider a

1812

See for eg Ralph Lauren PL v NSW TCP [2018] NSWLEC 207.
As in the case Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622 discussed in Chapter III
1814
This claim would most likely fail. See the discussion of Durham Holdings PL v NSW (2001)
discussed in s 10 Chapter III.
1815
In Boomerang & Blueys Residents Group Inc v NSW Minister for Environment, Heritage and Local
government, and MidCoast Council No.2 [2019] NSWLEC 202 the residents’ challenge to the Great
Lakes CZMP failed because the decisions taken by the council to adopt the Plan and by the Minister to
certify it were not discretionary but procedurally required.
1816
The maintenance of a temporary seawall built by Council was the subject of proceedings in Byron
Shire Council v Vaughan, Vaughan v Byron Shire Council [2009] NSW LEC 88.
1817
See for eg In Re White (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 129.
1818
See Egger v Gosford Shire Council (1989) 67 LGRA 304.
1819
These principles would include the maxim of caveat emptor, the doctrine of accretion, doctrine of
estates, principle of escheat, and the numerus clausus meta-principle, discussed above.
1820
This was the approach of Bannon J in EPA v Saunders (1994) discussed in s 8 Chapter III.
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landowner’s legal action to protect a claimed private property right in the context of all relevant
elements of law which apply to the land in dispute.

3. Public interest litigation
Public interest litigation to protect public rights of access and use of coastal land, or other public
interests in them could be brought by a member of the public, a community group,1821 nongovernment organisation (NGO), or conceivably by a local council or public authority, to halt
unapproved works by a private landowner, to construct a seawall or other structure which
impeded public access, created a risk to public safety, effected coastal processes or presented a
danger to public navigation.1822

Members of the public, community groups and public interest NGOs could initiate proceedings
under the open standing provisions, of the EPAA 1979,1823 but may be asked to give
undertakings for damages if the proceedings do not succeed. Proceedings could initially be of an
interlocutory nature, requiring a halt to works or a stay of decision-making until completion of
mandatory procedures, such as the public exhibition of relevant documents, or consideration of
an environmental impact study (EIS).1824 However, even where prima facie a serious case for
trial has been accepted by the court, a public interest applicant may not obtain interlocutory
relief due to uneven ‘balance of convenience’ considerations.1825

Another possible legal action could be an appeal by an objector who had cited loss of public
access rights as a reason for their objection to a permanent seawall.1826 Or a public interest
plaintiff could allege ‘harm to the environment’ from the works, and seeks interlocutory relief
until trial.1827 In these cases it might be argued that the seawall would increase erosion,1828

1821

See Friends of King Edward Park Inc v Newcastle City Council (No 2) [2015] NSWLEC 76.
In EPA v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655, the landowner was convicted of polluting tidal waters with
motor vehicles tyres in an attempt to construct an ad hoc seawall.
1823
Third party rights to civilly enforce the EPAA 1979 are available under s 9.45 to ‘any person’.
1824
Positive Change for Marine Life Inc v Byron Shire Council (No. 2) [2015] NSWLEC 157, [82].
1825
Ibid. The court agreed that the lack of an EIS was a serious issue for trial but declined to grant an
injunction against the works because, in its consideration of the balance of convenience, it concluded
that there was greater potential for environmental harm if the injunction was granted and a major storm
occurs, than in allowing the works to proceed without an EIS.
1826
Objectors to development proposals have an ‘appeal right’ under s 8.8 of the EPAA 1979 (NSW).
1827
Legal proceedings by a member of the public to halt unapproved works could be brought under s 9.45
of the EPAA 1979 (NSW), or s 219 of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW).
See eg Positive Change for Marine Life Inc v Byron Shire Council (No. 2) [2015] NSWLEC 157.
1828
This was a key issue in Egger v Gosford Shire Council (1989) 67 LGRA 304, 314-322 Hope JA),
328-9 (Clarke JA).
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inevitably lead to the total loss of the beach,1829 and public recreational opportunities, and
impacts on the habitats of key species of economic significance in adjacent estuarine waters.1830
In proceedings to prevent the destruction of beach habitats of species of ecological significance
it could be alleged that the works were in breach of Commonwealth,1831 or international law.1832
Evidence of rapid sea level rise creating ‘coastal squeeze’1833 could be crucial in convincing the
court that species of concern would be unable to relocate or adapt if a seawall is built, and
would face increased risk to their long-term survival.
An action could also be brought by a member of the public, against the local council as approval
authority, the private owner of a seawall, and or its maintenance contractor, alleging
‘negligence’ which has led to an injury to them, or their child, due to risks to public safety
created by the structure, or its lack of maintenance. The plaintiff might assert that the council,
owner and or contractor should have foreseen the hazard created by the seawall and effectively
mitigated the risks to public safety. In such a case the extent of local councils’ exemption from
legal liability1834 under the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW),1835 and the ‘duty of care’ owed
to members of the public1836 using coastal land or waters, may be highly pertinent.

4. Government initiated litigation
Under this ‘do nothing’ response a future State government Minister would be disinclined to
commence legal proceedings to enforce State law to protect the public interest in coastal lands,
or appeal an adverse lower court’s decision, 1837 and state government agencies may be
1829

See Pilkey and Young, above n 108, 165.
Many fish and crustaceans of commercial value spend the early part of their life in estuarine waters,
where water is shallow, wave action lower and marine vegetation abundant. Where a seawall is
constructed increased scour from erosion would likely lead to deeper nearshore waters, loss of seagrass
beds, and reduced value of adjacent waters as fisheries habitat.
1831
See the offences under s 17B RAMSAR sites; s 18A re threatened species and communities, s 20A re
Migratory species, Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth).
1832
Several species of migratory birds, such as the Sooty Oystercatcher Haematopus fuliginosus, are
protected in Australia under international law: Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
especially as Waterfowl Habitat (adopted 2 February 1971, Ramsar, Iran) (entered into force 21
December 1975) (the Ramsar Convention). See also the Japan Australian Migratory Birds Agreement
(JAMBA 1974) entered into force 30 April 1981; the China Australian Migratory Birds Agreement
(CAMBA 1985) entered into force 1 September 1988, and Republic of Korea Australia Migratory Birds
Agreement (ROKAMBA 2006) entered into force 13 July 2007.
1833
The phenomenon of ‘coastal squeeze’ was discussed in Chapter I. But see Doody, above n 79.
1834
See s 733 (3)(f), (f2), (f3) LGA 1993 (NSW).
1835
The test of ‘in good faith’ is stated in Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal
Council (1993) FCA 408, [27] – [34], (Gummow, Hill and Drummond JJ).
1836
In Simmons v Rockdale City Council [2013] NSWSC 1431, (Hall J) the court cited the ‘salient
features’ creating a ‘duty of care’, [398] and concluded that the council had such a duty [411].
1837
They may be constrained by party policy, or require Cabinet approval which is refused. They may
have their own agenda to pursue, be too busy, have insufficient competent staff, be unwilling to do the
‘extra’ work to obtain relevant evidence and build a credible case. Or to initiate proceedings may make
him or her unpopular with a key section of their electorate, or party donors. Political pressure on other
unrelated matters, personal circumstances eg ill-health may dictate that relevant action is not taken.
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prevented from doing so due to lack of ‘agency’ will, limited resources or a failure to gain
authorization from the executive government. More likely in this response the State government
would seek to shift the onus onto the local council, or other public land manager, to intervene
with legal action if a landowner attempts to build a seawall without approval. Avoiding
commencing litigation may not be entirely possible however, given the State government is the
‘owner’ of land below MHWM, and its agencies’ statutory roles.1838 Consequently under this
response a State government minister, agencies or public authorities would be more likely to
become involved in legal action as a defendant / respondent, rather than as plaintiff.
Hence there are range of potential legal proceedings which could be brought by different
plaintiffs, which, though seeking specific declarations and orders, would be essentially
concerned with seeking the court’s answer to the question, whose rights would prevail?
It is not proposed to further discuss here the likely decisions of future courts on these
proceedings, since these matters were canvassed in Chapter III.
5. Advantages and disadvantages of this response
5.1 Advantages
This response would have an advantage of being consistent with existing elements of law1839
and consequently would most likely create no disruption to existing operations of property law
or level of commercial trade in real property. From a government perspective, this response has
the advantage of incurring least public spending. However, it seems inevitable that local or State
government bodies, as defendants in future legal proceedings brought by private landowners as
plaintiffs, would incur costs defending the litigation. This ‘do-nothing’ response would also
have the advantage of ‘plausible deniability’. The government could ‘blame’ the courts for
adverse impacts on landowners’ expectations about their property rights and deny
responsibility, particularly if government policy had been frustrated by the legislature.
5.2 Disadvantages
The disadvantages of this litigation led response are numerous. Due to the courts’ process,
decisions are always made looking backwards, at what has happened in specific circumstances,
and the court would apply the law as it is, or was,1840 not as it should be.
1838

The Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) are
authorised to bring proceedings to enforce laws under their administration.
1839
Specifically existing property laws rules and property theory discussed in Chapter II, rulings by the
courts considered in Chapter III and the statutes examined in Chapter IV.
1840
In the proceedings, Ralph Lauren PL v NSW TCP [2018] NSWLEC 207, [2], [43] – [47] (Preston CJ)
the court applied the statute law and planning instruments current at the time of the seawall
application’s ‘deemed’ refusal.
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Thus under this response the courts would be unlikely to prescribe the nature of future law, how
it should operate, or how government should respond to future climate change impacts.1841
Hence this response would more likely lead to a series of narrow, specific decisions rather than
a strategic response to future scenarios. Together these rulings might later be interpreted as
having wider application to all coastal land, but it is highly likely that the emergence of a wider
view of the relevance of a suite of limited court rulings would be quite slow.
A further disadvantage of this response would be that landowners would have, and likely gain,
greater advantage from using the courts to advance their private property interests due to their
standing as owners, and balance of convenience considerations,1842 than would individuals or
groups acting to protect public rights, or the public interest.1843
Another disadvantage of the government taking no action, could be hidden costs and adverse
results. Despite their formal exemption from liability,1844 if local council decisions to act, or not
act, were found to have lacked ‘good faith’, this exemption from liability may not apply1845 and
significant costs for damages, restoration works or compensation might be ordered by the court.
A pre-occupation with litigation, or liability, may create problems for councils or state agencies.
It may absorb crucial financial resources in legal fees, which would otherwise have been
available to coastal management actions; could distract public authorities from developing
appropriate responses to other public policy and legal issues triggered by rising sea-levels and
receding shorelines, and hinder or prevent the implementation of wider more integrated
(adaptation) responses which address other ecological, social and economic priorities.1846
Of course, these adverse consequences would be avoided if considered timely responses to the
challenges posed by rising sea levels and receding shorelines were adopted and implemented by
a future State government.

But see Barker J’s suggestions in Falkner v Gisborne DC [1995] discussed in s 9 Chapter III.
See eg Positive Change for Marine Life Inc v Byron Shire Council (No. 2) [2015] NSWLEC 157.
1843
Though the landowners commenced the proceedings over a ‘deemed refusal’ of their seawall, the
court’s refusal of consent achieved the result unable to be achieved by the public interest NGO plaintiff.
1844
Under s 733 (2) (b) Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), provided they act ‘in good faith’.
1845
In a key case on ‘good faith’ decision-making by local councils, Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v
Rockdale Municipal Council (1993) FCA 408, [27] – [34], (Gummow, Hill and Drummond JJ) the
Court ruled that the term meant more than a state of mind or an absence of dishonesty and observed that
acting in good faith ‘may require that exercise of caution and diligence to be expected of an honest
person of ordinary prudence,’ and concluded ‘it would be wrong to assume’ that the term operated to
leave a council liable ‘only in respect to dishonesty’, and held that "good faith" calls for ‘more than
honest ineptitude’, finding that to act ‘in good faith’ councils are obliged to make a ‘real attempt’ to
access relevant information.
1846
Private property claims ‘can pervade, dissuade and undermine land use management policies’
according to Tayanah O’Donnell, in “Coastal management and the socio-legal geographies of climate
change adaptation in Australia’, (2019) 175 Ocean and Coastal Management 127-135, 127, 132.
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Part B. If government policy privileged private property rights
A second potential response of a future government to the challenges raised by global climate
change could be to adopt a policy to privilege private property and private property rights in any
conflict with public rights to use coastal land. This response would require extensive legislative
program to put it into effect, because the existing legal framework for real property in this
jurisdiction includes many elements of surviving common law, and statutory provisions which
provide contrary indications.1847 Only by comprehensive statutory changes could all these
elements of property law be repealed,1848 and new provisions be enacted, to privilege private
property rights where they conflict with public rights.
I have framed two versions of privileging private property rights in ‘weak’ and ‘robust’ versions
of this response. They differ slightly on four key issues of concern to private landowners: the
location of their boundary as MHWM moves landward; the security of long-term ownership of
the land title as sea levels rise; level of public funding for defensive structures; and payment of
compensation. However, these are only two hypothetical responses in a theoretical range, not
opposites, and not the only permutations of this approach which would be potentially available.
These responses reflect liberal philosophical values, where the rights of individuals, including
their private property rights, have great moral weight. In the weak response these property rights
would be recognised by a liberal democratic government, but not as immutable. In contrast the
robust pro-private property rights response would reflect a libertarian perspective,1849 wherein
private property rights are regarded as dominant, ‘absolute’, and immutable.1850
6. A ‘weak’ version of protecting private property ‘rights’
Under a ‘weak’ response a State government could recognise many claims to property ‘rights’,
but would not allow landowners, or commit the State, to protect private property at any cost.

(a) Location of property boundaries, ownership of land below MHWM

In this ‘weak’ version, the State could recognise the current location of MHWM as the property
1847

This was the conclusion I reached at the end of Chapter IV, having considered both surviving
common law and current statute laws.
1848
These are the property laws rules described in Chapter II, the court decisions rejecting a ‘right to
defend, and a ‘right to compensation’, on the nature and location of boundaries, and ownership of land
<MHWM discussed in Chapter III, and the many statutory provisions recognising the dominance of
public rights over private property rights described in Chapters II and IV.
1849
‘Rights discourses’ in the literature on property theory was discussed in s 3 Chapter II.
1850
This was the position of landowners in New Zealand in Falkner v Gisborne DC [1995] discussed in s
9 Chapter III, and Coleman, above n 13, discussed in s 9 Chapter II.
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boundary and legislate to fix it in that location permanently. The State could acknowledge prior
private ownership of land now below MHWM and pay compensation at full market value for
the land already lost to the sea.1851 However, in this weak version the government would not
allow lost land to be ‘reclaimed’, or the erection of seawalls along that historical boundary
defined by first survey.
(b) A right to a defence against the sea, or a right to compensation?

The State could create a statutory ‘right’ to a defence against the sea, which entitled a landowner to build a seawall, without consent on the MHWM boundary,1852 with public funding
contributed, if some public lands were also ‘protected’ by the structure. Where building a
defensive structure was not feasible, the government could remedy landowners’ foreseeable loss
of land to the sea, by acquiring land title at full market value, when the owners chose to sell.1853
(c) A transferable development right

Further, in this weak version, a transferable development right (TDR) could be created which
recognised the prior development consent for a dwelling or other structure as a valuable
property, and could be severed from the land title, to allow relocation of the dwelling or
structure within the allotment, or to another allotment owned by the same landowner.1854
7. A ‘robust’ version of privileging private property ‘rights’
A ‘robust’ version of privileging private property rights could go much further.
(a) Abolishing ambulatory boundary of MHWM

In this potential response a future State government may accept landowners’ claims to still own
land now below MHWM. It could abolish the ambulatory boundary of MHWM by legislation
and reinstate all boundaries as originally defined by survey, using GPS co-ordinates, even if
below tidal waters.1855 By so doing, the boundaries of the real property, and the continued
private ownership of the land title, might be permanently secured, even as sea levels rise.

1851

Legislation to this effect could enable the triggering of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms
Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW), and the payment of compensation on ‘just terms’.
1852
Similar to, or more robust than, the broad authorisation of landowners to undertake ‘emergency
coastal protection works’ without consent, created by the insertion of new sections 55O – 55V into the
Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW) in 2010.
1853
If the LA(JTC)A 1991 (NSW) was formally triggered by a public authority. See s 6 Chapter IV.
1854
See John Sheehan, et al. "Coastal climate change and transferable development rights." (2018) 35 (1)
Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 87, 96. The use of TDRs was also discussed in Freyfogle,
‘Eight’, above n 202, 795.
1855
Special legislation would be needed since this would be contrary to existing law as declared by the
courts in EPA v Saunders (1994) EPA v Leaghur Pty Ltd [1995] discussed in s 8 Chapter III.
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(b) A statutory right to defend along original property boundaries

Under this robust response the State government could create a statutory property ‘right’ to
protect against the sea1856 and allow landowners to build permanent defensive structures along
the original boundary and undertake reclamation works to reinstate the land above MHWM,
without the need for environmental impact assessment or a development consent.1857 Such
works would likely create privately owned foreshores and exclude public access and use.1858
The State government could also agree to publicly fund the costs of maintaining and upgrading
these structures to protect private property threatened by coastal hazards, in perpetuity.1859
However in this robust version, government acquisition of privately-owned coastal land would
be limited, since many landowners would rather defend their ‘original’ boundaries than sell.
Hence government acquisition would only occur if land was voluntarily offered for sale, and the
State paid ‘full market value’.1860 In such a buy-out, the government could acquire the land and
allow the landowner to sell the TDR for their dwelling to a third party.
(c) Restricting public use rights

A ‘robust’ pro-private property approach might include legislation to amend existing statutes to
extinguish public use rights, and increase penalties for trespass, and could seek to diminish
public rights wherever feasible, by directing public authorities to revoke easements for public
access across private land, and discontinue the requirement that public access to the foreshore
be provided as a condition of consent for new developments of privately-owned coastal land.1861
Such a ‘robust’ response might also revoke dedications of coastal lands for public use, end their
reservation from sale, and sell publicly-owned coastal lands to the private sector. 1862

8. Advantages and disadvantages of these responses
These potential responses, privileging private property rights, would have varying advantages
and disadvantages for private landowners, members of the public, and a future government.

1856

Legislation would be required because no right to defend has been recognised. See s4 & 5 Chapter III.
Though no ‘right’ to defend was created, exemption from the need to consider environmental impact
and obtain development consent before constructing ‘emergency’ coastal protection works, were
government policies reflected in amendments made to the Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW) in 2012.
See discussion of this in s 4 Chapter IV
1858
Legislation would be needed to overturn rights of public access described in s 9 Ch II, s 4 Chapter IV.
1859
This was the former approach employed in the UK which was subsequently discontinued. See the
discussion of landowner’s expectations by Cooper and McKenna in s 7 Chapter V.
1860
This policy would require amendment to the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991
(NSW) since ‘just terms’ provisions apply to compulsory acquisitions.
1861
See the NSW Coastal Development Guidelines 2003, discussed in s 5 Chapter IV.
1862
See discussion of the Minister’s powers under s CLMA 2016 (NSW) in s 3 Chapter IV.
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8.1 Advantages
Legislating for either ‘weak’ or ‘robust’ version of this response would have the advantage of
clearly stating the priority of private property rights, which could guide expectations and
decision-making to resolve future conflicts between competing rights. Though this might be a
dubious advantage, under either version of this potential response, the relevant law of property
would be simplified and limited to what the statutory provisions set out, and no more.
Private landowners would obtain several advantages. Under the ‘weak’ version their ‘original’
boundaries, would be recognised even if they could not be defended, via the payment of
compensation for land already lost to the sea, and they would gain a ‘right to protect’ their
property boundaries, fixed at the then current location, with defensive structures. Under the
‘robust’ version, landowners would be similarly advantaged by the recognition, re-instatement
of their original private property boundaries, ‘right to protect’, and their believed immunity
from the tidal boundary, as sea levels rise. The partial, or total, public funding to design, build,
repair, maintain and potentially, upgrade of these structures, over the long term,1863 and the
guaranteed acquisition of the land by the State government, at full market value,1864 as a last
resort, would also constitute a very substantial advantages to landowners. Thus this response
would secure the long-term private ownership of the land, and protect, or perhaps increase, the
market value of the ‘real property’ despite the effects of rising sea levels.
Advantages for government of a ‘robust’ response which permitted the sale of valuable public
lands, would be the savings in management costs and the generation of ‘profits’ for future use.
It is possible that this response could have appeal to voters in key marginal seats and thus be of
electoral advantage to the government. However the contrary is also possible.
No advantages to the public, or the ‘public interest’, are foreseen under these responses.

8.2 Disadvantages
A major disadvantage of both the weak and robust responses is that they would in effect, require
the reversal of the priorities under the status quo, and as a result seriously disrupt public uses of
coastal lands and waters, produce upheaval and create uncertainty in the State’s property law.
Because these responses would be deliberately contrary to the existing elements of property
law,1865 a future government which adopted either of these responses would face a serious
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, discussed the dangers of being ‘locked’ into building and
maintaining coastal management works. See s 7 Chapter V.
1864
If the LA(JTC)A 1991 (NSW) were triggered by a public authority. See s 6 Chapter IV
1865
The property law rules, common law decisions and relevant statutes described in Chapter I, III & IV.
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challenge in framing a credible rationale and articulating the social utility of privileging private
property rights over public rights and interests in coastal lands. The lack of a plausible
justification which explained how this would benefit society, or contributed to a greater public
good, would be a major disadvantage when seeking the support of the public or the legislature.
A serious disadvantage confronting a future government seeking to reverse the status quo,
would be the need for an extensive legislative program to implement it. Special legislation with
cognate amendments to existing statutes would be required to extinguish public rights in coastal
lands, create new private property rights in a new statutory framework, and repeal all common
law rules of property which would otherwise apply to the contrary. Until such legislation were
enacted there would likely be a period of confusion, and common law rules and public rights
would continue to conflict with private property rights.
One disadvantage to landowners of the weak response would be the loss of land below MHWM
‘to the sea’, although this loss would be mitigated by the payment of compensation. A further
disadvantage could be the cost of contributing, perhaps compulsorily, to the costs of designing,
constructing, maintaining and upgrading coastal defensive structures. Since their foundations
would need to be located below low water mark, there would be practical difficulties building
structures below the waterline, particularly in stormy conditions, creating disadvantages of
uncertainty in time required and total costs. Further, there may be little or no co-ordination of
design specifications, or inconsistent standards of construction between adjoining structures,
which could have the disadvantage of potentially compromising the structures’ likely
effectiveness under severe or extreme storm conditions.1866
A serious danger created by building structures to ‘protect’ private land, would be the ‘false
sense of security’ evoked in private landowners regarding the safety, and suitability for further
development, of lands vulnerable to coastal hazards.1867 Thus due to later development, were a
seawall to fail in storm conditions which exceeded its design limits, there would likely be far
greater damage and loss of private property due to inundation and wave attack, than there would
have been, had no structure been built at all. The failure of such a protective structure would
have catastrophic financial impacts, with public investment in building the structure effectively
wasted, and unwise, avoidable private investment in the affected land, diminished or lost.

Another serious disadvantage to private landowners of these responses would be the lack of

1866

This is the problem facing the current owners of coastal lands on the Queensland Gold Coast.
The ‘false sense of security’ seawalls create is recognised in the literature. See Cooper and McKenna,
above n 123, 301; Australian Government, above n 44, 152; Pilkey and Young, above n 108, 166.
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statutory exemption from legal liability.1868 It is possible that, unless this private liability was
also extinguished by the legislation which created a ‘right to protect’, litigation between
landowners on the adverse impacts of works on nearby private lands would increase.1869
Justifying landowners’ exemption from legal actions brought by other landowners, while
seeking to privilege private property rights would appear difficult, logically and ethically.
The disadvantages of these potential responses to members of the public and the public interest,
would be substantial. By privileging private property rights, public rights to access and use the
beach would be diminished, restricted to fewer locations or perhaps abolished altogether.
If sea-walls were permitted along current or original property boundaries, further disadvantages
would be the co-option of public land for private purposes, increased risks to safe public access
to and along the foreshore, dangers to recreational use of coastal waters for wading, swimming,
surfing or boating and the likely closure of the beach and the adjacent coastal waters to public
use, for extended periods to permit construction and repeated episodes of maintenance.1870
As shown in Chapter I, seawalls would create conditions conducive to ‘coastal squeeze’ by
reducing the area of beach available for public recreation,1871 decreasing the area of intertidal
habitats, generating adverse conditions for species dependent on these environments,1872 and
would inevitably destroy the beach.1873 Changes in coastal processes due to seawall construction
could create shocks in local ecosystems, such as rapid loss of salt marshes, seagrass beds, or
mangroves, leading to the loss of vital fisheries habitats, with consequences for ecological and
economic productivity.1874 Major changes in the amenity, safety or appeal of visiting and
recreating at certain beaches could produce economic shocks through adverse financial impacts
on businesses and industries which rely on public access to the coast.
If government committed to publicly funding coastal structures to protect private property,
major disadvantages would be the substantial public funds required for capital works, and
‘locked-in’ long-term public funding to repair, maintain and upgrade such structures.1875
Similarly committing to pay for lands lost to the sea would have serious cost disadvantages to
government, and the public purse, since compensation at full market value would not be cheap
and would need to continue indefinitely.
1868

Councils are exempt under s 733 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW). See s 3 Chapter VI.
See Egger v Gosford Shire Council (1989) 67 LGRA 304.
1870
These impacts on public access were recognised by the court in Ralph Lauren PL v NSW TCP [2018]
NSWLEC 207.
1871
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 301.
1872
See Bird, above n 80, 80.
1873
See Pilkey and Young, above n 108, 166-7.
1874
See David Pollard, ‘Estuaries are valuable contributors to fisheries production’ (1981) 40 Australian
Fisheries 7-9.
1875
See the discussion of costs in Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 300-302.
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‘Locked-in’ commitments of billions of dollars,1876 would reduce the public funds available for
other public purposes and would likely have negative re-distributive effects, converting public
funds expenditure into increased value of privately owned land for low or no public benefit.
Thus it is likely that the advantages of these ‘weak’ and ‘robust’ responses would favour private
landowners overwhelmingly, while the public and government would suffer the disadvantages.

Part C. If government policy protects, enhances public rights
In this Part I explore a third potential option, where a future government adopted policy to
protect public rights to use coastal lands and waters, in two versions: one ‘strong’ and another
‘stronger’ potential response. Under both these responses a future government’s policy would
be that public rights should prevail in future conflicts with landowners claimed private property
‘rights’ and legislation, funding and management action would protect public use rights, and
public interests in coastal lands and resources.
Both responses address the issues previously traversed from a public rights point of view: the
location and nature of property boundaries, security of long term land ownership, right to
defend, compensation, quantum and value of public expenditure.
These potential responses would reflect the civil law philosophical perspective of the ‘public
trust’ which recognizes the beach as ‘public property’,1877 the validity of public ownership of
resources and seeks to protect the public’s use rights over coastal lands and waters.1878
9. A ‘strong’ approach to protecting public rights and interests
A strong pro-public rights response would favour public rights to access and use coastal lands
and waters in any future conflicts with landowners claiming dominant private property rights.
This strong response would resolve any uncertainty by affirming the dominance of public use
rights1879 and dispel any confusion over the location of natural boundaries formed by tidal
waters, by explicitly confirming extant property rules1880 through declaratory legislation.

1876

The value of residences in NSW at risk of a 1.1 m sea level rise and 1:100 year storm tide were
estimated in 2009 to be between $12.4 and $18.7 billion. See Australian Government, above n 44, 77.
1877
See the discussion of surviving elements of the civil law in s 7 Chapter II.
1878
This is the core of the ‘public trust doctrine’ in the US, described by Sax, above n 189, and Slade,
above n 336, as discussed in s 5.1 Chapter V.
1879
As shown in s 27 CMA 2016 (NSW) discussed in s 4 Chapter IV.
1880
That is the rules devised and employed by judges in their decisions, as collected and summarised in
books of law such as Halsbury’s Laws of England (1st edn, Butterworths, 1908). Common law rules
relevant to this thesis were discussed in s 6.3 Chapter II and in ss 7 & 8 Chapter III.
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(a) The nature and location of the boundary of MHWM

Under this response, the government would introduce legislation to restate the settled rules of
the common law governing the ambulatory nature and location of the boundary between
privately owned ‘real property’ and the foreshore: that the legal boundary is the MHWM,
wherever it may be located from time to time.1881 Statutory provisions could direct the
Registrar-General to amend the folios of registered land titles1882 where a property boundary
first defined by a line of survey,1883 is supplanted by the ambulatory boundary of MHWM.1884

(b) Ownership of land below MHWM

Similarly, such legislation could codify existing common law rules regarding the ownership of
submerged lands below MHWM, by enacting provisions which declare that:
i) submerged lands below low water mark are owned by the State government;1885
ii) foreshore lands between MHWM and low water mark, are owned by the State government
under surviving common law; 1886
iii) ownership of part of a registered land title once above MHWM, which comes to lie below
MHWM, due to gradual erosion or inundation, reverts to the State government;1887 and
iv) compensation is not payable to coastal landowners for the loss of land to the sea.1888
Such declaratory provisions would make these common law rules visible in the legislation and
provide certainty to parties and arbiters in resolving future conflicts between competing rights,
remove any doubts about the ownership of the foreshore and the priority of public rights in
future disputes.
This would allow local councils to proceed with coastal management planning without lingering
uncertainty regarding these crucial elements of law. In theory such a ‘strong’ response would be
uncontroversial since this new statute would not disrupt existing property law, but codify
common law rules, preserving the status quo.
1881

See Environment Protection Authority v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655, 13,660 (Bannon J).
See s 12 (d) Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).
1883
Attorney General (Ireland) v McCarthy (1911) 2 IR 260, 298 (Gibson J).
1884
Environment Protection Authority v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655, 13,660 (Bannon J).
1885
Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980 (Cth); Marine Estate Management Act 2014 (NSW).
1886
New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 407 [44], [45] (Gibbs J).
1887
See Environment Protection Authority v Leaghur Holdings PL [1995] 87 LGERA 282, 287.
1888
See Durham Holdings PL v NSW (2001) discussed in s 10 Chapter IV. It is argued that the Land
Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) is not triggered by action of the sea, only by a
public authority, in Corkill, “Ambulatory, above n 63, 80-2.
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(c) Response to climate change impacts

In its response to climate change impacts, specifically coastal erosion ‘hot spots’ and areas of
shoreline recession, the differences between this and other responses would be apparent.
A government policy to protect public rights and public interests would mean that where they
conflict, private property rights would yield to public rights, public interests or public purposes.
Due to their adverse impacts on public access and their risks to public safety, the building of
more seawalls to ‘defend’ eroding land would be largely discontinued under this response.
To protect public rights to access and use the coast into the foreseeable future, under climate
change conditions, beach and dune systems, nearshore seabed and their associated biota would
be allowed to migrate – or naturally retreat - gradually landward, and the trend of shoreline
recession would continue uninterrupted by defensive structures, indefinitely into the future.1889
Hence under this response, the seawalls or other defensive structures would not be approved
behind retreating beaches except in essential circumstances. To facilitate this migration a future
government, in consultation with local councils, could adopt and implement the option of
managed relocation, or ‘retreat’1890 for appropriate locations.
Under legal instruments made to implement this response,1891 local councils would direct
landowners to relocate residences or businesses which become at risk from coastal erosion or
shoreline recession, within the lot, and if this is impossible, to remove the structures entirely.1892
Further they would also direct landowners remove anything1893 which could create threats to
public uses, risks to public safety,1894or dangers to public or environmental health.1895
Prioritising public rights to use coastal lands, and creating room for beaches to retreat naturally,
would also allow public recreational use1896 and ecological functions to go on uninterrupted.1897
The major challenge facing local councils managing public lands would then be to devise,

1889

This option of permitting the shoreline to recede naturally was discussed in Cooper and McKenna,
above n 123, 300. See also Figure 9.12 ‘avoiding the squeeze’ in s 3 Chapter I.
1890
See Australian Government, above n 44, 152.
1891
Such as Byron Shire Council, Development Control Plan Part J – Erosion-prone Lands (adopted 2
August 2018).
1892
Ibid sections J2.2 and J2.3.
1893
Councils may issue a clean-up order to a landowner under s 91 Protection of the Environment
Operations Act 1997 (NSW). Such as wire fences, electrical wiring or plumbing fixtures.
1894
Such as broken glass, steel structures, brickwork, masonry, cement steps and paths, footings.
1895
Such as fibro cladding manufactured before 1984, likely to be asbestos bearing. Abrasion of copper
pipe fittings or electrical cables could have serious impacts on the health of the marine environment.
1896
The suite of public uses of the foreshore was described in s 5.1 Chapter V.
1897
As is required by s 3 (a) CMA 2016 (NSW) discussed in s 4 Chapter IV. See also the recognition of
ecological benefits of no seawalls by Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 301, discussed in s 6 Ch V.
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through public consultation, effective ways to ensure public uses of coastal lands and waters
were ecologically sustainable.1898
Under this response a future government could modify public rights, and in association with
public land managers, to regulate public rights to use coastal lands and waters, where they
concluded that unregulated uses were inconsistent with the principles of ESD, and the
ecologically sustainable management of the coast. For example the timing and location of
public access to the beach and public uses, such as off-leash dog exercise, could be limited on
some beaches to protect the nesting areas of beach dependent migratory bird species protected
under international agreements,1899 in accord with the biodiversity conservation principle.1900

(d) Spending public money

A fourth area of difference would be the priorities for public expenditure, with public funding
directed to projects with the greatest public benefits. Under this response government approval
of public funding to build seawalls or other defensive structures, to protect private lands would
be unlikely. Public funding for seawalls might be approved however to protect public assets,
where this was justified by a careful assessment of impacts, risks, costs and benefits.1901

Under this response, other higher priorities for public spending to protect and enhance public
use rights, and manage coastal lands sustainably, under climate change conditions, may include:
i) relocating public infrastructure on coastal lands susceptible to damage by coastal processes
or coastal hazards, such as rail lines, roads, carparks, water supply, power, sewerage;
ii) removing hazards to navigation and public access from derelict seawalls;
iii) cleaning-up and decontaminating coastal residences surrendered or abandoned by their
private owners, to identify and remove potential hazards to the land’s future public use;
iv) preparing coastal lands surrendered to the government, for interim commercial uses, while
these uses are still feasible;
v) educating the public about the hazards created by climate change, the impacts forecast to
continue over centuries, and appropriate responses to these hazards and impacts; and
vi) purchasing key coastal properties offered for voluntary sale by owners.
1898

To ensure coastal management is consistent with the principles of ESD, as required by s 3 CMA 2016
(NSW) discussed in s 4 Chapter IV. See also s 5.2 Chapter V.
1899
Such as Japan Australia Migratory Birds Agreement (JAMBA) entered into force 1981; and the
China Australia Migratory Birds Agreement (CAMBA) entered into force 1988.
1900
See s 6(2)(c) POEAA 1991 (NSW) discussed in s 6.2 Chapter V.
1901
This is the approach recommended in the National Committee on Coastal and Ocean Engineering,
Institute of Engineers Australia, Coastal Engineering Guidelines for working with the Australian coast
in an ecologically sustainable way (EA, 2012).
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However this response could be ratcheted up into a ‘stronger’ response by government if prior
assumptions about the rate of increase in sea level, the extent of climate impacts on coastal
environments and the timing of their onset are shown to have been under-estimated.
10. A ‘stronger’ approach to protecting public rights and interests.
A stronger approach to protecting public rights could be adopted if an accelerating rate of sealevel rise and an increase in severe storms created an unexpected increase in shoreline recession,
and a spike in conflicts between private landowners and the public for access to coastal lands,
making a future government acutely aware of the need for a credible policy and effective action.
If a future government’s policy were to adopt a stronger position, to enhance public rights and
interests in coastal lands and strengthen them in any conflicts with private property rights,
considerably more might be done with the support of the legislature, in three ways:
a) broadening the public uses recognised as public rights;
b) enlarging the footprint of public uses rights;
c) increasing the level of protection through policy.
These possibilities are explored in the following sections
(a) Broadening public uses recognised as ‘public rights’

Broadening the public uses explicitly recognised by law as public rights could be achieved by
legislation which formalizes common law public rights to fish and navigate on tidal waters,1902
restates the right of pedestrian access to and along the foreshore,1903 and creates new ‘rights’.
The new statute could restate the legislature’s power to create and regulate statutory rights, add
‘for recreation’ as an approved purpose for public access to the foreshore and coastal waters,1904
create statutory ‘rights’, such as a ‘right to bathe or swim’, a ‘right to surf’ or a ‘right to dive’ in
coastal waters, and include as part of its objects a statement that future residents of New South
Wales should continue to have these public rights.1905 By legislating in this way, the government
could create a free-for-all in public uses of coastal lands and waters. However, conflicts between
competing public use ‘rights’ could be averted by precisely defining them, situating them in a
formal hierarchy, and specifying where they would, or would not apply.1906 Such ‘rights’ would
be statutory rights, not common law public rights.

1902

Specifically the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) and the Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW)
As per the public right of pedestrian access to the coastal region under s 3(d) of the Coastal
Protection Act 1979 (NSW), inserted in 1998.
1904
The public right of access to the foreshore was originally limited to fishing or navigation.
1905
This would be consistent with the ESD principle of ‘intergenerational equity’ described in s 6(2)(b)
POEAA 1991 (NSW) discussed in s 5.2 Chapter V.
1906
As does the statutory framework governing public navigation currently: see s 7 Chapter IV
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If the policy were broadened to include protecting public ‘interests’, or ‘the public interest’, the
enabling legislation could recognize the ‘use rights’ of others in the ecological community,1907
whose long-term protection under climate change conditions, was in the public interest.1908
Connected to existing legal principles,1909 broader protection of ‘public use’, public purposes
and public interests under this response could be framed as part of an endemic ‘public use
doctrine’ which operates within the statutory framework,1910 whose goal is to manage the State’s
coast to enable ecologically sustainably public use.
(b) Enlarging the footprint of public use rights

Two feasible options exist for enlarging the area where public rights could apply in the future:
raising the high water mark, and creating easements to facilitate public access to the beach.
i] Raising the level of high water mark
Traditionally the boundary between private land and the foreshore has been the high-water
mark,1911 as defined in English common law.1912 The State of New South Wales uses this
common law definition and has codified it as mean high water mark, (MHWM).1913 In contrast,
Queensland has adopted a higher high-water mark as the seaward boundary of private land,
being ‘mean high water at spring tides’ (MHWS).1914 By adopting a new statutory definition of
the boundary formed by tidal waters, at a higher level such as MHWS, or highest astronomical
tide (HAT)1915 the line of high-water would retains its character as an ambulatory boundary.1916
As advocated by Freyfogle, ‘Owning’, above n 310, 302-3, discussed in s 5.2 Chapter V.
For example migratory birds protected under international agreements.
1909
That the foreshore is owned by the State and available for public use: see 5.1 Chapter V.
1910
The existence of an endemic ‘public use doctrine’ in New South Wales was posited in s 6 Chapter V.
1911
The boundary between land and water was first determined as high-water mark in Vanhaesdanke's
Case 12 Car 1. (1636), as cited by Sir Matthew Hale in De Jure Maris (1667) Cap IV. IId. (I), in Stuart
A Moore A History of the Foreshore (1888) at 378.
1912
An ordinary high tide is… the line of the medium high tide between the springs & neaps, ascertained
by taking the average of the medium tides during the year. Tracey Elliot v Morley (Earl of) (1907) 51
Sol Jo 625 (Joyce J), cited in The English and Empire Digest Repl Vol 47 Waters at [491].
1913
In section 5 Definitions of the Survey and Spatial Information Regulations 2017 (NSW) "mean highwater mark means the line of mean high tide between the ordinary high-water spring and ordinary highwater neap tides." Clause 51(a) and (b) of the Regulation stipulates that references to high-water mark
and to tidal waters are to be taken to refer to “mean high-water mark”, (MHWM).
1914
See the Land Act 1994 (Qld) Schedule 6 – Dictionary, at 407 Reprint No. 10G, as in force at 18
December 2009: ‘high-water mark means the ordinary high-water mark at spring tides’. For a short
history of relevant legislation see Svendsen v Queensland (2002) 1 Qd R 216, 230 (Demack J). The
spring tides are the highest of the monthly tides, occurring at new and full moon.
1915
See Angus Gordon, ‘Highwater Mark - The Boundary of Ignorance’ (2001) (Paper presented at 11th
NSW Coastal Conference, Newcastle, 13-16 November 2001), 5, where Gordon states “it is illogical to
delimit a “land” boundary that is regularly over-washed by the sea”, suggesting that the highest
astronomical tide (HAT) [the highest high tide occurring naturally each year under non-storm
conditions], be adopted as the boundary line between public and private land.
1916
That the highwater mark is an ambulatory boundary was confirmed in SCOTI v SA [1982] and in EPA
v Saunders (1994) discussed in ss 7 & 8 Chapter IIII.
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Legislation could declare that existing real property boundaries would now be affected by the
ambulatory boundary of the new high-water mark, wherever it is located from time to time.1917
The State government would nominate an agency as the relevant public authority and authorize
the issuing of ‘notices’ to acquire the strip of land between the old high-water mark of MHWM
and the new mark of MHWS, or HAT. This would trigger the Land Acquisition (Just Terms
Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) and land would be acquired at then current market rate.1918
As an alternative, a statute could authorize a public authority to acquire the land at a rate set by
the legislation: which could be one payment per each affected land title, or at a specified price
per square metre of land title acquired.1919 In either case, the enabling legislation would
authorize the Registrar General to amend the description of boundaries of affected land titles to
reflect it gaining an ambulatory boundary of high-water mark,1920 as newly defined, and the
State’s acquisition of the land up to that boundary.
By adopting a new, higher definition of high-water mark, a future government could extend the
foreshore’s area landwards to include lands above MHWM regularly washed by spring tides and
storm surges, and augment the area of coastal lands subject to public use ‘rights’.1921 Because
both MHWS and HAT are more easily discernible in the coastal landscape than the mathematical mean of MHWM, such a change could reduce conflicts over a boundary’s location and
prevent the need for trespass actions over public use of privately-owned parts of the beach.1922
Redefining the high-water mark would have no impact where adjacent land was publicly owned,
but would move the boundary of privately-owned ‘real property’ landward to some extent, from
millimetres to metres, depending on the land’s topography and the foreshore’s gradient. Even
small changes could be seen by landowners as quite significant however, and an emphasis on
the public benefits gained, and payment of compensation for the land acquired would likely be
required to mitigate adverse reactions.
ii] Instituting a system of easements
The second means of increasing the area of land to which public use rights apply could be the
creation of easements, over a small part of privately owned coastal land, to allow public use of

1917

As per the common law rule stated in Scratton v Brown (1825) 4 B & C 485; 498-9 (Bayley J).
See the discussion of actions necessary to compulsorily acquire private land in s 6 Chapter IV.
1919
The State legislature’s power to assign a rate of compensation in legislation less than ‘full market
value’ was affirmed in Durham Holdings PL v NSW (2001). See s 10 Chapter V.
1920
See the court’s direction to the Registrar General to amend land titles which had become erroneous, in
EPA v Saunders (1994) discussed in s 8 Chapter III.
1921
The foreshore’s importance for rights of access and navigation was discussed in s 9.2 Chapter II.
1922
Trespass over private land and uncertainty about the location of the property boundary were key
issues in AG (UK) v McCarthy (1911) discussed in s 6 Chapter III.
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the beach, where the beach above MHWM extends onto privately-owned land.1923 Easements, as
instruments of property law, have existed for many years in various guises, including easements
for public access,1924 and more recently to protect significant public interests in land.1925
A rolling easement is similarly imposed on a ‘burdened’ private land title for the public’s
benefit,1926 but differs in an important respect. Its width, measured from HWM, is a defined
constant, but the location of its landward boundary is not static. As sea levels rise and the
shoreline recedes, the easement would maintain its specified width from the ambulatory
boundary of HWM and move, or ‘roll’ with it. ‘Rolling easements’ are well-known in the
United States of America1927 but were seldom seen in New South Wales,1928 until the Land and
Environment Court created an ambulatory easement for public access, when granting a claim
over vacant coastal Crown land at Red Rock in Coffs Harbour Shire.1929 Evidence in that case
showed that there was a large area of sandy beach above MHWM,1930 which had been subject of
ad hoc public use.1931 The claimant land council recognised that public use of the beach was an
essential public purpose, and conceded that the beach was not ‘claimable Crown land’.1932
However this public use did not extend to the whole of the land claimed, or prevent it from
being granted. As a condition of the grant the court created an ‘ambulatory easement’1933 30m
wide, measured from MHWM,1934 as the appropriate width to capture most of the beach,1935 to
permit its continued public use,1936 as the shoreline recedes.1937
Use of ‘rolling easements’ could be a feature of a future policy to protect and enhance public
rights, since they would ensure that public use rights survive likely climate change impacts.1938

1923

See Coffs Harbour and District Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister administering the Crown
Lands Act (2013) NSW LEC 216 discussed below: [hereafter CH & D LALC v Minister (2013)].
1924
See s 88A Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) discussed in s 6 Chapter IV.
1925
Such as native vegetation of conservation significance. See s 88E Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).
1926
Young et al, above n 437, 144, [32217].
1927
See Titus, ‘Rising’, above n 84, 1313; Titus, ‘Rolling’ above n 1558.
1928
See also Environmental Defender's Office, 'Climate Change and Adaptation and Coastal Biodiversity:
is a system of rolling easement is a legally feasible option for New South Wales?' (EDO NSW, 2010).
1929
CH & D LALC v Minister (2013) [163], [167] (Craig J).
1930
Professor Short provided evidence that beach width above MHWM varied between 20 and 50 metres,
and averaged 40 metres: CH & D LALC v Minister (2013) [108]-[113].
1931
Ibid [13], [145].
1932
Ibid [161].
1933
Ibid [163].
1934
Ibid [167].
1935
The average beach width was 40m, but it varied between 20m and 50m above MHWM. CH & D
LALC v Minister (2013) [111].
1936
In addition to a 30m wide rolling easement extending north south along the beach, in its Final Orders
of 10 March 2014 in CH & D LALC v Minister (2013) the court created a second easement for public
access to the beach from the west, five metres wide along the line of an existing track in use.
1937
CH & D LALC v Minister (2013) [109]. Professor Short’s evidence was that in the beach southern
section of the land in question had retreated ‘perhaps a few metres’ since 1993.
1938
An ‘ambulatory’ easement would migrate inland as sea level rises: see Corkill, ‘Coffs’, above n 1559.
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(c) Increasing the level of protection through policy

To enhance the public use doctrine in New South Wales a future State government could adopt
policies to increase levels of protection of public rights and public interests, such as:
i] ensuring that areas of publicly owned coastal land cannot be alienated;1939 and acquiring
through various means, additional areas of coastal land for public use,1940 where appropriate;
ii] directing local councils to police the tidal boundary of public lands to ensure hazards to
public use of the beach from adjacent private land, such as collapsed seawalls, or derelict
structures, are swiftly identified, and removed by the owners;
iii] instructing public land managers to protect public uses from commercial encroachment;
remove unnecessary constraints on public access and abolish fees for entry to public lands;1941
iv] requiring certain land-uses to undergo a higher standard of assessment; eg requiring
activities which were permissible without consent, to obtain consent; and an environmental
impact statement (EIS) to be prepared for certain activities;1942
v] using a higher threshold for approval; and refusal of consent1943 instead of using conditions to
mitigate threats to public uses or interests to make proposals compliant at the last minute.

11. Advantages and disadvantages of these responses
A range of advantages and disadvantages arise under these pro-public rights responses.

11.1 Advantages
Advantages of both these responses would be their strong foundation in existing law and local
doctrine on public use of coastal lands developed over New South Wales’ history,1944 and their
consistency with common law rules declared by the court.1945 Another plus would be the clarity
of the message conveyed by the government through the legislature to the community about
whose rights would prevail in future conflicts. A major advantage would be that many people
1939

Reserving coastal Crown lands from sale and dedicating them for public purposes were discussed in s
3 Chapter IV.
1940
Under the LA(JTC) 1991 (NSW) or under special legislation. See s 6 Chapter IV.
1941
See the recent authorisation of managers to charge the public entry fees to Crown lands, under s
9.25(2)(f) CLMA 2016 NSW) discussed in s 3 Chapter IV.
1942
This was the approach used in protecting coastal wetlands and littoral rainforests in the New South
Wales government’s State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs 14 and 26). See s 5 Chapter IV.
1943
Using powers under s 4.15 and 4.16 EPAA 1979 (NSW) discussed in s 5 Chapter IV.
1944
See discussion of this in s 3 Chapter IV, and s 5.1 Chapter V.
1945
On the nature and location of real property boundary and ownership of lands < MHWM, in EPA V
Saunders (1994), v Leaghur Pty Ltd [1995] discussed in s 8 Chapter III.
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would see them as consistent with historical norms,1946 creating no disruption to their lives, but
ensuring that public rights to use coastal lands, are not lost in the future, due to actions aimed at
addressing climate change impacts.

More fundamental advantages of these responses lie in the social and ecological uses of beaches
which could continue if the construction of hard defensive structures were prohibited, and the
shoreline allowed to recede naturally as sea levels rise.1947 The suite of public uses of beach and
dune systems, the diverse range of ecological functions of intertidal environments and their
related social and economic activities would be able to continue uninterrupted, as the result.1948

Both these responses would also have the advantage of saving public expenditure on
constructing, maintaining and upgrading seawalls, which a future government could then reallocate to projects or actions by public land-managers that protect public rights to use coastal
lands under the adverse conditions likely to be created by local climate change impacts.1949
The ‘strong’ response would not incur major public expense since it would simply codify the
status quo. The ‘stronger’ response would have the advantage of using a range of relatively low
costs actions: broadening public rights, creating easements for public access, monitoring
beaches for dangers to public use, and increasing the level of protection of public rights to use
coastal land via the planning and development control systems. Raising the high-water mark
would incur more public spending due to acquisition costs, but would have the advantages of
increasing the area of beach available for public use, more clearly situating the tidal property
boundary in the landscape, and reducing uncertainty about its location.

11.2 Disadvantages
From a public interest perspective there appear to be few disadvantages of these responses.

For private landowners however, there would appear to be immediate and longer-term
disadvantages. Changes in a property boundary, and hence the area, of their privately owned
‘real property’ could occur without their consent or effective remedy.1950 Hopes of constructing
structures to ‘defend’ privately-owned land would be dashed, since their approval would be
prohibited if the works would adversely affect public rights or interests in adjacent public lands,

1946

That the foreshore is publicly owned and available for a range of public uses. See s 5.1 Chapter V.
See the discussion of ‘coastal squeeze’ and how to avoid it in s 3.3 Chapter I.
1948
See Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 301, discussed in s 6 Chapter V.
1949
As did public authorities in the UK when deciding to discontinue the maintenance of seawalls along
the coast of England and Wales. See Cooper and McKenna, above n 123 discussed in s 7 Chapter V.
1950
Through the operation of the doctrine of accretion, discussed in s 5.3 Chapter II.
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or create a nuisance on nearby private land.1951 Current and future uses of private land may
become restricted, or prohibited, as risks from coastal hazards increase.1952 The value of the
coastal ‘real property’ may plateau, decline or drop away. Over the longer term the land could
be entirely inundated by tidal waters, and the land title lost, with no compensation payable.1953

Few disadvantages would accrue to government were this response endorsed by the legislature
through relevant legislation. In both responses mounting a credible argument that the policy was
in the public interest would be required, but not difficult. A ‘strong’ response would need only a
modest legislative program but more ambitious legislation would be necessary however if a
future government were to pursue the ‘stronger’ action of raising the high-water mark.

One disadvantage of raising of the high-water mark through statutory redefinition, would be its
effect on many owners of coastal lands all at once, potentially causing an electoral backlash.
This disadvantage could be ameliorated somewhat if the public benefit was clearly explained
before the legislation was introduced and payment of compensation was specified in the Act.1954
Acquiring the strip of land between old and new high-water marks via ‘notices’ under the Land
Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) would have the disadvantage of likely
incurring higher costs, due to high value of coastal land, but implementation could be staggered
by the staged issue of ‘notices’ of intent to acquire, perhaps on a geographic basis.1955 The
disadvantages this would be it would continue over many years, perhaps decades, ‘locking-in’
long-term public expenditure and making estimation of the total cost impossible. Further, it is
likely that the focus of local coastal management would not ‘move on’ but would return again
and again to the questions of acquisition and valuation of small strips of coastal land.

Acquiring the strip of land between old and new high-water mark by special legislation could
have lower costs if the rate of compensation payable was clearly designated in the legislation.
One disadvantage of this legislative approach would be that all coastal landowners would be
affected at once, potentially creating an administrative logjam in the issuing compensation
payments and amendment of land titles. However this approach would have the advantages of
allowing the total cost of the policy to be credibly estimated, and once completed, the focus of
coastal management would be able to move on to other issues and actions.

1951

See s 27 Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW) discussed in s 4 Chapter IV.
For lands identified as ‘vulnerable’ to coastal hazards under s 5 CMA 2016 (NSW) see the
development controls created under the SEPP Coastal Management 2018, discussed in s 5 Chapter IV.
1953
This was the result for many lots in the sub-division considered in EPA v Saunders (1994) discussed
in s 8 Chapter III.
1954
As was the case in Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v NSW (2000) discussed in s 10 Chapter III.
1955
The operation of the LA(JTC)A 1991 (NSW) was considered in s 6 Chapter IV.
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Hence there are a range of advantages and disadvantages which may arise from these responses,
and estimating the public appeal of a ‘stronger’ public rights response would require a careful
weighing of the potential costs likely to be involved and the public benefits likely to be gained.

Part D. If government policy attempts to do both
A fourth potential response, is conceivable. A future government may attempt to protect both
private and public rights in coastal land, for a range of reasons.
Politically, it may be impossible to abandon coastal residents, or those in key electorates, to
climate change impacts, without some form of government assistance. Further, the public and
the government might foresee problems in consistency, compliance and equity in a scenario
where private landowners bear the cost of hazard minimization to avoid legal liability for
pollution of coastal waters.1956 Therefore a legitimate role for government might be identified as
planning and supervising the clean-up of coastal lands to prepare for anticipated climate change
impacts, as part of managing the State’s coastal resources.
Policy responses of a future government seeking to protect both private and public rights could
have many diverse manifestations. I next consider two differently oriented potential responses.
In the first, the government might seek to move away from historical notions of dominant rights
and attempt to ‘balance’ competing private and public rights in any resolution of a conflict. In a
second, a future government might accept public rights’ dominance, historically and currently,
but not want to ignore private landowners’ interests altogether. Thus it could protect public
rights, and seek to accommodate private interests in coastal lands, where this was feasible.
I explore these potential responses of ‘balancing’ and ‘accept and accommodate’ next.
12. ‘Balancing’ private and public rights
In theory a future government could enact legislation to extinguish common law rules on the
movement of property boundaries,1957 repeal provisions of existing statutes where public rights
are dominant1958 and declare private property rights and public rights to be ‘equivalent’. In this
new statutory framework, no rights would be ‘trumps’, and disputes would be heard and
resolved by an arbitrating tribunal, not a court. An arbiter’s task in solving disputes over
conflicting uses of coastal land would be to ‘balance’ the competing private and public interests.

1956

The pollution of tidal waters with tyres was the initial cause of action in EPA v Saunders (1994)
discussed in s 8 Chapter III.
1957
As described in s 5.3 Chapter II, and the case considered in s 8 Chapter III.
1958
A suite of legislation where public rights are dominant were considered in ss 3 – 6 Chapter IV.
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In this response it is likely that adjoining private landowners and members of the public would
be parties, but local councils may also be involved due to their interests as land owner, or
Crown land manager, or as an agency responsible for protecting an aspect of the public interest.
Conceivably other parties to a dispute over conflicting private and public uses of an area of
coastal land could include State agencies with a public interest role, such as fisheries or NPWS,
and local businesses that depend on public access to the beach, and whose clientele value it.
Hence this ‘balanced’ response could more closely resemble mediation, rather than litigation,
between multiple parties with diverse interests in using certain coastal lands, which would aim
to recognize and include all relevant private and public interests in the balance. The results of
the mediation, the ‘balanced’ outcome, could be formalized through a deed of agreement
between the parties or the adoption of a plan of management for the lands as defined.
In this response the location of the boundary between private and public land could be
disconnected from prior rules governing the movement of property boundaries and the
mediation may involve parties ‘agreeing’ to a boundary location which is convenient, ‘splits the
difference’ between competing proposals, or reinstating its location prior to the dispute.
Hypothetically the parties could agree instead that the property boundary’s location does not
matter so much, and the public use area could be defined by a mapped easement1959 which
includes both public land and parts of privately owned land.
A ‘balanced’ response could seek to enshrine the co-existence of private and public use rights in
an agreement and seek to integrate a diverse suite of land uses via an agreement, but such an
agreement would need to address the potential for competing uses to conflict. One approach
could be to ‘divide’ certain coastal lands and allocate part to public and part to private uses. A
second approach could be to institute a ‘time-sharing’ arrangement in which public uses of the
designated coastal lands would continue during agreed hours and days, and exclusive private
uses would be permitted at other agreed times.1960 To ‘balance’ the use of public easements over
private land to allow public access to the beach, adjoining landowners could seek to extend their
private uses onto public land. Using these ‘balanced’ approaches, a great deal of private use of
publicly owned coastal lands would be possible. A further approach could seek to balance the
diminution of private property rights created by easements for public access with a transfer of
development rights to elsewhere on the land title.

1959

If a public authority agreed to do so under the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). See s 6 Chapter IV.
Both these approaches were used by Council at the King Edward Park in Newcastle, but were found
unlawful, in FOKEPI v NCC [2015]. They are however now lawful approaches under the CLMA 2016
(NSW). See the discussion of this in s 3 Chapter IV.
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In this ‘balanced’ response private and public interests would contribute equally to the costs of
managing coastal lands and maintaining public access to the beach, and this principle would
extend to landowners committing to pay half the costs to build and maintain any new seawall.
Or, under this response it might be agreed that an approval could be granted to build a privatelyowned seawall but a consent condition1961 could require the beach to be ‘nourished’ repeatedly,
at the wall owner’s expense, to ensure a beach continues to exist and be available for public use.
Striking a balance between private and public interests could see a State government
compulsorily acquire privately-owned coastal lands for public purposes, but enact legislation
authorizing payment of compensation at less than market value1962 in recognition of the costs it
would incur in demolishing structures and rehabilitating the site.

13. Accept and accommodate
A less disruptive response would be for a future government to adopt the strong approach to
protecting public rights and a very weak approach to protecting private interests.
In this potential response government would accept public use rights in coastal lands as
dominant,1963 acknowledge private interests in coastal lands notwithstanding that they may not
constitute ‘rights’ and accommodate them where this is possible, while protecting public rights.
This ‘accept and accommodate’ approach would state a clear priority of rights and interests to
be protected where possible and allow a future government to devise and implement measures
to support affected private landowners without being obliged to ‘compensate’ them.1964
In this response the government would implement some or all the policies of the ‘strong’ and
‘stronger’ responses above, and take other actions not inconsistent with them, which recognise
and accommodate private interests in coastal land by various means, such as by creating a
‘transferable development right (TDR). In this way, though dominant, public rights and interests
would not negate private interests.

Create a coastal land exchange scheme

One means of achieving both these goals could be the creation of a coastal lands exchange
scheme. A future government could recognise shoreline recession as a natural process, which
cannot be ‘tamed’ by engineering1965 and, to assist residents affected by coastal hazards, begin a

1961

Conditions may be imposed on development consent under s 4.17 EPAA 1979. See s 5 Chapter IV.
This was the approach employed by the NSW government, cited in Durham (2001). See s 10 Ch III.
1963
Under the property law rules, court decisions and statues considered in Chapters II, III & IV.
1964
By not formally triggering the LA(JTC)A 1991 (NSW). See s 6 Chapter IV.
1965
Or plausibly denied, or wished away as a temporary phenomenon, likely to be soon reversed. These
were the responses of local MPs and ministers in the O’Farrell / Baird government 2011-2015.
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program of relocating existing development at risk from coastal hazards.1966 It could, following
public consultations, introduce legislation to authorize the creation of a statutory scheme, to
encourage the surrender of private land affected by coastal hazards to the State, in exchange for
new land titles created by government.1967
Under such a scheme when land titles affected by coastal hazards were identified by local
councils, currently or in the future, during the preparation of coastal management programs,1968
the owners of affected land titles would qualify to enter the voluntary scheme.1969 In exchange
for the surrender of their hazard-affected land title, the State government would grant a new
land title, to a new allotment, in new residential estate in an approved hazard free location.
Public assistance to affected private landowners could be justified as an exchange ‘in kind’, ie a
new allotment to compensate for land lost to the sea, in line with an old common law rule.1970
Identifying suitable areas for ‘replacement’ estates, to relocate the existing at-risk population,
and cater for anticipated population growth,1971 and as part of an overall government response to
climate change impacts, would require careful consideration of appropriate locations, to avoid
other hazards.1972 Ideally, preferred locations would optimize existing and planned
infrastructure, preserve agricultural land, prevent conflicts with adjoining land-uses and avoid
adverse impacts on environmentally sensitive land, including threatened species’ habitats.1973
If the number of new land titles needed1974 could not be obtained from existing suitable Crown
1966

Planned or managed retreat is one of three macro-options canvassed in Australian Government, above
n 44, 152. Other adaptation options canvassed were ‘protection’ and ‘accommodation’.
1967
This idea was first publicly proposed in a discussion paper, John R Corkill, ‘Getting real about shoreline recession: time to plan ahead and develop a scheme to relocate threatened coastal communities’,
(Paper presented at 22nd NSW Coastal Conference, Port Macquarie, 12-15 November 2013). See <
http://www.coastalconference.com/2013/papers2013/John%20Corkill.pdf >
1968
See the mandatory requirements to identify areas at risk when preparing a coastal management
program in NSW Government Coastal Management Manual, Part A, over immediate, 20, 50 and 100
year planning horizons; s 6 ii ‘determine and assess coastal risks, vulnerabilities and opportunities’; and
s 8 iii ‘identify the key coastal management issues affecting the areas to which the CMP is to apply and
how these have been considered’.
1969
In the recent case, Boomerang & Bluey’s Residents Group Inc v NSW Minister for Environment,
Heritage and Local Government, and MidCoast Council No.2 [2019] NSWLEC 202, the residents
objected to the identification of their land titles as at risk in the CZMP then in preparation.
1970
The possible gain of land from the sea to compensate for loss of land to the sea was first discussed by
Sir Matthew Hale in De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem (c 1667), in Moore, above n 37, 396.
1971
Department of Planning Far North Coast Regional Strategy 2006-2031 (2006).
1972
Such as contaminated lands, or from other hazards likely to be made worse by climate change
conditions, such as riverine flooding, mass movement, or fire.
1973
See Appendix 1 –Sustainability criteria in NSW Government, Department of Planning Far North
Coast Regional Strategy 2006-2031 (2006), 45-6.
1974
Between 40,000 and 63,000 ‘replacement’ allotments would be needed in NSW by 2100, if the
assessment of properties at risk in NSW were relied upon. See Australian Government (2009) above n
3, 77-79. Plus an additional 110,000 new dwellings are required by 2031 to cater for anticipated
population growth in the Mid North Coast and Far North Coast regions alone, = > 150,000 new lots.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Page 275

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Laws)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

Chapter VI – Potential responses

© John R Corkill
Student No. 2376398

land, and privately owned lands were better located, or had fewer constraints on their
development, the government could purchase,1975 sub-divide them and create new estates and
land titles ‘at cost’, rather than leave this to private enterprise, who may not be committed to
achieving wider economic, social or environmental outcomes. A major program of governmentled residential development would provide opportunities to apply, as core principles,
ecologically sustainable estate layout, water and energy efficient housing design,1976 use of
recycled or recovered building materials and environmentally responsible building practices.1977
Though they are issues beyond the scope of this thesis, relocating at-risk dwellings and creating
new housing estates could also improve the mix of housing types and apply current best practice
in locating social and economic infrastructure, and designating adequate ‘employment lands’.
Such a land exchange scheme would require overarching legislation to authorize it and initiate
processes to identify suitable Crown lands, approve new sub-divisions or settlements, and
ensure the development of necessary infrastructure,1978 but could use existing statutory
provisions which permit new land titles to be created,1979 registered,1980 surrendered,1981 or
exchanged.1982
Because joining the scheme would be voluntarily initiated by the landowner agreeing to
exchange land titles under the authorizing legislation, the Land Acquisition (Just Terms
Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) would not apply, and the State government would avoid the
liability of the ‘just terms’ compensation at full market value.1983 By surrendering their land title
the private landowner’s responsibility for demolishing structures and decontaminating the land
would transfer to the State, as the new owner, and the strict liability for pollution of coastal
waters from sources on their private land,1984 would cease.

1975

At full market value per Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW).
See the standards for water, energy and thermal comfort in new buildings in the Building
Sustainability Index (BASIX) < https://www.planningportal.nsw.gov.au/basix/about-basix >
1977
Micheal Mobbs, Sustainable House – Living for our future (Choice, 1998)
1978
Under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW)
1979
Land titles are generated by the ‘creation of a folio’ for that land under s 13D or s 17 Real Property
Act 1900 (NSW) New land titles are principally created through the approval of a plan of sub-division
pursuant to s 195G Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) for a land title already registered under the Real
Property Act 1900 (NSW) and Registrar-General’s registration of the plan and the creation of new
folios of the State’s Land Titles Register under s 32(4) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).
1980
Folios for new land titles are entered into the Register by the Registrar General under s 31B Real
Property Act 1900 (NSW).
1981
See sections 134, 135 and 137 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1982
See s 34 CLMA 2016 (NSW).
1983
This would be apt because no ‘real property’ would be acquired. See the discussion of this in John R
Corkill ‘Claimed property right does not hold water’ (2013) 87 Australian Law Journal 49-58, 56-7.
1984
Pollution of tidal waters with tyres, contrary to s 27A Clean Waters Act 1970 (NSW) was the cause of
action in Environment Protection Authority v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655, 13,656. Pollution of
waters, including tidal waters, is an offence under s 120 of the Protection of the Environment
Operations Act 1997 (NSW).
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This would be desirable since the State government could oversee, or operate, timely, consistent
and effective demolition and clean-up programs, to avoid a legacy of disastrous environmental
health and public safety impacts from derelict buildings and abandoned infrastructure.
Critics might assert that no-one would swap a million-dollar coastal property for an allotment
worth a fraction of that value. However, after a series of major storms the appeal of a land swap
may increase. A more astute analysis may conclude that, even if true today,1985 that assertion
may not hold in the future. If the impacts of coastal hazards and the costs of maintenance
increase, and insurance becomes prohibitively expensive or unattainable, and coastal land
values fall, the utility or appeal of owning coastal land may diminish. Thus if defensive options
were unavailable and land exchange was the only available option, its appeal may increase. The
attractiveness of swapping an uninsurable, devalued hazard-prone site, with a weather-beaten,
high-maintenance dwelling of compromised structural integrity, and a potentially substantial
legal liability, for an allotment in a new, best-practice Crown sub-division, free of demolition
and clean-up costs and legal liabilities, could become irresistible.
Entry into the scheme could be encouraged by offering landowners incentive payments to
participate,1986 not linked to market values.1987 Capped incentive payments would allow
Treasury to calculate the costs of the scheme, in contrast to an ongoing, unlimited liability for
compensation at full market-value. Incentive payments could assist landowners to meet the
costs of moving their residence, if feasible, or demolishing it and building a new better, more
space- and energy-efficient dwelling on their new lot.
If incentives were offered at their highest levels for early entry into the scheme,1988 when the
land title was first identified by a local council in its coastal hazard study as likely to be affected
by coastal hazards,1989 the State government would gain substantial benefits. Through early
surrender of land, government would obtain a larger area of shrinking land title, have greatest
flexibility in permitting appropriate revenue-generating interim uses, such as short term rental,
and longer lead time to assess, organise and conduct demolition and clean-up. When short term

1985

Such a view is contestable, since there are many houses at risk which have been for sale for some
time eg Wooli village. This may indicate that the owners cannot find a buyer at the price sought.
1986
Incentive payments would accord with ESD principle (d) ‘improved valuation, pricing and incentive
mechanisms’. See s 6(2) POEAA 1991 (NSW).
1987
since they would not be ‘compensation’ as such.
1988
Say, $100,000.
1989
Consideration of coastal hazards impacts was required when preparing a coastal zone management
plan. See s 55C CPA 1979 (NSW). Impacts of coastal hazards must be considered and maps of affected
areas are required when preparing a coastal management program. See s 15(3) CMA 2016 (NSW). See
also Our Future on the coast… NSW Coastal Management Manual Part B s 1.5, 7-9.
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commercial uses become inappropriate, public benefits could be secured by dedicating the land
for conservation and recreational uses, until it becomes unsafe for these uses to continue.1990
With lower incentive payments for late entry into the scheme,1991 when the area of land
surrendered would have been reduced due to tidal waters intrusion, and the State obtained no
advantage from interim commercial uses, or flexibility in assessing and organising timely
demolition and clean-up, landowners might be motivated to join the scheme sooner, rather than
later. Landowners who chose not to participate would be free to do so but would receive no
assistance, and eventually may have no land title to sell or exchange.1992 They would bear the
demolition and clean-up costs or face the strict legal liability for any pollution of tidal waters
which came from their land while it was being lost to the sea.1993
Transferable development rights could provide flexibility

A further incentive to enter the scheme could be to use an idea from the weak private property
response, and create a transferable development right (TDR) for approved structures, such as a
dwelling, on land voluntarily surrendered to the State. Such a TDR would recognize the consent
– which would continue to be valid - as ‘property’ and allow its severance from the site.1994
A TDR for a dwelling could be relocated on existing free-hold land, or linked to a new land title
generated under the scheme. This would expedite any final approval process and allow lawful
residential occupation to continue, albeit in a new location. Such a TDR could also be sold to
another landowner, or acquired by a local council, or the State government.
14. Advantages and disadvantage of these responses
An entirely different suite of advantages and disadvantages flow from these potential responses
of ‘balancing’ private and public rights, and ‘accept and accommodate’, where possible.

14.1 Advantages
The advantages of the ‘balancing’ response would be limited. One advantage would be its
A reduced ‘incentive payment’ of, say, $50,000 could be paid for a delayed entry into the scheme,
where the Crown retains some flexibility on demolition and clean up, or if a substantial area of land is
surrendered, enabling some revenue generating interim uses and/or dedication for public purposes.
1991
Say, $10,000.
1992
Lands below MHWM cease to be land for the purposes of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) and
title to that land reverts to the State government. See Environment Protection Authority v Leaghur
Holdings PL [1995] 87 LGERA 282, 287 (Allen J).
1993
See Environment Protection Authority v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655, 13,661.
1994
See the suggested use of TDRs in John Sheehan, et al, ‘Coastal climate change and transferable
development rights’ (2018) 35 (1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 87, 96. See also Peter
Williams, ‘The Curious Case of Property Rights in the NSW Planning System and Its Reluctance to
Adopt Transferable Development Rights’ (2012) 17 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 61.
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appearance of ‘fairness’, since neither set of ‘rights’ would dominate the other as trumps.
Another advantage would be the avoidance of an adversarial approach to dispute resolution
common in court proceedings and the absence of litigation costs. Under this response it is
possible that the interests of a range of parties to the dispute could be considered and addressed
in resolving the dispute. There would be few, if any, other advantages to this response.
A primary advantage of the ‘accept and accommodate’ response would be its consistency with
the normative elements of property law in which public rights are dominant.1995 Another major
advantage would be its clear signal to the community: that public rights have precedence, but
private interests would be recognised and accommodated where possible. Major advantages
would be that public use and ecological functions of beaches and other intertidal habitats, and
associated social and economic activity, would continue uninterrupted, while disruption of
existing property law, would be minimal.
The ‘accept and accommodate’ response would reflect Freyfogle ethical approach since it would
properly consider physical and temporal issues but would better address impacts across the
whole social community by assisting adversely affected private landowners, where feasible.
This response would allow flexibility for government in its spending to achieve its policy goals.
Long-term funding would not be ‘locked in’ to maintain and upgrade sea defences, or buy out
landowners and public funds could be allocated to respond to changing circumstances.1996
A future government could gain support for this response from the diverse public who use the
coast, and from beachside residents, and obtain an electoral advantage by being seen to
champion public rights while also accommodating private interests, where possible. By
avoiding the social division in coastal communities likely to arise if a future government only
focused on protecting the private property of waterfront residents, with adverse impacts on a
larger group of non-resident beach and coast users, the potential for electoral back-lash might be
minimized. The proposed land exchange scheme would have the advantage of reducing political
risks to the government, since landowners affected by coastal hazards would not be abandoned,
and though they would not be paid for their land, they would be compensated ‘in kind’ and
receive payments to assist their relocation. The advantages of this response for non-resident
coast users would be retaining public access to the foreshore and ensuring coastal lands and
waters are safe for public use, despite climate change impacts.

1995

Under the property law rules, court decisions and statues considered in Chapters II, III & IV.
This would heed the warning against being locked into an ever increasingly expensive cycle of
construction and defence, in Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 304, discussed in s 6.2 Chapter V.
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Further, concerns about public funds being diverted from essential programs or re-distributed
into private hands for no public benefit, would also be minimized. Though the costs of publicly
funding a land exchange scheme and rendering surrendered lands safe are not known, the
scheme may have the advantage of costing less than acquiring land on ‘just terms’.1997 Hence a
distinct advantage of this response would be that for limited public expenditure, long-term
threats to public safety, public health and the health of coastal environments, from deteriorating
derelict structures, would be avoided.
The advantages to private landowners under this response would be more modest than under a
response which gave weak or robust protection to private property rights, but the level of public
funding and other assistance available to landowners would likely be greater than that available
under a strong or stronger pro-public rights response, or from litigation.
This response would also have an advantage of creating a range of social and economic benefits.
Coastal tourism, recreational and commercial fishing industries would not be ‘squeezed’ and
face decline and eventual collapse. New infrastructure would be built and existing residential
infra-structure would be better utilized. Implementing the scheme would boost employment and
economic growth in regional areas. Under this response it would also be possible for the energy
efficiency and sustainability of the State’s housing stock to be improved, the mix of housing
types to be diversified, and house prices to be unaffected by scare supply and high demand.

14.2 Disadvantages
Consistent with their divergent objectives, there are major differences in the disadvantages
likely to result from these potential responses.
The ‘balancing’ response has many disadvantages. A major weakness is its inconsistency with
the normative elements of property law discussed above.1998 Since it would change the status
quo, the government’s message of ‘balance’ may not be well understood, or accepted. Stating a
credible rationale for revoking private and public ‘rights’ and explaining the new system’s
operation would be needed, but difficult, and may not be effective in mobilizing public support.
A major disadvantage would be the difficulty in preparing and enacting the comprehensive
legislation required, to repeal the status quo, create the tribunal and new statutory framework in
which conflicting ‘use rights’ might be ‘balanced’, train arbiters on how to achieve this
‘balance’, and restore or modify it, if the prior ‘balance’ is upset. Another disadvantage would
1997

A direct comparison of costs is not possible without a detailed economic study. However, the value of
residential buildings in NSW potentially affected by a 1.1m sea level rise and a 1 in 100 year storm was
assessed as between $12.4 billion and $18.7 billion. See Australian Government, above n 44, 77.
1998
The property law rules, court decisions and statues considered in Chapters II, III & IV.
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be that public rights would have less weight and private rights more than under current law.
Other serious drawbacks would include the costs of creating a new system, and the confusion
and serious disruption likely to occur until the enabling law had been enacted and implemented.
An obvious disadvantage of this response is that it would provide little or no guidance in
resolving future disputes between conflicting private and public uses. Since every dispute would
focus on the particular circumstances, not theory of dominant ‘right’, the ‘balance’ of interests
achieved to resolve one dispute would not apply in resolving other disputes. Where the
boundary was located, whether and where a seawall could be built, and which uses of coastal
land would be permitted would be decided by an arbiter on the basis of facts and evidence of
actual practice reported by the parties, not theoretical arguments. Resolving disputes by
achieving a ‘balance’ of the parties’ competing uses could be complicated by difficulties in
assembling adequate evidence, inconclusive results, extensive delays and cost blow-outs. Due to
coastal lands’ dynamic nature and changing social and economic uses, it is likely a ‘balance’
could be upset, so additional disadvantages of this response would be the likelihood that many
‘balances’ would be needed over time, and earlier mediations would be of limited value.
A further disadvantage would be the likelihood that only recent and current uses of the land in
dispute would be considered, not its use by future generations. Thus other disadvantages of this
response would be its lack of long-term perspective, overstates benefits, underestimates impacts
and undervalues costs into the future,1999 in an attempt to ‘balance’ competing uses. Hence, the
‘balancing’ response appears to reflect the ‘wrong’ philosophical approach flagged by
Freyfogle2000 since the parties’ uses would be considered, and the land’s characteristics, its
wider social community including future generations, and ecological community would not.
There appear to be a few disadvantages to the ‘accept and accommodate’ response. For landowners affected by coastal hazards the main disadvantage would be that they would not get the
response they wanted. As a result they could create an electoral backlash to disadvantage the
government. However this disadvantage could be minimized and the reaction tempered if
assistance was provided to affected landowners, with the support of non-resident beach users.
The costs of creating and operating a land exchange scheme would be a major disadvantage of
the ‘accept and accommodate’ response but the public funds needed to implement such a
scheme could create substantial public benefits that would be otherwise unachievable.
This concludes my exposition of responses. Next I summarise and begin to compare them.
1999

The defects in estimating costs and benefits were recognised by Cooper and McKenna, above n 123,
302, discussed in s 6.2 Chapter V.
2000
See Freyfogle, ‘Ownership’, above n 193, 1278-1283.
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Part E. Discussion
In this Part I tabulate the responses’ policies on key issues and make some preliminary
observations on them, preparatory to my evaluation of their merits in the next chapter, VII.
15. Summary of potential responses policies
A summary of potential responses policies on key issues is shown in Table 6. below.
Response 1] do

2] weak

3] robust

ISSUE

nothing

pro-private

pro-private

Location of
boundary

Remains
ambulatory
boundary
of MHWM

Frozen at
current
position by
new statute
no longer
ambulatory

Ownership
of land
which falls
<MHWM

Reverts to
the State as
owner of
foreshore
under
common
law

Right to
defend?
Build
seawalls

No.
Yes. Only
with
developme
nt consent.

Compensat
ion payable

Public
funding

Likely cost
Other
policies

No. Not
payable for
lands lost to
the sea,
under
common
law
Yes
Court costs

low
nil

4] strong
pro-public

5] stronger
pro-public

6]
balanced

7] accept +
accommodate

Affirms
ambulatory
boundary of
MHWM by
new
declaratory
statute

Raises
ambulatory
boundary to
MHWS or
HAT by new
statute

Remains
ambulatory
boundary
of MHWM

Affirms or
raises
ambulatory
HWM by new
statute

Reverts to
State, who
admits gain
of private
land
<MHWM:
acquire +
compensate
Yes.
Yes. No
developme
nt consent
required.

New statute
revives
original
position,
even where
< MHWM
or < LWM;
declares not
ambulatory.
Remains
privately
owned /
may be
reclaimed
as property
right under
new statute
Yes.
Yes. No
developme
nt consent
required.

Affirms
reversion to
the State via
new
declaratory
statute

Affirms
reversion to
the State via
new statute

Reverts to
the State
under
common
law unless
changed by
statute

Affirms
reversion to the
State via new
statute

No.
Not preferred.
Only with
development
consent.

No.
Not preferred.
Only with
development
consent.

No.
Possible.
Only with
developme
nt consent.

No.
Not preferred.
Only with
development
consent.

Yes, at
‘market
value’ for
lands lost to
the sea via
new statute

Not
preferred
but Yes at
‘market
value’ per
statute

No. New
statute law
confirms not
payable for
lands lost to
the sea

Yes, ‘market
value, for
ribbon of land
when raising
HWM, or less
if special Act

No.
Agreement
balances
uses, no
change to
ownership

Yes
Co-fund
seawalls
Acquire
land
<MHWM

Yes
Build
upgrade
seawalls for
private land
Acquire
land title as
last resort
very high
Repeal
public
rights
Sell public
land
Revoke
easements

Yes
Provide
public access
Acquire land
title if rec

Yes. Plan /
prepare for
climate
impacts
Improve
public access
Raise HWM,
acquire land
high
Enact new
public rights;
Require
higher EIA
standard;
Widen veg sp
protected;
Create TDRs,
‘rolling’
easements

Yes if in
agreement
‘balancing’
uses;
May need
‘balancing’
payment by
landowners
mod - high
Multi-party
managemen
t agreement

No. ‘In kind’
assistance
provided, to
expedite
relocation of at
risk residents +
residences
Yes
As 4], 5]

high
Reduce
public
rights
Restrict
area
available

moderate
Create TDRs

+ Land
exchange
scheme, i/c
demolition, site
clean up
very high
Per 5] Stronger
+ Land
exchange
scheme
Demolition and
site clean-up of
surrendered
land

Table 6. – Summary of potential responses’ policies on key issues
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16. Preliminary observations on these potential responses
From the exposition above is apparent that a diverse suite of policy responses to future conflicts
over coastal land use would be available to a future NSW government. The merits of these
various potential responses are evaluated next in the chapter, using the criteria identified in the
last chapter, as ethical decision-making about land use, and as successful public policy. However some preliminary observations might be made here on their similarities and differences.

Not all potential responses would be easy to justify using the rationale of a greater public good,
as it is presently understood, in order to win public support and gain the legislature’s approval.
Nor would they all be equally easy to achieve through the passage of necessary legislation.
Further, the disruption to existing property law they would generate would also differ greatly.
Relatedly, the time required to implement each potential response would vary markedly. The
passage of legislation to apply the strong pro-public response, might be achieved in a matter of
months, but more complex, disruptive responses which seek to reverse the status quo, enacting
and implementing relevant legislation may take some time, even years. A ‘do nothing’ response
which leaves disputes to the courts, would likely see litigation continue for many years.

Major differences in social impact arise from these potential responses, on private land owners,
on members of the public and on the government itself. Those responses privileging private
property rights of beach residents, would benefit a comparatively small number of people, while
disadvantaging a larger group of non-resident beach users. Responses which sought to protect or
enhance public rights would reverse this ratio of benefits and disadvantages. The balancing, and
the ‘accept and accommodate’ responses would also vary in their social impacts, and produce
different distributions of benefits and costs entirely.

The ecological impacts and implications of these responses would likely be polarized. Potential
responses which would privilege private property rights and permit seawalls to proliferate,
would produce, through the resultant ‘coastal squeeze’, significant immediate, ongoing and
long-term impacts on coastal environments.2001 Other responses which would facilitate the
natural retreat of the beach and shoreline, would minimize or prevent such adverse impacts.
Responses which sought to enhance the public interests, more broadly defined, would most
likely allow, or create, conditions conducive to biodiversity persistence in coastal environments,
and effective ecosystem functioning, under climate change conditions.2002
2001

Such as the sandy beach, mangroves, salt marshes and seagrasses. See the discussion of this in
Chapter I.
2002
This would align with the principles of ESD, and Objects of the CMA 2016 (NSW) discussed in s
Chapter IV.
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These responses would have different economic impacts, affecting private property owners,
members of the public, beach-based businesses, coastal industries, local councils and State
government, in different ways, to different degrees. As noted above, an economic analysis of the
costs and benefits of these responses would be desirable but is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Nonetheless it can be observed that, since economic activity in coastal cities and towns relies on
stability and predictability, responses which generate instability and disruption, or exhaust key
natural resources, eg beaches, would be likely to create economic shocks, and adverse impacts
on local, and State, economies.2003 All these responses would require some public funding but,
as a competent comparative economic analysis would show, each would involve different costs
and varying totals of expenditure, from public funds, and from private landowners. As well as
different total commitments of public funds, these responses would differ in the costeffectiveness of the public spending, in preventing or resolving future conflicts, or preparing for
climate impacts, and in their redistributive effects. They also differ in their effect on future
government spending. Some would allow great flexibility, others would ‘lock in’ long-term
funding to repair and maintain coastal defensive structures for decades. 2004

Though characterized as a set of potential responses of government to climate impacts and
conflicts between private and public rights, these hypothetical responses are only illustrative. A
future government could combine elements of any response, in the public policy they adopt.

17. Conclusion
In this chapter I have provided an exposition of a diverse suite of potential responses by a future
State government to conflicts between competing rights to use coastal lands, as a first step in
anticipating the likely legal framework in which these conflicts will be decided in the future.

In the next chapter I evaluate the merits of these responses, to determine which has greatest
merit in resolving future conflicts between competing rights over use of coastal lands, and in
addressing the climate impacts which frame them.

This potential for ‘knock-on effects’ on economic activities was recognised by Cooper and McKenna,
above n 123, 301, as discussed in s 6.2 Chapter V.
2004
Despite the warning to avoid this, given by Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 305.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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“Time is more complex near the sea
for in addition to the circling of the sun
and the turning of the seasons,
the waves beat out the passage of time
on the rocks and
the tides rise and fall as a great clepsydra.”
John Steinbeck Tortilla Flat (1935)

Chapter VII – Evaluating potential responses
Introduction to Chapter VII
In the last chapter I outlined a diverse suite of potential responses by a future government to
disputes between competing private and public rights. In this penultimate chapter I assess the
merits of these potential responses, as a key step in estimating the likely policy environment of
the future. These assessments and this estimation will allow me to formulate, in the final
chapter, an appropriate answer to my research question: ‘Will private property rights ‘trump’
public rights in coastal lands, under climate change conditions?’

In Part A, I restate the two sets of criteria identified in Chapter V, and reiterate the method of
assigning scores in my assessments of the suite of potential responses, against these criteria.

In Part B I draw on the property theory, common law responses, statutory responses considered
in Chapters II, III and IV and my knowledge of and experience in political decision-making in
New South Wales, to assess each potential government response’s satisfaction of the criteria,
and award it a score. A summary of results is shown in Table 7, s 10 of this chapter.
In Part C, I discuss the responses’ satisfaction of the criteria adopted in Chapter V, summarise
their performance, make observations on their merit and ranking, and draw key conclusions.

In the next and final chapter, VIII, using the results of this merits appraisal, I make political
assessments of which response a future State government would be ‘most likely’ to adopt using
three political criteria. With this estimate of a NSW Government’s likely public policy position
in the future, and insight into the feasibility of the theoretical option of reversing the status quo,
I then state an answer my primary research question which makes sense in practice.
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Part A - Recap on assessment criteria and scoring method
In this Part, I briefly restate the assessment criteria adopted and the method of assigning scores.

1. Re-statement of assessment criteria
Ten criteria in two sets were identified from the literature reviewed in Chapter V for use in
assessing the merits of potential responses: criteria for ethical land management;2005 and criteria
for successful public policy.2006

Ethical land management

Five criteria for ethical land management were identified. They ask one focus question: how
well would the likely impacts on the following matters be considered, under these responses?
i] the land’s physical characteristics, features, limits, carrying capacity and location in the
landscape;
ii] the social community of neighbours, adjacent, downhill, down-stream, or downwind, nonowner residents nearby, members of the public, and future generations;
iii] the ecological community, those diverse forms of non-human life inhabiting that area of
land and adjoining environs, including native plants and animals, and introduced species ;
vi] a temporal perspective: any long term opportunities, threats, impacts or costs likely to be
generated or accumulated over time, including over many generations;
v] the contribution towards key social goals: e.g. restoring land health, abating land ills.

Successful public policy

Five criteria were also identified from the property theory, case law, statutes and literature
considered above for evaluating the merits of responses as successful public policy, and a suite
of related focus questions were developed for each criterion.
I] Public interest rationale. How would this response be in the public interest? Will it solve a
social problem, or contribute to the ‘greater good’? What is its rationale? How easy is it to
justify?
from Freyfogle, ‘Ethics’, above n 201, 631 – 661; Freyfogle, ‘Owning’, above n 310, 279-307.
drawn from Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 294-306, Freyfogle, above n 201, and others eg
Althaus et al, above n 162.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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II] Timeliness. Is the response timely? Delayed, rushed or ill considered? Has time to consult
been factored in? How long will it take to implement? Are there long term implications, costs?
III] Cost-effectiveness. Are the public funds, and public officials’ time, spent implementing this
response ‘value for money’? How well do they achieve priority public goals?
IV] Minimal Disruption. Would the response minimize disruption? Or create unforeseen
impacts or costs? What time and effort would be required to enact and implement the policy?
V] Credibility. Would the response be seen as credible by the public or other stakeholders in
coastal management? Is it consistent with the latest scientific research and expert opinion?
Would it foster or frustrate ‘best practice’ coastal management?
Next, in Part B, I assess the likely capacity of each potential response to satisfy these criteria.
However it is appropriate to first describe my method of scoring responses against the criteria.

2. Method of assigning scores
As described in section 15.5 in Chapter I, I employ a blend of deductive and inductive reasoning
to assess each response against each criterion. Reflecting on the advantages and disadvantages
of the potential responses identified in Chapter VI, and using the criteria’s designated focus
questions and the four considerations described in section 15.4 in Chapter I:
i] whether it is foreseeably possible that the criterion could be satisfied;
ii] if so, in what ways, to what extent and how well;
iii] whether its satisfaction might be logically indicated, or contra-indicated, and
iv] whether there are foreseeable obstacles to satisfying the criterion under that response;
I assign a score for the response’s satisfaction of each criterion.

A score of 1.0 is awarded for full satisfying a criterion and partial scores are assigned for lesser
satisfaction, using the scale shown in Table 3 in Chapter I, section 15.5 above.

However these raw scores are adjusted by applying the weight assigned to each criteria. Due to
their primary importance, scores against the criteria of ‘physical characteristics’ and ‘public
interest rationale’ are weighted x 1.0, and scores against all other criteria are weighted x 0.8.

The raw scores, weighted scores against each criterion and final total scores of all responses are
shown in Table 5. – Summary of results, in section 11 below, and are discussed in Part C.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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Part B - Evaluation against derived criteria
In this Part I comment on how well each response would likely satisfy the two sets of criteria,
refer to correlating elements of existing property theory and property law described above,2007
and rate the level of satisfaction with an appropriate score. These raw scores are shown in the
sub-heading for each criterion as [score x / 1.0].
At the end of each response’s evaluation its satisfaction of both sets of criteria is summarized.
The responses’ raw scores are then adjusted using the weight assigned to the criteria, to produce
a weighted score. These ten weighted scores are then aggregated to generate a final total score.
(See Table 7, in Section 10 of this Chapter)

3. No response by government
The first potential response I consider is:
1] a ‘nil response’ by government: no legislative action would be taken; the courts would
arbitrate conflicts between private and public rights using current law and legal rules.
Initially I considered commenting on the courts’ capacity to satisfy these criteria but decided
that the likely decisions of the courts were not relevant to my focus on the merits of future
Government’s responses. Hence reviewed below is a Government’s ‘do nothing’ response.

a] Ethical decision making about land

This response performed very poorly against these criteria.

i] Physical characteristics [0.0]
A nil response would not indicate that the physical characteristics or condition of land affected
by coastal hazards had been properly considered by the Government, or by the Legislature.
ii] Social community [0.0]

A failure by government to respond to the potential for social conflict between competing
private property rights and public rights to use coastal lands, brought on by rising sea levels,
would not demonstrate a consideration of the present social community, or future generations.
2007

Agreed elements of property theory regarding the origin, nature and extent of private property rights
over land, and the existence of public property and public rights were discussed in Chapter II, the
common law rules used by the courts regarding the nature and location of real property boundaries
formed by tidal waters, the ownership of land below MHWM, the courts’ rulings that there is no right to
defend and no right to be paid compensation for loss of land to the sea, were discussed in Chapter III,
and current statutory provisions which recognise the dominance of public rights and apply them coastal
lands and waters were discussed in Chapter IV.
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iii] Ecological community [0.3]

A nil response would not exhibit proper consideration of impacts on coastal ecological
communities. Absent any new legislation, impacts on the ecological communities of coastal
land,2008 or the quality of tidal waters,2009 would probably be no better considered in future
decision making than currently.2010

iv] Temporal perspective [0.0]

A failure to respond to global climate change would not reflect an understanding by government
of the effects of natural processes on coastal land, over geological time.2011 Nor would it
anticipate the likely future impacts of climate change on adversely affected coastal land.2012

v] Key social goals [0.0]

A nil response by government would not achieve the key social goals of ethical landownership
nominated by Freyfogle: the restoration of land health and amelioration of ‘land ills’.2013 Hence
this response would satisfy only one ethical land management criterion to a minor degree.
b] Successful ‘public policy’

A ‘nil response’ would also score very poorly on successful public policy criteria.
I] Rationale [0.0]

By doing nothing, a rationale explaining its ‘social utility’ and contribution to ‘the greater good’
would not be required. However, the government would still need to justify this lack of action.
II] Timeliness [0.0]

The lack of any response by government would not be timely.
III] Cost-effectiveness [0.0]

The cost-effectiveness of this response would be moot, because it would not spend public funds:
even to protect public rights and interests in coastal land, from climate change impacts. Where

2008

Consideration of potential impacts of development on Threatened species is required under s 7.12 of
the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (NSW) section 5.7 of the Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), and s 221 of the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW).
2009
See Environment Protection Authority v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655 discussed in Chapter III.
2010
Though the impacts of development on the ecological community ought to be considered in a
proposal’s EIS, the ecological impacts of climate change may be under-estimated or poorly considered.
2011
For example loss of land to sea is well known to coastal geographers: see Chapman et al, above n 96.
2012
Increased coastal erosion and tidal inundation, leading to shoreline recession, according to Church, et
al, above n 44, discussed in s 2.4 Chapter I.
2013
See Freyfogle, ‘Owning Nature’, above n 1480, 158 – 177.
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government legal expenses to defend actions brought by a non-government party, were publicly
funded, this spending would be unlikely to represent good value for ‘public money’.

IV] Minimal disruption [1.0]

A lack of response by government would mean minimal disruption and an absence of transition
costs. This is the only criteria which this response would be likely to satisfy.

V] Credibility [0.0]

It is unlikely that this response would be seen as credible by the public, or other stakeholders.
A ‘do nothing’ response would not be consistent with the latest research warning of serious
impacts from climate change,2014 or expert opinion on appropriate actions to address them.2015
This response would not be seen as fostering best practice in coastal management.
Hence this response would probably satisfy only one criterion for successful public policy.2016
4. ‘Weak’ pro-private property rights response
In this section I consider
2] a ‘weak’ pro-private property response which would privilege private property rights as dominant, and compensate the private owners at full market value for coastal land lost to the sea.
a] Ethical land management

This response would perform poorly against the criteria for ethical land management.

i] Physical characteristics [0.2]

It is likely that a ‘weak’ pro-private property response by a future government would not
consider the physical characteristics and condition of land in its decisions. The focus on
protecting privately owned ‘real property’ and property ‘rights’ would be asserted at an abstract
level, in which individual characteristics of land would be thought largely irrelevant.2017
Building defensive structures such as seawalls, under this response, could however imply

2014

The erosion and inundation of coastal lands, due to sea level rise and increased storminess, forecast
by IPCC, above n 7, and Church, above n 44, discussed in Chapter I.
2015
See the four broad approaches to rising sea levels and receding shorelines discussed in s 3 Chapter I.
2016
It would not be appropriate to assess the possible satisfaction of these criteria by the courts, through
the process of extensive litigation foreshadowed as part of this potential response. The decisions of the
court do not fall within the definition of ‘public policy’.
2017
This would be consistent with the critique of property theory that in conceptualizing land as ‘real
property’ to commodify it, land is stripped of its special values and ‘dephysicalised.’ See Freyfogle,
‘Ethics’, above n 201, 643-9, Graham, above n 235, 7, 182-4 discussed in s 3.2 Chapter II.
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recognition of the features of the land, including the hazards affecting it, and its condition,2018
but would not demonstrate an understanding of the long-term geomorphological processes
underway,2019 or the physical limits to land use they create.
This response would fail to recognize that lands increasingly affected by coastal hazards are
unsuitable for long-term residential occupation, because sea levels are predicted to rise for
centuries,2020 with effects lasting for millennia.2021 Recognising the physical characteristics and
condition of land would be key to its market valuation, in any scheme to buy private land.2022
However the only physical feature likely to be considered relevant for entry into the scheme,
would be whether the land title has been identified by the local council as affected, or likely to
be affected, by a coastal hazard.2023
ii] Social community [0.1]

In this ‘weak’ response the property rights of one part of the social community, the private
beachfront landowners, would be paramount over the interests of nearby landowners, residents
or members of the public.2024 However, because this policy is contrary to existing elements of
property theory and property law,2025 and would seek to reverse the status quo, comprehensive
legislation would be needed to implement it.2026 Where consent authorities, or landowners build
sea defences along MHWM, this would create ‘coastal squeeze’ for the social community, and
as a result future generations of non-resident beach users would be denied access to the
beach.2027 Further this response would not help resolve conflicts between adjoining landowners
over their individual property rights to protect and enjoy their private land.2028
iii] Ecological community [0.0]

Ecological impacts would be unlikely to be closely considered under this response. 2029 In this

2018

As identified in a Coastal Zone Management Plan (CZMP) or Coastal Management Program (CMP)
and shown in planning certificates for land titles, required by s 10.7 EPAA 1979, discussed in s 5 Ch IV.
2019
Erosion and inundation of coastal lands due to sea level rise, was discussed in s 3 Chapter I.
2020
IPCC, AR5, above n 7, 12.
2021
Pittock above n 8, 125, discussed the potential for rapid melting and ice sheet disintegration and
concluded that if the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets ‘more or less completely melted’ the
world could experience ‘sea level rise of up to 10 to 12 metres lasting for millennia’.
2022
The ‘beach-front’ location would be a factor in assessing the full market value of compulsorily
acquired private land, to award ‘just terms’ compensation under the LA(JTC)A 1991. See s 6 Ch IV.
2023
In a CZMP, CMP or planning certificate issued under s 10.7 EPAA 1979. See s 5 Ch IV.
2024
This was one matter considered in Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, discussed in Chapter V.
2025
The property rules and common law decisions and statutory provisions which recognise the
dominance of public rights, discussed in Chapters II, III and IV.
2026
For eg to remove the current requirement under s 3 CMA 2016 for coastal lands management to be
consistent with the ESD principle of ‘intergenerational equity’, discussed in s 4 Ch IV, s 6 Ch V.
2027
See explanation of this problem in s 3.3 Chapter I. See also Pilkey and Young, above n 108, 165-6.
2028
See the outline of possible litigation between private landowners explored in s 2 Chapter VI.
2029
The ecological impacts of coastal squeeze created by constructing permanent seawalls and the related
impacts on public access to the foreshore and coastal waters were discussed in s 3 Chapter I.
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anthropocentric analysis only humans would have ‘value’ and eco-centric ideas of ‘rights’ or
interests of other species would likely be thought foreign, inferior and irrelevant. Thus the
ecological impacts created by building seawalls on receding shorelines, on inter-tidal species
and nearshore environments, even if recognised, would not be important considerations.

iv] temporal perspective [0.0]

Ignoring the historical effects of the geo-morphological processes at work would appear to
underpin the ‘weak’ pro private property response, and it seems improbable that a realistic
appraisal of coastal hazards’ effects over time2030 would be considered under this response.
More likely points of temporal focus would be the present, particularly in defining property
boundary location of MHWM, or restoring the boundary to its prior location in the recent past.
Thus temporal considerations about future climate impacts and future public use would likely be
ignored or deemed irrelevant.

v] key social goals [0.0]

This ‘weak’ response may appear aimed towards the goal of land health, where seawalls seek to
cure the ‘land ill’ of coastal erosion. However it would be difficult to sustain this view after
analysis of the literature on the adverse impacts of hard seawalls.2031 This point will be further
considered in my assessment of the ‘stronger’ pro-private property response below.
However, two points might be usefully made here. The first concerns the meaning of ‘land ills’.
Freyfogle characterized ‘land ills’ as those activities that were antipathetic to ‘land health’. He
included increased erosion and more flooding, among others, attributing cause and culpability
for these ‘ills’, to poor land management by owners or managers.2032 Shoreline recession is not
however due to human mis-management of land, but natural processes that have been underway
for millennia. Thus it would be inappropriate to characterize it, or coastal erosion, as ‘land ills’.
The second is that for a sandy beach and dune system ‘land health’ means the continuation of
complex, highly dynamic, functioning natural eco-systems. Allowed to retreat, beaches and
dunes would likely survive sea level rise and increased storminess.2033 Backed by ‘permanent’

2030

For example the effect of sea level rise on coastal land by the current planning horizon of 2100. See
IPCC, above n 7, 12 discussed in s 3 Chapter I.
2031
Impacts of seawalls on ocean beaches were discussed in Chapter I.
2032
Freyfogle, ‘Eight’, above n 202, 791.
2033
See Figure 10.12 in s3 Chapter I. This was the conclusion of Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 301,
discussed in s 7 Chapter V.
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seawalls, it is certain that before long the beach will be permanently lost.2034 Thus more
seawalls, to defend property boundaries, would be inconsistent with the goal of land health.

Hence this response would only consider a sub-set of relevant facts about the physical characteristics of coastal lands and would be unlikely to satisfy other ethical land management criteria.
b] Successful ‘public policy’

This potential response also faces serious challenges in satisfying the public policy criteria.

I] Rationale [0.1]
One major difficulty of the weak response would be articulating a convincing rationale, which
explained why it was in the public interest. Justifying on a ‘greater good’ basis, the repeal of
existing elements of property law2035 to reduce public rights to use coastal lands and waters,
where they conflicted with private property rights would be difficult, perhaps impossible.
Though it is likely that a future government might claim that protecting private property would
be in the public interest, the logic and credibility this claim would be questioned by the public
and cross-bench legislators.
Two contexts where this rationale might be advanced can be imagined. In the first, the loss of
public rights would be limited to specific areas, or circumstances, so that regulated public uses
of coastal lands and waters would be permitted elsewhere, albeit in a relict form. A second
context could be a ‘trade-off’, where loss of public rights to access the beach adjacent to private
land, would be justified by a new initiative in a ‘package’ of great ‘public interest’, eg a new
coastal national park, where public access to coastal lands and waters would still be available.
Though these contexts exist theoretically, whether this ‘weak’ pro-private response would
satisfy the criterion of public interest ‘rationale’ would depend on the quality of the advocacy,
the scope of the ‘trade-offs’, the plausibility of the Government’s arguments to justify it.

II] Timeliness [0.1]
By allowing seawalls to be built without development consent,2036 this response could be seen as
making ‘timely’ preparations for the forecast impacts of coastal hazards, satisfying the
‘timeliness’ criterion. However by ignoring the extent of likely impacts on coastal lands from

2034

Pilkey and Young, above n 108, 166.
For example by repealing s 27 CMA 2016 to abolish the prohibition on development consent for
seawalls if they unreasonably limit public access to and along the beach, or pose a risk to public safety.
2036
As per amendments to the CPA 1979, made in 2010, 2012, now repealed, discussed in s 4 Chapter IV.
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centuries of rising seas,2037 and not relocating development away from lands affected by coastal
hazards, while there is time to do in an orderly manner,2038 this response would not be ‘timely’.
Since reversing the status quo would be required,2039 hold-ups enacting the enabling legislation
and long delays in its implementation are foreseeable, due to the need to create new procedures
and retrain staff. These factors would all adversely affect the likely ‘timeliness’ of this response.

III] Cost-effectiveness [0.0]
Spending public funds to protect private land or to purchase private land affected by coastal
hazards at full market value, might be difficult to justify as ‘cost-effective’ public expenditure,
since it may provide little or no public benefit, and incur additional non-financial costs to the
public and wider social community, through the loss of public access and use of the beach.2040
Further, because it is contrary to existing elements of property theory and law,2041 and would
require the reversal of the status quo, this response would likely create unproductive costs
transitioning to the new system of dominant private property rights. Moreover, though
protecting private land might become a goal of ‘public policy’ under a future government,
which theoretically ‘legitimated’ spending public funds in ways which limited or extinguished
public rights, this would not be seen by the public to be ‘good value for money’. Public funding
of this kind would convert the value of public spending on defensive works into increased value
of the ‘protected’ private land, and reduce the funds available to the government to pursue other
‘public goals’. Hence the weak response would not satisfy this criterion.

IV] Minimal disruption [0.0]
To implement the weak response, and privilege private property rights, the status quo would
need to be reversed,2042 through enactment of comprehensive legislation which repealed existing
property law rules, common law doctrine and provisions of legislation and declared new law
consistent with its policies eg freezing the location of real property’s seaward boundary.
Announcing this policy of reversal would create major disruption to existing practices and
expectations of property law, and until relevant legislation was enacted and became operational,
confusion and uncertainty would be likely. However, if the government could not obtain a
majority in the Legislature Council to enact enabling legislation, reversing the status quo would

2037

The erosion and permanent inundation of coastal lands by tidal waters, as discussed in s 3 Chapter I.
In accordance with the retreat option, shown in Figure 6 in Chapter I.
2039
Due the total inconsistency of this response with existing elements of property theory, property law
rules and rulings, and statutes in which public rights are dominant, discussed in Chapters II, III and IV.
2040
These were core concerns of the court in Ralph Lauren PL v NSW TCP [2018] NSWLEC 207.
2041
The norms, rules, decisions and statutory provisions where public rights are recognised as dominant,
and intended to continue to be dominant in the future, described in Chapters II, III and IV.
2042
The status quo in current NSW law, where public rights to access and use the foreshore are dominant
over private property rights, was described at the conclusion of Chapter IV.
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not be possible and disruption would be sustained. If enacted, implementing this response would
need to promulgate new rules, make new institutional arrangements and re-train government
agency staff, remedy unintended effects, minimize hidden costs and overcome unforeseen
delays. Thus this response would be very disruptive.

V] Credibility [0.1]
Since it abandons existing property theory and property law,2043 ignores the IPCC’s warnings on
climate change impacts2044 rejects expert opinion on how to address coastal hazards,2045 and
allowing ad hoc seawalls would be inconsistent with ‘best practice’ in coastal management,2046
the public and other stakeholders would likely see this weak response as lacking credibility.
Nonetheless adversely affected landowners may see it as credible and gain a ‘false sense of
security’.2047 For these reasons the weak response would not satisfy the credibility criterion,
and its overall satisfaction of the public policy criteria would be very low.
5. ‘Robust’ pro-private property rights response
The next potential response to be considered is
3] a ‘robust’ pro-private property response, which would entrench private property rights in
practice, publicly-fund hard defensive structures, and reduce, or extinguish, public rights.
a] Ethical land management

Satisfaction of ethical criteria by this ‘robust’ pro-private property rights response would also be
poor. Its impacts can be distinguished from the ‘weak’ response however, in several ways.

i] Physical characteristics [0.1]

In this ‘robust’ response there would be an emphasis on one of the physical particulars of land:
the location of the original boundary, since it would be along this boundary – even if fully
submerged - that landowners would be allowed to build permanent defensive structures, without
development consent,2048 to defend and reclaim their private property from the sea.2049 It is
unlikely that the land’s susceptibility to coastal hazards would be taken into account by
landowners, except perhaps in specifying design parameters for their proposed structure.
2043

The property norms, rules, decisions and statutory provisions described in Chapters II, III and IV.
That sea level rise will continue for centuries. See IPCC, above n 7, 26 reported in s 2.4 Chapter I.
2045
That retreat or relocation is the most feasible option. See the analysis in s 3.3 Chapter I.
2046
Best practice in designing, planning and approving seawalls is stated in the Coastal Management
Manual – Part A & B, proscribed under s 21 CMA 2016, discussed in s 4 Chapter IV.
2047
See the explanation of the danger of creating a false sense of security in s 3.3 Chapter I.
2048
Because this is contrary to existing law which requires consent, as described in Chapters III and IV,
comprehensive legislation would be needed to reverse the status quo and make this policy lawful.
2049
Such actions by the landowner were the cause of a criminal prosecution in EPA (NSW) v Saunders
(1994) 6 BPR 13,655. See also Coleman, above n 13, 422.
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Hence physical suitability of the land would not limit or guide the land-use pursued on the site.

ii] Social community [0.0]

The wider social community would be likely to receive no consideration under this ‘robust’
response since only beachfront landowners’ interests would matter.2050 Building seawalls along
original property boundaries even if submerged, and the structures themselves, would however
likely disrupt the social community of beach users. During construction, in adjacent areas, the
beach would be closed to public use in the interests of public safety to allow the movement of
materials, machines and equipment on site.2051
Once built, seawalls would alienate parts of the foreshore, prevent public use,2052 reduce public
safety,2053 and lead to the beach’s permanent loss.2054 Damaged seawalls may also create hazards
to navigation, surfing or swimming in adjacent waters. Significant sudden changes to the safety,
amenity and appeal of a beach would disrupt its social community, but the ‘knock-on effects’
such as economic shocks to local businesses and coastal industries,2055 would be overlooked.
iii] Ecological community [0.0]

In this anthropocentric response, likely adverse impacts of building seawalls on the ecological
community would not be considered. If protecting coastal ecosystems, or ecologically or economically significant species hindered landowners defending their original property boundaries,
under this response the government would likely ‘suspend’ or rescind the protection law.2056
iv] Temporal perspective [0.0]

This ‘robust’ pro-private property rights response would not consider present or future impacts
or uses. It would focus on re-establishing and defending the original real property boundaries.
In the future under this response, the boundaries of coastal land would return to their location in
the past, and remain unchanged forever, despite rising seas and shoreline recession.2057

2050

Since this is contrary to existing property law which recognise public rights, s 27 CMA 2016, and
require consideration of future generations, s 6 (2)(b) POEAA 1991, repeal of these and other relevant
statutory provisions through special legislation would be necessary to implement this response.
2051
That is this would be required was noted by Preston CJ in Ralph Lauren PL v NSW TCP [2018]
NSWLEC 207, [125].
2052
Ralph Lauren PL v NSW TCP [2018] NSWLEC 207, [122]
2053
Ralph Lauren PL v NSW TCP [2018] NSWLEC 207, [126].
2054
Orrin H Pilkey and Rob Young, The Rising Sea (Island Press, 2009) 165.
2055
These impacts were recognised by Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 301. See s 6.2 Chapter V.
2056
Special legislation would be needed to repeal current law requiring consideration and protection of
Threatened species: eg s 3(a) CMA 2016, s 3.25 EPAA 1979, discussed in ss 4 & 5 Chapter IV, and the
ESD principle of the conservation of biological diversity, s 6(2)(c) POEAA 1991, see s 5 Chapter V.
2057
To achieve this reinstatement and permanent relocate real property boundaries would also require
special legislation since this policy too is contrary to key elements of existing property law regarding
the nature and location boundaries, ownership of land below MHWM, described in s 8 Chapter III.
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v] Key social goals [0.0]

This response would also fail to achieve progress towards social goals, such as ‘land health’.
Building major coastal structures would not ‘cure’, but probably increase, erosion2058 and, as sea
levels rise, inevitably the natural sandy beaches would be wholly lost.2059 Even artificially
nourished beaches would have only a very limited ‘life’, before they too disappeared.2060
Thus, this response would not satisfy any criteria for ethical land management.
b] Successful ‘public policy’

This ‘robust’ response would also struggle to satisfy the criteria for successful public policy.
I] Rationale [0.1]
Because it is contrary to existing property law,2061 a major difficulty of the robust response
would be framing a plausible public interest rationale for privileging private property rights,
which explained why this was necessary and how it would contribute to a greater public good.
To achieve the goals of this response and enact the necessary enabling legislation to reverse the
status quo, the government would need to prosecute the argument successfully and gain support
of the public and the Legislature. However, this would not be easy since many people would
object to weakening or repealing public rights to use coastal lands and waters. The illogic of
arguing that a loss of public rights, and redistribution of public funds into private hands, was in
the public interest, would be an inherent flaw in this response’s capacity to satisfy this criterion.

II] Timeliness [0.1]
Allowing landowners to build new seawalls to protect against anticipated climate impacts of
rising seas and receding shorelines without consent, could indicate timeliness in this response.
However this response would focus on the past, not the future, and reclaiming land previously
lost to the sea. The structures built to reclaim land below MHWM, or LWM, would need to be
substantial to be effective in the short term, and in the medium term would require regular repair
and maintenance. In the long term, to be effective ‘timely’ upgrades would likely be required to
increase their crest height.2062 Thus timeliness under this response would include a race against
time to find the materials needed to augment defensive structures to stay ahead of rising seas,2063

2058

See s 3.3 Chapter I.
Pilkey and Young, above n 108, 165.
2060
Ibid 166. They posit that nourished beaches ‘will typically disappear in less than five years’.
2061
The property law rules, case law and statutory provisions examined in Chapters II, III & IV.
2062
See discussion of the disadvantages of seawalls in s 3.3 Chapter I.
2063
Increasing seawall crest height requires the foundation to be enlarged to support it. Thus materials and
costs increase by the second power, ie squared. A doubling of height would need four times the volume
of materials and hence costs. A trebling in height would require nine times the materials and funding.
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and a parallel race to secure the funds for these upgrades. However it is likely that the costs of
upgrades could escalate and become prohibitively expensive in the future.2064
Because this ‘robust’ pro private property rights response would reverse the status quo,
extensive complex legislation would be necessary, which may face some serious delays, and its
implementation would require a change-over phase. Public objections, community concerns, or
legislative delays would also adversely affect its timeliness.

III] Cost-effectiveness [-0.1]
Under this ‘robust’ response public expenditure to build and maintain structures to protect
private land, or buy private land at full market value,2065 would be poor value for public money.
Moreover, funds spent on seawalls would inevitably lead to the beach’s loss, with adverse social
and economic impacts.2066 Thus the cost-effectiveness of its public funding could be negative.

IV] Minimal disruption [0.0]
Because it would need to reverse the status quo to implement it,2067 this response would deliberately create major disruption to existing property law system and incur unproductive costs in
changing to the ‘new’ system. Where landowners sought to build seawalls along their original
property boundaries, below MHWM, or below LWM, the impacts of these works could cause
severe, immediate and long lasting disruption if they divide the social community, destroy the
ecological community, and generate shocks to coastal economies.2068

V] Credibility [0.1]
Due to its gross inconsistency with existing property theory and property law,2069 reversal of the
status quo, and the apparent failure to understand the extent of likely climate change impacts as
foreshadowed by the IPCC2070 and apply appropriate responses to increased coastal hazards,
recommended by experts,2071 it is likely that this response would only be seen as credible by
adversely affected coastal landowners. It is unlikely to be seen as consistent with ‘best practice’

2064

This was the conclusion of the management authority for coastal lands in England and Wales cited by
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 300-1, see s 6.2 Chapter V; and of the public authority in New
Zealand, which led to the appeal Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995], see s 9 Chapter III.
2065
By triggering the LA(JTC)A 1991 (NSW), see s 6 Chapter IV.
2066
The impacts of seawalls on the beach and their social and economic ‘knock-on effects’ were
acknowledged by Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 300-1, discussed in s 6.2 Chapter V.
2067
Because the status quo, recognises public rights as dominant, and continuing to be indefinitely, in
applicable property law rules, court decisions and statutory provisions cited in Chapters II, III & IV.
2068
See Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 300-1, discussed s 6.2 Chapter V.
2069
The property law rules, court decisions and statutory provisions cited in Chapters II, III & IV.
2070
Eg that sea level rise will continue for centuries: IPCC, AR5, above n 7, 26, cited in s 2.4 Chapter I.
2071
Including retreat, relocation or realignment of at risk development. See Figure 6 s 3.2 Chapter I.
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in ecologically sustainable coastal management2072 by beach-using non-resident members of the
public, local council staff and other stakeholders.
Thus the ‘robust’ response would not satisfy the public policy criteria.
6. ‘Strong’ pro-public rights response
Next to be considered is
4] a ‘strong’ pro-public rights response, which would protect public rights, permit the beach to
migrate landwards naturally and allow public uses and ecological functions to continue.

a] Ethical land management

A ‘strong’ pro-public rights response by government would largely satisfy these criteria.

i] Physical characteristics [0.8]

Under this response the land’s physical characteristics, condition and natural limits would be
closely considered, and local and State governments would recognize private lands subject to
current, or future, coastal hazards, which pose risks to current or future residential use.2073
Moreover, under this response it would be more likely that other relevant site specific
information, including provision of safe access, would be considered by a public authority when
determining whether the land was suitable for continued, or future, residential occupation. The
particulars of individual allotments of coastal lands might thus become very important in
guiding, limiting or excluding future land uses.2074 Since this response would protect public
rights to access and use of the beach,2075 it would identify and remove any dangers to public
safety or threats to environmental health generated from adjoining private land.2076 Thus many
specific attributes of private land may need to be carefully considered, under this response.

ii] Social community [0.7]

Due to its orientation to public rights, in this response impacts on beachfront landowners would
probably receive little or no consideration. However, the public benefits for the social
community would be large, and the community would extend to include local ‘members of the

2072

As required by s 3 CMA 2016 (NSW) discussed in s 4 Chapter IV.
Lands at risk from coastal hazards would be identified by local councils through studies prepared for
coastal management plans or programs under the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW): see s 4 Ch IV.
2074
The inundation of some lots and the location of the ambulatory MHWM were crucial physical facts in
EPA v Saunders (1994), EPA v Leaghur Pty Ltd [1995]. See s 8 Chapter III.
2075
See s 27 CMA 2016, in s 4 Chapter IV, and Ralph Lauren PL v NSW TCP [2018] discussed in Ch V.
2076
The pollution of tidal waters with truck tyres was the charge sustained against the landowner in EPA v
Saunders (1995) discussed in s 8 Chapter III.
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public’, domestic visitors, international tourists, and future generations of these users of the
beach and coastal waters. Government policy discouraging new seawalls except where
necessary, would reflect an awareness of their likely adverse impacts on other social community
members of immediate neighbours, nearby landowners and future generations.2077

iii] Ecological community [0.5]

Though the focus would be on protecting public rights, this response would avoid the ecological
impacts of coastal squeeze and would give the ecological community time and space to migrate
landward with the beach system, as sea levels rise.2078 It would not weaken environment laws
protecting the ecological community and would protect public interests in coastal resources,
where possible. This would include protecting native vegetation types of public interest value,
maintaining high standards of coastal water quality, and safeguarding the health of seafood. By
avoiding adverse environmental impacts it would minimize the risk of economic shocks to local
business and coastal industries dependent on public uses of coastal lands and waters.

iv] Temporal perspective [0.8]

A strong pro public response would recognize the effects geomorphological processes have had
on the State’s coast over geological time, and see coastal erosion and shoreline recession in their
appropriate context, as natural processes which have been underway for millennia.2079 Further, a
future government with a strong pro-public rights response would prepare to manage the State’s
coastal lands and resources, in a future of major climate change impacts.2080 Were it competent,
a future government would aim to ensure its policies were timely and implemented on schedule.

v] Key social goals [1.0]

This response would be appear to be consistent with the goal of land health. By banning
seawalls behind sandy beaches in all but exceptional situations, beach and dune systems could
survive, by migrating landwards as sea levels rise.2081 Ensuring the future health of coastal lands
and waters would however require attention to identifying and removing dangers to public
safety or threats to environmental health which might be generated or uncovered by the shoreline’s retreat.2082 Overall, this response could satisfy all the criteria for ethical land management.

The social environmental and economic impacts of ‘coastal squeeze’ created by building seawalls
behind sandy beaches, were discussed in s 3.3 Chapter I.
2078
See Figure 10.12, s 3.3 Chapter I; Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 300-1, discussed in s 6.2 Ch V.
2079
See Chapman et al, above n 96.
2080
This would be consistent with the ESD principle of ‘intergenerational equity’ defined by s 6(2)(b)
POEAA 1991, cited in s 6.2 Chapter V, and as required by s 3 CMA 2016, discussed in s 4 Chapter IV.
2081
See Figure 10.12, s 3.3 Chapter I.
2082
Local councils are exempted from liability for failure to remove dangerous materials from a public
beach under s 733(3) Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), provided they act ‘in good faith’.
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b] Successful ‘public policy’

This ‘strong’ public rights response could also satisfy the criteria for successful public policy.
I] Rationale [1.0]
Due to its consistency with existing property theory and property law,2083 articulating a plausible
rationale for this response would be simple, and likely to be persuasive. A credible justification
for protecting public rights and overriding private property rights, for the greater good, though
theoretically easier, would still be needed. The responsible Minister could argue that protecting
public rights to use coastal lands, where they conflicted with private property ‘rights’, would be
in the public interest, and explain how this response addresses emerging climate change
impacts, and maintains continuity with existing legal principles.2084 Social utility arguments
could also be made, to show how it would be useful, and contribute to a greater public good.2085
Thus this response would be likely to satisfy this criterion.
II] Timeliness [0.7]
It would also be likely to be timely since the government would quickly resolve disputes over
conflicting rights to use coastal lands, by protecting public rights. This would provide a clear
framework for resolving future disputes and clarifying expectations of future use. By accepting
that global climate change would continue for centuries,2086 anticipating long-term impacts, and
preferring ‘retreat’ over ‘defend’ as a principal policy, this response would exhibit timeliness.
Identifying other consistent policy actions, through future coastal management planning, and
implementing them effectively, would be other vital indications of this response’s timeliness.
Because the legislation to implement this response would be limited to protecting existing
public rights to use coastal lands and waters,2087 and codifying existing common law rules,2088 it
would not be complex and may not be controversial, making its timely passage likely.
III] Cost-effectiveness [1.0]
The cost-effectiveness of public expenditure would likely be well considered under this
response. Public funds would be directed by a future government to public authorities, such as
local councils to maintain public rights to access coastal lands and waters in their coastal
planning and management. Public funding would not be available for protecting private land
2083

The property theory, rules, decisions and statutory provisions which recognise the dominance of
public rights discussed in Chapters II, III and IV.
2084
Eg the public right of access to and along the foreshore, and of public navigation discussed in Ch II
the public trust doctrine considered in s 6.1 Chapter V.
2085
For eg by securing the basis for local towns’ beach-based economies and coastal industries.
2086
See IPCC, Climate Change 2103, above n 6, 26.
2087
By stating the ambit of these common law public rights, described in Chapter II, in the statute law.
2088
recognizing public (Crown) ownership below MHWM. See EPA v Leaghur PL [1995] in s 8 Ch III.
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vulnerable to coastal hazards,2089 preventing a transfer of value from public to private interests.
The absence of locked-in commitments to maintain and upgrade coastal defenses would allow
public funds to be allocated to other actions, to protect public rights, provide safe public access,
prevent or minimize harm to the public interests in the environment, or encourage existing
development to ‘retreat’.
IV] Minimal disruption [1.0]
Because it is consistent with existing elements of property law,2090 not disruptive of existing
practice and expectations, or incur transition costs, this response would satisfy this criterion.
Relevant law would be clearly stated and more certain, so business would continue as usual.
V] Credibility [0.8]
Since it is consistent with existing property law, would protect public rights over coastal lands
and waters, address climate change impacts highlighted by the IPCC and others,2091 and
discourage new seawalls to allow beach and dune systems to retreat landwards as sea levels rise,
consistent with ‘best practice’ in coastal land’s management,2092 this response would be likely to
be seen as highly credible by the public, and other stakeholders in coastal management.
Hence this response would have the potential to satisfy all five criteria for sound public policy.
7. ‘Stronger’ pro-public rights response
To be considered next is
5] a ‘stronger’ pro-public rights response, which would broaden the public uses recognised as
rights, extend the area where they apply and increase the level of protection of public rights.
a] Ethical land management

This response would likely satisfy the criteria for ethical decision making to a large degree.
i] Physical characteristics [0.9]

The physical characteristics, condition and limits of land would probably receive close
consideration under this ‘stronger’ pro public rights response. The susceptibility of land to
coastal hazards would be recognised,2093 and with other site specific considerations such as
2089

Discontinued public funding of ineffective protection works along the coast of England and Wales,
was considered by Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, and was the management option adopted by the
local authority in New Zealand, challenged in Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622.
2090
Rules, decisions and statutes which recognise public rights as dominant, cited in Chapters II, III & IV.
2091
See climate change impacts forecast in IPCC, AR5, above n 7, 26, cited in s 2.4 Chapter I.
2092
See the requirement for retreat of buildings at risk of erosion in Byron Shire Council, Development
Control Plan – Part J Coastal Erosion Lands – (adopted August 2018) cited in s 3.1 Chapter I.
2093
As identified in a CZMP or CMP prepared under s 13 CMA 2016, as disclosed in a ‘planning
certificate’ issued by a local council under s 10.7 EPAA 1979, discussed in ss 4 & 5 Chapter VI.
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access, would determine the site’s suitability for residential occupation. Further, the existence of
a valid development consent for a physical structure could be recognised by creating a TDR.2094
The gradient and other features of coastal lands, and possible impacts on them, would be
relevant matters for a future government to consider when deciding to adopt a new HWM, and
setting the compensation payable when it acquires the ribbon of land from landowners.2095
Enlarging the foreshore by raising the HWM to mean high water at springs tides (MWHS) or to
highest astronomical tide (HAT)2096 would recognize that many sandy beaches on private land
above MHWM are regularly re-shaped by tidal waters, and often inundated during storms.2097

ii] Social community [0.7]

The wider social community of current and future generations of non-resident beach-users is
central to this ‘stronger’ response. Government would increase protection of public rights,2098
and public interests in coastal lands, to sustain them indefinitely, despite climate impacts. But
impacts on adversely affected landowners would be likely overlooked.

iii] Ecological community [0.7]

Impacts on the ecological community would be considered, as part of protecting wider public
interests in decisions about the use and management of coastal lands under this response.2099
Though this ‘stronger’ response would still be anthropocentric, ecological communities would
probably survive because coastal squeeze impacts would be avoided, and beach-dependent
species would be able to migrate with the beach as it recedes landwards.2100 Further, under this
stronger response a future government could extend formal protection over other coastal
resources: the habitat of all coastal species of ecological or economic significance. 2101
iv] Temporal perspective [0.8]

This response would involve better temporal considerations including: the effects of sea level
rise and shoreline recession over geological time,2102 the likely future impacts of coastal hazards
Transferable Development Right. Sheehan, above n 1854, 96; Freyfogle, ‘Eight’, above n 202, 795.
Either by enacting special legislation as in Durham Holdings v NSW (2001), discussed in s 10 Chapter
III, or by triggering the LA(JTC)A 1991, as indicated in s 6 Chapter IV.
2096
In Queensland high water mark is MHWS, and s 6(b) Marine Estate Management Act 2014 (NSW)
adopts ‘highest astronomical tide’ (HAT) as its landward boundary of tidal estuaries. See s 7 Ch IV.
2097
For the dynamic nature of wave-dominated beaches, see Short and Woodroffe, above n 80,114-128.
2098
such as allowing beaches to retreat by banning seawalls behind them, raising the level of HWM to
extend the area of the foreshore, and applying rolling easements …
2099
This would align with s 3(a) CMA 2016 requiring coastal management to ‘protect… , biological
diversity and ecosystem integrity and resilience’, and the ESD principle of biodiversity conservation per
s 6(2)(c) POEAA 1991, discussed in s 6.2 Chapter V.
2100
See Figure 10.12, and how to avoiding seawalls’ ecological impacts in s 3.3 Chapter I.
2101
Through instruments such as CM SEPP 2016, which prohibit clearing of coastal native vegetation
without completion of an environmental impact statement.
2102
See Chapman et al, above n 96.
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on existing development,2103 and the long-term effects of seawalls,2104 which would constrain
future land uses. Further, future costs of purchasing coastal lands or maintaining seawalls would
be foreseen and avoided.2105 Requiring the retreat of vulnerable development,2106 and increasing
the opportunities for public rights to survive, under climate change conditions, would indicate a
realistic appraisal of future conditions.

v] Key social goals [1.0]

By protecting public rights, allowing the beach to retreat,2107 and social, ecological and economic uses to continue, this response would advance key social goals, including land health.2108
Hence all five criteria for ethical decision-making about land could be satisfied by this response.
b] Successful ‘public policy’

This response also exhibits potential to satisfy the criteria for successful public policy.

I] Rationale [1.0]
Articulating a public interest rationale for this ‘stronger’ pro-public rights response in terms of
its ‘social utility’ or benefits for a greater public good, would be straightforward but necessary.
Protecting public rights to access and use coastal lands and waters, where they conflicted with
private property rights, could easily be characterized as in the public interest.2109 The additional
measures proposed under this response, a higher HWM, and ‘rolling easements’, would also be
in the public interest, but would require justification, and explanation of their future operation.
Were these basic steps taken, the first public policy criterion would likely be satisfied.

II] Timeliness [0.6]
This ‘stronger’ response would be likely to demonstrate ‘timeliness’ in several ways. It would
provide a basis for resolving current disputes over conflicting rights, and would likely prevent
future disputes. It would provide timely input into coastal management programs,2110 and inform
approval authorities’ consideration of development applications.2111 Since this response would
also prefer ‘retreat’ rather than ‘defend’, it would acknowledge the long-term coastal processes
2103

Church et al, above n 44, 192; Australian Government, above n 44, 73-86 cited in s 3 Chapter I.
Eg Silvester, above n 81, 44 and Pilkey and Young, above n 108, 165 quoted in s 3.3 Chapter I.
2105
As recommended by Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 302, and reported in s 6.2 Chapter V.
2106
Through planning instruments such as the Byron Shire Council, DCP – Part J Coastal Erosion Lands
(2018) cited in s 3 Chapter I.
2107
See Figure 10.12 in s 3.3 Chapter I. See also the doctrine of accretion discussed in s 5.3 Chapter II.
2108
This was the conclusion of allowing the coast to ‘fluctuate freely’ adopted by Cooper and McKenna,
above n 123, 301, reported in s 6.2 Chapter V.
2109
This would accord with the court’s ruling in Ralph Lauren PL v NSW TCP [2018]. See s 5.1 Ch V.
2110
Prepared pursuant to ss 13 -16 CMA 2016, discussed in s 4 Chapter IV.
2111
By local consent authorities under s 4.1 – 4.70 EPAA 1979, as discussed in s 5 Chapter IV.
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at work, and recognise likely climate change impacts on the State’s coast in the medium to long
term.2112 Raising the HWM and using easements would be timely measures which would
anticipate and prepare for future conditions.
Enacting the legislation necessary to implement this response would be more complex than the
‘strong’ response above, but because its core elements align with existing property law,2113 they
may be seen as non-controversial by non-government legislators, and their passage not unduly
delayed. However, raising the HWM could be contentious, since the State would compulsorily
acquire ribbons of private land, but the idea would not be novel: legislation permitting this
already exist.2114 Nonetheless some delays in passing the enabling legislation and completing
acquisitions would be possible, perhaps likely.
Creating ‘rolling easements’ to extend public use rights over small areas of private land would
be easy to implement since public authorities are empowered to do so under existing law.2115
Raising the HWM would not be a ‘time sensitive’ action, so public consultation and dialogue
with legislators to avoid legislative delays would not be problematic. The ‘timeliness’ of these
measures would be their anticipation of likely future climatic and geographic conditions of the
State’s coast, and their preparations to protect public rights to use coastal lands and waters
under those future conditions.

III] Cost-effectiveness [0.7]
The expenditure of public funds would be limited under this ‘stronger’ response. No public
funds would be allocated to protecting privately owned coastal land, though the commitment of
funds for works to protect key public assets or infrastructure would likely be necessary. Public
funds would be mainly directed towards relocating public infrastructure, preparing vulnerable
areas of publicly owned coastal land for climate impacts, providing continued safe public access
to the coast under these conditions, and encouraging existing development to retreat, not defend.
Were these the primary expenditures, the cost-effectiveness of public funding under this
response would be likely to be high.
Defining a new HWM to enlarge the foreshore and maximize the area available for public use,
would incur greater public expenditure in several ways however, so assessing its costeffectiveness would be more complex. Though a future government could re-define the HWM

2112

See the impacts forecast in Church, et al, above n 44, cited in s 3 Chapter I.
Those property rules, decisions and statutes which recognise the dominance of public rights,
described in Chapters II, III & IV.
2114
Private land may be acquired by the State for public purposes, under relevant authorising legislation,
and the provisions of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) then apply.
2115
A public authority may create an easement under s 88A or s 88E CA 1919 (NSW) see s 6 Chapter IV.
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without notice by regulation,2116 it is more likely it would give notice to coastal landowners
under the LA(JTC)A 1991 of its intention to acquire the ribbon of land between the old and new
HWM boundary lines and agree to pay compensation for it.2117
Existing conventions, and current statute law, would require compensation to be paid ‘on just
terms’ at full market value,2118 though special legislation could stipulate a cap to payments.2119
Addition to these capital costs would be the costs of amending affected land titles to show the
position of the new property boundary formed by the new HWM.2120 Initially the State could
underwrite the costs of updating land titles, but it would be likely that later costs of boundary
survey and new plan lodgment would be paid by private landowners, as it is presently.
By adopting a new HWM however, certain other costs might be saved. With a more easily
recognised boundary of MHWS, or HAT, rather than the mathematical mean of medium tides,
real property boundaries would be more easily located in the coastal landscape, avoiding some
disputes and reducing survey costs. In the short-term, the cost-effectiveness of this measure may
be limited, but over a longer term, its benefits to future generations of beach users might
substantially increase. Creating and registering new ‘rolling’ easements for public access over
private land where required,2121 would be low cost actions. The costs of survey and registration
would be limited and incurred once, but each easement would have enduring effect2122 and
provide good value for the public interest and the modest public funding required.
At a higher level of public funding, a new higher high-water mark would transfer significant
public funds into private hands,2123 but the State would acquire strategic inter-tidal land, and
extend protection of public rights to larger areas. Overall, public expenditures under this
response could be moderately cost-effective.

2116

An amendment to a key definition in the relevant regulation, Surveying and Spatial Information
Regulation 2017 (NSW) would not require prior legislative approval.
2117
See s 6 Chapter IV. The ribbon of land acquired would be slightly broader if HAT were adopted as
the boundary tide-line, and its width would vary due to its gradient. The area of low gradient land so
acquired could be extensive. On high gradient land, or vertical walls, little or no area may be acquired.
2118
See ss 10(1), 54, 56(2) of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW)
2119
This was the approach of the NSW government in 1990 when cancelling coal leases to create new
national parks. See the discussion of compensation payable under the enabling legislation, in Durham
Holdings PL v State of New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399; 177 ALR 436.
2120
See Regulation 48(6) Surveying and Spatial Information Regulation 2017 (NSW) which requires a
‘comprehensive report’ to be prepared on surveys which recognize changes to real property boundaries
formed by tidal waters. Other costs, such as fees for amending land titles, would also be incurred.
2121
Under the Conveyancing Act 1919, discussed in s 6 Chapter IV.
2122
For the creation of a rolling easement in Coffs Harbour LALC V Minister (2014) see s 5.1 Ch V.
2123
By paying a level of compensation designated in special legislation, as in Durham Holdings v NSW
(2001) as discussed in s 10 Chapter III, or by triggering the LA(JTC)A 1991, as described in s 6 Ch IV.
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IV] Minimal disruption [0.8]
This response would be largely consistent with existing elements of property law2124 and hence
would not disrupt existing public rights to access and use coastal lands and waters.2125 However,
several policy actions of this response, such as creating new rights and setting higher standards
of impact assessment,2126 would likely create minimal disruption, and few if any additional
public costs. However, adopting a new HWM would create substantial disruption, which would
vary however, with some landowners extensively affected, while others were not.2127
Owners of land to be acquired by the State would be paid compensation2128 however, which
would probably ameliorate much of the disruption. The public would not be disrupted, other
than through the expenditure of public funds. Creating ‘rolling’ easements across private land,
where necessary to secure public access to and use of the foreshore, would disrupt affected
landowners, but to a minor degree. Public use would be limited to small areas,2129 and neither
ownership nor existing uses on adjoining private land would be disrupted. Consequently, public
use of coastal lands would be enhanced, not disrupted. Hence, this response would likely create
some minimal disruption, but gain tangible benefits for public use rights.

V] Credibility [0.8]
Since it aligns with existing property law, its policy actions would address the climate impacts
identified by the IPCC and others,2130 and seeks to ensure the survival of public rights to access
and use coastal lands under climate change conditions, it is highly likely that this ‘stronger’
response would be seen as credible by many members of the public and by other stakeholders.
Its implementation would be consistent with current ‘best practice’ in coastal management2131
but may require the development of better practice in protecting public rights and application of
more ecologically sustainable ways to manage coastal lands affected by coastal hazards.
Thus this response would substantially satisfy all five criteria for successful public policy.

2124

The property rules, decisions and statutes recognising public rights cited in Chapters II, III & IV.
Under common law rights identified in Chapter II, or s 27 CMA 2016, discussed in s 4 Chapter IV.
2126
Such as designating the need to prepare and consider an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in a
planning instrument made under the EPAA 19179, such as SEPP 14, or 26, as discussed in s 5 Ch IV.
2127
Landowners with existing high gradient land, or vertical walls, as boundaries would not be affected.
2128
Either set by the special legislation, as in Durham Holdings PL V NSW (2001) discussed in s 10
Chapter II, or at full market rate per ss 10(1), 54, 56(2) LA(JTC)A 1991, discussed in s 6 Chapter IV.
2129
For example an easement for public access created in the CHLALC v Minister (2013) which followed
an existing track in use, was only 6 metres wide. A second easement created in that case for a ‘rolling
easement’, measured 30 metres from the position of MHWM.
2130
See IPCC, AR5, above n 7, 21; Church, et al, above n 44, 192 cited in s 3 Chapter I.
2131
Ecological sustainable management, as described by s 3 CMA 2016. See s 4 Chapter IV.
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8. ‘Balancing’ response
I next assess a future government option of seeking to protect both public and private interests
in coastal land through:
6] a response where neither private or public rights would be dominant; and disputes would be
resolved by ‘balancing’ competing private and public uses. government would enact
legislation to make public and private property rights ‘equivalent’, so there were no ‘trumps’.

a] Ethical land management

These criteria would likely be satisfied only to a very limited degree by this response.

i] Physical characteristics [0.1]

When resolving conflicts over use of coastal land by ‘balancing’ competing private and public
uses under this response, the land’s physical character, condition and natural limits may be
overlooked, and its unsuitability for one use could be deemed irrelevant. Hence it is unlikely
this response would satisfy this criterion.

ii] Social community [0.3]

Under this ‘balancing’ response the likely effects of land use decisions on the social community
could be considered if conflicts over use of coastal lands were arbitrated rather than litigated.
Initially there may be two parties to a dispute, but a wider consideration of social community
impacts would lead to other parties being joined in what becomes a multi-faceted dispute. The
process of ‘balancing’ uses, to resolve disputes would then require the co-operation and
accommodation of many interested parties and stakeholders. The greater complexity of interests
to be included, the more difficult would be the task of achieving a balance. Hence, effects on
future generations would be unlikely to be considered.

iii] Ecological community [0.0]

Potential ecological impacts would probably not be considered in resolving future disputes
under this response.2132 Its focus on balancing private and public ‘rights’ would suggest that the
non-human world inhabiting particular places would likely receive little or no consideration.

iv] Temporal perspective [0.0]

It seems unlikely that the effects of time would be closely considered under this response. In
seeking to ‘balance’ private and public uses, an arbiter could consider the history of local land
2132

This would require the repeal of provisions s 3 CMA 2016, s 3.25 EPAA 1979, and s 6(2) POEAA
1991 requiring conservation of biodiversity, cited s 4 & 5 Chapter IV and s 5.2 Chapter V.
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use, to be important. More likely the focus would be on the present and immediate future, and
longer-term impacts and costs, which are difficult to forecast and quantify, would be unlikely to
be considered.2133 Any ‘balance’ would also be temporally limited. When external events, such
as a severe storm, change of private land ownership or the death of one party, upset the balance
a new dispute could arise, requiring resolution via a new ‘balance’ of then competing uses. Thus
over time this response could require many iterations of ‘balances’ to resolve, temporarily,
perennial disputes between competing private and public interests.

v] Key social goals [0.0]

This response’s narrow anthropocentric focus is not directed towards the goal of land health, but
the perpetuation of then current competing claims of priority in using coastal lands. Satisfaction
of criteria for ethical land management under this response would be patchy at best.
b] Successful ‘public policy’

This response also faces difficulties in satisfying the criteria for successful public policy.
I] Rationale [0.1]
One advantage of this response would be its simple rationale of ‘balancing’ competing private
and public interests, which might be publicly justified as fair, since there would be no dominant
‘right’, and disputes would be resolved by a ‘balanced’ win-win outcome. However, it would be
difficult to justify this response as in the public interest, or for the greater good, if it would
provide less protection of public rights to use coastal lands and waters, than previously.2134 Thus
a future government could offer a superficially plausible rationale, but fail to justify this
response by not explaining its social utility.
II] Timeliness [0.1]
Several obstacles appear to limit this response’s capacity to satisfy the criterion of ‘timeliness’.
In order to implement it, a new statutory framework for ‘balanced’ dispute resolution would be
required to overturn the dominance of public rights and create an ‘equivalence’ of ‘rights’.
Consequently, comprehensive legislation would be needed to repeal existing laws, state the new
property ‘rules’ and procedures, and make transitional arrangements. Drafting the necessary
Bills could be slow, and progress through the legislature may be opposed or delayed, frustrating
‘timely’ action. Timeliness could be further limited by the need to devise and institute new
procedures and train arbiters of disputes how to ‘balance’ competing rights and interests.
2133

A flaw of short-term analysis noted by Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 298. See s 6.2 Ch V.
Ie under existing property rules, court decisions and statutory provisions cited in Chapters II, III & IV,
which recognise the dominance of public rights, uses, interests and purposes over private land.
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Assuming enabling legislation were enacted, resolving future disputes through a new, untried,
unpredictable process, would be unlikely to be timely. Moreover, the life of a ‘balance’ between
competing uses could be short, with many ‘balances’ required over decades. Thus this response
would be unlikely to satisfy this criterion.
III] Cost-effectiveness [0.1]
Under this response public funds could be used to ‘balance’ private funds, to construct, maintain
and upgrade coastal defensive structures, to protect private land, or to protect both private and
public land. However, given seawalls’ adverse impacts on social, ecological and economic uses
of the beach,2135 this spending would likely be counterproductive to protecting public rights to
use coastal lands and waters. There would likely be additional public expense in instituting a
new framework to resolve disputes between competing interests, with little public benefit, if the
‘balances’ achieved derogate from prior public rights to access and use coastal lands and waters.
Hence this response would likely rate poorly on the cost-effectiveness of its public spending.
IV] Minimal disruption [0.0]
Since it is contrary to existing elements of property law2136 and would need to overthrow the
status quo to create a completely new system to ‘balance’ competing interests; cause uncertainty
until the enactment of enabling legislation, and incur a range of unproductive transition costs,
this response would deliberately create significant disruption for little or no new public benefit.
V] Credibility [0.1]
It seems unlikely that this response would be seen as credible by the public or other stakeholders, except perhaps by some private landowners. It would be inconsistent with existing
property norms and property law,2137 not based on robust evidence, and ignore expert opinion. It
would not focus on, and would likely frustrate, rather than foster, best practice in the
management of coastal lands.2138
Hence, the ‘balancing’ response would perform poorly against all public policy criteria.

See Figures 10.1 – 10.12 and the discussion seawall impacts in s 3 Chapter I.
The property law rules, court decisions and statutory provisions cited in Chapters II, III & IV in which
public rights, uses, interests and purposes are dominant, and intended to remain so into the future.
2137
cited in Chapters II, III & IV.
2138
Currently defined as the ecological sustainable management of the coast, s 3 CMA 2016, in which the
coast’s social, economic and ecological functions are protected for future generations of beach users, as
described in the Coastal Management Manual Parts, A & B, proscribed by s 21 CMA 2016.
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9. ‘Accept and accommodate’ response
The last option to be considered is
7] an ‘accept and accommodate’ response, which protects public rights, and accommodates
private interests, where this would be feasible, and consistent with the first objective.
Here the government would accept the current dominance of public rights2139 and adopt the
strong or stronger pro-public rights response and accommodate private interests to some degree.

a] Ethical land management

This response would satisfy ethical criteria in similar ways as the pro-public rights responses,2140
but would differ in several ways, due to its use of TDRs and a land exchange scheme.

i] Physical characteristics [0.9]

The physical characteristics and condition of land would be closely considered in this response.
Areas exposed to current or future impacts from coastal hazards would be recognised as
unsuitable for continued use, or future development.2141 In the land exchange scheme suggested,
particulars of site would be considered in other ways: access to the land, its utility services
infrastructure, suitability for short-term uses, and in identifying and removing dangers to public
safety, or threats to environmental health from prior uses of surrendered lands.2142
Once any short-term uses were discontinued, the lands’ condition would guide decisions on how
to make it safe for future public uses, as a migrating beach.

ii] Social community [1.0]

Social community considerations would be likely be substantial under this response and similar
to the pro-public rights responses above. Adverse impacts on beach users would be minimized
and public rights to use beaches and tidal waters would be protected, extended or enhanced.2143
Under this response, management planning for coastal lands and waters would focus on
ensuring that public use would continue to be available to future generations, despite the

2139

That public rights are dominant over private property rights was one conclusion drawn in Chapter IV.
To avoid repetition here, see the discussion of this in the ‘strong’ and ‘stronger’ responses above.
2141
Through a CZMP or CMP prepared under s 13 CMA 2016, and or shown on the ‘coastal vulnerability
area’ map prepared under cl 6(3) SEPP CM 2018, see s 4 Ch IV. This would heed the warning of
adopting a ‘false sense of security’ due to a seawall, discussed in s 3 Chapter I.
2142
This would include building foundations, utility service pipes, underground wiring and fence lines,
and hazardous materials such as copper fittings, and asbestos bearing fibro building products.
2143
This would be consistent with the body of case law and statute law which constitute a local NSW
‘public use doctrine’, akin to the PTD in the US, discussed in s 5.1 Chapter V.
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impacts of climate change.2144 However, by creating TDRs or exchanging land, the interests of
private landowners trapped on an eroding land title of falling value and soaring liabilities might
be accommodated to some extent, and assisted to relocate to a location free from hazards.
Hence, this response would recognize the widest social community.
iii] Ecological community [0.7]

This response would consider the ecological community of land, similarly to the pro-public
right responses canvassed above. By minimizing use of seawalls and avoiding the impacts of
coastal squeeze, beach and estuary species of ecological or economic significance could migrate
landwards as the shoreline recedes.2145 Dedicating parts of surrendered private lands2146 for
future ecological purposes, eg fisheries habitat, would be a major advantage of this response.
iv] Temporal perspective [0.8]

Like the pro-public rights responses, under this ‘accept and accommodate’ response the State
government would be more likely to consider ‘time’ in their decision making. They would
likely recognize the natural geomorphological processes at work in shoreline recession; note the
conditions forecast to prevail under climate change conditions; and anticipate likely future
impacts of coastal hazards on coastal settlements under these conditions.2147 The government
could direct local councils to plan and act to protect public rights and interests in coastal lands
and waters for future generations;2148 and implement state-wide programs to achieve these goals.
Further, by creating an enduring land exchange scheme this response could assist landowners
caught in an economic ‘coastal squeeze’ and protect public rights for decades or longer.2149
v] Key social goals [1.0]

Allowing sandy beach and dune systems to recede naturally, and hence survive, as seas rise,
would avoid the impacts of seawalls and contribute to coastal land health. Further it would
allow other beach-based social and economic activities to continue, thus contributing to a range
of social goals. As part of the land exchange scheme proposed under this response, a high
priority would be to identify and remove dangers to public safety, and threats to environmental
health from adjoining private land, to restore surrendered lands to a safe, healthy condition
suitable for future public use and public interest ecological purposes.
Thus this response has the potential to satisfy all the criteria for ethical land management.
2144

In accordance with objects of coastal management in s 3 CMA 2016 discussed in s 3 Ch IV; and the
ESD principle of ‘intergenerational equity’ stated in s 6(2)(b) POEAA 1991, reported in s 5.2 Ch V.
2145
See Figure 10.12 and discussion of avoidance of seawall impacts in s 3.3 Chapter I.
2146
The dedication of lands above MHWM for public purposes were discussed in s 3 Chapter IV, and
dedication of lands below MHWM for ecological protection were discussed in s 9.2 Chapter II.
2147
The impacts of climate change on coastal settlements in NSW was outlined in s 3 Chapter I.
2148
As per the ESD principle of ‘intergenerational equity’ in s 6(2)(b) POEAA 1991. See s 5.2 Ch V.
2149
The Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) is already over a century old, and pre-dates federation.
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b] Successful ‘public policy’

This ‘accept and accommodate’ response combines elements of the ‘strong’ public rights, and
‘soft’ private property responses. Consequently, its satisfaction of criteria for successful public
policy reflects theirs in many ways. However, there would be significant differences, due to its
use of TDRs and a land exchange scheme.
I] Rationale [1.0]
Due to its consonance with existing elements of property theory and property law which
recognize the dominance of public rights and uses,2150 articulating a plausible public interest
rationale for this response would not be difficult. A future government could easily mount a
persuasive argument that protecting public rights and accommodating private interests where
this was feasible - and consistent with the primary objective - would be in the public interest and
contribute to a greater public good. The responsible Minister could thus properly argue that this
response would have greater social utility and achieve better outcomes than other responses.
However a more persuasive rationale might be to place it in a wider context, as part of a more
comprehensive government policy position on the impacts of climate change.2151 It could then
be argued that this response was in the public interest and appropriate for future conditions.
Further, its public interest rationale could be augmented by a statement of the ongoing role of
the State government in coastal management, as the owner of public lands, trustee of public
rights and interests, and as a key regulating authority, in partnership with local councils.2152 By
providing a coherent rationale for continued State government involvement, which justifies its
policy actions, this response would be likely to satisfy the first criterion of sound public policy.
II] Timeliness [0.8]
The ‘accept and accommodate’ response would be timely because its priority of public rights
would resolve disputes about competing rights and provide a basis for avoiding or resolving
future disputes. With the macro-policy of retreat as a core element, it could demonstrate
timeliness in several other ways.
Legislation which mandated the orderly relocation of existing development at risk from coastal
hazards and prohibited new development in ‘at risk’ areas, would appear to be timely, since
thousands of residences are likely to be adversely affected by these hazards.2153 By adopting
2150

The property theory, rules, court rulings and statutory provisions identified in Chapters II, III & IV.
As forecast by IPCC, above n 7, 26, reported in s 3 Chapter I.
2152
Recent government policy has been to devolve responsibility for coastal management to local
councils, and minimise the role played by the State government on behalf of the public interest.
2153
Up to 62,400 residences in NSW. See Australian Government, above n 44,77, cited in s 3.1 Chapter I.
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‘retreat’ as a preferred policy, a future government could demonstrate its understanding that
coastal environments will undergo major rapid change in the future,2154 and require coastal
managers to adopt strategies to reflect that temporal reality.2155 Moreover, by creating a land
exchange scheme, the government would make a timely response to climate impacts on coastal
land, while ensuring the necessary mechanisms of property law operate stably and equitably,
without disruption, over decades or centuries.2156
Importantly, once adopted, this response could be speedily implemented. Certain elements, such
as legislation which confirmed existing common law rules via statute law,2157 might be dealt
with by the Legislature routinely. Legislation for other elements of this response, such as
creating TDRs, or a land exchange scheme, might take longer to prepare, attract closer scrutiny
by the Legislature and proceed more slowly. Indeed, due to the longer lead time required to gain
final approval for such a scheme, a timely response would develop an enabling bill and allow
time for public consultation, and the bill to be fine-tuned to gain the legislature’s approval.2158
Once enacted, its implementation could then proceed without delay. There would, therefore, be
a good basis for this response satisfying this criterion.

III] Cost-effectiveness [0.9]
Like other pro-public rights responses which recognize the dominance of public rights in the
existing property theory, case law and statutes, this one would not incur unproductive costs
creating and moving to a new system, or spend public funds for little or no public benefit.
Hence, it would not commit public funds to coastal defensive works whose sole purpose was to
protect private land but would fund works to provide public access or protect key public assets.
This expenditure would be a cost-effective use of public funds because of the direct public
benefits achieved. However, the cost-effectiveness of public funding could be increased if funds
were authorized for defensive works to protect both public assets and private land, where this
‘levered’ a financial contribution from all benefitting landowners. The costs of creating a TDR
for approved structures on land adversely affected by coastal hazards, would also be a costeffective use of public funds, if relocating at risk development helped achieve the public goal of
protecting public rights. Similarly, the minor costs of creating and registering static or ‘rolling
easements’ across some private land to permit ongoing public access to the beach would be

2154

As forecast by IPCC above n 7, 26, Church et al, above n 44, 191, cited in s 3 Chapter I.
Consistent with the ‘precautionary principle’ of ESD, per s 6(2)(a) POEAA 1991. See s 5.2 Ch V.
2156
Since sea levels are forecast to continue to rise for centuries, more land titles will become inundated
by tidal waters over many decades; hence any land exchange scheme will need to continue indefinitely.
2157
These are the property law rules regarding the nature, movement and location of real property
boundaries formed by tidal waters, and the State’s ownership of land below MHWM described in s 6.3
Chapter II, recognised in EPA v Sanders (1995) as discussed in s 8 Chapter III.
2158
As occurred with 1997 Bill to amend CPA 1979, and the 2015 Bill for the CMA 2016.
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cost-effective, due to the enduring protection of public rights they would provide.2159
The overall cost of public spending necessary to plan and implement a land exchange scheme, is
difficult to assess due to the many expenditures it would involve.2160 Significant public funding
would be required to design the scheme, draft its enabling bill, consult widely, prepare for and
promote its implementation, employ and train staff to operate it for decades. Public funding
would also be needed to identify suitable sites for new government land releases to replace
surrendered land titles, prepare documentation of the sub-division, register new land titles,
install infrastructure needed for fully-serviced sites, and facilitate exchange of land titles.
‘Incentive payments’ to encourage landowners to join the scheme early, while substantial public
benefits from surrendered lands were still possible would also require public funding. However
in the scheme proposed, these payments would be structured to ensure their cost-effectiveness.
On acquiring surrendered land titles the government would also acquire the legal liabilities
attached to them,2161 so public funds would be needed for remediation works to render sites safe,
install facilities for public access, or to protect ecological functions of public benefit. Thus the
public funding to fully implement such a scheme could be substantial.
It is not possible to closely assess of the cost-effectiveness of the land exchange scheme
outlined, since its total cost is unknown at present, and would involve many variable factors,
affecting the making of credible appraisals. Its overall cost-effectiveness would be best assessed
over the long term, when the scheme was mature, and all relevant costs and benefits to the
public, affected landowners and the public interest generally, could be ascertained and
integrated into the evaluation.
However, despite the absence of high-confidence costings I conclude that public expenditure on
a land exchange scheme could be of enduring benefit, since public rights to use coastal lands
and waters would be protected over time, and private interests accommodated to some extent.
In the long term, if well implemented, though more costly initially, this approach could be a
more cost-effective use of public funds, better protect public rights and achieve wider public
benefits than other responses. Hence this more ambitious response has significant potential to
satisfy this criterion.

2159

Easements are registered on a land title and continue to remain in place when ownership changes.
Rolling easements are intended to ‘roll’ with the ambulatory MHWM in perpetuity.
2160
Ideally a detailed comparative economic study would estimate each response’s implementation costs.
It seems likely that the costs of creating and operating a coastal land exchange scheme would be less
than the costs of acquiring all private land adversely affected by coastal hazards, at full market value,
estimated to be between $12 and $18 billion in 2009. See Australia Government, above n 44, 77.
2161
Landowners are liable for pollution of waters which emanates from their real property, under s 120 of
the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW).
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IV] Minimal disruption [1.0]
The ‘accept and accommodate’ response would minimize disruption. Accepting the dominance
of public rights to access the foreshore and coastal waters2162 and codifying extant property rules
regarding tidal boundaries and ownership of lands below MHWM in declaratory statutes,2163
would not be disruptive since this would not change current property law. Extensive legislation
and the re-education of government staff, practitioners and the public would not be required.
Even creating a land exchange scheme could minimise disruption, if handled well. Administrative procedures could ensure that, private landowners would be no worse off, through their early
entry into the scheme, and probably in a ‘better’ position in the medium term than if no action
had been taken. Though relocation would be disruptive in the short term, landowners would
gain secure title to a new allotment of land, free from hazards and liabilities, be able to transfer
approved uses to it via TDRs, assisted by publicly-funded incentive payments. Land titles would
be surrendered and new land titles would be created, but there would be no change to existing
property law or the system of land title registration. Disruption to landowners would be limited
but ongoing as more land titles become affected by the landward movement of the MHWM.2164
Retreating, rather than defending, would also least disturb existing social, ecological and
economic uses of beaches and waters.2165 Thus this response would largely minimize disruption.

V] Credibility [1.0]
Finally, it is highly likely that this response would be seen as credible by the public, local
council staff and other stakeholders in coastal management, including most landowners affected
by coastal hazards. It would align with existing property theory and law,2166 be consistent with
expert opinion on the nature and rate of climate change,2167 and its actions would address the
local impacts of rising seas and receding shorelines while protecting public rights to access and
use coastal lands and waters, and hence likely promote best practice in coastal management. By
implementing a coastal lands exchange scheme and adopting innovative actions from the
‘strong’ or ‘stronger’ responses it could develop better practice in managing coastal hazards
impacts. Consequently, this response would satisfy all criteria for successful public policy.
This concludes my analysis of potential responses. I next report the results of these assessments.

2162

As per the common law stated in Blundell v Catterall (1821), see s 3 Chapter III, and under current
statute law per s 27 CMA 2016, discussed in s 4 Chapter IV.
2163
See the common law rules used in EPA v Saunders (1994) v Leaghur PL [1995] in s 8 Chapter III.
2164
Between 40,800 and 62,400 residential buildings in New South Wales would be at risk of a sea level
rise of 1.1m and a 1:100 years storm tide. See Australian Government, above n 44, 77.
2165
This was the conclusion reached by Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, 301, noted in s 6.2 Ch V.
2166
The rules, decisions and statutes which recognise public rights, stated in Chapters II, III & IV.
2167
See the doubling in the rate of sea level rise shown in the CSIRO graph cited as Figure 2, s 2.4 Ch I.
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10. Summary of Results
The results of my assessments of these responses, above, are shown in Table 7 below. As
described in s15.5 in Chapter I, raw scores assigned for their satisfaction of criterion are shown
in [brackets]. They are adjusted by applying that criteria’s designated weight, to produce a
weighted score for each criterion. Due to their relative importance against other criteria, scores
for ‘physical characteristics’ and ‘public interest rationale’ criteria are weighted x 1.0, and all
other criteria are weighted x 0.8. These scores are aggregated to produce a final total ‘weighted’

Ecological community

Temporal considerations

Contribute to key social goals

Public interest rationale

Timeliness

Cost-effectiveness

Minimal Disruption

Credibility

1.0

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

1.0

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

[0.0]

[0.0]

[0.3]

[0.0]

[0.0]

[0.0]

[0.0]

[0.0]

[1.0]

[0.0]

1] do nothing

2] weak pro-private

3] robust pro-private

4] strong pro-public

5] stronger pro-public

6] balancing

7] accept /

accommodate

0.24
[0.2]

[0.1]

0.2

0.08

[0.1]

[0.0]

[0.0]
[0.3]

1.04

0.8
[0.0]
[0.0]

[0.0]
[0.0]

0.1

[0.1]

[0.1]

[0.0]

0.1

0.08

[0.1]

[0.1]

[-0.1]

0.1

0.08

-0.08

[0.0]

[0.1]
0.08

[0.0]

TOTAL SCORE

Social community

CRITERIA
Weight value
[raw]weighted score
RESPONSE

Physical characteristics

score for each potential response.

0.54

[0.1]
0.08

[0.8]

[0.7]

[0.5]

[0.8]

[1.0]

[1.0]

[0.7]

[1.0]

[1.0]

[0.8]

0.8

0.56

0.4

0.64

0.8

1.0

0.56

0.8

0.8

0.64

[0.9]

[0.7]

[0.5]

[0.8]

[1.0]

[1.0]

[0.6]

[0.7]

[0.8]

[0.8]

0.9

0.56

0.4

0.64

0.8

1.0

0.48

0.56

0.64

0.64

[0.1]

[0.3]

[0.0]

[0.0]

[0.0]

[0.1]

[0.1]

[0.1]

[0.0]

[0.1]

0.1

0.24

0.1

0.08

0.08

[0.9]

[1.0]

[0.7]

[0.8]

[1.0]

[1.0]

[0.8]

[0.9]

[1.0]

[1.0]

0.9

0.8

0.56

0.64

0.8

1.0

0.64

0.72

0.8

0.8

0.08

0.24
7.00
6.78

0.68
7.66

Table 7. – Summary of results
Next, in Part C I comment on the responses’ satisfaction of the criteria and overall performance,
rank them against the criteria and form some initial conclusions on their merits.
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Part C - Discussion of results
11. Satisfaction of the criteria for ethical decision-making about land
In this section I compare the responses’ satisfaction of the criteria for ethical decision making.
i] Physical characteristics
Coastal lands’ physical characteristics would not be considered at all under the ‘do nothing’
response, hence it did not record a score against this criterion. The physical condition of land
could be considered under the ‘balanced’ response but would not be useful in ‘balancing’
competing uses. The ‘weak’ and ‘robust’ responses recorded low scores against this criterion
because only a small sub-set of the physical characteristics of land and its condition would be
recognised: primarily as a cause for the erection of seawalls, and the land’s natural limits would
not guide decisions about its future use. The ‘strong’, ‘stronger’ and ‘accept and accommodate’
responses scored more highly because they would better consider land’s physical character and
its likely future condition due to anticipated climate impacts, and would likely modify planned
future uses to recognize the land’s natural limits.2168
ii] Social community
Impacts of future land uses on the social community would be considered to varying degrees in
all except the ‘do nothing’ response. The ‘weak, ‘robust’ and ‘balanced’ responses scored
poorly against this criterion because of the narrowness of the social community likely to be
considered. The ‘strong’ and ‘stronger’ responses recorded higher scores because they would
consider social impacts on all members of the public, and future generations.2169 However, the
‘accept and accommodate’ response scored highest on this criterion because its consideration of
social impacts would have the widest scope and consider adversely affected private landowners.
iii] Ecological community
The ‘weak’ and ‘robust’ responses recorded no score against this criterion because they would
ignore the likely profound ecological impacts they would make on the ecological community.
The ‘balanced’ response also did not record a score due to its focus on the parties to any dispute
over conflicting uses, not ecological communities. The ‘do nothing’ response recorded a low
score because, the government would ignore the forecast ecological impacts of climate change
and the need to develop an appropriate public policy response, but would not change existing
2168

By making and updating coastal management programs (CMPs) under s 13-16 CMA 2016, consistent
with the SEPP Coastal Management 2018, discussed in s 4 & 5 Chapter IV.
2169
In accordance with ESD principle of ‘intergenerational equity’ defined by s 6(2)(b) POEAA 1991.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Page 318

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Laws)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

© John R Corkill

Chapter VII – Evaluating potential responses

statutory provisions which require impacts on ecological communities to be considered in
decision-making about coastal land.2170 The ‘strong’ response recorded a median score since it
would avoid the ecological impacts of ‘coastal squeeze’ and secure positive outcomes for
coastal ecological communities albeit co-incidentally, but would not extend the protection of
public interest values in native vegetation on private land beyond its existing limited scope.2171
The ‘stronger’ and ‘accept and accommodate’ responses would also avoid the ecological
impacts of coastal squeeze but earned higher scores since they would use planning instruments
to extend the protection of native vegetation and other public interest values on private lands.
vi] Temporal perspective
Results for this criterion were polarized. The four ‘do nothing’, ‘weak’, ‘robust’ and ‘balanced’
responses would ignore or discount the effects of time. Hence they did not score against this
criterion. The ‘strong’, and ‘stronger’ responses would consider future generations and time to a
degree, recording higher scores, but the ‘accept and accommodate’ response scored highest
because it would also consider the effects of climate change impacts over time on private lands,
particularly when assessing what assistance to landowners would be feasible.
v] Contribution to key social goals
Scores were also highly polarized for this criterion. Because of their very narrow focus the ‘do
nothing’, ‘weak’, ‘robust’ and ‘balanced’ responses would not contribute to key social goals,
such as restoring land health, and recorded no score. In contrast, the ‘strong’, ‘stronger’ and
‘accept and accommodate’ responses recorded higher scores because they would seek to achieve
public good outcomes and contribute to wider social goals, including restoring land health.
This concludes my review of the responses’ satisfaction of the ethical decision-making criteria.

12. Satisfaction of the criteria for successful public policy
I next I compare these responses’ satisfaction of the criteria for successful public policy.
I] Rationale.
The ‘do nothing’, ‘weak’, ‘robust’, and ‘balanced’ responses scored poorly against this criterion
because it would be difficult to articulate a credible public interest rationale for them. In contrast
the ‘strong’ and ‘stronger’ responses scored well because a coherent public interest rationale to
justify these responses could be confidently stated, drawing on well established precedents in
2170

See s 3.25 EPAA 1979, and s 6(2)(c) POEAA 1991, discussed in s 5 Chapter IV and s 5.2 Chapter V.
Coastal wetlands and littoral rainforests formerly protected under SEPPs 14 & 26. See s 5 Chapter IV.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
2171

Page 319

Thesis submitted for award of Doctor of Philosophy (Laws)
[v_5.2_22_December_2021]

© John R Corkill

Chapter VII – Evaluating potential responses

property norms, common law rules, court decisions and statutory provisions of existing property
law,2172 and persuasive explanations of why and how these responses had social utility could be
easily given. Moreover such a rationale would provide an important justification for authorizing
public funding. Because it would adopt either the ‘strong’ or ‘stronger’ responses, the ‘accept
and accommodate’ response would also satisfy this criterion. However a rationale would also be
required to explain and publicly justify its key element: protecting private property interests
where feasible. A future NSW government could also justify limited public expenditure to
assist adversely affected private landowners, as being in the public interest, where this created,
or contributed to, public benefits such as continued public access to the beach, or avoided
threats to public health, dangers to public safety and harm to the environment. Hence the
responses’ satisfaction of this criterion were also polarized.

II] Timeliness.
No response exhibited the level of urgency necessary to fully satisfy this criterion. The ‘do
nothing’ response recorded no score, while the timeliness of the ‘weak’, ‘robust’ and ‘balanced’
responses rated poorly because the government would not make timely preparations for future
circumstances. Further, because they would overthrow the status quo, the legislation necessary
to implement these responses would likely take time to prepare, may encounter opposition to its
passage in the Legislature and delays in its implementation. Due to the simplicity of the ‘strong’
response and uncontroversial nature of laws codifying existing common law rules and public
rights, the passage of legislation for this response would be straight-forward and its implementation would be immediate. Thus it would be very likely to be ‘timely’. However, the legislation
required for the ‘stronger’ response would take longer to prepare due to its wider scope and
diverse actions, and its passage could be delayed, making it less ‘timely’. Its timeliness could be
further reduced if its implementation depended on major changes to institutions within
Government. Hence it recorded a more modest score. Though the complexity of the legislation
required, potential legislative hold-ups and delays in implementation would also affect the
timeliness of the ‘accept and accommodate’ response, its initiation of government policies and
legislation, which anticipated and prepared for future climate impacts, protected public rights,
and created enduring public benefits, warranted a higher score.
III] Cost-effectiveness.
The cost-effectiveness of the public spending involved distinguished these responses. At the low
end, the legal costs incurred by the State as a respondent, due to its ‘do nothing’ response may,

2172

recognising the dominance of public rights, uses, interests and purposes cited in Chapters II, III & IV.
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or may not, be cost-effective use of public funds. Because publicly funding seawalls would
likely create threats to public access and use rights, the cost-effectiveness the ‘weak’ response
would likely be nil, but with its higher spending and greater impacts, the ‘robust’ response’s
cost-effectiveness could be negative. Similarly, the ‘balancing’ response’s cost-effectiveness,
with its many ill-defined ongoing public costs for uncertain public benefit may also be negative.
The cost-effectiveness of all three pro-public rights responses would be underpinned by their
consistency with existing property law,2173 and hence would not incur unproductive costs in
reversing the status quo to create a new system. By not incurring major public expenditure, the
‘strong’ pro-public rights response would be cost-effective because it would protect public
rights and prepare for climate change impacts. At the higher end of the scale, the ‘stronger’ and
‘accept and accommodate’ responses could be more cost-effective use of public funds, but
would require higher spending to obtain significant additional public benefits.

IV] Minimal Disruption.
Scores against this criterion varied. Two responses most closely aligned with existing property
law, which preserved the status quo with little or no disruption, the ‘do nothing’ and ‘strong’
responses, rated highly. The ‘stronger’ and ‘accept and accommodate’ responses, which would
be consistent with extant property theory and law but create some disruption, recorded moderate
scores. In contrast the ‘weak, ‘robust’ and ‘balanced’ responses, which would overthrow the
status quo, and hence deliberately maximize disruption, recorded very low scores.

V] Credibility.

Several responses would not be likely to be seen as credible by the public or other stakeholders,
since they would be inconsistent with long-standing elements of existing property theory and
property law which recognize the dominance of public rights,2174 not be based on robust
evidence, published research or expert opinion, and would frustrate or subvert, rather than
foster, best practice in coastal management. Hence ‘do nothing’, ‘weak’, ‘robust’ and ‘balanced’
responses recorded low scores. The ‘strong’ and ‘stronger’ responses scored well due their
alignment with extant property law, and their focus on managing local climate change impacts.
The ‘accept and accommodate’ response scored more highly because it would be likely to be
seen as credible public policy by more people, including adversely affected private landowners,
and would foster the development of best practice in managing coastal hazard impacts on
privately-owned coastal lands. This concludes my review of criteria satisfaction.
2173

In which public rights are dominant. See s 9 Chapter II, s 3 Chapter III and ss 3-7 Chapter IV.
The property theory, common law rules, decisions and statutes considered in Chapters II, III & IV.
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13. Responses’ performance against criteria
In this section I summarise each responses’ performance.
a] ‘Nil response’ by Government: courts decide

This response scored poorly against all criteria for ethical land management, and against the
criteria for successful public policy, with the exception of ‘disruption’, where the lack of
government action would be unlikely to disrupt the status quo. It would not be seen as a credible
response to climate change impacts by the public, or other stakeholders in coastal management.
b] ‘Weak’ pro private property rights response

Neither the criteria for ethical land management or successful public policy would be satisfied
by this potential response. Claims it could satisfy the public interest rationale and timeliness
criteria, would be contestable and may not withstand closer scrutiny. Since it would commit
significant public funds to protect private land into the future indefinitely, it would have low
cost-effectiveness of public expenditure for public benefit. Further by reversing the status quo, it
would create uncertainty, incur unproductive transition costs and significantly disrupt current
property law. It is likely that this response would be seen as lacking credibility by the public and
other stakeholders in coastal management, due to its reversal of public rights dominance, lack of
robust evidence, inconsistency with recent research findings on climate change impacts and
incompatibility with ‘best practice’ in ecologically sustainably managing coastal lands.
c] ‘Robust’ pro-private property response

Due to its focus on narrow goals, this response rated poorly against both sets of criteria.
Noteworthy were the difficulties this response faced: in framing a coherent public interest
rationale, the very low value of its public funding for public benefit gained, and its likely
immediate adverse impacts on existing social, ecological and economic uses of coastal lands.
Major disruption to current property law to reverse the status quo, creation of ill-defined
unproductive costs, potential for social division in coastal communities, and the redistributive
effects of its spending would be likely under this response. For these reasons, its inconsistency
with IPCC’s findings on climate impacts, and due to the subversion of ‘best practice’ in coastal
management which would be required to implement it, this response would not be seen as a
credible public policy response by the public or other stakeholders.
d] ‘Strong’ pro-public rights response

This response largely satisfied ethical land management criteria. However, due to its focus on
public rights, the social community considered would not include affected private landowners,
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and consideration of impacts on the ecological community could be overlooked. Its contribution
to ‘land health’, while potentially positive since it would avoid ‘coastal squeeze’ impacts, would
be incidental. It also performed well on criteria for successful public policy. Notable were the
logic of its rationale, cost-effectiveness of its modest public funding, and the minimal, if any,
disruption likely to result from protecting existing public rights to access and use coastal land
and codifying property rules. Because it would align with other elements of existing property
theory and law, reflect the IPCC findings on climate change, address the likely local impacts
and apply ‘best practice’ in coastal management, this response would be seen as credible by the
public and other parties involved in coastal management.
e] ‘Stronger’ pro-public response to public use rights’

Most criteria for ethical land management were satisfied by this ‘stronger’ pro public rights
response. The ecological community would likely be considered in protecting wider public
interests in coastal lands and waters, and though future generations of beach users would be
considered part of a wider social community, adversely affected private landowners would not.
This response would satisfy the public interest criteria of rationale, and timeliness, and if
handled well would likely sustain public support for the Government. It would produce varying
results against cost-effectiveness and disruption criteria however, depending on the policy
measures pursued. The use of easements, including rolling easements, to provide public access
across private lands to use the beach, would only minimally disrupt private landowners, but
would provide major public benefits of enduring value, for relatively low public expenditure.2175
Enlarging the foreshore by raising the HWM and acquiring intertidal land would create minor
disruption and incur greater public funding, but this could be justified by the greater public
benefits that would be gained. Its credibility among the public and other coastal management
stakeholders would be likely to be high, due to its consistency with existing elements of
property law, acceptance of the need to manage the impacts of climate change on coastal
environments, and the likelihood that it would apply best practice’ and develop better practice in
protecting public access to the beach and coastal waters, as shorelines recede.
f] ‘Balancing’ response,

Despite its apparently reasonable premise, the ‘balancing’ response performed poorly against
almost all assessment criteria. It would struggle to frame a credible public interest rationale for
change, and though it would consider the interests of the social community, it would likely
adopt a narrow focus on the parties to the dispute, who may or may not represent public
interests. Though it would be possible for the interests of future generations to be considered, it
would be more likely that, to resolve the dispute, the interests of current parties to the dispute
2175

As in the case Coffs Harbour LALC v Minister (2013) discussed in s 5.1 Chapter V.
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would matter most. Since it would require tortured logic to frame a credible public interest
rationale, lacks timeliness, would abandon longstanding elements of property theory and law to
create a new ‘no trumps’ system and hence cause extensive disruption, uncertainty and
unproductive costs, with low cost-effectiveness of public spending this response scored poorly
against these criteria. In addition to these problems, this response would be seen as credible by
only a very narrow section of the community. It would be likely to be rejected as lacking
credibility due to focus only on ‘balancing’ interests, not future impacts, its lack of evidence as
to its workability, and conflict with existing best practice in coastal management. Hence this
response would be unlikely to satisfy any criteria for successful public policy.
g] ‘Accept and accommodate’

Most criteria were well satisfied by this response, save consideration of the ecological
community. By accommodating private landowners’ interests where feasible, as well as future
generations of the public, the widest scope of social community consideration would be
possible. However, apart from avoiding coastal squeeze, its positive environmental outcomes
would be incidental. The goal of ‘land health’, the survival of beach and dune systems into the
future, would be possible, but not certain. One strength of this response would be its use of
economic instruments to protect public rights, accommodate private interests to some extent,
and improve environmental outcomes, as a result. Although its cost-effectiveness would depend
on the methodology used to assess it, another strength is that its policy ‘to accommodate private
interests where feasible’, would require government to make careful appraisals of the feasibility,
including the cost-effectiveness, of committing additional public spending to accommodate and
assist private interests in adversely affected coastal lands, when protecting public rights. The use
of economic instruments, TDRs, and land title exchange would be feasible ways to implement
this response. Further, this response would be likely be seen as credible by the public, other
coastal management stakeholders and importantly, by adversely affected private land owners. It
would protect public rights and would recognize and respond to forecast climate change impacts
on public land and on privately-owned coastal lands, where this was feasible. It is likely that
this response would apply best practice in coastal management, and develop better practice in
managing coastal hazards’ impacts on private land. Hence it would satisfy all the successful
public policy criteria.

14. Ranking of responses by merit
Based on the summaries and scores shown in Table 5 above, the potential responses’
satisfaction of the criteria rank from highest to lowest in the order shown in Table 8 below.
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Score

Ranking Potential response

7.66

1

Accept and accommodate

7.0

2

Stronger pro-public rights response

6.78

3

Strong pro-public rights response

1.04

4

Do Nothing

0.68

5

Balancing response

0.54

6

Weak privileging of private property rights

0.24

7

Robust privileging of private property rights

Table 8. - Ranking of potential responses by merit.
15. Conclusions
From these assessments I have formulated the following preliminary conclusions:
1. Results are strongly polarized: there are several very low- and several high-scoring responses.
2. The ‘weak’, ‘robust’ and ‘balanced’ responses would be difficult to justify and execute,
would ignore social and ecological impacts, incur unjust public spending and lack credibility.
3. The ‘strong’ and ‘stronger’ responses closely align with existing elements of property theory
and law and hence seem credible and would be easy to justify and implement. They would
maximize public benefits for public spending but overlook affected private landowners.
4. Both the ‘stronger’ and ‘accept and accommodate’ responses could increase the protection of
public access and use rights through legislation and additional public spending.
5. The ‘accept and accommodate’ response would also align with existing property theory and
law and be seen as most credible. By incurring higher public spending to accommodate private
interests where feasible, it could secure additional valuable and enduring public benefits.
This concludes my assessment of the merits of potential responses.
In this chapter I evaluated seven potential responses by a future State government to determine
which would be most useful in resolving future conflicts between competing rights over use of
coastal lands, and in addressing the climate impacts which frame them.
In the next, final chapter, I use the results of this evaluation to identify the response most likely
to be adopted by a future government and state my answer to the primary research question.
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“What The Sea Wants, The Sea Will Have”
[The album] steers its helm
through nautical themes and scenes, drawing
on our defencelessness in the face of nature
and our fragility under the weight of the sea.
Sarah Blasko (2006)2176

Chapter VIII – A practical answer to the Question
Introduction to the final Chapter

In the last two chapters I have explored what the policy environment created by a State
government may be in the future by outlining a diverse suite of potential responses which might
be adopted, assessing their merits against criteria for ethical decision-making and successful
public policy, and identifying three high-scoring responses.
In this last, short chapter I move from a technical assessment of these responses’ merits against
multiple criteria, to make a final, essentially political assessment of which response would be
most likely to be adopted by a future government. Using this forecast of the policy environment
most likely in the future I then answer my primary research question: will private property
rights ‘trump’ public rights and interests in coastal lands, under climate change conditions?

In Part A I recap the methodology for the final stage of analysis, which moves beyond the
results of the merit assessment, to focus on which potential response would be most likely.

In Part B I assess the likeliness of potential responses, discuss relevant insights from these
assessments and draw conclusions on the response most likely to be adopted by a future New
South Wales government. With the benefit of these analyses I then forecast the policy
environment likely to exist in the future, in which my primary research question is situated.

In Part C I move beyond the theoretical answer foreshadowed in Chapter IV to furnish a
practical answer to the primary research question and state the reasons for my answer. I then
outline the significance of my research and indicate where these answers might usefully apply.
Finally I offer an alternative answer, from an eco-centric perspective.

From the liner notes of the album by Sarah Blasko, ‘What the Sea Wants, the Sea Will Have’ (Dew
Process Records 2006).
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Part A – Moving from ‘most merit’ to ‘most likely’
At the end of Chapter VII I identified the responses that best satisfied the criteria employed, and
ranked them in order of their scores. In this Part I recap the results of this merits assessment,
reiterate why a further assessment of responses’ ‘likeliness’ is required and restate my methodology for identifying the response ‘most likely to be adopted by a future NSW government.

1. Recap of results of merits assessment
The results of the merits assessment ranked the potential responses in this order:
1. Accept and accommodate
2. Stronger pro-public rights response
3. Stronger pro-public rights response
4. Do Nothing response
5. Balancing response
6. Weak pro-private property rights response
7. Robust pro-private property rights response.2177

However, the merits of these potential responses would not be the only matter considered by a
future government when deciding which one to adopt to address conflicts between competing
rights to use coastal lands, and the substance of public policy for managing coastal lands under
climate change conditions. The first ranked ‘accept and accommodate’ response, though best
theoretically and highest scoring in this assessment, may not be seen by decision-makers as the
most desirable response to adopt for political reasons: enabling legislation would be complex,
need time to develop, explain, enact and implement, incur higher public spending and involve
political risks. Hence it is necessary to undertake a final assessment to identify which response
would be ‘most likely’ to be adopted by a future State government.

2. A political assessment is also required
This final assessment of the responses’ ‘likeliness’ is necessary because the public policy is
political.2178 Which response to adopt, the nature and content of enabling legislation, the
allocation of public funds and estimations of likely public and legislative support would all be
fundamentally political decisions by parliamentarians, involving political considerations.

2177

See Table 7 in Chapter VII.
See Althaus et al, above n 163, 6.
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Though analysis of merits would likely be considered in a future government’s decisionmaking, it would not necessarily determine the response ‘most likely’ to be adopted.
Hence this last assessment approximates this final stage of decision-making government.2179

In the next section, I restate the methodology for this assessment: applying insights from the
merits assessment to identify the response ‘most likely’ to be adopted by a future government.
3. Methodology for identifying ‘most likely’ response
As explained in Chapter V, when determining the direction of future public policy on whose
rights should prevail when they conflict, key political decision-makers in a future NSW
government would consider the merits assessment of potential responses, but would likely focus
on three core political factors: difficulty, overall cost and the kudos generated for government.

Considerations of potential responses using these factors would likely integrate the results of the
merits review into political assessments using these political criteria. This integration would
likely simplify the merits review results and synthesize from them political appraisals of the
responses’ difficulty, cost and their political value: in their appeal to the public, electoral impact
in key areas and demographics, and their capacity to generate kudos for the government. Hence
considerations under the five ethical criteria, the criteria of public interest rationale and minimal
disruption would inform political assessments of difficulty. Nuanced assessments of costeffectiveness would likely be relied on, but flattened, to inform political assessments of total
cost, and more diverse assessments under criteria of achieve social goals, timeliness and
credibility would be used as part of political assessments of potential kudos for government.2180

In the next sections this approach is applied to make political assessments of the potential
responses, to identify which one would be ‘most likely’ to be adopted by a future government.
These are important because by identifying the response most likely to be adopted by a future
government, it becomes possible to foresee an appropriate context in which a credible answer
can be stated about the likely relationship between competing private and public rights in the
future, in New South Wales, in practice.

2179

A political assessment is necessary because it provides scope for input from the decision maker, to be
considered. “The decision maker almost always has information and insight not available to the analyst.
Decision makers and political leaders are likely to be keen aware of the constraints that the context
imposes, which must be taken into account in formulating policy. Such constraints are not always
evident to the professional analyst.” See Quade (1982) quoted in Althaus et al above n 163, 82.
2180
See Table x – Integration of merits assessments into political assessments, in Chapter I sX Method.
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Part B – Forecasting the future
In this Part I assess the likeliness of potential responses using these political criteria, form
conclusions on which one would be ‘most likely’ to be adopted by a future government, and
forecast the likely public policy environment of the future.
4. Estimates of the ‘likeliness’ of potential responses
Using estimations of the three core political considerations of difficulty, overall cost and kudos,
I next explore which response would be ‘most likely’ to be adopted by a future government.
1] A ‘nil response’

It would easy for a future government to decide to take no action, and hence not require
legislation or public funding. The immediate direct costs to the public purse from this response
would be low, but would likely include the government’s legal costs as a party to legal
proceedings.2181 However, whether due to an inability to act or disinterest, a ‘do nothing’
response would probably be seen as lacking credibility by the public, or stakeholders in coastal
management. It would be unlikely to have electoral appeal or win kudos for the government.
The likeliness of this response being adopted by a future government is rated ‘low’
2] and 3] ‘Soft’ and ‘robust’ pro private property responses

Both the pro-private property rights responses would face major difficulties in framing a
credible public interest rationale, encounter major legislative and administrative obstacles in
reversing the status quo via legislative ‘reforms’, and would incur unproductive transition costs.
Further, their high levels of public funding to protect private land would have redistributive
effects, contrary to the public interest.2182 For these reasons and their inconsistency with expert
scientific opinion2183 and best practice in current coastal management,2184 these responses would
not be seen as credible by the public and other coastal management stakeholders. Under these
responses, social and ecological impacts would not be apparent immediately. However once
‘coastal squeeze’ became obvious, as beaches narrowed,2185 non-resident beach-using voters
could voice concerns about the loss of the beach, undermining support for the government. It is
likely that these responses would only have electoral appeal to landowners adversely affected by

2181

The likelihood and nature of possible proceedings were discussed in Part A Chapter VI.
This was the case in the UK reported by Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, discussed in s 6 Ch V.
2183
The expert opinion of the IPCC and climate change researchers on likely local impacts were discussed
in s 2.4 Chapter I.
2184
See discussion of s 3 Objects, and s 21 CMA 2016 proscribing the Coastal Management Manual Part
A as the mandatory standard of best practice in coastal management, discussed in s 4 Chapter IV.
2185
The ‘coastal squeeze’ created by building seawalls on beaches was discussed in s3.3 Chapter I.
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coastal hazards and would be opposed by the greater number of non-resident beach-users,
creating an electoral back-lash and a loss of kudos for the government.
Due to these serious limitations these responses are rated as unlikely to be adopted.
This conclusion has major implications for resolving the lingering uncertainty inherent in the
theoretical answer to the primary research question foreshadowed at the end of Chapter IV.
4] ‘Strong’ pro-public rights response

This response would face least difficulty in framing a credible public interest rationale, enacting
relevant legislation and implementing government policy because protecting public rights and
codifying common law rules2186 would maintain the status quo. Improving public access and
dedicating additional areas of coastal Crown land for public use, as national parks or recreation
areas would have good public interest value for only limited public expenditure.2187 This
response, where the government recognised the likely local impacts of climate change2188 and
addressed conflicts over use of coastal land with strong protection of public rights, would be
seen as credible and responsible by the public, coastal scientists, academics, local council staff
and other stakeholders in coastal management. Even if this policy had not been publicized
before the election, protecting public rights over coastal lands and waters would likely engender
wide public support for the government, and would be unlikely to provoke a public backlash or
undermine the government’s electoral support. Adversely affected landowners may not support
this policy, or the government, but the electoral significance of their dissatisfaction, would
likely be minor compared to support among the wider beach-using members of the public.
Hence it would likely appeal to many electors and would create support for the government.
With its low difficulty, comparatively low cost and potential to create kudos, the likeliness of
this response being adopted by government is rated high.
5] ‘Stronger’ pro-public rights response

Little difficulty would be likely encountered in articulating a public interest rationale for this
response, and only moderate difficulty might be expected in legislating to implement it since
statutory mechanisms to acquire land and create easements for public purposes already exist.2189
Declaring new statutory rights, creating new public easements, requiring higher standards of

2186

Relevant common law rules applicable in New South Wales regarding the ambulatory nature of the
MHWM, the location of real property boundaries, the ownership of land which falls below MHWM
were stated in my discussion of EPA v Saunders (1994) and v Leaghur Pty Ltd [1995] in s8 Chapter III
2187
The cost-effectiveness of public spending, in achieving public benefits was a key issue flagged by
Cooper and McKenna, above n 123, and by Althaus et al, above n x. See ss 6 & 8 Chapter V.
2188
See the summary of likely local impacts of climate change in s 2.4 Chapter I.
2189
Current NSW statutes governing land acquisition and easements were outlined in s 6 Chapter IV.
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impact assessment and protecting more coastal native vegetation,2190 would have high public
interest value for low public expenditure.2191 Land acquisition costs would vary from medium, if
only a narrow ribbon of land was acquired, to very high if the government were to compulsorily
acquire whole land titles to protect public access and use of the beach.2192 Because it responds to
faster than anticipated climate change impacts,2193 seeks to ensure the survival of public rights,
and would likely apply and develop best practice this response would likely be seen by the
public, local council staff and other stakeholders in coastal management as highly credible.
This response’s capacity to garner support for the government would depend on its level of
public promotion before the election. A clear pre-election policy, plausible public interest
rationale, adroit legislation, followed by a realistic implementation program, would likely evoke
a positive electoral response from the public. Adopting this response mid-term without a formal
mandate would be politically feasible, especially if climate change impacts become acute, but
could diminish support for the government among adversely-affected, unassisted landowners.
Handled well however, it would likely create kudos and electoral support for the government.
On this basis, the likelihood of this response being adopted is rated as moderate.
6] ‘Balancing’ response

Major difficulties are foreseen in justifying, enacting and implementing this response. Since it
would overthrow the status quo,2194 invent an new untested framework for arbitrating disputes
over competing uses, create significant disruption and uncertainty, and incur a suite of transition
costs for doubtful public benefit, this response would appear have serious deficiencies.2195
However a superficial rationale of ‘fairness’ may be plausible, making it seem politically
attractive. The lack of a robust evidence base, inconsistency with scientific warnings on climate
change impacts2196 and incompatibility with current best practice in coastal management2197
would mean this response would be seen as lacking credibility by many stakeholders. The
weakening of public rights,2198 potential for counter-productive public funding2199 and need for
repeated ‘rebalancing’ would make it unlikely that this response would obtain public support.

2190

See the discussion of higher standards of impact assessment and measures to protect native vegetation
in SEPPs made under the EPAA 1979 in s 5 Chapter IV.
2191
For discussion of the importance of the cost-effectiveness of public spending, see ss 6 & 8 Chapter V.
2192
See discussion of land acquisition costs in s 6 Chapter IV, and s 11 Chapter VI.
2193
The increasing rate of sea level rise was discussed in s 2.4 Chapter I.
2194
The status quo in NSW, in which public rights are dominant was described in s 11 Chapter IV.
2195
See conclusions on the ‘balancing’ response’s performance against the criteria in s 14f] Chapter VII.
2196
As discussed in s 2.4, s 6 Chapter I.
2197
That is, not consistent with the principles of ESD under s 3 CMA 2016 and or compliant with best
practice set out in the Manual proscribed under s 21 CMA 2016, as discussed in s4 Chapter IV.
2198
Existing public rights to use coastal lands and waters in NSW were described in s 9 Chapter II.
2199
See the likelihood of creating unproductive transition costs in moving to an entirely new and untested
system outlined in s 14 Chapter VI, s 14 Chapter VII.
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The likelihood of delays and uncertainty in outcomes would be great, benefits to private
landowners and the public would be minor, if any. Thus this responses would probably alienate
many members of the public and weaken electoral support for the government.
Overall, its difficulty, unproductive costs and limited electoral appeal mean this response would
be most unlikely to be adopted by a future government.
7] ‘Accept and accommodate’ response

Drafting Bills to protect public rights and codify common law property rules would not be
hard.2200 However preparing legislation to create TDRs and a land exchange scheme would face
some difficulties which could be reduced by using existing legal means to implement them.2201
This response would likely attract no public opposition and gain wider legislative support
because as well as protecting public rights it would assist adversely affected landowners. The
costs of introducing TDRs or creating easements would be low, however the cost of creating
and operating a land exchange scheme could be very high, but could be off-set by income from
interim uses of surrendered lands, or sale of some lots in new Crown sub-divisions.2202
Nonetheless, the costs of this response would probably be less than the cost of acquiring all
adversely land titles at market value.2203
This response would be seen as credible by the public and other coastal stakeholders due to its
focus on protecting public rights while managing the local impacts of global climate change.2204
Moreover this response would be seen as credible by landowners adversely affected by coastal
hazards and would develop and apply best practice in managing these impacts, where this were
feasible. It would be highly likely that this response would attract public support due to its
appeal to members of the public, coastal management stakeholders and private landowners.
Were the responsible government Minister to publicly justify this response, and advocate for its
timely implementation as in the public interest,2205 this response would likely create electoral
and legislative support for the government. If a Crown land exchange scheme were part of the
response adopted this would likely maximize the kudos created for government.
On the basis of this appraisal, despite its increased difficulty and greater overall cost, the
likeliness of this response being adopted by a future government would be high because of its
2200

Common law rules re the nature and location of boundaries, ownership of land below MHWM and
loss of land to the sea, raised in EPA v Saunders, v Leaghur Pty Ltd were discussed in s 8 Chapter III.
2201
Relevant existing provisions of the CLMA 2016 were described in s 13 Chapter VI.
2202
See the discussion of costs for such a scheme in s 13 Chapter VI
2203
The value of the more than 62,000 residential buildings at risk in NSW, assessed as between $12.4
and $18.7 billion dollars by the Australian Government, above note x, 77, was discussed s 6 Chapter I.
2204
As forecast by the IPCC and Australian climate impact researchers, cited in s 2 Chapter I.
2205
The need for a public interest objective to be stated and timely were discussed in s 8 Chapter V.
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wider public and private benefits and its very high potential to create kudos for the government..
The ratings of responses’ ‘likeliness’ under these three criteria are shown in Table 9 below.
Criteria

Potential responses

‘nil response’ = courts
‘weak’ pro private property
‘robust’ pro-private property
‘strong’ pro-public
‘stronger’ pro-public
‘balancing, no trumps’
‘accept and accommodate’

i] rationale, legislative or
implementation difficulty

ii] indicative overall
cost to implement

Nil Status quo
high
Very high
Low
Moderate
Very high
High

Nil / very low
High
Very High
Low-moderate
Moderate to high
Very High
Very High

iii] kudos, potential
electoral appeal

Low
Low / negative
Low / negative
High
Moderate
Low / negative
Very high

Table 9. – Ratings of ‘most likely’ response

5. Conclusions on ‘most likely’ response
Drawing on the foregoing considerations I have formed the following conclusions:
1/ The ‘strong’ pro-public rights response would be most likely to be adopted by a future
government. It would be easy to justify and enact, low cost and low risk, and create kudos.
2/ The ‘stronger’ response would be the next ‘most likely’ policy to be adopted. It would be
easy to justify, face only moderate difficulty in enactment and implementation and though it
would cost more, could generate additional electoral support for the government.
3/ If the ‘strong’ or ‘stronger’ responses were implemented well in the short to medium term,
and good governance or good politics required further government public policy intervention,
adoption of the ‘accept and accommodate’ response may become ‘more likely’ in the long term.
4/ This order of likeliness is strongly justified because all three pro-public rights ‘options – the
‘strong’, ‘stronger’ and ‘accept and accommodate’ responses accord with existing property law
rules,2206 common law decisions2207 and current legislation.2208 The ‘strong’ response would
create no disruption to the status quo, only clearly state it. The stronger’ response would build
on this foundation in existing elements of law2209 and seek to extend them where feasible,
creating minor disruption only but for clear additional public benefits. Likewise, the ‘accept and

2206

Eg the doctrine of accretion which governs natural boundaries to real property, as discussed in s 5.3
Chapter II and the principle of ‘escheat’ under which land ownership reverts to the Crown when it falls
below the Mean High Water Mark, discussed in s 6 Chapter II.
2207
See the courts’ rulings on the nature and location of boundaries, ownership of land below MHWM
and loss of land to the sea, in EPA v Saunders, v Leaghur Pty Ltd were discussed in s 8 Chapter III.
2208
The protection of the public right of access to and along the foreshore in the prior Act and the current
legislation, in s 27 CMA 2016 (NSW) were discussed in s of Chapter IV.
2209
The property law rules, common law decisions and statutory provisions cited in Chapters II, II and IV.
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accommodate’ response would be entirely consistent with these existing elements of law and
hence unlikely to be disruptive. However, because it would also assist private landowners where
this was feasible, and could employ existing mechanisms, the ‘accept and accommodate’ option
offers an opportunity to minimize likely disruption to private interests, albeit it at some
considerable public cost, while potentially obtaining valuable and enduring public benefits.
5/ The three potential public policy options which would reverse the status quo, explored in
Chapters VI and VII, - the weak, and the robust pro-private property rights responses and the
‘balancing’ response – would be most unlikely to be adopted by a future government. Because
they would aim to change the status quo, none of these options would be consistent with the
normative elements of property law discussed above.2210 Hence for all three of these responses
the government would face serious difficulty in in framing a credible rationale to show how
diminishing public rights was in the public interest, in justifying public spending without public
benefit, or to the detriment of the public interest,2211 and thus in winning the support of crossbench legislators to enact the legislation needed to give the policy effect. 2212. Further, it is likely
that a future government would foresee that reversing the status quo for these three options
would likely create major disruption, incur unproductive transition costs and risk being seen as
“morally illegitimate”,2213 undermining public support for the government.2214
This conclusion is crucial to answering the primary research question in a way that makes sense
in practice. By exploring what it would take to adopt and implement a policy to reverse the
status quo, it has been possible to conduct an analysis of its feasibility as public policy. That
analysis has demonstrated that, despite its availability, in theory, as a future policy option,
reversing the status quo would face major, apparently insuperable, barriers to its adoption as
public policy, and its enactment, rendering its likeliness extremely remote, in practice.
For these reasons potential responses rank in likeliness as shown below (see Table 10).
Ranking
1. ‘most likely’
2. next ‘most likely’
3. may be ‘more likely’ in the long term

Potential Response
a ‘strong’ pro-public
a ‘stronger’ pro-public
‘accept and accommodate’

Table 10. – Ranking of ‘most likely’ response

2210

The rules of property law, court findings and relevant legislation cited in Chapters II, III and IV.
See discussion of their advantages and disadvantages in s 8 Chapter VI. See also these responses
assessment against the criteria in sections 5 and 6 Chapter VII.
2212
The importance of special legislation to reverse the status quo was discussed in ss 6 & 7 Chapter VI.
2213
See Freyfogle, On Private Property, above n 1607, 124. Freyfogle’s comments on the legitimacy of
land use decisions were discussed in s 6 Chapter V.
2214
These likely consequences of the pro-private rights responses were discussed in ss 7 & 8 Chapter VII.
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6. Forecasting the policy environment of the future
These conclusions indicate that the public policy of a future NSW government would ‘most
likely’ continue to protect or enhance public rights to access and use coastal lands and waters,
not privilege private property rights. Public rights, and public interests would remain dominant
over some private property rights where they conflicted, but not ‘trump’ others.
Further, they suggest that as climate change impacts intensify it is possible, perhaps likely, that
a future government would strengthen its policy commitment to protecting public rights by
adopting and implementing additional policy measures aimed at ensuring safe public access to
the beach and public use of coastal lands and waters are able to continue into the future. Thus I
forecast that in the future the public policy environment will continue to favour public rights.

Part C - Answering the primary research question
In this Part I move beyond the some-what inconclusive theoretical answer posited at the end of
Chapter IV, to address the primary research question at the core of this thesis.
Based on my positivist review of property theory in Chapter II, common laws decision in
Chapter IV and current applicable statutes, I concluded at the end of Chapter IV, that public
rights, public interests and public purposes are dominant over private property rights at present,
and that successive legislators have clearly intended that this dominance continue indefinitely
into the future. However I observed there, an answer in the negative was a tentative theoretical
answer, because in theory at least, a future government, with the co-operation of the legislature
could enact legislation to reverse this dominance and privilege private property rights. Hence, as
I observed, this theoretical answer left the question open.
With the benefit of the merit review, my conclusion about the likely future policy environment,
and my conclusions on the major practical barriers to a future government adopting and
implementing a public policy to reverse the status quo to privilege private property rights, I can
rule out this theoretical option as unachievable in practice, and define with considerable
certainty a plausible realistic context in which I can frame a coherent, practical answer.
7. A straightforward practical answer
Q: Will private property rights ‘trump’ public rights and interests in coastal land in New South
Wales, under climate change conditions?
A: No, they will not. Private property rights will not ‘trump’ public rights and interests in
coastal lands in New South Wales, under climate change conditions, for the following reasons.
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8. Reasons for this answer
A principal reason for this answer is that public rights over coastal lands and waters have been
dominant over private property rights under common law property rules for centuries.2215
Further as shown in Chapters III and IV, public rights are dominant in New South Wales
currently, as of 2020, under a mix of statutory provisions and surviving common law rules.2216
One such rule, that privately owned real property in New South Wales does not include lands
below MHWM, unless this is explicitly stated on the Certificate of Title,2217 operates currently
and unless negated by statute would apply in the future. A further rule of current property law,
by which ownership of private land ‘reverts’ to the State when it falls below MHWM, makes
it clear that private property rights would not extend beyond the tidal boundary of MHWM.2218
Thus mistaken assumptions about the dominance of private property rights, ‘permanence’ of
real property and misunderstandings about the doctrine of accretion’s effect on property
boundaries under current property law have been addressed and comprehensively rebutted.2219
These common law rules2220 will continue to operate unless expressly repealed, and they readily
apply to future changes in boundaries and ownership of coastal lands as shorelines recede, due
to rising seas and global climate change.2221
Unmistakable evidence of the legislature’s intention that public rights and interest be dominant
over private property rights in land can be seen in statutes authorising NSW public authorities to
compulsorily acquire privately-owned land or manage biosecurity hazards on private land.2222
Evidence that private property rights are not now, and in the future would not be, ‘trumps’ can
also be found in current NSW statutes which permit public authorities to create easements over
privately owned land titles, to allow right of public access to the beach, and facilitate public use
of the beach above MHWM, indefinitely into the future.2223 However, the easement area would
be small and well-defined, and other private property rights, including ownership and ability to
2215

The jus publicum as defined by Hale in De Jure Maris (c 1667) was discussed in s 3 Chapter III.
This was the conclusion reached in s 10 Chapter IV.
2217
See the discussion of EPA v Saunders (1994) 6 BPR 13,655 in s 8 Chapter III.
2218
The authoritative ruling of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in EPA v Leaghur Holdings PL [1995]
87 LGERA 282, was discussed in s 8 Chapter III.
2219
See the discussion of these cases in s 8 Chapter III.
2220
Including the doctrine of tenure and principle of escheat, discussed in s 3 Chapter II.
2221
The doctrine of accretion’s subtractive modes, erosion and diluvion, were discussed in s 8 Chapter II.
2222
The compulsory acquisition of real property under the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation
Act 1991 (NSW) was discussed in s 6 of Chapter IV. The impact of biosecurity legislation on
landowners’ common law property rights was discussed in the ‘right to manage’ in s 5 Chapter II.
2223
The creation of easements over private land for various public purposes was discussed in s 6 Chapter
IV. Use of a ‘rolling easement’ by the Land and Environment Court, in Coffs Harbour and District
Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister administering the Crown Lands Act [2013] NSW LEC 216
(Craig J) to guarantee public access to the beach, was discussed in s 10 Chapter VI.
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lease, mortgage, sell or bequest of the land, would remain unaffected. On land not within the
easement, private property rights would not be diminished at all. Thus current property law2224
indicates that the legislature intended that within the easement - albeit on private land - public
rights would be dominant over a landowner’s private property right of exclusive possession, to
the extent necessary for the public purpose, and continue to be dominant indefinitely.
Hence I conclude that private property rights would not trump public rights in the future, but the
converse would not be the case either. Public rights would not trump all private property rights,
but would be dominant in certain locations where they conflicted, through easements.2225
A further reason why private property rights would not be trumps in the future, is that some
claimed rights do not exist in current NSW law2226 and are highly unlikely to exist in the future.
Moreover, through my exploration of options to privilege private property rights it is apparent
that despite its availability in theory, in practice, due to their serious intellectual challenges,
procedural difficulties and electoral risks, there is little or no possibility of a future government
in New South Wales adopting a public policy to reverse the status quo.2227 Hence, I conclude
that this theoretical possibility is not actually feasible in practice, and thus, there is no plausible
future scenario in which public rights will not remain dominant in the future.
In summary my reasons for finding private property rights will not be trumps in the future are:
• They are not dominant over public rights to access and use coastal lands under current law.
• Public rights have been dominant in English common law since at least the 17th century.
• Many current NSW statutes contain provisions which ensure public rights are protected.
• Successive legislatures have enacted laws that intend that public rights, interests and
purposes continue to be dominant into the future.
• Absent reversal of the status quo by legislation, public rights would remain dominant.
• It would be too difficult, disruptive, expensive and unpopular to reverse the status quo.
• Private ownership and property rights do not apply to land which falls below MHWM.
• Public rights are dominant elsewhere in current NSW property law eg easements.
• Some claimed private property rights do not exist now and probably will not in the future.

2224

Sections 88A and 88E Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) were considered.
This was the conclusion reached at the end of s 6 Chapter IV.
2226
Claimed private property rights to defend or be defended, against the sea, and to compensation for
land lost to the sea were discussed in s 9 Chapter II. The finding of no common law right to
compensation is based on Durham Holdings PL v State of New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399,
discussed in s 10 Chapter III.
2227
These responses were assessed as unlikely to be adopted by government in s 4 of Chapter VIII.
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9. Usefulness of this answer
My research for this thesis, and the conclusions presented above, have clarified how important
elements of property law currently operate in New South Wales, and will operate in the future,
to resolve the confusion and uncertainty which has persisted for some time. Further I have
highlighted several existing means and outlined other innovative ways a future State
government could protect or enhance public rights to access and use coastal lands and waters.

Providing clarity on the current law governing five key issues - the nature and location of real
property boundaries, ownership of land below HWM, whether a ‘right to defend’ exists, and
liability for compensation for lands lost to the sea - will assist local council staff in responding
to landowners’ claims of ‘rights’ when developing plans or programs of management for coastal
lands under the Coastal Management Act 2016 (NSW).

Further, it is hoped that these clarifications might usefully inform, and modify, private landowners’ expectations regarding their future use of their land, the nature and extent of their
private property rights, and the current and future operation of property law in this State.

It remains to be seen if a future State government can, with local councils, develop timely plans
and programs to protect public rights to use coastal lands and waters, and assist adversely
affected private landowners to make an orderly ‘planned retreat’ away from coastal hazards.

10. A concluding eco-centric observation
Though this thesis is anthropocentrically focused, another answer might be offered from an ecocentric perspective. It is possible - due to rapid increases in sea levels, and increased storminess
- that it will be climate change impacts which operate as ‘trumps’ in the future, with coastal
erosion and accelerated shoreline recession adversely affecting both public rights to access and
use publicly owned coastal lands, and coastal landowners’ private property rights.

Without a willingness to understand the nature and scale of climate changes likely to affect
coastal environments, climate change impacts will be likely to produce sudden and severe
shocks for coastal residents. However, private property rights will not protect them or their land
from the power of wind and waves under a storm tide, when it is highly likely that these
physical forces will ‘trump’ unrealistic human expectations and limit coastal lands’ future use.
.oO0Oo.
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Part D - Treaties
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